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Abstract 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have significantly increased attempts to use 
the Capital Market (CM) to change corporate practices. The main purpose of this thesis 
is to critically review UK NGO CM intervention in order to establish whether it is 
legitimate and effective and why. It argues that NGO CM intervention with welfare- 
enhancing objectives is both legitimate and in the long-term collective interests of 
listed companies and their shareholders. It demonstrates that, under certain conditions, 
NGOs can generate welfare-enhancing outcomes through CM intervention effectively 
and efficiently. 
This thesis adopts a mixed methodology for data gathering, using both a desk-based 
literature review and exploratory interviews. It uses a grounded theory approach to 
systematically analyse the data, and to generate theory and hypotheses. The thesis 
develops a model of NGO CM intervention and presents a chronology of UK 
intervention between 1990 and 2002. It uses the model to analyse the chronology in 
order to discern whether there have been any underlying trends in the evolution of 
NGO CM intervention strategy. 
The analysis of this empirical data demonstrates that, while capitalism and the capital 
markets have been heavily criticised by many NGOs, NGOs in general have an under- 
developed understanding of the structure of the CM, and tend to make strategic 
mistakes when using it as a campaign device. Furthermore, even where an NGO 
believes that the CM is systematically undermining the achievement of its long-term 
objectives, it tends not to have a detailed alternative public policy agenda that would 
reform or replace the functions of the CM in a way that redresses the balance. 
Presentation of the practical conclusions relating to the normative implications for 
NGO CM strategy is the main outcome of this research. The findings of this research 
include that the probability of success is significantly increased when the NGO targets 
institutional investors, when it uses financial as well as moral arguments, and when it 
calls for investors to use the influence within the rights associated with share 
ownership, not divestment. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have significantly 
increased their attempts to use the influence of company shares listed on the Capital 
Market (CM) in order to change corporate practices. The origins of campaign use of the 
CM in the UK can be traced back to the 19th century. From these early individual 
origins, organised NGO attempts to use the CM did not emerge until the 1970s when 
the anti-apartheid movement used Annual General Meetings as a mechanism to 
publicly embarrass companies that had operations in South Africa3. 
However, there is a paucity of independent and verified data that researches the 
impact, effectiveness and legitimacy of such NGO activity. This is a problem because 
companies, investors, public policy-makers and NGOs have no research with which to 
inform their decisions in this area. The main purpose of this thesis is to critically 
review NGO CM intervention in order to establish whether it is legitimate and 
effective, and why. This thesis develops a model for NGO CM intervention and 
includes a chronology of this intervention in the UK between 1990 and 2002. It uses 
the model to analyse the chronology so as to discern first, whether there have been 
any underlying patterns in the evolution of NGO CM intervention strategy, and 
second, whether there has been an impact on the relative success of the intervention. 
As will be demonstrated in Section 4.1 below, while the majority of early NGO CM 
intervention focused on AGM disruption, the nature of this intervention has evolved 
to include a broad range of different interventions including, inter alia: 
" The production of investment analysis in support of their campaign issues; 
" direct attempts to generate capital in-flows to certain investment projects and 
out-flows from others; 
2 For example, the social reformer Dr Annie Besant (1847-1933) successfully drew attention to the low 
wages paid to the Bryant and May match girls in 1888 by shaming shareholding clergymen. 3 The 1977 Midland Bank AGM, for example, included a resolution filed by the End Loans to South 
Africa Campaign. 
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" ongoing programmes of communication with investors in relation to specific 
corporate social responsibility (CSR4) issues; 
" attempts to stimulate dialogue between investors and companies on NGO 
issues; 
" public policy advocacy on the rules that govern the CM; 
" analysis of the responsibilities of the owners of company share capital; 
" the development of capital market-based incentives to promote sustainability; 
" policing the claims of self-professed `socially responsible investors' (see 
Section 1.7); and 
" formal programmes of collaboration between investors and NGOs. 
Against this historical background, there are now more than 30 NGOs5 in the UK that 
have made substantive attempts to use the CM in their campaigning. This research has 
identified more than 70 distinct interventions by these NGOs over the past decade (see 
Appendix 2). Such interventions have caught the attention of Newsweek International 
(2002, p18), leading it to the colourful claim that: 
"A cultural revolution is underway as protesters in pinstripes figure out how 
to work the capitalist system... Friends of the Earth can now draft shareholder 
resolutions. Protest groups tap members over the Internet for business 
expertise, commission financial studies, collect free advice over lunch with 
sympathetic investment bankers and poach talent from the corporate world. 
Amnesty International last week released a global map of 34 countries 
accused of human-rights abuses, and warned that 129 multinationals working 
4 There are a number of alternative definitions offered for CSR. This paper's use of the term is 
consistent with the definition used by Business for Social Responsibility, USA: "Operating a business 
in a manner that meets or exceeds the ethical, legal, commercial and public expectations that society 
has of business. Social Responsibility is a guiding principle for every decision made and in every area 
of a business" (BSR, 2003, internet). 
5 Including: Accountability, Amnesty International, Business in the Community, Campaign Against the 
Arms Trade, Centre for Tomorrow's Company, Christian Aid, Communication Workers Union, Forum 
for the Future, Free Tibet, Friends of the Earth, Global Witness, Greenpeace, Institute for Public Policy 
Research, International Business Leaders Forum, Living Earth, Oxfam, PARTIZANS, Save the 
Children, Surfers Against Sewage, Tear Fund, The Berne Declaration, The Big Issue, The Burma 
Campaign, The Corner House, The Ecologist, The Ilisu Dam Campaign, The Kurdish Human Rights 
Project (UK), The Sarawak Solidarity Campaign, The Trades Union Congress, Traidcraft, 
Transparency International, UK Social Investment Forum, Voluntary Services Overseas, War on Want 
and WWF-UK. See chronology in Section 4.1. 
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in those nations put their reputation, and their share price, at risk "We finally 
realized it's all about money, so we have to talk that way, " says Fouad 
Hamdan, a Greenpeace director in Germany. " 
Whether or not a `cultural revolution' is indeed under way, it is certainly the case that 
there has been an increase in the frequency of NGO CM interventions (see Section 4.1 
below). 
But why might NGOs be attempting to use the CM at all? Companies listed on the 
CM are of relevance to NGOs because they can support or undermine NGO aims (see 
Section 1.3). Separately, the CM is of relevance to companies because it can support 
or undermine company aims (see Section 1.5). Therefore, if NGOs can change the 
CM's influence on companies in some way, they can enhance their own influence 
over companies, and more effectively reduce negative and enhance positive corporate 
impacts on society and the environment (see Section 1.6). 
In general, NGOs have sought to exert pressure on companies via the CNI using two 
strategic alternatives (Waygood and Wehrmeyer, 2003, p2): 
1. Economic pressure arising from investment decisions: exerting pressure on 
investors in order to encourage them to invest capital in one company or sector 
or out of another (see Section 3.2 for a detailed discussion). 
2. The advocacy influence of shareholders: using the rights associated with share 
ownership to voice concerns directly with company Directors and senior 
management (see Section 3.3 for a detailed discussion). 
The two options above are set out here as alternatives because where an NGO 
successfully promotes a reduction or elimination of a particular company from an 
investment portfolio, then the investor's influence over that company originating from 
the rights associated with share ownership (see Section 3.3) are commensurately 
reduced or eliminated. 
12 
While NGO intervention has increased, is there any evidence that it has had any 
influence on the CM? As mentioned above, there is a paucity of independent and 
verified data in this area. This is due, in part, to both the inchoate nature of NGO CM 
intervention as well as the corporate response, and the commercially sensitive nature 
of certain aspects (see below). While this paucity underlines the need for detailed 
research, a prima facie analysis suggests that there are instances where NGO 
intervention appears to have been influential. Sources of information fall into five 
broad categories: 
1. Survey data: in reporting a survey by Control Risks (Control Risks Group, 
2000) the Financial Times stated that "pressure groups have influence on 
investors", and concluded that while "only 6% of respondents were prepared to 
state that pressure groups had a direct impact on policy, the survey suggests 
that the publicity surrounding their actions may be influencing a growing 
number of clients and shareholders" (Financial Times, 2000, p2). However, 
assessing the impact of NGO campaigns on investors by asking investors 
whether NGOs have been influential is problematic, because they may have 
commercial interests that lead them to misrepresent the impact. 
2. Evidence of changing investment practice: "the investment world has 
recognised that many factors previously assumed to be extraneous to the 
generation of shareholder returns - business ethics, social responsibility and 
environmental sustainability - are increasingly material6 to financial 
performance" (Henderson Global Investors, 2003, p2). More generally, the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) recognises that "ethical considerations 
are influencing the decisions of a growing number of investors" (CBI, 2000, 
p2). Similarly, many large fund managers have published policy statements that 
formally recognise that some social, ethical and environmental (SEE) issues that 
NGOs work on can be material to equity valuation: "Good Corporate 
6 There have been a number of attempts to define materiality in the context of the capital markets. In 
the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission - the capital market oversight body - has set out that information is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important" in making an investment decision. To fulfil the materiality requirement, there 
must be a substantial likelihood that a fact "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available. "(SEC, 2000). 
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Governance of a company includes the management of its impact on the 
environment and the community. Failure to address these matters may harm a 
company's reputation... [and] can lead to legal action and higher operating cost 
which represent potential damage to shareholder interests" (Barclays Global 
Investors7,2003a, p7). However, questions remain as to the extent to which this 
anecdotal evidence of changing investment practice can be directly attributed to 
NGO campaigning. 
3. Evidence of changing corporate practice: there are instances where the target 
company has confirmed that it was influenced by an NGO CM intervention. 
This strongly indicates that the campaign may have been influential, although 
there may be reasons why a company may wish to present a change in its 
practice as being as a consequence of NGO campaigning (see Section 2.2). One 
example of a company admitting that it was influenced by an NGO CM is GSK: 
following an Oxfam campaign, Jean-Pierre Gamier, the Chief Executive, 
declared that "GSK recognises that it has a responsibility to make its products 
as affordable as possible in the poorest countries", and that he was responding 
to concerns raised by investors and shareholders as well as campaigners 
(Financial Times, 2001, p9). (See Oxfam `Cut the Cost' case study in Section 
5.5). 
4. NGO claims: while probably coloured by understandable bias, NGOs have 
themselves claimed CM campaign success. For example, Friends of the Earth 
(FoE) used its `campaign express' network between March and June 2000 to 
target Norwich Union to demand the introduction of greener investment 
policies. The company subsequently announced that it would be establishing an 
ethical investment unit and made a commitment to engage in SEE issues on all 
its funds under management. FoE claimed credit for the change: its Policy and 
Campaigns Director declared that "in responding to our campaign for greener 
7 The UK's largest fund manager with £450 billion under management (Barclays Global Investors, 
2003b). 
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investment policies, CGNJB has gained a competitive advantage" (see Case 
Study 5.4). 
5. Public policy research: the Congressional US-China Commission received a 
report into the national security issues arising from the capital markets - an issue 
which it termed `capital market security'9. In part, this report used NGO CM 
intervention in the US to demonstrate that CM policy could be a useful 
government foreign policy instrument and concluded that US NGOs have had 
significant influence on the CM: "The field of capital markets security has only 
recently been introduced to America's policy-making community. The funding 
patterns of global `bad actors' and those governments that may be judged to be 
potential adversaries of the United States are not sufficiently understood... 
While official Washington struggles to get a handle on the complexities of this 
21st century issue area, NGO's, some Members of Congress and other activists 
will likely continue to oppose certain foreign offerings that do not reflect their 
fundamental values and perceptions of U. S. national interests... The government 
would be well-advised to understand more fully the impact of pressure 
campaigns by U. S. NGO's and the broader trends of `socially-responsible 
investing', both of which can significantly sway the markets and have shown 
escalating intensity and sophistication. " (Pener and Casey, 2001, p. 75). The UK 
government appears not to have made similar deliberations in relation to capital 
market security and UK NGOs. Nevertheless, this US research does suggest that 
some NGOs can be highly influential CM actors. 
However, while it is possible to point to a growth in UK NGO CM intervention - and 
this prima facie evidence of influence presented above - it is not at all clear that NGO 
CM intervention has been systematically effective. There are three main interrelated 
problems'°: 
8 During the campaign Norwich Union merged with CGU to form CGNU (which has subsequently re- 
branded to become Aviva). 
9 The report defines capital market security as "the nexus between foreign fundraising activities in the 
U. S. capital markets and traditional national security concerns" (Pener and Casey, 2001, p2). 10 Section 2.2.3 below reviews these performance evaluation problems in detail. 
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Effect attribution in an interdependent and complex system: company 
practice may be influenced by a number of mechanisms and the aim of an NGO 
campaign may be coincidentally realised during its lifetime, which makes it 
difficult to verify cause and effect claims. 
2. Data gathering problems: perhaps partly as a consequence of the difficulties 
that arise when measuring performance, it is not standard practice for NGOs to 
publish an analysis of their campaign results. As a result, there is a general lack 
of data on the performance of NGO CM intervention. As Edwards and Hulme 
(1995, p11) highlight: "Indicators of the uali of organisational performance 
are very rare... Because so few fixed, absolute standards exist, NGO evaluation 
(even more than evaluation in other organisations) is inevitably a matter of 
judgement and interpretation". 
3. Self-reporting bias: NGOs, companies and financial institutions (FIs) have a 
range of commercial and campaign interests that may be furthered by certain 
interpretations of events. NGOs may want to show that they are effective; 
companies may wish to deny that they have been pressured into a particular 
course of action; and FIs may receive valuable media coverage by claiming to 
be responsive to society's broader needs and demands. 
In addition, even where NGOs appear to have brought about change via CM 
intervention, it is not clear that campaigners have always accurately understood the 
chain of influence that generated the success (see Section 5.7). For instance, the 
intervention against apartheid is regarded by many campaigners as having reduced 
access to the capital of those companies operating in South Africa, and been 
instrumental in the downfall of the system. One such view is expressed here: "What 
SRI did in regard to South Africa should be considered a major victory... Corporate 
Executives have a strong interest in the price of their company's stock options and 
were influenced in leaving South Africa because of the pressures by public employee 
and universityfunds. I know. They told me so" (Schwartz, 1993, p1). 
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However, while this represents a commonly held view, the assertion `they told me so' 
is by no means conclusive evidence. Teoh et al (1999) attempted to measure a share 
price effect on US firms with large South African operations when 16 large 
institutional investors announced their divestment on anti-apartheid grounds. They 
found no evidence in support of a negative impact on either the US companies' share 
prices or the South African financial markets. It is of course possible that such a share 
price effect from this divestment was clouded by extraneous factors. However, on the 
basis of this research, it appears more likely that any impact on the apartheid system 
from ethical divestment was largely political and not economic. Any long-term 
decline in the share value of companies with significant operations in South Africa 
was probably as a consequence of successful consumer boycotts affecting the bottom 
line that influenced mainstream investors' views on the investment potential of a 
company, rather than ethical investors boycotting the shares on grounds of principle. 
But why should either the lack of evidence of the effectiveness of NGO CM 
intervention, or NGO confusion as to how it affects change, matter? 
It is argued above that it is possible for NGOs to utilise the influence of the CM in 
order to reduce negative and enhance positive corporate impacts on society and the 
environment. Some contend that the existing structure of rewards and incentives in the 
CM leads to short-term profit maximisation to the detriment of both long-term 
investment initiatives and corporate practices that would benefit society and the 
environment (referred to as short-termism - see Section 1.6). To the extent that NGO 
CM intervention can resolve short-termism and effectively generate outcomes that 
benefit society and the environment, it is economically beneficial and welfare- 
enhancing (see Section 1.1), which makes it a worthwhile endeavour. 
Conversely, ignorance of how the CM functions may lead to poorly constructed NGO 
CM interventions that generate unintended perverse consequences and reduce welfare. 
While no welfare-oriented analyses of NGO CM intervention have been published to 
date, reviews of NGO corporate campaigning have shown that in certain 
circumstances, such corporate campaigns can reduce welfare. Rahman (2000) found 
that the `naming and shaming' of apparel companies that source products 
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manufactured overseas using child labour can ultimately reduce the welfare of the 
subsequently evicted children who have gone into prostitution as they try to avoid 
starvation. 
It is therefore important to properly understand the extent to which NGO CM 
intervention can enhance welfare, and by what means, in order to maximise its 
potential welfare benefits. 
However, the previously mentioned paucity of published literature in this area is a 
significant impediment to this enhanced understanding. This thesis intends to go some 
way to correct this situation by critically reviewing NGO use of the CM in order to 
establish where and why it is legitimate and effective. The central argument is that 
while some NGOs have become effective at generating corporate change via the CM, 
effective NGO CM intervention is not yet widespread and, therefore, the combined 
efforts of NGOs do not maximise positive welfare impacts. 
More specifically, the main arguments that will be put forward here fall into the 
following four broad categories: first, its changing nature; second, its societal 
function; third, the identification of NGO `blind spots'; and finally, the normative 
recommendations for strategy. The main NGO CM intervention claims are 
summarised under these subject headings below: 
The changing nature of NGO CM intervention 
This thesis will demonstrate that NGO CM intervention has increased. It will show 
that NGOs have explored a broad range of strategies and that they have changed their 
strategies from mainly confrontational media-focused activities at AGMs to focus on 
more substantive interventions that challenge corporate strategy. It will also show that 
the growing number of successful interventions suggests that NGOs may have learned 
from previous interventions. 
The societal contribution of NGO CM intervention 
The thesis argues that NGO CM intervention with welfare-enhancing objectives is 
both legitimate and in the long-term collective interests of listed companies and their 
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shareholders. It will demonstrate that it is possible for NGOs to generate welfare- 
enhancing outcomes through CM intervention and that, from the perspective of the 
NGO, there are clear cases where NGO objectives have been achieved effectively and 
efficiently. 
`Blind spots' 
However, it will also be shown that while NGO CM understanding is demonstrably 
improving (see above), NGOs in general do not have a sufficiently developed 
understanding of the machinery of the CM and, as a result, have a tendency to make 
strategic mistakes. This thesis will also demonstrate that NGO CM intervention is 
mainly short-term instrumental use of CM influence for corporate campaigning, rather 
than attempts to change the structure of the CM to influence companies over the 
longer term. For example, NGOs have not conducted concerted public policy 
campaigns aimed at changing short-termism within the CM (see Section 1.6). While 
there are signs that this may be changing, even where an NGO believes that the CM is 
systematically undermining the achievement of its long-term objectives, it tends not to 
have a detailed alternative public policy agenda that would reform or replace the 
functions of the CM in a way that would redress the situation. Furthermore, whereas 
investment intermediaries such as sell-side brokers and investment consultants (see 
Section 1.5) have significant influence, NGOs have for the main part overlooked these 
intermediaries in their campaigns. 
Normative implications for NGO strategy 
In addition to those implications arising from the `blind spots' analysis above, this 
thesis will argue that when attempting to change corporate practices, the probability of 
success is significantly increased by the NGO targeting institutional investors rather 
than purchasing `token' shares. It will also be argued that carefully constructed moral 
as well as financial arguments are important components of successful CM 
intervention. However, in almost all cases, advocating that institutional investors 
divest from a particular stock for purely moral reasons will fail. NGOs should initially 
call for institutional investors to use their influence within the rights associated with 
share ownership, not divestment. 
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The practical conclusions relating to the normative implications for NGO CM strategy 
are tested in a series of hypotheses developed in Section 3.5. In seeking to develop 
these practical normative implications, the analysis will be conducted in the following 
stages: 
I. An initial review of the relevance of the CM to NGOs and a theoretical 
evaluation of the legitimacy of NGO CM intervention are presented in the rest 
of this introductory Chapter. 
2. In Chapter 3 this initial description is developed into an analytical model for 
classifying the complexity underlying NGO CM intervention. A detailed 
description of the nature of main dimensions of the model is also presented. 
This Chapter concludes with an analysis of what deductive implications for 
NGO CM strategy arise from the model and establishes a set of hypotheses for 
testing. 
3. The above model is then used to classify a chronological list of all UK NGO 
CM intervention (1992-2002) in Chapter 4. This chronological classification is 
used to assess what the underlying trends in the development of NGO CM 
strategies have been. A statistical analysis of this table is conducted in order to 
assess many of the claims outlined above. 
4. A detailed analysis of specific cases of NGO CM intervention is presented in 
Chapter 5, along with a discussion of the implications for NGO CM strategy. 
5. Finally, the normative recommendations for NGO CM strategy arising from this 
research are presented in Chapter 6. 
However, before embarking upon the analysis, it is first necessary to define the main 
terms in use, such as `NGO', `PLC' and `Capital Market'. This is the focus of the next 
few sections of this introductory Chapter. The rest of this Chapter sets out the 
relevance of companies to NGOs, and introduces a range of NGO corporate campaign 
strategies. It also defines the main role of the CM and reviews the CM's campaign 
relevance to NGOs. In particular, due to the importance of the burgeoning area of 
socially responsible investment (SRI) to NGO CM intervention, a discussion about its 
nature and specific relevance of different SRI strategies is included. As mentioned 
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above, a discussion as to the legitimacy of NGO CM campaigning concludes this 
Chapter. 
1.1 The Definition and Role of NGOs 
When conducting a critical evaluation of NGO CM intervention, it is necessary to be 
clear about what is meant by `NGO', as it is a somewhat ambiguous term. 
`Non-governmental organisation' is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "an 
organisation not belonging to or associated with a government". However, this 
covers a numbers t of different institutions, aspiring to achieve a wide variety of aims. 
Classifying an organisation by `what it is not' is unhelpful, as it does not specify what 
it is. Consequently, there have been a number of attempts at a more precise definition. 
The term `NGO' derives from Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) 
which provides that "... the Economic and Social Council may make suitable 
arrangements for consultations with non-governmental organisations which are 
concerned with matters within its competence". Willetts (1997, p201) considers the 
United Nations process for assessing NGO eligibility for consultative status to the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), "as having the status of customary 
international law". Among the provisions of the relevant ECOSOC resolution12, 
Willetts states that for NGOs to be considered acceptable, they: 
" must not be antithetical to the participatory democratic state; 
" should be non-profit making; 
" should be non-violent and non-criminal; and 
" must not be directed against a particular government. 
The use of the term `NGO' here is consistent with the UN ECOSOC protocol 
mentioned above. Indeed, as highlighted in Section 2.2.3, the protocol is used as a 
11 The Union of International Associations has maintained a database of international organisations 
since its inception in 1910. This database currently includes profiles of "about 25,000 international 
non-governmental organisations" (Union of International Associations, 2002). 
12 "The first statute for NGOs was passed as ECOSOC Resolution 288 (X) B of 27 February 1950. It 
was amended and replaced by ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968. As a result of the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992, there was a four-year review of the UN's relations with NGOs, which resulted 
in a third revision of the statute, ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996" (op cit). 
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measure of the societal legitimacy of the NGOs in focus. However, the protocol itself 
does not define the actual role of the NGOs in question. In fact, the protocol is largely 
based on what NGOs should not be doing rather than what they are and what they do. 
By way of providing structure to the question of NGO definition, McIntosh et al 
(2003, p64) broadly define the diversity of NGOs by geographical scope, type, 
structure, focus and activity and offer the following diagram of NGO characteristics: 
Figure 1.1: Diagram to Show the Diversity of NGO Characteristics 
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Figure 1.1 above demonstrates the diverse range of forms that NGOs can take and the 
broad range of focus. While the above is broadly consistent with the NGOs covered in 
this thesis, the specific purpose of the NGOs in scope here is captured in the following 
definition: "Groups whose stated purpose is the promotion of environmental and/or 
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societal goals rather than the achievement or protection of economic power in the 
marketplace or political power through the electoral process" (Bendell, 2000, p16). 
Unlike either the UN or OED definitions, this definition illuminates what NGOs are, 
as well as what they are not" 
However, two further refinements to Bendell's definition are required for this thesis. 
The first is that "the achievement or protection of economic power in the 
marketplace" is interpreted narrowly and taken to refer to the achievement or 
protection of economic power for commercial gain. This is because many non-profit 
making NGOs - including, in particular, those in focus in this thesis - use the 
`economic power in the marketplace' to promote environmental and social goals. The 
second and arguably more important refinement is that the NGOs' "environmental 
and/or societal goals" are welfare enhancing. In other words, those NGOs that are not 
generally regarded as working to improve overall social welfare are excluded. For 
example, some definitions of NGO (although, significantly, not the UN ECOSOC 
protocol) include organisations such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Animal Liberation 
Front. While it can perhaps be argued that such organisations are promoting 
environmental and/or societal goals, they are not generally regarded as working to 
improve overall social welfare 
Therefore, NGOs that are in the scope of this thesis fall within the narrower definition 
of "groups whose stated purpose is the promotion of welfare-enhancing 
environmental and/or societal goals rather than the achievement or protection of 
economic power in the marketplace for commercial purposes or political power 
through the electoral process" (adapted from Bendell, 2000). 
This welfare-oriented distinction between NGOs requires some clarification: what is 
societal welfare? 
13 While it is not an issue for this thesis, Bendell's narrower definition may cause problems elsewhere 
as it is to some extent inconsistent with the original UN protocol in that Bendell excludes a number of 
organisations that the UN would consider to be NGOs - for example, most business organisations and faith groups that work on issues not directly related to 'environmental and/or social goals' are NGOs 
under the UN definition but are excluded by Bendell. 
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Societal welfare can be regarded as an aggregation of the wellbeing of individuals in a 
society - i. e. their collective interest. There is a significant body of literature on 
welfare, but a lack of consensus as to how it should be defined and measured. Some 
welfare economists, for example, attempt to measure welfare as the satisfaction of 
rational preferences or desires (Rawls, 1971). Other disciplines use a different 
measure: Aristotle, for example, held that happiness was the sole measure of welfare. 
However Hausman and McPherson (1996, p72) highlight that: "Many people believe 
that only mental states are intrinsically good, but there is less agreement here than it 
seems, because there are so many different views of which mental states are 
intrinsically good. Jeremy Bentham holds that the good is pleasure, while John Stuart 
Mill holds that it is a diverse set of mental states he calls `happiness'. Mystics find the 
good in contemplative states of mind. Henry Sidgewick argues for the hybrid view that 
the good is any mental state that is intrinsically desirable... the theory of well-being is 
a messy area of philosophy". As can be seen, welfare is an unresolved concept. 
Nevertheless, despite a number of conceptual and practical problems concerning the 
precise definition and measurement of welfare, it is not contentious to claim that 
welfare is a broadly accepted term that, even if not well-defined, is generally 
understood. Therefore, the focus of this thesis on NGOs that aim to enhance welfare 
should also be generally understood. 
Exploring further what this welfare-oriented role of NGOs might be, Edwards and 
Hulme (1995, p15) claim that the NGOs' role has evolved to provide `funding or... 
other forms of support to communities and other organisations". They also highlight 
the fact that many NGOs are supported by governments and intergovernmental 
agencies in this role: "Official agencies support NGOs in providing welfare services 
to those who cannot be reached through markets" (op cit, p4). 
In terms of the `other forms of support to communities', "NGOs are... seen as 
vehicles for `democratisation' and essential components of a thriving `civil society' 
[see below]. Which in turn are seen as essential to the... econom[y]" (op cit, p4). 
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NGOs are also said to act as an essential counterweight to State power (Adair, 1999) 
with some claiming that their existence represents the failure of governments and 
companies to address some dissatisfaction with the contemporary condition of society 
(Willetts, op cit, p211). The UN highlights a further welfare-related role of NGOs in 
global governance: "NGOs... provide analysis and expertise, serve as early warning 
mechanisms and help monitor and implement international agreements". (United 
Nations, 2003, internet). 
More specifically, Zadek (1998) incorporates NGOs in the term 'civil society' and 
argues that one emerging role of civil society is to regulate corporate behaviour, 
deeming such activity 'civil regulation': "Companies are under pressure to improve 
social and environmental standards through their supply chains principally through 
civil action. These pressures are not linked in the main to public regulation. 
Companies which respond are not therefore taking 'voluntary' action or complying 
with public regulation, but are responding to an emerging organic 'civil regulatory 
environment'. " (p5). Similarly, as Bond (2000, p16) articulates: "As finance and 
production become more global and increasingly important decisions are taken at an 
international level, where there is no political machinery to deal with citizens' 
concerns, NGOs are filling the open 'democratic deficit"'. 
This indicates that the role of NGOs in society includes that of Civil Regulator - i. e. 
NGOs exist, in part, to ensure that the behaviour of other organisations, including 
companies, stays within generally accepted societal norms. The concept of Civil 
Regulator is important here because the CM can be regarded as one mechanism 
through which NGOs regulate corporate behaviour - indeed, one might call it `Civil 
Capital Market Regulation'. 
The associated concept of `civil society' is also important as it provides the 
philosophical foundations of NGO legitimacy that undergirds the UN ECOSOC 
resolutions and subsequent protocol. The origins of civil society can again be traced 
back to Aristotle (Kaldor, 2003, p584). It is "a society based on social contract among 
individuals" and is defined as "the process through which individuals negotiate, 
argue, struggle against or agree with each other and with the centres of political and 
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economic authority. Through voluntary associations, movements, parties, unions, the 
individual is able to act publicly" (ibid). This definition incorporates NGOs within 
`voluntary associations' and `movements'. It also highlights the fact that civil society 
is a process of debate and that NGOs may facilitate this debate in a public forum at 
the levels of the individual, the state and the market. 
One measure of the extent to which society regards NGOs as legitimate is the degree 
to which their analysis is trusted by society. Worcester (2001, p 105) claims that 
research conducted by MORI has found that "a majority of the public say they trust 
`scientists' but whenever a scientist's employer or sponsor is mentioned, the veracity 
of the source becomes highly relevant: the scientists trusted by the highest proportion 
of people are those working for environmental NGOs". More specifically, when 
responding to the question "how much confidence would you have in what each of the 
following has to say about environmental issues", MORI (2000) found that 78 per 
cent have a great deal or fair amount of trust in scientists working for environmental 
groups, compared with only 48 per cent for scientists working for industry and 47 per 
cent for scientists working for the government. Therefore, one factor supporting 
NGOs' presence in civil society, and their role as Civil Regulators, is the trust that the 
public currently places in them. 
In conclusion, this thesis defines NGOs as `groups whose stated purpose is the 
promotion of welfare-enhancing environmental and/or societal goals rather than the 
achievement or protection of economic power in the marketplace for commercial 
purposes or political power through the electoral process'. It recognises that there are 
questions regarding the legitimacy of some NGOs but argues that, in general, they can 
be shown to play a legitimising role in civil society. In the context of this thesis, their 
role as `Civil Regulator' has been shown to be of particular relevance, as this may 
involve campaigns that target listed companies. Finally, it has been shown that the 
United Nations NGO ECOSOC eligibility process has the status of customary 
international law. It is therefore used (in Section 5) as a proxy for the legitimacy of 
the NGOs under review. 
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1.2 The Definition and Role of Companies 
In general, there are two main perspectives on the role of companies: economic and 
legal. These are summarised below: 
The economic perspective: a company's primary purpose is regarded as being 
the generation of profit through the production of goods and services. More 
specifically, Pass and Lowes (1993, p195) define a company's economic role as 
a "transformation unit concerned with converting factor inputs into higher 
valued intermediate and final goods or services". 
2. The legal perspective: companies owe their formal existence to the law - 
specifically, the Companies Act - as it defines what they are, how they should 
operate, who owns and controls them, and what rights and responsibilities these 
controllers should have. Company Law establishes companies as individual 
legal entities with a similar status to that of a person, in that a company can, for 
example, own property, enter into contracts, sue for damages and be sued 
(Northey and Leigh, 1987, p2). The Companies Act requires companies to have 
directors and a secretary, hold regular meetings of shareholders and to appoint a 
chairman for these meetings, make accounts, have them audited by professional 
auditors, and provide the auditors' report to shareholders (Davies, 1997). 
There are `four main ways of organising the production of goods and services sold on 
markets" (Lipsey, 1992, p168): a single proprietorship (or sole trader), a partnership 
(with two or more owners), a public corporation (owned by the state) and a Public 
Limited Company (PLC)14. As this thesis is a discussion about NGOs' use of capital 
markets, it is the PLC form of corporate enterprise that is in scope. A PLC is `public' 
in the sense that it has issued shares that are publicly traded on the CM and publicly 
held by shareholdersts. It is `limited' insofar as the maximum loss for which 
shareholders are liable is limited to the capital they originally invested. A PLC is 
14 Also referred to as public company, joint-stock company or, simply, company. 15 Specific stock market listing protocols require, for example, minimum liquidity thresholds in order 
for PLCs to maintain a listing. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is on listed PLCs. 
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entitled to acquire capital by selling sharesL6 to individual (or retail) and 
organisational (or institutional) investors on the CM via the stock exchange. 
This outline of both perspectives on the role of the company should facilitate a more 
complete understanding of the alternative routes through which shareholders influence 
corporate practice. These are reviewed in detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below. 
1.3 The Corporate Form and its Relevance to NGOs 
What is it that makes companies relevant to NGOs? There are four principal answers 
to this question: 
1. Economic Scale 
Companies are significant in both number and economic scale. In the UK, for 
example, there are 1,794,551 companies registered with Companies House". In 
particular, from the perspective of the scope of this thesis, there are 699 publicly listed 
companies in the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) UK All Share which are 
collectively worth more than £1.1 trillion - with the top 100 representing 86 per cent 
of that figure'8. Furthermore, regarding the economic contribution of listed 
companies, "Publicly quoted companies... account for 25 per cent of turnover. " 
(Hewitt, 2003, p7). 
Therefore companies in general are economically important and listed companies, in 
particular, have achieved significant economic scale. This renders them relevant 
targets for NGOs attempting to alter the market forces in the economy in some way. 
2. Political Influence 
Some argue that companies' economic scale has an associated level of influence that 
is potentially inimical to the democratic process of nation states and, more broadly, 
may pervert NGO sustainable development19. Hertz (2001, p7), for example, suggests 
that companies have usurped governments, and claims that "business is in the driving 
16 Also referred to as stocks, securities or equities. 17 At 19 April 2003. 
18 Stock market figures at 31 Dec 2002 (HSBC, 2003). 
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seat, corporations determine the rules of the game, and governments have become 
referees, enforcing rules laid down by others". This claim that companies have `taken 
over' is controversial. 
Attempts to assess companies' influence relative to countries have been made by 
comparing their relative economic scale. The most robust attempt to negotiate the 
procedural difficulties arising from the lack of comparability between economic 
measures of a size of company and country was by UNCTAD (2002, p1). This used 
`value added'20 as the basis for comparison and concluded that "twenty-nine of the 
world's 100 largest economic entities are transnational corporations". This figure 
clearly demonstrates that some companies have achieved significant economic scale. 
However, it says nothing about the relative influence of companies vis-a-vis countries, 
or whether the influence of companies is in some way pernicious. The nature of the 
influence of companies and countries is clearly quite different. For example, most 
would accept that it is legitimate for a country to develop a military capability 
whereas, beyond hiring security guards, it would be illegitimate (and illegal) for a 
company to do the same. 
While the claim that companies have `taken over' is controversial, the same cannot be 
said for the assertion that they have significant political influence in a free market or 
mixed economy. In the UK for example, the CBI accepts that business is powerful 
and argues that this power has grown in recent times due to public policy changes: 
"Government efforts to cut taxes, curb public spending and pursue business friendly 
policies of privatisation and de-regulation have resulted in a worldwide transfer of 
power and resources from the public to the private sectors" (2000, p2). 
Similarly, McIntosh et al declares that there has been a "coalescence of power, and 
therefore responsibility, in the hands of a relatively small number of international and 
global corporations" (2003, p15). It worth noting the association of power with 
19 "Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable - to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland, 
1988, p43). 
20 In the case of companies, `value added' is estimated as the sum of salaries and benefits, depreciation 
and amortisation, and pre-tax income - and, in the case of countries, Gross Domestic Product. 
29 
responsibility, as it is the delivery of this corporate responsibility that NGOs are 
policing when they engage as Civil Regulators (see Section 1.1). 
Furthermore, companies frequently participate in public policy debates by responding 
to consultation documents and actively lobbying for change. The UK government, for 
example, consults companies as a matter of policy when assessing the impact of 
regulatory changes (i. e. Regulatory Impact Assessments). This gives rise to the 
second area of corporate relevance to NGOs - companies have political influence. 
This influence can positively or negatively impact on the ability of NGOs to achieve 
their objectives and is sufficient to render many companies relevant targets for NGOs. 
3. Environmental Impact 
Like other organisations, companies use raw materials, consume energy and produce 
waste. They also produce products and services that contribute to resolving 
environmental problems. As WWF-UK highlights in its business and industry 
engagement policy: "businesses are at the very core of global environmental concerns 
and affect everyone. Unless these concerns are addressed, it will be impossible for 
WWF to achieve its mission and goals" (1999, p3). 
To take a particular example of a corporate environmental impact, UK industry 
collectively emitted 40.7 million tones of the `greenhouse gas' carbon dioxide, 
representing some 28 per cent of the overall emissions in 2000 (Defra, 2002). To the 
extent that this contributes to detrimental changes to climate patterns, in the absence 
of measures to internalise the costs on companies, society must carry the cost of this 
impact (referred to as an externality in the economic literature). Such significant 
production of climate change gases makes energy-intensive companies relevant to 
NGOs working on climate change. As a result, WWF has developed `Climate Savers' 
(an initiative working with companies wishing to address the climate change issue) as 
part of its corporate climate change campaign. 
The implication of this analysis is that it is the very ability of companies to impact on 
the environment that renders them relevant to NGOs with environment related 
missions. 
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4. Social Impact 
If companies treat their employees poorly, this can create significant social problems. 
The International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy states: "Through international 
direct investment and other means such enterprises can bring substantial benefits to 
home and host countries by contributing to the more efficient utilization of capital, 
technology and labour. Within the framework of development policies established by 
governments, they can also make an important contribution to the promotion of 
economic and social welfare; to the improvement of living standards and the 
satisfaction of basic needs; to the creation of employment opportunities, both directly 
and indirectly; and to the enjoyment of basic human rights, including freedom of 
association, throughout the world. On the other hand, the advances made by 
multinational enterprises in organizing their operations beyond the national 
framework may lead to abuse of concentrations of economic power and to conflicts 
with national policy objectives and with the interest of the workers" (ILO, 1977, p2). 
In relation to the abuse of economic power and conflicts of interest with the workers, 
a study into labour conditions in Chinese factories producing goods for export to the 
US (Kernaghan, 1998) found up to 96 working hours per week, wages per hour as low 
as 13 cents, employees being fined if they did not work overtime and corporal 
punishment for talking at work. It also found clear evidence that these measures were 
having a significantly detrimental impact on employees' health. 
The implication of this analysis is that it is also the ability of companies to impact on 
welfare that makes them relevant to NGOs with social and development related 
missions. 
In summary, the above discussion identifies four main reasons as to why companies 
can be relevant to NGOs: they are influential economically and politically, and they 
can impact upon the environment and society. Therefore, wherever a company's and 
NGO's mission interacts - either positively or negatively - the company and the NGO 
become relevant to each other. 
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1.4 NGO Corporate Campaigns 
It has been established that there are circumstances in which a companies' objectives 
interacts with that of NGOs. The scale of a company's obstruction or support can be a 
significant determinant as to whether it is possible for NGOs to achieve their mission. 
In such cases, it helps the NGOs in question to be able to change companies' business 
strategies in a way that either magnifies support or, more typically, mitigates 
obstruction. 
NGOs have influenced corporate practices by deploying a range of strategies. The 
OECD, for example, identified that "in recent years, NGOs have assumed an 
increasingly high profile role in the public debate on the activities of multinational 
corporations. NGO activity in monitoring and shaping business conduct has been 
diverse. It has included monitoring of the activities of some multinational enterprises 
and conducting public campaigns against those activities that are deemed to be 
inappropriate. They have also issued model codes of conduct (often in co-operation 
with the business community) and have provided expert advice in the field on 
managerial and strategic issues in the area of corporate responsibility" (OECD, 
2001, p22). 
Returning to Zadek's concept of the NGO as a Civil Regulator (Section 1.1), the 
following diagram of `Civil Regulation' (Figure 2) outlines the range of civil society 
intervention routes. From the specific perspective of this thesis, it also provides a 
diagrammatic representation of how a CM strategy fits into the broader context of 
NGO corporate campaigning (emboldening inserted): 
32 
Figure 1.2: The Pyramid of Civil Regulation 
/ Governance \ 
External public 
Verification 
Code of Capacity 
Conduct Development 
Mooring 
Public Employee Shareholder Government 
Pressure Morale Crisis Action Concern 
Source: Zadek (1998, p5) 
Zadek claims that "Civil Society has leverage over companies by moulding the 
zeitgeist, which the business community follows' in forming and exploiting markets 
for financial gain" (p5). In other words, as NGOs fulfil their civil society role by 
facilitating debate on contemporary issues in a public forum at the levels of the 
individual, the state and the market, they change the normative environment in which 
companies operate. These new norms then `regulate' the behaviour of companies. 
Figure 2 shows that there is a range of NGO corporate campaign strategies relating to 
the above routes for change, including, inter alia, consumer boycotts, direct action 
demonstrations, media campaigns and lobbying for changes to legislation. 
In addition, and in particular focus here, NGOs mobilise `Shareholder Action' as part 
of their corporate campaigning - as can be seen from the diagram. Mackenzie (1993, 
p9) claims that this last approach can be highly effective: "One of the best ways for 
people to ensure that their interests are represented in the corporate decision-making 
process is for them to buy shares and use them to take shareholder action. " 
However, whereas NGOs can endeavour to encourage the CM to integrate their 
concerns in some way, as is shown in Appendix 2 below, many NGO corporate 
campaigns targeted at listed companies have made passive use of the CM (often 
unintentionally): when NGO corporate campaigns such as boycotts are effective, this 
can show up in the investment analysis and result in additional pressure on the 
directors of a company from a fall in its share price (see Section 3.2.1). 
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When seeking to influence companies' business strategy via this range of approaches, 
NGOs have adopted different stances in relation to their own approaches to business. 
Where they believe that the corporate form is immoral and beyond reform, they have 
worked to undermine the legitimacy of companies and bring the corporate form to an 
end. Alternatively, where NGOs have believed that the negative impacts of companies 
can be reformed, they have sought to work in partnership with those companies and 
help to promote their financial success. In the context of NGO CM intervention, this 
choice of `stance' is important because it forms part of the CM strategy deployed by 
an NGO. Consequently, it requires a little further explanation here. 
The tension between the alternative approaches of `revolution' and `reform' has 
spawned a heated debate among NGOs regarding what the correct response should be 
(see, for example, Monbiot vs. Porritt, 2000, p. 18). This tension stems in part from a 
view held by some that when `reformist' NGOs work with (or even talk to) a 
company, this gives the company an unjustified veneer of responsibility and enables it 
to defend itself more robustly when confronted by more `revolutionary' campaigners. 
Subscribers to this view argue that this makes the job of campaigning harder and 
reduces the overall chances of changing corporate practice successfully - and, 
therefore, limits the extent to which NGOs can ultimately effect change (Monbiot, 
ibid). Conversely, WWF (1999, p3) argues: "incremental change towards sustainable 
development can be achieved by working in partnership with business". 
Covey and Brown argue that the reluctance on the part of some NGOs to engage in 
collaborative initiatives with business stems from entrenched views on the role of 
business and a lack of creativity: "Many civil society actors remain sceptical about 
the potential for positive social gain through cooperation with business organisations, 
in part because they hold stereotypes of businesses as greedy perpetrators of social 
and environmental problems, and in part because they are not prepared to invent 
ways to make business strengths an asset to development initiatives" (Covey and 
Brown, 2001, p2). 
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While it is important to note the tension that exists between and within some NGOs in 
respect of the most appropriate business engagement strategy (Crane, 2000), it is not 
necessary to resolve this debate here because NGO-business partnership strategy is 
not the main focus. Furthermore, both strategies have been shown to be effective: "as 
either business provocateurs or partners, NGOs are playing catalytic roles in 
changing corporate policy and practice" (Bendell, 2000, p. 246). 
However, while unnecessary to resolve the debate, it is useful to the subsequent 
analysis of NGO CM intervention to use a conceptual framework of the range of 
Stances that NGOs can adopt when intervening in the CM as the Stance - or the 
extent to which it is `reformist' or `revolutionary' - may have an impact on success. 
Such a framework has been developed by Elkin-ton and Fennell (1998). While this 
`taxonomy' was developed to model the NGO methods of engaging with businesses 
generally, it is used in this thesis to model the interaction between NGOs and the 
Financial Institutions (FIs) that operate within the CM (see Section 2.2.2). 
In the Elkington and Fennell model, a distinction is first made between integrators and 
polarisers. Integrators place a high priority on developing productive relationships 
with business, and strive to identify non-confrontational `win-win' strategies. 
Polarisers, on the other hand, make a strategic decision not to develop close working 
relationships with business, preferring to concentrate their energies as a watchdog. 
These distinctions are similar to the `reformist' and `revolutionary' distinctions used 
above. Second, a distinction is made between discriminators and non-discriminators. 
Discriminators attempt to understand the issues facing a particular industry and track 
the SEE performance of individual companies compared with industry benchmarks. 
For non-discriminators, the focus is the environmental burden of the industry in 
general; a company's relative environmental performance is not of particular interest. 
Hence, in this taxonomy, four distinct NGO business approaches emerge: 
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Table!.!: A Taxonomy of Company NGO relationship 
ORCA (polariser, discriminator) DOLPHIN (integrator, 
discriminator) 
Scrutinises relative performance of 
companies; attacks selected targets Scrutinises relative performance of 
companies, chooses to work closely 
with some of them 
SHARK (polariser, non-discriminator) SEA LION (integrator, 
non-discriminator) 
Ignores relative performance of companies; Ignores relative performance of 
attacks most targets that present themselves companies; willing to work closely 
with any of them 
source: Llkington and Pennell (IYY) p. )s. 
Elkington and Fennell's idiosyncratically-named taxonomy applies in this CM 
context, as when an NGO engages with an FI to change the practices of the listed 
companies it holds, the FI intermediate investment institution also tends to be a 
company. In other words, where `companies' appears in the table above, the specific 
company here will be the Fl. 
This taxonomy does, however, have a number of limitations: 
" By classifying an overall NGO with a particular taxa, the model implies that 
individual NGOs always engage with companies in the same way. In reality, the 
mode of engagement with any one company can change over time. Similarly, 
'L NGOs often work simultaneously in different ways with different companies. 
" The designated taxa are shorthand for only two aspects of the NGO personality 
- whether it establishes partnerships, and whether it compares the relative 
performance of companies. Therefore, when used in this way, broader 
21 This specific limitation was recognised by one of the authors during interview: "I think that any 
model that simplifies and labels any organisation in this way is limited and can be misleading if 
misapplied... you can have any given NGO displaying a number of these behaviours in sequence - or. 
in some cases, in tandem... I think it can work as long as you are aware of the limitations" (Elkino on, 
2000: interview). 
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characteristics such as NGO policy in respect of trade liberalisation and the 
structure of the corporate form have to be inferred. 
0 The taxa does not cater for NGOs that adopt a neutral Stance - i. e. those that 
neither develop productive relationships with business nor watchdog their 
activities. 
" It is difficult to use the taxa to classify one intervention by different NGOs 
working in a coalition. 
" Finally, while there is perhaps some relevance, it is not immediately clear from 
the natural behaviour of these animals in the wild precisely to what NGO- 
business behaviour each taxa refers. 
Notwithstanding the above, the model does provide a useful framework for 
conceiving of the Stance adopted by NGOs in their business relations. Nevertheless, 
in view of its limitations, Section 2.2.2 significantly adapts the taxonomy before it is 
used for the analysis in Section 4.1 to classify the `Stance' taken by NGOs in their 
relations with FIs. 
Having outlined what companies are, why they are relevant to NGOs, and reviewed 
NGO-corporate engagement, the following section provides an introduction to the 
CM. 
1.5 The Definition and Role of the Capital Market 
In order to be clear about the chain of corporate influence that makes the CM of 
interest to NGOs, it is first necessary to establish the purpose of the CM and how the 
main types of CM institutions relate to each other. 
The CM is a place where debt and equity can be bought and sold. It formally includes 
the market for share capital, long-term loan capital (e. g. bank loans) and government 
bonds. The equity market and the money market are the two principal sources of 
external capital to industry. The equity market is defined as "a market where 
specialised intermediaries buy and sell securities under a common set of rules and 
regulations through a closed system dedicated to that purpose" (Michie, 1999, p3). 
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By way of historical context, in the UK the London Stock Exchange was formally 
founded in 1801, with the first Official List of prices being issued in 1803. However, 
the market for securities pre-dates this time. From the 17th century onwards, with the 
appearance of national debt and transferable stocks issued by Joint Stock Companies 
such as the English East India Company (founded in 1623), the volume of business 
generated by securities was sufficient to warrant the beginnings of professional 
intermediation and organised markets (Michie, op cit). 
The two principal functions of a stock exchange are to provide: 
"a primary market where companies can raise new investment capital by 
issuing new stocks, shares or corporate bonds; and 
"a secondary market for dealing in existing securities. Although referred to as a, 
secondary market, this is by no means a secondary role as most of the trading 
that takes place is in previously issued securities. 
The stock exchange allows the original owners of the firm to spread the risk of their 
company over a large number of investors by issuing shares. Similarly, it allows 
investors to spread their risk among a variety of shares, and to realise the current 
value of their investment by selling in the secondary market. The stock price 
represents the market's view of the discounted value of future income streams 
(including dividends) and, at any one point, reflects the market's aggregate view of 
the company's financial value: "Prospects for any particular company... [are] always 
uncertain. Some people rate the company... more highly than - others. The market 
price is the average of everyone's valuations, weighted by the amount of money they 
are able to mobilise behind their views" (Kay, 2003, p142). 
The stock exchange intermediaries and institutions include, among others, 
stockbrokers, fund managers, issuing houses, merchant banks and, as general buyers 
and sellers of securities, the central bank, commercial banks, pension funds, insurance 
companies, unit trusts, investment trusts, open ended investment companies, company 
treasuries and private individuals. Here they collectively represent the FIs in question. 
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The introduction highlights the fact that, in order to be clear about the chain of 
influence over companies that makes the CM of interest to NGOs, it is necessary to 
set out how the main types of FIs relate to each other. The following discussion 
describes the CM institutions that facilitate the flow of capital from investors (which 
supply the capital) to companies (which demand the capital). Figure 3 below depicts 
the relationship between the FIs that operate the market between the demand for and 
supply of capital. The different roles of the FIs are important in the context of this 
thesis, as each role reflects the nature of the influence. 
Figure 1.3: The Structure of the CM 
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The diagram above shows that in the UK, the supply of equity capital originates from 
two main areas: 
" Individual Investors - individuals, either as scheme beneficiaries or directly as 
`retail' investors, purchasing stocks and shares from an investment broker, or 
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investing in pooled schemes such as OEICs, unit trusts and investment trusts, 
managed by fund managers; and 
" Institutional Investors - such as company and local authority pension 
funds, 
insurance companies, trusts, charities and organisations operating unit trusts 
and investment trusts. 
At the end of 2002, the UK fund management industry was responsible for around 
£2,600 billion of funds. Around 60 per cent of these funds were managed on behalf of 
UK institutional clients (IFSL, 2003, p3). 
The demand for UK equity capital comes from companies (PLCs) listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. These PLCs use the services of investment banks to 
underwrite the new issues of their shares. Investment banks also have a role 
in 
facilitating mergers, acquisitions and new placements on the exchange. Furthermore, 
many investment banks include sell-side22 broker operations that act as intermediary 
agents between companies and investors, maintain markets for previously issued 
securities and offer advisory services to fund managers: In particular, this last 
advisory service role is what renders them important to NGOs working on SEE issues. 
Fund managers place considerable authority in the views of these analysts (Myners, 
2001). Therefore, where the views of the most influential brokers change, markets 
also tend to move: consequently, the broker's view on the NGO issue will be 
influential 
Buy-side23 fund management houses acquire equities from sell-side brokers, may also 
use their advisory services and may also employ internal analysts. It is the job of the 
individual fund manager to make individual portfolio investment decisions in 
accordance with the stated goals of the investment fund. These depend to a large 
extent on the owners of the capital. 
22 'Sell-side' refers to institutions that sell equities to investors for a percentage commission. 
23 'Buy-side' refers to institutions that buy and hold securities in the expectation of a return on 
investment. 
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Similar to retail investors seeking the advice of independent financial advisors (IFAs), 
institutional investors place considerable authority24 in the views of investment 
consultants who advise as to which fund manager has the most robust investment 
process and can meet the investment needs of the investment scheme. Therefore, 
being able to articulate a robust investment process that impresses investment 
consultants is of central importance to fund managers because, in order to win 
institutional mandates, they need to be able to convince the investment consultants 
that in addition to having the right people in place, there is also a process in place that 
should deliver consistent market out-performance. Consequently, fund managers 
spend a considerable amount of time and effort on the areas that investment 
consultants rate as important aspects of a good process. 
Investment consultants are relevant to the NGOs in focus here because, if investment 
consultants believe that something is important, this will influence institutional 
investors' choice of fund manager and, as a consequence, signal its importance to 
fund managers. 
In the UK, the operations of the London Stock Exchange fall within the scope of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in its role as the UK Listing Authority (UKLA). 
The FSA is an independent non-governmental body that has been given statutory 
powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). Its role is to ensure 
that the system remains effective and credible by policing the stock exchange, 
investigating and, where appropriate, using its criminal prosecution powers against 
firms that have breached the FSMA. 
Having outlined what the CM is, how the FIs relate to each other, and how it is 
regulated, the question remains - why is the CM of interest to NGOs? 
24 This is partly for legal reasons in that a trustee has the responsibility to represent pension fund 
beneficiaries, and partly for practical reasons in that many trustees do not have the professional skills to 
assess the investment processes of fund managers. 
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1.6 The Relevance of the Capital Market to NGOs 
The CM is primarily of relevance to NGOs because it influences the practices of listed 
companies. This means that the CM can be used by NGOs to increase corporate 
accountability and promote improved corporate social and environmental 
performance. 
As Björn Stigson, President of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, explains: "Financial markets are key in the pursuit of sustainable 
development because they hold the scorecard, allocate and price capital, and provide 
risk coverage and price risks" (2003, p6). Further, as Etsy and Gentry (1997, p4) 
contend: "how the hundreds of billions of private capital are spent matters far more 
than how the few billion dollars of official assistance... get dispensed'. 
As Stigson (op cit, 2003, p6) argues, "if financial markets do not understand and 
reward sustainable behaviour, progress [in developing more sustainable business 
practices] will be slow". The implication of this analysis is that the CM can be both a 
constraint and a facilitator in respect of improved sustainability practice within 
companies. 
Some argue that the current structure of the CM is a general constraint in respect of 
sustainable development goals: "Most savers want a solid long-term return. 
However, the structure of incentives and focus within the current investment system is 
heavily biased towards short-term performance. In order for the long-term needs of 
savers to be met... companies need to be able to sustain their ability for generating 
returns over time by focussing on the long-term and investing in people, plant and 
other resources and the investment process needs to be better equipped to evaluate 
them on this basis" (Goyder, 2003, p2). 
The problem therefore appears to be that the structure of the incentives within the CM 
is said to motivate short-term investment behaviour on the part of fund managers that 
is more akin to speculation than ownership. As McLaren (1998, p262) argues: `fund 
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managers are subject to a legal fiduciary duty to obtain the best financial returns for 
their clients, and are evaluated on the basis of very short-term, even daily results. 
Their interest should be in the long term, but the structure of the market pushes them 
into maximising short-term returns... we need new instruments to direct investment to 
support innovation and longer-term sustainable business". 
This apparent maximisation of short-term results is seen as a long-term problem for 
the economy: where the CM does not sufficiently factor in long-term capital 
investment returns, it undermines long-term economic investment decision-making on 
the part of company directors by allocating insufficient capital to these practices 
(Turner, 2001). 
As many SEE issues are inherently long-term, such `short-termism' is also a particular 
problem for NGOs working on SEE issues as it results in the systematic erosion of 
incentives for company directors to invest in the resolution of SEE performance issues 
within their business. As Mitchell (2001, p3) argues: "the main cause of [companies"] 
irresponsibility is their drive to maximise short-term stock prices, a result that no 
thoughtful person really wants. " 
One of the UK's largest pension schemes, the Universities Superannuation Scheme 
(USS, 2003a), highlights the extent to which short-termism originates from the 
contract (or mandate) between institutional investors and their agents (i. e. fund 
managers): "There appear to be resistors to responsible investing which relate to 
deeply-rooted characteristics of the investment decision-making system including: the 
mandates that pension funds and their investment consultants set; the systems for 
measuring and rewarding performance (which focus on peer comparison and beating 
benchmarks rather than on fulfilling the long-term liabilities of pension funds); and 
the competencies of service providers (e. g. sell-side analysts). The effect of this 
resulting short-termism is that less attention is paid to responsible investment matters 
than is appropriate - these issues are too long-term in nature to affect the day-to-day 
behaviour of fund managers. " 
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Furthermore, as the Chairman of USS says elsewhere, the CM can use its influence 
proactively to encourage SEE performance improvements within listed companies: 
"One of the things that we have learnt is that the business world - and, of more 
relevance to us, the financial markets - could be doing more to promote economic, 
social, political and environmental stability and progress more generally without 
straying from the fundamental purpose of generating wealth... As pension funds, 
should we not be taking a longer-term perspective? " (Davies, 2003, p3). 
The central point here is that the CM is relevant to NGOs for two reasons: first, it can 
exacerbate SEE issues through short-term investment time horizons; and second, its 
influence can be used by NGOs to increase corporate accountability. Therefore, the 
influence of the CM is relevant to NGOs in two distinct but related ways: 
1. As an instrumental mechanism for changing corporate practices that NGOs can 
seek to harness in different ways. 
2. As a target for systemic change in itself because the influence of the CM can 
undermine long-term sustainable development goals. 
In summary, it has therefore been established that the CM is relevant to NGOs 
because it can influence the practices of listed companies, which, in turn, can 
influence the NGOs mission. But where does this influence originate? The capital 
market influence over companies can be regarded as originating via two principal 
routes: 
1. Economic Influence: The buying and selling of shares on the CM influences the 
cost of capital for listed companies - this is the price the company has to pay to 
raise capital to finance its business. The more a company has to pay for capital, 
the less it can raise. This limits the extent of its activity. In addition, the economic 
value of the shares influences a director's remuneration and the degree to which 
the company is perceived as a candidate for takeover. (See Section 3.2. ) 
2. Investor Advocacy Influence: Shareholders are the `principals' of the business 
and can exercise their rights of share ownership over their 'agents', the company 
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directors. They do this by sending explicit signals (referred to in the Corporate 
Governance25 literature as `voice') regarding the management of the company. 
For example, at the end of a company director's term, the investor can vote for or 
against that director's re-election at the AGM. (See Section 3.3. ) 
As highlighted in the introduction (section 1.6), NGO CM interventions have to date 
sought to utilise these two routes of influence in order to exert external pressure on 
companies via the investment decision-makers (Economic Influence), or to exert 
internal pressure as members of companies via the rights associated with share 
ownership (Investor Advocacy Influence). 
The two routes above are alternatives because Economic Influence requires changes 
in the level of investment. When divestment occurs, the rights necessary for Investor 
Advocacy Influence are no longer available. There are parallels between these two 
routes of influence and the alternatives of `exit' and `voice' through which 
management may find out about an externally perceived deterioration in performance 
of an organisation (Hirschman, 1970, p4). While Hirschman was principally 
concerned about a firm's customers, the options of exit and voice remain open to 
investors in relation to their shares. Indeed, due to the rights associated with share 
ownership, the `voice' alternative is an arguably more influential route for investors 
than for customers. 
However, while distinct, these strategies are linked via their long-term implications: 
where an NGO Investor Advocacy Influence strategy succeeds in convincing an 
investor to raise a concern with the directors of its company - and the company 
remains intransigent - then, if the investor believes the issue to be material, s/he 
should re-evaluate its holding. If this re-evaluation leads to divestment on a sufficient 
scale, it could have cost of capital (i. e. Economic Influence) implications for the 
company. 
25 "Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. " (Hampel, 
1998, page 1). A more comprehensive definition is the OECD (1999): "Corporate governance involves 
a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. " 
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Both the Economic and Investor Advocacy routes of CM influence are centrally 
important concepts in this thesis and are used in Section 3 to develop the NGO CM 
intervention model. Due to their importance, Section 3 includes a more detailed 
analysis of the precise origin and nature of this influence. 
In addition to the above main rationale of company influence for NGO CM 
intervention, there are a number of subsidiary reasons why the CM is of interest to 
NGOs. These include: 
1. Raising capital. A few NGOs have sought to use the CM to raise investment 
capital for their activities. The Financial Times (2002e, p16) has christened such 
attempts `Alternative Public Offerings' (APOs), "demonstrat[ing] the readiness 
of social activists to embrace capitalist methods". One example of such an APO 
is Traidcraft plc, which is part of Traidcraft Exchange and Traidcraft 
Foundation (a registered charity). Traidcraft plc aims "to demonstrate that there 
is an alternative model of capitalism, [and] that a company can still provide a 
reasonable return without being exploitative, [by] working in the interests of all 
stakeholders" (Traidcraft, 2002b) and has raised in excess of £2 million 
(Traidcraft, 2002a, p15). 
2. Generating fundraising income. The need for financial services and 
investment products among an NGO's membership can provide it with an 
opportunity to raise funds via licensed financial products where the endorsing 
NGO receives a commission on sales from the Fl. Examples of such an 
approach include the RSPB's relationship with Frizzel and the WWFINPI 
Investment Fund. However, the commercial basis for such partnerships can be 
problematic. For example, there may be a conflict of values and the companies 
underlying the investment vehicles may come into conflict with the NGO's 
mission. Even so, depending on how the assets are managed, such partnerships 
can bring programmatic as well as financial benefits to the NGO (see Section 
1.8). 
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3. Stewardship of financial reserves. Some NGOs maintain financial reserves for 
continuity of project finance during downturns in fundraising income. The 
Charity Commission dictates that, in certain circumstances, good stewardship of 
these reserves involves the investment of a proportion in the stock market. For 
some charities this raises questions surrounding the appropriateness of the 
underlying investments and there have been some instances where NGOs have 
been found to have arguably inappropriate investments. For example, the RSPB 
was found to hold investments in TotalFinaElf following an oil slick for which 
the company had been responsible, and which had killed a number of sea birds 
(The Guardian, 2000, p4). In a study of more than 100 of the UK's largest 
charities and foundations, Green (2003, p3) found that "60% of top charities 
surveyed have no written ethical or socially responsible investment policy. "26 
In summary, the CM is primarily of relevance to NGOs because it can be used as a 
mechanism for changing corporate practice and because of its effect on long-term 
sustainable development goals. In addition, it can be used by NGOs to raise capital, 
generate fundraising income, and to invest their financial reserves. 
In addition, there is a sub-set of the CM that represents a special case: investors who 
consider themselves practitioners of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). The next 
section defines SRI and considers in more detail how this special case is relevant to 
NGOs. 
1.7 The Relevance of Socially Responsible Investors to NGOs 
Socially responsible investors are of particular relevance to NGOs working on SEE 
issues because they explicitly claim to integrate SEE issues into their investment 
process in some way. Some NGOs recognise this relevance; FoE's `Corporate Alert' 
campaign, for example, declares that "the rise of ethical investment in the 'City' 
provides financial leverage on companies to act ethically" (McRae, 2001: 
presentation). NGOs target non-SRI investors in order to persuade them to adopt SRI 
26 Unlike most other institutional investors, charities and charitable foundations are free to adopt SRI 
screening policies so long as the trustees take account of their responsibilities under trust law when 
making investment decisions. The current legal position is outlined in the Charity Commission booklet 
CC14 - `Investment of Charitable Funds', which states: "Trustees of a charity may, of course, decline 
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strategies. - When - effective, this ' 
increases , NGO CM influence. 
More specifically, 
NGOs have targeted SRI in two principal ways: 
", as interested audiences for the NGOs' corporate SEE performance information 
and lobbying activity; and- 
" as a lobbying target to test the authenticity of their claims to `social 
responsibility'. 
The discussion below defines SRI, outlines the range of alternative strategies and 
analyses what specific relevance these alternative strategies have to NGOs. 
Mansley (2000, p3) defines SRI using the text of the UK reform of the 1995 Pensions 
Act (see Case Study 5.3) as follows: "investment where social, environmental or 
ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and 
realisation of investment, and the responsible use of rights (such as voting rights) 
attaching to investments". However, this definition encompasses a number of 
different SRI strategies, so it is necessary to be clear about what they are because of 
their differing relevance to NGOs. HSBC (2002a, p18) offers the following 
categorisation of the alternative strategies: 
to consider investing in a particular company if it carries out activities that are directly contrary to the 
charity's purposes and, therefore against its interests and those of its beneficiaries" (p3). 
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Table 1.2: A Categorisation of Alternative Approaches to SRI 
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In Table 1.2 above, the column assessing the `impact on the environmental and social 
performance of companies' is of particular relevance to the NGOs here in that they 
are `promoting environmental and/or societal goals' (see Section 1.1). 
As the HSBC analysis. identifies, 'Ethical/negative screening' and `Best in Class/ 
Positive screening' have a negligible impact on the environmental and social 
performance of companies due to the very small amounts of money under 
management. The total UK money managed under this strategy is estimated to be in 
the order of £60 billion. In absolute terms this is a considerable amount - but it is less 
than 2.5 per cent of the £2,600 billion of total assets under management in the UK 
(IFSL, 2003, plO), which demonstrates the relatively limited nature of influence 
arising from this area. As Lake (1999, p3) highlights: "It is sometimes argued that 
demand for a company's shares from ethical investors supports that company's share 
price, helping to make it easier for it to raise other new capital to finance investment. 
and that ethical funds' decisions not to buy shares depress their price. But these 
effects are unlikely to be significant for most companies, given that the total volume of 
ethical investment is still relatively small as a proportion of the Stock Market as a 
whole. Other buyers will readily be available for the shares of most companies 
`boycotted' by ethical investors. " 
Furthermore, such screened investment funds are typically offered by FIs among 
many investment products, and do not represent a considered attempt to meet the 
responsibilities that arise out of owning company shares. Consequently, as vehicles 
for effecting corporate change, `Ethical/negative screening' and `Best in 
Class/Positive screening' are of relatively limited relevance to NGOs. 
However, the HSBC analysis also identified the fact that the `Environmental 
Technology investment27', `Engagement/Advocacy'28 and `Integrated Assessment' 
27 At the time of writing there are very few `Environmental Technology investment' funds in the UK. 
While a potentially controversial category, the `purest' form of such funds invests in venture capital 
and private equity. The Merrill Lynch New Energy Technology fund invests in theses areas. While funds under management in this area are highly limited, it is important to emphasise that these funds 
can have a positive `pump-priming' effect on unlisted environmental technology companies. 28 Engagement is defined by EIRIS as "a conscious process in which areas of improvement are identified for individual companies; the investor then seeks to persuade or assist these companies to commit themselves to change (environmental and social) and then monitors the implementation of any 
50 
approaches have the greatest potential to influence the environmental and social 
performance of companies. So it is these SRI strategies that are of the greatest 
relevance to NGOs. 
More specifically, those SRI investors that' have adopted an Engagement/Advocacy 
investment approach are of most relevance to NGOs implementing an Investor 
Advocacy Influence strategy (see Section 3.3 below) because such investors are likely 
to be more receptive to their issue. Furthermore, some of these investors publish SRI 
policy statements and reports against which NGOs can hold them to account. 
McLaren (2002, p5) goes further to claim that most NGOs need to work with 
institutional investors: "Where asymmetries of power [between companies and NGOs] 
persist, this precludes a dialogue of equals... For most stakeholders to obtain an 
equal position requires effective collaboration with SRI, who can exercise power, and 
mobilise a credible threat within the current system. " As to how likely such 
collaboration is, Dresner (2001, p21) found that all the SRI fund managers surveyed 
claimed to be "responsive to issues brought by third parties such as NGOs" but that 
"all fund managers caveat[ed] their responses with the need for discretion and 
balance". There are a number of possible reasons for this caveat. For example, 
Sparkes (2002, p36) expresses the view that "it seems quite legitimate for [NGOs] to 
want to cause financial harm to a company, perhaps by encouraging consumer 
boycotts, if that is seen as the most effective way to achieve their aims. On the other 
hand, it is hard to conceive of any circumstances in which SRI fund managers would 
actually want to see a decline in the value of the shares that they hold. "29 
commitments made. Engagement comprises three main elements; persuasion, support and voting" 
(1999, p6). 
29 Mansley (2001: interview) highlights three further tensions in the relationships between NGOs and 
SRI institutions: "NGOs want quick action and they want it soon - six months. Investors are looking at 
a multi-year timescale - with possible annual correspondence - so a comparatively slow timescale. 
Sometimes ridiculously slow. So there is a tension there. You also have a tension in terms of media 
coverage: NGOs most of the time are quite aware of the media dividend they can get from their 
payback. However... SRI investors prefer to operate privately, and I think there is quite a lot of tension 
there. Thirdly, NGOs actually want a major change: they want the company to pull out of Burma. 
Something defined Whereas investors prefer them to look at policy, for example one on human rights... 
the assumption is that if this policy is implemented then you will review your involvement in Burma and 
maybe get around to pulling out of it. " 
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Similarly, those SRI investors that have adopted Environmental Technology and/or 
Integrated Assessment approaches are of particular relevance to NGOs implementing 
an `Economic Influence Strategy' (see Section 3.2 below). This is because ý an 
investment process based on these approaches should allocate more capital into 
companies with positive SEE performance, and 'reward, companies with good 
corporate environmental management performance. 
However, it should be noted that it is somewhat unclear how HSBC distinguishes 
between `Status Quo' investment, which `factors in environmental and social issues 
where material" and `Integrated Assessment' investment, which "involves integrating 
environmental, social and financial issues into a holistic, integrated investment 
process". One differentiator appears to be that "specific effort is made to focus on the 
environmental and social performance of companies". While this may be the case, the 
extent of effort required to graduate from Status Quo into Integrated Assessment is 
not clear. Furthermore, HSBC claims that the Status Quo category "has no impact on 
sustainable development" (op cit). This can be challened on two grounds: short- ., 
in the CM undermines sustainable development goals (see section 1.6); and 
some SEE issues are included within Status Quo investment analysis `where 
material': this has changed certain corporate behaviour (see Section 3.2.1). 
In summary, therefore, while FIs in general provide an influential target for CM 
campaigning, FIs claiming to be socially responsible and implementing 
`Environmental Technology investment', 'Engagement/Advocacy' and `Integrated 
Assessment' strategies are of particular relevance to NGOs because of their impact on 
cost of capital or investor advocacy. 
1.8 The Legitimacy of NGO Capital Market Intervention 
The above discussion demonstrates that the CM is of relevance to NGOs because (i) it 
can be used as a mechanism for changing corporate strategy and (ii) it affects long- 
term sustainable development goals. However, it says nothing about whether such 
NGO use of CM influence is legitimate. This section considers whether NGO use of 
the CM is legitimate from a broader societal perspective. 
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Many NGOs hold a proportion of their financial reserves on the CM (see Section 1.6). 
Where the NGO CM intervention is motivated by a concern about the future financial 
performance of its investment, that intervention is legitimised by the rights associated 
with the NGO's investment ownership. This is because these rights exist in order that 
the shareholders can protect their financial interests (see Section 3.3). If the NGO is a 
genuine shareholder, then it follows that the rights should apply. 
However, as demonstrated in Section 4.1, the majority of NGO CM intervention is 
conducted outside any `genuine' investment ownership. Most of the time, NGOs 
purchase the company shares in order to gain access to the shareholder rights, or 
instead of purchasing company shares, they approach institutional investors. 
Therefore, this kind of NGO CM intervention lacks the legitimacy derived from 
genuine investment ownership. In these circumstances, what renders NGO CM 
intervention legitimate? 
There are three broad areas from which NGOs derive legitimacy when practising 
NGO CM intervention: 
1. Welfare-oriented legitimacy: Perhaps the most important claim to legitimacy 
by the NGOs in focus here30 is their welfare-enhancing public interest role 
which society recognises as legitimate (see Section 1.1). When acting as Civil 
Regulators (Zadek, 1998), NGO CM intervention can be an effective and 
efficient method for NGOs to achieve welfare-enhancing social and/or 
environmental goals (see Section 5). Therefore, NGO CM intervention is 
legitimate when it furthers the long-term welfare of society. Conversely, NGO 
CM intervention that undermines welfare is, therefore, illegitimate. Davis 
(2002, p3) uses this welfare-orientated role of NGOs to argue that NGOs have 
a specific role to play in participating in the creation of a more sustainable 
economy: "The global market ideal implicit in a civil economy is one in which 
institutional owners accountable to their millions of savers push corporations 
toward sustainable prosperity through socially responsible management... In a 
30 NGOs whose stated purpose is the promotion of welfare-enhancing environmental and/or societal 
goals rather than the achievement or protection of economic power in the marketplace for commercial 
purposes, or political power through the electoral process. 
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civil society, political parties, an independent judiciary, a free press, impartial 
law and civic bodies are the core sustainers of democracy. Parallel 
institutions of a civil economy can be understood as engaged shareowners, 
independent monitors, credible standards and civil society organizations 
[NGOs] participating in the marketplace". The implication of this analysis is 
that civil society NGOs have a legitimate role to play in ensuring that FIs 
advocate socially responsible management to the companies in which they 
invest. 
2. Investment analysis legitimacy: by enhancing information flows on 
corporate performance in SEE areas that may be material to share price, 
conceptually NGOs can improve investment analysis. While there are no 
independent and verified analyses of this conceptual NGO benefit, when 
describing its SRI `Sustainability of Securities' analysis process, HSBC 
(2002a, pl0) states: "When assessing companies, we will build on [the 
knowledge of HSBC's mainstream investment analysts] by analysing any 
publicly available information from the company, public interest groups or the 
media... In particular, we expect to establish and maintain links with a number 
of non-governmental organisations, think tanks and industry bodies". This 
indicates that one large CM institution apparently believes there is value in 
maintaining links with NGOs. One practical reason why NGOs may be a 
useful source of relevant investment information is that they tend to spend 
time analysing and lobbying for changes to public policy on SEE issues. 
Consequently, NGOs can be a useful indicator of future public policy that 
could be material to company evaluation. Where NGO CM intervention 
contributes to enhanced investment analysis, that intervention is legitimate 
because it helps improve investment decisions and market efficiency. 
3. Market trust legitimacy: while NGO CM intervention may serve to improve 
investment analysis, there are circumstances in which it has been detrimental 
to a company's share price (see Section 3.2.1 below). However, while NGO 
CM campaigning may represent a short-term financial burden for a company, 
this alone is not sufficient reason to render the activity illegitimate. This is 
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because there is a case for NGO CM intervention being in the long-term 
collective interests of listed companies and their shareholders: companies 
benefit from the existence of the CM, and the existence of any market depends 
in part on society's trust in order to maintain its own legitimacy. As Korten 
(1995, pp89-98) argues, "an economic system can remain viable only so long 
as society has mechanisms to counter the abuses of either state or market 
power and the erosion of the natural, social, and moral capital that such 
abuses commonly exacerbate". His preferred system is democratic pluralism, 
which combines "the forces of the market, government and civil society 
[including NGOs]". From the perspective of NGO CM intervention, therefore, 
where such intervention serves to correct welfare-undermining aspects of the 
CM, it also serves to maintain trust in the CM. The implication of this analysis 
is that NGO CM intervention is not only legitimate, but also necessary for the 
long-term viability of the CM itself. So, in the long term, NGO CM 
intervention as Civil Regulator of unethical corporate practices maintains trust 
in the market and, therefore, helps to maintain the market itself. Consequently, 
it is in the long-term interest of companies and their shareholders for NGOs to 
undertake a Civil Regulatory role via the CM. 
Therefore, NGO CM intervention is legitimate where it furthers the NGO's welfare- 
oriented role in society, where it contributes to investment analysis, and where it 
maintains market trust. 
That said, are there any other constraints on NGO CM intervention? Company Law 
sets out the legal boundaries for shareholder advocacy (see Section 3.3) and, while 
establishing boundaries, it does not prohibit NGO CM intervention per se. Most UK 
NGO CM intervention so far has remained within the boundaries of what the law sets 
out as legitimate shareholder advocacy. However, there are occasions where NGO 
CM intervention has been illegal and, therefore, illegitimate. 
At one end of a `spectrum of illegality' is the benign but nevertheless illegal action 
typified by Greenpeace when it used a public address system in conjunction with a 
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recording device at the ICI AGM in 199131 (Intervention 4, Appendix 2). At the other 
end of the spectrum is the far more pernicious CM intervention that involves death 
threats, vandalism, and psychological and physical violence used by animal rights 
protestors when confronting investors in Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). While this 
latter intervention targeted investors, some argue that it was not representative of 
NGO CM intervention: "they weren't using the capital markets as capital markets, 
they just happened to be thinking that if we are beating up the managing director with 
a baseball bat, we might as well be beating up the shareholders. They are not an - -- 
NGO, they are terrorists" (Bell, 2001: interview). 
Regardless of whether it represents a use of the CM or not, most would accept that, 
from a broader perspective, an NGO using terrorism to realise campaign goals is not 
only illegal but also antithetical to societal welfare (and therefore illegitimate) 
Consequently, the Huntingdon case is outside the scope of this thesis, which focuses 
on NGOs with welfare-enhancing goals. 
Logan (2001, pers com) believes that, in general, "NGO use of the capital markets as 
a lobbying tool is both legal and legitimate... [it] is healthy in many ways". However, 
he also states that "NGOs will overplay their hand if they are not careful. Single-issue 
pressure groups in particular just don't see the complexity of balancing stakeholder 
issue across modern global businesses. They should be respectful of what the AGM is 
for and respectful of how it works. It is in their long-term collective interests to do 
so". In other words, while NGO CM intervention has in general been both legal and 
legitimate, illegal NGO CM intervention risks the loss of NGO legitimacy in this area 
to the detriment of long-term CM intervention efforts. 
More generally, as NGO CM intervention serves to maintain the legitimacy of the CM 
(point 3 above), does this mean there are circumstances in which particular NGOs 
should refrain from proactively intervening via the CM, even where the NGO has 
welfare-oriented objectives? If the aims of the NGO include fundamental opposition 
to the existence of the CM, a conflict will arise. As Michie (1999, p8) identifies: 
"Following on from the 1930s depression, when capitalism itself was blamed for the 
31 It is illegal for anyone other than the relevant company to record an AGM. 
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world's economic problems... in socialist countries stock exchanges simply ceased to 
exist with central planning replacing financial markets". More specifically, where the 
aims of an NGO are anti-capitalist or opposed to economic growth - perhaps because 
it believes that consumption patterns are unsustainable - the NGO should consider the 
long-term impacts of its CM intervention on its own mission. Investors aim to profit 
from their investment and may intend to spend this profit on consuming goods and 
services. So from this perspective, one of the CM's primary purposes (see Section 
1.5) exacerbates the very problem the NGO is seeking to redress. 
In conclusion, where NGO CM intervention is welfare-oriented and legal, it is 
legitimate. More specifically, NGOs derive legitimacy from their welfare-oriented 
role in society, their potential contribution to investment analysis and, in particular, 
the maintenance of market trust derived from Civil Regulation. However, where NGO 
CM intervention seeks to promote aims that undermine welfare or is conducted in 
such a way as to be illegal, then the intervention is illegitimate. 
1.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This introductory Chapter has defined the main terms in use, including `NGO', `PLC' 
and `Capital Market'. It has also established the societal role that NGOs play, 
including that of Civil Regulator. It has argued that companies are relevant to NGOs 
because their economic, political and social influence can impact upon an NGO's 
mission. It has also outlined the various strategies and Stances that NGOs can adopt 
when conducting corporate campaigns, including attempts to harness the influence 
within the CM. 
This Chapter has established that the CM has influence over companies via two 
principal mechanisms: Economic Influence via the cost of capital and Investor 
Advocacy Influence via the rights associated with share ownership. It has also been 
demonstrated that the CM is relevant to NGOs because of this influence and that this 
influence of the CM is relevant in two related ways: 
1. As an instrumental mechanism for changing corporate practices. 
2. As a target for systemic change in itself. 
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It has also been shown that there are a number of subsidiary reasons why the CM is of 
interest to NGOs, including raising capital, generating fundraising income and the 
proper stewardship of financial reserves. 
It has also been highlighted that FIs adopting SRI strategies are of the greatest 
relevance to NGOs but that this relevance differs depending on the SRI strategy 
adopted. Specifically, `Environmental Technology investment', `Engagement/ 
Advocacy' and `Integrated Assessment' strategies are of particular relevance because 
of their impact on cost of capital or investor advocacy. 
Finally, this Chapter has argued that NGOs derive legitimacy for CM intervention 
mainly from their welfare-oriented role in society, but also from their potential 
contribution to investment analysis and, the maintenance of market trust derived from 
Civil Regulation. Consequently, it has been suggested that NGO CM intervention 
which operates within the boundaries of Company Law and aims to enhance welfare 
is legitimate and in the long-term collective interests of companies and their 
shareholders. 
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Chapter 2. Scope and Methodology 
The purpose of this Chapter is to define the scope of the enquiry, set out the research 
questions, present the process for data collection and the methodology for analysis. 
2.1 Scope 
This section confines the scope of the research. The main parameters are geographical 
coverage, NGO type, company type, the nature of NGO intervention, sub-section of 
the CM and organisational focus: 
1. Geographical coverage 
This thesis focuses on local, national and international NGOs operating in the UK and 
their interventions targeting UK listed companies. The primary reason for this is that 
the author is based in the UK and limiting the scope in this way facilitates both 
interviewee accessibility and the more ready availability of sufficiently detailed 
background NGO research material that tends not to be published. A secondary 
benefit of limiting the geographical scope is that it enables a more accurate 
comparison between different NGO CM interventions because the NGOs are all 
operating within the same legal, political and social environment and tend to confront 
the same market challenges. Similarly, the inter-NGO sharing of lessons takes place 
more readily within a geographically constrained area and it is possible to monitor the 
development of NGO CM intervention over time. Finally, the UK focus also reflects 
the importance of the City of London ('the City') as a key international financial 
centre. 
The situation in other countries may be different. For example, it is recognised that 
NGOs in the US have made extensive use of the CM in their campaigning, and that 
they use shareholder resolutions more frequently than in the UK. Nevertheless, the 
relatively nascent UK NGO CM intervention provides an opportunity to analyse this 
evolving practice in its early stages. 
59 
2. Type of NGO 
By definition, NGOs that are antithetical to overall social welfare are outside the 
scope of this thesis. As established in Section 2.2, while there are many types of 
NGO, those in focus here fall within the narrower definition of "groups whose stated 
purpose is the promotion of [welfare-enhancing] environmental and/or societal goals 
rather than the achievement or protection of economic power in the marketplace [for 
commercial purposes] or political power through the electoral process" (adapted 
from Bendell, 2000). While such NGOs typically have a broad programme, of 
corporate engagement, it is their engagement actively conducted via the CIN1 that is in 
focus. 
3. Type of company 
This thesis is a discussion about NGOs' use of the CM and, as established in Section 
2.3, companies listed on the CM (i. e. PLCs) are the form of corporate enterprise in 
focus. When compared with unlisted corporate enterprises, on average, PLCs tend to 
be significantly bigger than unlisted companies and therefore are more likely to be 
confronted by NGOs in search of relevant and influential single targets. However, 
unlisted companies collectively represent a significant part of the UK economy (see 
Section 1.3), vastly outnumbering listed companies, and are of relevance to NGOs as 
well. Nevertheless, focusing on PLCs does not entirely exclude unlisted companies as 
NGOs can engage with unlisted companies via the CM through a listed company's 
supply chain. 
4. Nature of NGO-company intervention 
Arguably, all NGO corporate campaigning involves the CM as, if the campaign is 
effective, the CM should passively pick up this effect in its analysis and respond 
accordingly. While no systematic empirical studies of this effect have been conducted, 
conceptually, if an NGO's actions are material to company share price, then where 
investors do not integrate an analysis of its concerns into the overall analysis, then 
share price will suffer. One example of an investor integrating NGO activity into their 
analysis is Deutsche Bank's (2002, p4) brokerage investment analysis on 
ExxonMobil: "Greenpeace is currently pursuing ExxonMobil in a PR war that 
focuses on forecourt boycotts of its biggest European market, the UK... W While the 
company insists that it has suffered no fiscal impact from the boycott, being handed a 
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reputation as environmental enemy number one for such a big customer facing 
business has to be considered a brand risk". This demonstrates that the Greenpeace 
campaign influenced, to some extent, Deutsche Bank's investment analysis of 
ExxonMobil. However, the focus of this thesis is on the NGO intervention with the 
CM that arises from a strategic choice on the part of the NGO to engage with the CM. 
Therefore, this thesis concentrates on the intervention that takes place when the NGO 
has actively sought to stimulate the CM into integrating the campaign into its analysis. 
Furthermore, while company response is included within the outcome analysis, the 
focus for the model is the NGO CM intervention and not the corporate response to the 
intervention. 
S. Section of the CM 
As established in Section 1.2, this enquiry focuses on NGO interaction with that part 
of the CM responsible for portfolio investment flows via stocks, shares and, to a lesser 
extent, corporate bonds. Formally, the CM also includes the market for share capital, 
bank loans, long-term loan capital, and government bonds. Arguably, therefore, a 
more precise classification would be the Market for Equity Capital. Nevertheless, CM 
is used because it is better understood and, subject to this caveat, is not anticipated to 
be problematic. 
NGOs have also intervened in other areas of the CM such as project finance and the 
market for long-term debt capital. Friends of the Earth, for example, named and 
shamed financial institutions involved in the debt financing of the Three Gorges 
Dam32 in an attempt to encourage those banks to rescind their debt provision. This 
intervention is, however, outside the scope of this thesis. The scope has been set in 
this way as there are important differences between the market for equity finance and 
debt capital. For example, there are different regulations, FIs and intermediaries 
involved. More important, perhaps, is the fact that unlike equity investments, bonds 
do not have the rights associated with share ownership. 
32 The Thee Gorges Dam is a controversial hydroelectric dam along the Yangtze River in China. 
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6. Organisational Focus 
A number of organisations are involved in the NGO CM intervention, including the 
NGO, the CM institutions, the company and, in some circumstances, public policy 
institutions. This thesis primarily focuses on NGOs and does not look in the same 
detail at the types of responses that companies, CM or public policy institutions have 
taken in response to NGO campaigns. That would be a different research topic. 
In summary, this thesis is primarily concerned with UK-based environmental and 
social NGOs' use of equities listed on the CM to influence the practices of PLCs. 
2.2 Methodology 
This thesis is a critical assessment of the ways UK NGOs use the CM as a campaign 
tool to influence the practices of PLCs. To that end, the methodology uses a grounded 
theory approach (Creswell, 1998) encompassing the following steps: 
" An assessment of the legitimacy of NGO CM intervention (Section 1.8). This 
establishes whether, why and where NGO CM intervention is legitimate. 
" The development of a model for NGO CM intervention (Section 3.1). This 
provides some clarity concerning the complex interface between NGOs, the CM 
and PLCs, and enables the classification of their historic interventions in the 
chronology (see below). 
"A deductive analysis of the implications of the model for NGO CM intervention 
and the development of specific hypotheses (see Section 3.5) in relation to the 
probability of success of NGO CM intervention for subsequent empirical testing 
(see below). 
"A chronology of the distinct NGO CM interventions that occurred between 1990 
and 2002. This uses the model to classify each intervention and includes an initial 
analysis of success. This analysis enables a quantitative evaluation of how NGO 
CM strategy evolved over this time. It also provides an initial investigation into 
the main claims and hypotheses regarding the probability of success of various 
strategies developed in Section 3.5 (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). 
9A qualitative empirical review of the effectiveness and efficiency of specific case 
studies of NGO CM influence (Section 5). This enables a much more detailed 
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analysis of the main claims and hypotheses in relation to NGO CM intervention 
(see above). This more detailed analysis also reviews the classification within the 
chronology. In particular, it is here that the relative success of NGO CM 
intervention is properly evaluated. Therefore, it significantly augments the 
analysis of the normative implications in relation to NGO CM intervention 
strategy and policy (see below). 
"A presentation of the normative implications for NGO CM intervention strategy 
and policy arising from the preceding review of the main claims and the 
conclusions in relation to the hypotheses (Section 6). 
As can be seen, the main research aim is to develop and then test hypotheses in 
relation to the probability of success of alternative NGO CM intervention strategies. A 
secondary aim is to understand how NGO CM strategy evolved between 1990 and 
2002. 
In analysing NGO CM intervention, it is necessary to contend with a number of data 
gathering and effect attribution challenges that arise from the environment in which 
NGO CM intervention takes place. Key among these challenges are the following: 
Data Gathering Challenges 
1. Literature Quality: As highlighted in Section 1, NGO CM intervention has so 
far received little attention in an academic forum. Therefore, much of the 
relevant literature is from non-traditional sources such as unpublished 
conference papers, newspaper articles and non-peer reviewed sources. 
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2. Data availability: NGOs do not routinely publish external performance 
evaluations of CM interventions (see Section 6). This hinders access to 
performance data and implies a self-reporting bias on the part of NGOs (see 
below). 
3. Self-reporting bias: for reasons related to reputation, funding or misplaced 
belief, it is possible that interviewees from NGOs and SRI may overstate 
success and/or understate failure. Equally, for similar reasons, companies may 
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understate NGO success and overstate failure. For example, where the target 
company ultimately decides to capitulate, it may face a potentially embarrassing 
climb-down - in which case it may claim that the strategy change was based on 
commercial considerations. 
Effect Attribution in an Interdependent System: 
1. Complexity: as referred to above, NGO activity takes place in a complex 
environment. When attempting to establish whether an NGO has influenced a 
company at any one time, it is necessary to remove other extraneous sources of 
company influence including, inter alia, commercial factors, public policy and 
regulators, trade unions and trade organisations etc. This complexity highlights 
the need for a conceptual model of NGO CM intervention. It also highlights the 
importance of framing conclusions regarding NGO CM influence appropriately. 
2. Incidental success (related to the above point): it is possible that the aim of the 
NGO campaign is coincidentally realised during the campaign - i. e. without the 
campaign having had any effect on the outcome. So reaching a conclusion in 
absolute terms about the success, or otherwise, of the NGO campaign simply by 
focusing on outcome would be flawed. Nevertheless, if it can be demonstrated 
that an NGO had taken measures that had a reasonable chance of being 
effective, and the desired outcome had come to pass, then concluding that it is 
probable that the NGO had played a role in establishing that change can be 
justified. 
3. Temporal problems: due to possible time lags between an NGO's calls for 
action by a company and the company's response, an NGO CM intervention 
that was not immediately effective may come to be regarded as a success if a 
company subsequently changes its practice. Conversely, an initially successful 
NGO campaign may be regarded as a failure if the company later reverts to its 
original practice. This highlights the need for a reasonably long time period to 
have elapsed before concluding the effectiveness or otherwise of the CM 
intervention. 
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Both the chronology of NGO CM intervention and the detailed case studies required 
detailed data on NGO CM intervention. This was particularly true with the case 
studies as they sought to establish the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
interventions. The discussion below reviews the process for the collation and analysis 
of the required data. By way of structure for this discussion, having set out the 
methodological challenges above, the rest of this section first reviews why semi- 
structured interviews and a desk-based literature analysis were chosen as the data 
collection process; it then reviews how the interviews were designed; and, finally, it 
describes the analysis process for both the chronology and the case studies. 
2.2.1 Selecting the Data Collection and Analysis Process 
A number of alternative data collection and analysis methodologies were considered. 
A combination of a mixed methodology analysis approach (Bulmer, 1984) using data 
gathered via a desk-based literature review and exploratory interviews (Oppenheim, 
1992, p65)33 were chosen over other approaches for the following reasons: 
1. As the thesis attempts to define recommendations for NGO CM intervention, it 
was important to ascertain the views and assumptions underlying nuanced 
positions. This is not possible with a quantitative approach. As Worcester 
(2001, p100) notes: "One uses qualitative research to provide an insight into 
issues under examination, to dig below the surface to discover the reasons: 
Why? Or Why not?... Qualitative research... can enable the moderator... to 
challenge initial reactions and comments, and collect relevant, and sometimes 
surprising, verbatim comments. " 
2. The practice of NGO CM intervention is relatively young and there is not yet a 
sufficiently large community of individuals from which to procure meaningful 
survey data. 
3. Most NGO CM interventions in the UK are not documented and there is no 
centralised record of those that are. Therefore, the best way of gathering data is 
to interview individuals who have been involved in the area for the duration in 
question, and to question them in respect of their experience and analysis of the 
specific situations they have experienced. 
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4. `Mixed methodology' analysis combines quantitative and qualitative data and is 
a useful way to triangulate the accuracy of research results. The problems of 
quantitative data analysis in SPSS (see below) are alleviated by using 
interviews; the difficulties of interviews are alleviated by using data analysis 
Consequently, a series of exploratory interviews with a number of carefully selected 
individuals was conducted. In terms of the criteria for interviewee selection, 
Oppenheim's guidance (1992, p65) that "quality rather than quantity should be the 
essential determinant of numbers" has been followed. The 16 selected interviewees 
include NGO CM campaigners, individuals from the area of socially responsible 
investment, CSR opinion formers and a former Secretary of State (due to professional 
posts in the area of SRI). When selecting NGO interviewees, identifying which person 
to interview became evident once the case studies had been selected. The SRI analysts 
and opinion leaders were selected due either to prominence in their field, or specific 
knowledge of a particular NGO CM intervention (the full list of interviewees is 
included in Appendix 1). 
In many cases, the NGO campaign was relatively high profile. In such cases, it was 
also possible to critically review the press coverage. Further data was primarily 
sourced during the desk-based review from the following areas: 
" media searches on NGO CM campaigns; 
" the author's personal records from his period of employment at WWF-UK 
34 ; 
" access to the records of individuals who had worked for four socially 
responsible investment houses - ISIS, Henderson, NPI and Jupiter - for the 
duration in question; 
"a search through the back issues of the two main periodicals featuring news on 
NGO CM intervention: The UK Social Investment Forum's What's New in 
33 The exploratory interview is defined by Oppenheim (1992, p65) as a "depth interview, or free-style 
interview". 
34 The author worked for WWF-UK between 1996 and 2000. This allowed increased access to data 
concerning WWF's CM interventions and may bias the data. However, this bias will have been 
partially mitigated by the propensity of NGOs to collaborate in their interventions (see Section 4.1) 
which will have provided greater access to NGO CM interventions overall. 
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Social Investment and the Ethical Investment Research Service's The Ethical 
Investor, and 
" other relevant literature including Mackenzie (1993), Hildyard and Mansley 
(2001), and Sparkes (2002). 
While this combination of semi-structured exploratory interviews and desk-based 
research has a number of benefits, the process does generate challenges - for example, 
data gathered in interviews is notoriously difficult to quantify. Consequently, the next 
section sets out how the design of the interview will tackle these challenges. 
2.2.2 Interview Design 
It is important to ensure that data gathered during the interviews is academically valid. 
Therefore, it was necessary to: 
1. Develop a structure for the interview and prepare interview questions. 
2. Adopt procedures for contending with the inherent flaws in the research process. 
This section provides an overview of the how the interviews were structured and what 
procedures for contending with the flaws were implemented: 
Interview Structure 
The specific questions put to NGO representatives fell into two categories: 
" standard benchmarking questions that applied to all the case studies; and 
" questions specific to the particular NGO campaign. 
The standard benchmarking questions were set out in advance of the interviews by 
drawing on the analysis in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 below. These include questions 
pertaining to the management of the NGO including mission, policy, practice, 
strategy, transparency and accountability of the particular NGO case studies. 
Similarly, where appropriate, questions relating to the ex ante and ex post 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity were asked (see also Section 2.2.4). The standard 
benchmarking questions therefore covered issues pertaining to legitimacy, 
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accountability, transparency, monitoring and review, impact and effectiveness. The 
analysis resulted in the following core list of NGO question areas: 
1. The mission of the NGO and how it relates to the CM intervention. 
2. Whether the NGO had established an overall strategy for engaging with the 
private sector. 
3. The catalyst for the CM intervention. 
4. The transparency with which the NGO set campaign targets and reported back 
on the success of those campaigns 
5. The NGO representative's view of the organisation's role when engaging with 
the CM. 
6. Whether there were any philosophical issues arising from the campaign 
approach (for example, was there concern regarding the possible legitimisation 
of the CM by engaging with it? - see Section 1.8). 
7. The resources used for the CM intervention. 
8. Whether a review of the effectiveness of the CM intervention had been 
conducted. 
9. Lessons learned from the CM intervention. 
10. Knowledge of other NGO CM interventions. 
11. Whether any legal issues arose from the chosen campaign approach. 
12. Views regarding illegal NGO CM intervention using the campaign. 
13. How the NGO representative believed the NGO would be classified by the 
Elkington and Fennell `dolphin/shark/orca/sea lion' taxonomy of NGO business 
relations (see Section 1.4 above). 
14. The degree to which the NGO integrated SEE issues into its own financial 
arrangements. 
15. The degree to which the NGO had a policy regarding its corporate donations. 
To develop the questions specific to the particular NGO campaign, the relevant 
documentation detailing the NGO's approach to CM intervention was reviewed in 
advance of each interview. Similarly, those questions specific to opinion formers and 
SRI analysts were prepared in advance of each interview. These questions were based 
on the professional research area of the interviewee and, in some cases, included 
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detailed questions about other NGO campaigns. As the course of the interviews 
progressed, it became possible to raise certain comments or criticisms made by 
previous interviewees (on an anonymous basis) during the interview, thus facilitating 
both the unearthing of opinions relating to previous assertions and quick access to the 
core of specific issues. 
Interview Procedures 
Each interview was recorded and transcribed to enable detailed note-taking thereafter. 
In order to facilitate the free-flowing exposition of views and encourage the disclosure 
of potentially controversial positions, all interviewees were offered the opportunity to 
make comments on an unattributable basis (an opportunity taken up by a number of 
them). 
As recognised elsewhere, there are a number of inherent and, in some cases, related 
potential biases. For example, by interviewing NGO representatives who are 
employed in this area, there may be a bias towards exaggerated claims of success and 
skirting around failures. This bias has been mitigated in part by the addition of 
analysts from the area of SRI who have responded to NGO campaigns. Such analysts 
have access to information in respect of the target company's CSR practices and are 
well placed to assess the impact on target companies. Occasionally, such interviewees 
were able to substantiate the NGO as the route cause of the change through 
engagement dialogue with company managers. However, insofar as these analysts are 
employed by entities with commercial interests, they may themselves also be biased 
and may misrepresent the impact of an NGO CM intervention on a company. 
Therefore, the analysis was further augmented by independent opinion leader 
interviews and an extensive desk-based review of the relevant material. 
As with all such interviews, a considerable onus remained on the interviewer to judge 
the integrity of claims, seek out the hidden biases behind individual judgements and to 
remain, as far as possible, neutral during the research interviews. Further, the 
temptation to develop the interview into an exchange of views was resisted. As 
Oppenheim (op cit, p65) notes, "although words and sentences are exchanged in both 
directions, an interview is essentially a one-way process. Indeed, if it should become a 
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two-way process of communication (more like a genuine conversation) it will lose 
much of its value because of the bias introduced by the interviewer. " 
Having set out how the data was gathered and how the interviews were structured, the 
next two sections consider the evaluation process for the chronology and for the case 
studies. 
2.2.3 Process for Chronology Development and Analysis 
The period 1990-2002 was chosen as the timeframe for the chronology as it was 
during this time that UK NGO CM intervention developed into a relatively 
widespread NGO strategy (as demonstrated in Section 4.1). While there are 
occurrences of UK NGO CM intervention before this time (see, for example, Section 
1.0) they are limited and sporadic. Therefore, mapping the intervention from 1990 
onwards was sufficient to demonstrate the changing nature of the intervention. 
Having gathered the data on NGO CM intervention, to analyse the underlying trends 
it was necessary to catalogue and then classify the interventions. 
Cataloguing the data involved organising it into the following fields for each 
identified intervention: 
" Number: The chronological position among the NGO CM interventions that 
took place during the period in question. This is used for subsequent reference 
in the text. 
" Date: The year (and month, where known) that the intervention was launched. 
Where the intervention spanned a number of years, this is also reflected. 
" NGO(s): The name of the NGO or NGOs involved in the intervention. 
" Aim: The aim of the intervention. Where the NGO's own articulation of its aim 
is not available, an apparent aim is developed. 
" Nature of CM intervention: The action that took place in relation to the NGO 
CM intervention. 
" Classification: The strategy adopted by the NGO (see below). 
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" Success: Whether there is any prima facie evidence that the intervention was 
successful (see below). 
Classification of the interventions is a principal function of the NGO CM intervention 
model (developed in Section 3.1 below). This model was developed through analysing 
the main alternative dimensions of NGO CM strategy. The components of the model 
provided the means of classification. NGOs may adopt different strategies (see 
Section 1.4) when targeting different organisations, or may change their strategy over 
time. Therefore the model is used to classify each NGO CM intervention event rather 
than the NGO overall. Where an NGO CM intervention significantly shifts strategy, 
this is regarded as a new intervention. Each intervention was therefore classified using 
the following components of the NGO CM intervention model: 
1. Mechanism of company influence: economic cost of capital and/or Investor 
Advocacy influence. 
2. Route of influence: Direct or Indirect (and, where Indirect, what Stance was 
adopted - see discussion below). 
3. Primary audience: corporate and investment `CM institutions' or government 
`policy-makers'. 
4. Nature of argument - moral and/or business case. 
There were some instances where the NGO chose both options within the 
classification - for example, by using Both Business and Moral Case arguments. In 
such circumstances, where significant emphasis was given to one option over the 
other, then the intervention was classified by its primary component. Where it was not 
possible to identify a primary component, the intervention was classified as `both' for 
the relevant component of the model. It is recognised that these three alternative 
classifications (either/or/both) did not always provide full scope for the portrayal of 
what can be a more subtle relative focus within the intervention. Consequently, in the 
case studies, a polar diagram was used to depict this more subtle and nuanced view. 
However, as the polar diagram is intended to be purely a diagrammatic aid to 
represent NGO CM strategy, it is not suitable for use in a statistical analysis as it is 
too subjective to produce robust statistical results. The scale on the polar diagram 
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represents the extent to which a particular component was deployed and valid values 
range from zero to five, where five represents a significant relative focus on the 
component in question. 
In addition, for those interventions where the NGO sought to adopt an Indirect 
approach, Elkington and Fennell 's taxonomy of business-NGO relations was used to 
classify the `Stance' of the NGO. This facilitated a more complete representation of 
the NGO approach to Indirectly co-opting the influence of financial institutions. 
However, a number of important refinements to Elkington and Fennell's original 
model have been made in order to rectify the limitations previously identified (see 
Section 1.4). Use of the taxonomy here applies to the specific Indirect intervention 
taken by the NGO and does not classify the NGO-company Stance overall. This 
allows for the changing strategy over time and the simultaneous deployment of 
different strategies in different circumstances, thus eliminating two of the main 
limitations of the original taxonomy. 
The final component of the categorisation is an initial indication of the success of the 
intervention. Unlike the case studies, the chronology's classification of success of the 
NGO's CM intervention is based on a prima facie analysis of outcomes. `Success' is 
defined here as `some of the campaign objectives appear to have been met'. For 
reasons identified above (Section 2.2), accurate outcome attribution generally requires 
detailed analysis against a set of performance criteria (such as those developed in 
Section 2.2.4 below for the case studies). Nevertheless, it is possible to include an 
initial classification of `success' for use in establishing some early insight into the 
relative success of various strategies. Where no prima facie evidence of success or 
failure was present, the intervention is classified as such. Similarly, classifications are 
also included for relative degrees of confidence that the prima facie analysis is 
accurate. It uses the following key to represent relative success: 
" Apparently successful =Y 
" Possibly successful = Y? 
" Unsure one way or the other =? 
" Possibly unsuccessful = N? 
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0 Apparently unsuccessful =N 
SPSS was then used to analyse the underlying patterns in the changing nature of the 
NGO CM interventions in order to establish frequencies, relationships in the data, to 
discern underlying trends and establish empirical data on the relative probability of 
success of alternative CM intervention strategies. Probability is measured using an a 
posteriori definition35, i. e. it is "calculated from the results of the experiment after the 
series of trials has been completed' (Jenkins and Slack, 1985, p137). In this context, 
the NGO CM intervention event is regarded as a `trial', and the overall chronological 
record (1990-2002) represents the overall `experiment'. 
This stage of statistical analysis represents the macro analysis of the overall NGO CM 
interventions. The main claims established in Section 1, and the hypotheses in relation 
to NGO CM intervention success set out in Section 3.5, were used to structure this 
analysis. 
A further function of the NGO CM intervention model (developed in Section 3.1 
below) was to provide a structured set of hypotheses in relation to the probability of 
success of alternative strategies. More specifically, each component of the model 
provided the framework for the hypotheses (see Section 3.5). These hypotheses were 
developed through a process of deductive analysis of the practical likelihood of 
success from the main alternative components of NGO strategy. This deductive 
analysis on the relative limitations of each strategy appears in Section 3.4. As 
identified above, having developed these hypotheses it was possible to inductively test 
them against the empirical experience contained within the chronology. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Section 4.1 and the normative implications for NGO CM 
intervention are reviewed in Section 6. 
It should be noted that while every effort has been made to ensure the chronology is 
comprehensive, it may not be entirely complete because NGO CM intervention can be 
confidential and not well publicised. While the table does include many unreported 
examples (and some that were confidential at the time), unless unreported NGO 
35 "Also called the experimental or empirical or relative frequency" (Jenkins and Slack, 1985, p 137). 
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interventions have been specifically identified during the interviews, or included in 
the available SRI records (see above), the NGO CM intervention is omitted. However, 
in view of the exhaustive review of the relevant publications, considerable access to 
NGO and SRI NGO CM intervention records, and the fact that over half of the 
interviewees worked in a relevant area for the entire duration of the chronology, it is 
probable that all relevant and significant NGO CM interventions are included. This 
approach should have minimised sampling errors. 
A further point of note is the special status of UKSIF in the chronology. Formally, ' 
UKSIF is an NGO that is within the scope of this thesis (see Case Study 5.3). 
However, the chronology does not include all of its CM interventions. This is because 
UKSIF was set up as a trade association focused on promoting SRI and has conducted 
a substantial number of interventions over this time. Inclusion of its unilateral CM 
interventions would therefore significantly skew the data on the trends in campaigning 
NGO use of the CM. That is why only those UKSIF CM interventions that were 
conducted in conjunction with campaigning NGOs are included in the chronology. 
2.2.4 Process for Case Study Development and Analysis 
As identified above, case studies were required to provide a sufficiently detailed view 
of the effectiveness and efficiency of NGO CM intervention. The much more detailed 
analysis of success included in these case studies enabled a complete analysis of the 
main claims and hypotheses in relation to NGO CM intervention. This is particularly 
important for the development of the normative recommendations in relation to NGO 
CM intervention strategy and policy. 
In order to provide a sample size that was broadly representative and allowed for 
sufficiently detailed analysis, the author decided to conduct detailed case studies on a 
sample of 10 per cent of the interventions from the NGO CM chronology. They were 
selected primarily to analyse different NGO CM intervention strategies that had been 
adopted in relation to Mechanism of company influence, Route of influence, Primary 
audience, Nature of argument and the relative success of each. 
As the chronology (Appendix 2) demonstrates, there has not been an even spread of 
attempts to use the four main strategic approaches to NGO CM intervention identified 
74 
in Section 3.1. Consequently, the sample size for each of the four approaches varies 
considerably, as does the empirical data from which to draw conclusions. The specific 
case studies were selected for one or more of the following reasons: 
" to assess what factors influenced the outcome where prima facie evidence of 
success or failure existed; 
" interviewees had highlighted the particular case as being noteworthy in some 
way; 
" the NGO made significant use of CM Intervention overall; 
" the level and quality of the available data regarding intentions and outcomes 
was sufficient to conduct the analysis36 
The interventions cover nine NGOs and every component of the model except a shark 
and sea lion Stance37, and involve differing `scale' interventions in terms of resource 
and time commitment. 
As highlighted above, data was secured during interviews and via desk-based 
research. The analysis challenge for the case studies is arguably greater than that for 
the chronology, as it attempts to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
intervention. This depends on qualitative as well as quantitative data and requires a 
series of performance indicators. The rest of this section develops the process for the 
NGO CM intervention performance analysis within the case studies. 
Assessing NGO performance in this way presents a number of challenges. As Drucker 
(1990, p57) points out, the ultimate objective of NGOs is "changed human beings". 
Consequently, "performance and results are far more important - and far more 
difficult to measure and to control - in a non-profit organisation than in a business". 
Similarly, Edwards and Hulme (1995, p11) assert that "a great part of the dilemma... 
36 A predominance of case studies involves WWF-UK. This is for three main reasons: during the period 
in question, it appears to have made the most number of CM interventions; WWF deployed a range of 
strategies and the selected cases highlight a range of associated strengths and weaknesses; and as 
recognised above, because the author previously worked at WWF, the quantity and the quality of the 
information available for these case studies is greater than for most other NGO CM interventions. 
Every attempt has been taken to remain objective in reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
WWF cases. 37As noted in Section 4.1, neither of these Stances has been frequently deployed. 
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lies in the nature of the work that [NGOs] do and the messy and complex world in 
which they do it - measuring performance in relation to the kind of development 
subscribed to by most NGOs is an extraordinarily dill cult task... NGO evaluation 
(even more than evaluation in other organisations) is inevitably a matter of judgement 
and interpretation". 
The challenges surrounding the judgement and interpretation of NGO performance 
are similar to those that arise during attempts to assess the performance of government 
intervention and public policy. While the scale is different, both NGO and 
government forms of intervention have social welfare objectives, operate in complex 
environments, focus on targets that are difficult to measure accurately, and may be 
beyond their exclusive control. 
The literature reviewing the performance of regulatory interventions includes a review 
by Borkey and Leveque (1998) of voluntary approaches for environmental protection 
in the European Union (conducted for the OECD). Borkey and Leveque's 
performance criteria can be adapted to the context of NGO CM intervention 
performance evaluation. The adoption results in a two-stage assessment structure for 
NGO effectiveness: 
" Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility: how ambitious is the target? 
How realistic is it? What are the underlying aims? What dimensions are likely 
to work and why? Why might it fail? 
" Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness: has there been any change 
arising from the intervention? How does the change compare with stated aims? 
What is the relationship between the effectiveness of the intervention and the 
inputs or resources allocated to it? How significant a role did the CM campaign 
play? What was the chain of influence and why did it work? Where did the 
chain of influence break down and why did it fail? How openly is performance 
reported (akin to Edwards' above reference to `probity')? 
Where the intervention involved multiple objectives, in order to facilitate the overall 
analysis of ex post effectiveness of the intervention, each aim is analysed within a 
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tabular format. Where this is the case, the results of the analysis are presented in the 
following way: 
" Evidence that NGO achieved desired outcome =Y 
" Evidence that NGO partially achieved desired outcome = Y% 
" Insufficient evidence that NGO achieved desired outcome =? 
" Evidence that NGO did not achieve desired outcome unsuccessful =N 
It should be noted that the classifications refer to the degree to which there is evidence 
that the NGO achieved the desired outcome and not simply the degree to which the 
outcome came to pass. Partly as a consequence, the key for the categorisation of 
outcome effectiveness is more stringent than that which applies to the NGO CM 
intervention chronology success (Appendix 2). This analysis of `success' within the 
case studies is a much more detailed review (see Section 2.2.3). 
In addition to Borkey and Leveque's performance effectiveness criteria, an evaluation 
of the efficiency of the CM intervention from the perspective of the NGO was 
conducted: 
40 Efficiency: what is the relationship between the effect of the intervention and the 
inputs or resources allocated to it? 
As this is a review of efficiency from the perspective of the NGO, it is not an 
assessment of overall cost and benefit, but an assessment of costs and benefits 
accruing to the NGO. Where an economic measure of the outcome can be derived, 
this will be presented. More generally, a cost/assets influenced multiplier will be 
calculated. This will be calculated by dividing the total (sterling) value of equity 
assets that appear to have been influenced by the intervention, by the costs to the 
NGO (all values in sterling). These values facilitate an inter-intervention comparison. 
While the above criteria cover the effectiveness and efficiency of the NGO CM 
intervention, they say little about the societal context in which it is working. From this 
perspective, an NGO CM intervention can be effective only when it contributes 
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towards enhanced societal welfare. A more complete set of criteria therefore requires 
some measure of the degree to which the intervention is seeking to enhance welfare. 
However, as established in Section 1.1 above, welfare is a controversial concept and 
measuring changes in welfare presents significant conceptual and practical 
difficulties. This thesis therefore uses NGO legitimacy as a proxy for the degree to 
which the NGO overall is seeking to enhance societal welfare in some way. As 
identified in Section 1.1, Willetts (1997, p200) regards the United Nations process for 
assessing NGO eligibility for consultative status to ECOSOC "as having the status of 
customary international law". Therefore, in order to establish NGO legitimacy, the 
status of each NGO in relation to this process is assessed at the outset of each case 
study: 
" Legitimacy: what is the status of the NGO in relation to the ECOSOC protocol?.. 
While legitimacy is an assessment of the NGO, it does not include an assessment of 
the welfare-related outcomes of the intervention. One part of welfare is equity, which 
refers to the fairness of the distribution on costs and benefits. The measurement of 
equity is less controversial than the measurement of welfare and does not present the 
same practical challenges. Consequently, an equity review is included within each 
case study: 
" Equity: how fair is the distribution of benefits and burdens associated with the 
outcome of the NGO CM intervention? Have there been any unintended 
consequences and, if so, why did they occur? 
Further insight into more detailed NGO performance measurement can be gained 
from the literature on the accountability of NGOs. This considers that various 
attributes of NGO management are important indirect indicators of NGO 
performance. For example, Edwards and Hulme (1995, p9) notes: "Effective 
accountability requires a statement of goals... transparency of decision-making and 
relationships, honest reporting of what resources have been used and what has been 
achieved, an appraisal process for the overseeing of authority to judge whether the 
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results are satisfactory, and concrete mechanisms for holding to account (i. e. 
rewarding or penalising) those responsible for performance. NGO accountability 
may... emphasise the honesty and efficiency with which resources are used 
(commonly referred to as 'probity'), or the impact and effectiveness of work 
(commonly called `performance'). " 
Edwards' analysis of effective accountability requirements suggests that a series of 
generic NGO questions are necessary. These cover the NGO's stated goals; the 
rationale behind why it decided upon CM intervention; the nature of its relationships 
with business and FIs; the level of physical and financial resources used; whether an 
evaluation of the intervention was conducted; and what internal performance 
accountability mechanisms exist. 
One further measure of the impact of NGO CM intervention on targeted companies is 
the degree to which it influenced the company's share price. However, conducting a 
quantitative event analysis of the impact of NGO CM interventions on share prices in 
an attempt to discern a cost of capital effect was rejected on the following grounds: 
Statistical significance: in the context of the multifarious micro and macro 
economic influences on the share price, with some exceptions (see Section 
3.2.1), the share price impact of any NGO CM campaign is likely to be limited. 
For example, when assessing "The Relationship of Environmental and 
Economic Performance at the Firm Level", Wagner and Wehrmeyer (2002, 
p156) found that the problems associated with attributing economic 
performance to environmental performance were "compounded by the fact that 
influence on economic performance [of corporate environmental performance] 
is likely to be much smaller than that of many other factors. At the same time, 
due to the low quality of environmental performance data... there is 
considerable noise around the (small) environmental performance signal. " 
There are similarities here in respect of both lack of (a) the availability of 
standardised and consistently high-quality data on NGO CM intervention and 
(b) the anticipated scale of the impact of NGO CM intervention compared with 
other economic factors. 
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2. Sampling problems: the relative `youth' of NGO CM intervention means that 
the sample size of potential candidates for event analysis is small 
3. Diversity: though small in population size, the NGO CM interventions are 
highly diverse (see Appendix 2) 
Notwithstanding the above caveats, where an NGO's attempts to sway corporate 
practices by influencing a share price can be clearly defined, quantitative event 
analysis of the impact of NGO CM intervention would be an interesting avenue of 
future research. 
Instead of using secondary quantitative events analysis data, this thesis measures the 
impact of NGO CM intervention primarily through analysis of whether the 
intervention achieved its primary aims. Secondary effects on share price (and, 
therefore, cost of capital) are included, where available in professional investment 
analysis and independent studies. 
The analysis concludes with a review of the case study against its classification within 
the CM Intervention chronology in order to check the accuracy of its original 
classification. It is important to note that it also includes an inductive analysis of the 
degree to which the case study supports the main claims of this thesis in relation to 
NGO CM intervention. It also reviews whether there were any issues in assessing 
performance such as effect attribution or data-gathering problems (see below). 
In summary, therefore, having introduced the NGO and the specific CM intervention, 
the assessment within the case studies will take the following structure: 
" NGO Legitimacy: Review of the NGO against the UN consultative status 
ECOSOC process. 
" Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility: How ambitious is the target? 
How realistic is it? What are the underlying aims? What dimensions are likely 
to work and why? Why might it fail? 
" Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness: Has there been any 
change arising from the intervention? How does the change compare with 
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stated aims? How significant a role did the CM campaign play? What was the 
chain of influence and why did it work? Where did the chain of influence 
break down and why did it fail? How openly is performance reported (akin to 
Edwards' reference to `probity')? 
" Efciency: What is the relationship between the effectiveness of the 
intervention and the inputs, or resources, allocated to it? 
" Equity: What is the distribution of benefits and burdens associated with the 
outcome of the NGO CM intervention? Have there been any unintended 
consequences and if so, why did they occur? 
" CM Intervention Model Categorisation: which components of the NGO CM 
intervention model has the intervention used? (Section 3.1) 
" Inductive analysis of the case: does the case support the deductive hypotheses 
in relation to NGO CM intervention? 
" Issues in assessing performance: what are the main problems in relation to the 
data or effect attribution? 
" Conclusion 
Once this analysis has been conducted for each case study, then as with the 
chronology, an overall assessment is carried out on the degree to which the empirical 
experience within the case studies supports or undermines the main claims (Section 1) 
and subsequent hypotheses (Section 3.5). The results of this analysis are presented in 
Section 5.7 and the normative implications for NGO CM intervention are reviewed in 
Section 6. 
2.3 Chapter Conclusion 
In conclusion, having considered alternative methodologies, a grounded theory 
approach that combined desk-based research and exploratory interviews for data 
gathering and a mixed methodology quantitative and qualitative approach for data 
analysis. In order to minimise some of the disadvantages inherent within exploratory 
interviews, they were constructed to facilitate a one-way flow of information and to 
prevent their becoming an exchange of views. To validate specific claims, a cross- 
section of interviewees were chosen and claims from previous interviews were 
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relayed to relevant interviewees. The desk-based research involved a literature and 
press search. 
The data collected from these interviews and the desk-based research is used in two 
ways: 
1. To provide the empirical record necessary to develop a chronology of NGO CM 
intervention. The model developed in Section 3.1 is subsequently used to 
classify the chronological list of NGO CM interventions in Appendix 2. This 
data is then statistically analysed in Section 4.1 to discern the underlying trends 
in how NGO CM strategy evolved between 1990 and 2002. 
2. To provide the raw material for the case study review of evidence regarding the 
impact and extent of specific case studies of NGO CM influence in Section 5. 
This data is then assessed against the criteria for evaluation developed in the 
Section above. 
The complexity of NGO CM intervention was managed in two ways: 
1. The development of a classification model of NGO CM intervention. 
2. The consistent application of outcome measurement criteria relating to ex ante 
effectiveness, ex post effectiveness (similar to efficiency), and equity - and 
overlaying this analysis with questions pertaining to the transparency and 
accountability of the NGO in question in relation to the resource inputs and 
internal performance evaluation. 
Hypotheses for the relative success of NGO CM intervention were developed and 
tested against the empirical data contained in both the chronology and the case 
studies. Finally, the normative implications for NGO CM intervention are presented in 
the conclusion. 
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Chapter 3. Developing the NGO-CM Intervention Model 
The main aim of this Chapter is to introduce the model for NGO CM intervention and 
to explain in more detail the theoretical underpinnings of the CM `Mechanisms' of 
influence introduced in Section 1. 
The principal role of the NGO CM intervention model is to provide a better 
understanding of the complex interface between NGOs and the CM. As outlined in 
Section 2.2, the model defines the CM intervention strategies, and is used to classify the 
chronological list of NGO CM intervention between 1990 and 2002. It also provides 
structure to the analysis of the limitations in such interventions, and enables the 
development of specific hypotheses in respect of the probability of success. 
The structure of this Chapter commences with an outline of the model. Then the 
model's Mechanism of Influence components are reviewed in detail. This involves a 
review of the source of the CM's Economic Influence, followed by an outline of how 
NGOs use this influence. The source of the CM's Investor Advocacy Influence is then 
reviewed, and is similarly followed by an outline of how NGOs use Investor 
Advocacy Influence. The penultimate section includes an analysis of the theoretical 
limitations of NGO CM intervention. The Chapter closes by using this limitations 
analysis to develop hypotheses in relation to which NGO CM intervention strategies 
have the highest probability of success. These hypotheses are then evaluated in the 
empirical part of the project. 
3.1 The NGO CM Intervention Model 
This section uses the overview of the alternative CM-company influence mechanisms 
set out in Section 1 to derive a model for the overall structural interface (i. e. issue 
independent) between the NGO and the CM. To the knowledge of the author, no other 
model of NGO CM intervention has been developed. Consequently, this model 
represents one of the central contributions of this thesis. It also represents the 
preliminary stage in the analysis of the various NGO CM strategies deployed. 
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It has been established in Section 1.6 above that the CM has influence over the 
practice of listed companies. This influence is realised via two principal mechanisms: 
1. Economic Influence: The market establishes the cost of capital for listed 
companies. The more a company has to pay to for capital, the less it can raise. 
This limits the extent of its activity. 
2. Advocacy Influence: Shareholders are the `principals' of the business and can 
exercise their rights of share ownership over their `agents', the company 
directors. 
In the same way that the influence of the CM is realised via these two mechanisms, 
there are two associated strategies deployed by NGOs when attempting to encourage 
the consideration of SEE issues by the CM: 
I. An `Economic Influence' strategy - where the NGO attempts to divert capital 
away from one area and into others so as to affect companies' share prices and, 
therefore, the cost of capital. 
2. An `Investor Advocacy Influence' strategy - where the NGO uses the rights 
associated with share ownership to raise concerns with the company. 
This NGO choice of Mechanism of Influence forms one of the two main dimensions 
of the model and is described in more detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below. 
The other main dimension arises from the Route of Influence: NGOs may buy and sell 
shares on their own account or they may attempt to magnify their influence by co- 
opting the influence of large institutional investors. Co-opting investors' influence is 
classified as `Indirect'. Conversely, `Direct' involves an NGO (or coalition of NGOs) 
lobbying without having co-opted FIs. Which of these the NGO chooses is an 
important strategic factor and is therefore one of the main two dimensions of the 
model. 
Consequently, the Direct/Indirect dimension is defined as: 
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" Direct: the NGO uses the influence it has as a buyer, seller and owner of shares in 
listed companies. 
" Indirect: the NGO co-opts the influence of other CM actors associated with 
buying, selling and owning shares in listed companies. 
When combined, these two main dimensions of `Mechanism' and `Route' result in 
four strategic options: Direct and Indirect Economic Influence, and Direct and 
Indirect Investor Advocacy. 
Indirect NGO attempts to co-opt the influence of FIs have included confrontational 
campaigns - particularly when the NGO has believed that the FI is impeding the 
progress of a corporate campaign - and the relatively recent emergence of formal 
collaborative partnerships between SRI fund managers and NGOs38. To elucidate the 
NGO `Stance' taken during indirect approaches, a classification element of this 
Stance is added to the Indirect route: a revised form of Elkington and Fennell's 
taxonomy (Section 1.4) is used to classify the `Stance' taken by the NGO in the 
39 Indirect approach 
In addition to `Mechanism' and `Route' and the subsidiary element of `Stance' 
(which, as stated, applies only to the Indirect strategic options), there are two final 
subsidiary elements to the model: `Primary Audience' and `Nature of Argument'. 
Both apply to all four permutations of the two main dimensions (see diagram below). 
The audience element involves deciding whether to target companies and their 
investors and/or the public policy framework in which these CM institutions operate. 
As demonstrated in the chronology (Appendix 2), NGOs have attempted to use the 
strategic opportunities for sustaining long-term influence presented by the legislation 
governing the CM. In theory, changes to legislation could influence the behaviour of 
all listed companies by changing Economic Influence or Investor Advocacy Influence 
38 McLaren's study of SRI investors identifies that formal partners "rarely include non-governmental 
organisations and campaign groups" (2002, p7). 
39 As set out in Section 2.2, the Elkington and Fennel taxonomy is being used here to highlight the 
Stance adopted by NGOs when co-opting FIs in order to influence companies Indirectly, and not the 
Stance the NGO adopts in relation to attempts to Directly influence companies. 
85 
in some way. Changing the legislation therefore provides NGOs with a potential 
mechanism for influencing listed companies en masse. In addition to referring to the 
legislation underlying the CM, this component of the model also refers to 
interventions where the ultimate target is changed legislation in general - 
strengthened construction sector health and safety legislation, for example. 
The argument component denotes whether the NGO primarily used business case 
and/or moral case foundations to the debate. A business case argument uses 
conceptual, quantitative or qualitative financial analysis in support of a particular 
course of action - but a moral case argument uses ethical principles such as `do no 
harm'. 
As both the latter Primary Audience and Nature of Argument components are `and/or' 
options, each results in three alternative classifications - primarily business case, 
primarily moral case, and both business and moral case. 
The main two dimensions of `Mechanism' and `Route', when combined with the three 
subsidiary elements of Argument, Audience and Stance, yield the following model: 
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Figure 3.1: The NGO Capital Market Intervention Model 
This three-dimensional representation of the model (Figure 3.1) highlights the central 
importance of the two main choices of 'Direct/Indirect' and `Economic/Investor 
Advocacy Influence'. The foundations of the argument, the primary audience and 
Stance, underlie these two main dimensions. The lack of a third tier Direct Stance box 
indicates that a Direct intervention does not involve a Stance because the NGO is not 
attempting to co-opt FIs and, therefore, does not adopt a Stance in relation to them. 
By way of demonstrating how the model applies in practice, where an NGO attempts 
to influence a company via the CM by attempting to encourage its institutional 
investors to divest from the stock - perhaps because the company's environmental 
practice is potentially detrimental to share price - and they do so confrontationally via 
targeted correspondence with its main investors, the model would classify this as: 
" Economic Influence: `encourage a company's institutional investors to divest 
from the stock'. 
" Indirect: `via targeted correspondence with its main investors'. 
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9 Business case: `because the company's environmental practice is potentially 
detrimental to share price'. 
9 CM Institutions: `institutional investors'. 
" orca (see Section 1.4): `confrontationally'. 
Whereas, if an NGO attempts to influence a company via the CM by purchasing 
shares in order to attend an AGM so that it can raise questions surrounding the moral 
integrity of a company's behaviour, then the model would classify this as: 
" Investor Advocacy Influence: `purchasing shares in order to attend an AGM in 
order to raise questions'. 
" Direct: `an NGO... purchasing shares'. 
" Moral case: `questions surrounding the moral integrity of a company's 
behaviour'. 
" CM Institutions: `in order to attend an AGM'. 
(As this approach is Direct, then the Stance is not classified. ) 
There are clearly other components to the NGO-CM intervention that are not included 
in this NGO Capital Market Intervention Model. For example, the type of issue, type 
of NGO, scale and duration of the intervention are not incorporated. However, the 
model intentionally focuses on the structural approach of the NGOs in scope - not the 
nature of the SEE issues underlying the intervention - as the research questions apply 
to NGO CM strategy. Second order questions such as the scale and duration of the 
intervention will be covered in the descriptions of the intervention. As the Chronology 
" (Appendix 2) demonstrates, the model is operational, applicable and heuristically 
useful. 
One specific point of note is that the concept of an NGO as a `stakeholder' in the 
company is not explicitly used in the model. Organisational stakeholders are defined 
by Freeman (1984, p46) as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of an organisation's objective". The model opts instead for a 
neoclassical economic theory of the firm view of Investor Advocacy Influence: "In 
the neoclassical economics view of the business environment, which derives from 
Smith... the firm is viewed as a closed system with its only concern to satisfy 
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stockholders" (Andriof et al, 2003, p11). While the model proposed here is entirely 
consistent with the stakeholder view of the firm (and highlights one avenue through 
which NGOs affect companies and therefore become stakeholders), the neoclassical 
economic view provides sufficient and arguably less controversial theoretical 
grounding for the model. 
In summary, the two dimensions of the NGO CM Engagement model are defined by 
the NGOs' strategic direction and the degree to which they seek to utilise the 
influence of FIs. Underlying each strategy is the option to confront investors and/or 
policy-makers, and the option to use moral and/or business case arguments. 
Underlying the Indirect strategies is a choice of one of four `Stance' taxa. There are 
other ways to model this complex interaction, but focusing on the relationship 
between NGOs and the CM in this way is a useful means of categorising NGO 
behaviour that makes broad and intuitive sense. 
Having introduced the model, a more detailed review of the nature and origins of the 
two main Mechanisms of influence - Investor Advocacy and Economic - is required. 
This review is conducted in the sections below. 
3.2 The Source of CM `Economic Influence' 
Financial capital is of central importance to companies because they require this 
capital not only to meet operating costs, but also for investment in new projects. PLCs 
can raise new capital in the form of loans or equity - but capital costs money: 
1. Cost of debt: providers of debt finance, such as banks or investors in 
Corporate Bonds, "loan the money in return for a debenture -a promise to 
pay a stated sum each year [interest] and to repay the loan at some stated time 
in the future" (Lipsey, 1992, p169). The cost of debt, therefore, is the interest 
on the loan. 
2. Cost of equity: providers of equity finance - shareholders - "may receive 
dividends... [and] the possibility of capital appreciation" (Griffiths and Wall, 
1993, p361). Capital appreciation is expected by shareholders (Pareek, 2003) 
and "this expectation may be termed as the cost of equityfor a firm. The cost 
of equity is the cost paid to attract investors to invest in the stock of a company 
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and to keep them interested in retaining their investment. If this return is not 
returned to investors, they will dump the firm's stock and walk, and such a 
firm will not be able to raise future capital without offering substantial 
discounts. " (ibid). In addition to the costs arising from dividends and capital 
appreciation expectations, further costs in the form of underwriting fees4° arise 
at the point of new share issuance. 
A company's cost of equity capital will be higher the more it has to pay in dividends 
or the less it receives as a price for its stock. The price is set by market expectations 
(see Section 1.5). All other things being equal, the more favourably the CM views a 
company's prospects, the cheaper it will be for that company to raise equity capital to 
finance its growth through new investment projects. This is because the CM will 
perceive the company security as a lower risk and/or higher return investment 
opportunity and therefore value the equity more highly41. 
The cheaper the cost of capital to the company, the greater its ability will be to grow: 
it has to pay a lower proportion of the capital raised back to borrowers and investors, 
leaving more for investment projects and rendering it easier to generate a return on 
that capital. Conversely, as Handy (2002, p57) describes, "if management fails to meet 
their financial hopes, the share price will fall, exposing the company to unwanted 
predators and making it more difficult to raise new finance". 
Herein lies the main part of the CM's Economic Influence over corporate practice that 
is in focus in this thesis: the market for equities within the CM market sets a 
company's share price. This affects a company's cost of capital, which is an important 
business constraint. 
While this cost of capital effect is the primary source of economic influence in focus 
here, there are others. As recognised by Handy (above), where a director has presided 
over a long-term depreciation in share price, investors may call for the director to 
resign. The resulting damage to their professional reputation is sufficient motivation 
40 "Merchant Banks underwrite new share issues, guaranteeing to buy up any shares that are not sold 
on in the open market" (Pass and Lowes, 1993, p543). 
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for most directors to want to avoid such a scenario. More immediately, some argue 
that it is in the long-term interests of shareholders to have their financial interests and 
those of the directors aligned: "one way to give managers and incentive to maximise 
the value of a company's stock is to pay part of the manager's salary in stock options 
so that good stock market performance translates directly into higher compensation" 
(Hawley and Williams, 2000, p. 72). This has resulted in a significant performance- 
related component of many FTSE All Share company directors' remuneration 
packages. So Economic Influence also affects a director's remuneration and, 
therefore, acts as an additional motivating factor. 
In summary, the principal source of the CM Economic Influence is primarily the 
shareprice influence on a company's cost of capital, but it also originates from 
takeover prospects and directors' remuneration packages. 
3.2.1 How NGOs have an effect on CM Economic Influence 
This section reviews the practice of NGOs in adopting an Economic Influence 
strategy. Individual NGOs do not have sufficient financial reserves to buy and sell 
shares on their own account to be material to the CM. Therefore, an Economic 
Influence strategy is typically attempted Indirectly. 
Conceptually, if NGO corporate campaigning on SEE issues negatively affects 
investors' views on the company, then, ceteris paribus, a rational investor would 
decide to divest from the stock. Such action would drive down market demand for the 
share and, therefore, its price. This in turn would cause the cost of capital for the 
company targeted by the NGO to increase. In this hypothetical case of a highly 
effective NGO campaign, if a company decided not to change the cause of concern, it 
would become less competitive as its capital became more expensive - ultimately 
exposing itself to takeover. Consequently, the rational action on the part of the 
company would be to deal with the cause of concern in such a way as to bring the 
campaign to a close. 
The above conceptual case demonstrates how an effective NGO campaign could 
41 A complete treatment of the process of professional investment analysis, asset allocation and 
91 
influence corporate SEE performance via share price movements and cost of capital 
restrictions. However, in practice, two main questions arise: 
1. Investors buy and sell shares for a number of reasons - what evidence is there 
that SEE issues are integrated into their analysis at all? 
2. If investors do integrate SEE issues into their analysis, how in theory could 
NGOs working on those issues influence that analysis? 
In relation to the first question, Stigson (op cit, 2003, p6) argues that the financial 
markets are "starting to recognise that companies focusing on sustainable 
development represent a lower financial risk and also produce a better financial 
performance". Furthermore, investors are increasingly claiming to take into 
consideration SEE issues in their investment process in some way (Mathieu, 2000, 
P2)" 
But does the empirical evidence in relation to share price movements arising from 
SEE issues confirm these claims? There is a significant body of literature analysing 
the relationship between SEE issues and share price. Studies have taken a number of 
different approaches. The following analysis sets out the findings from different 
approaches and discusses the relevance of each approach to the question at hand: 
1. Portfolio analysis using negatively screened 'SRI funds (see Section 1.7): 
the claim in this context is that if funds that explicitly include SEE issues can be 
shown to outperform `unethical funds', it can be inferred that the market does not 
typically factor in SEE issues into its investment analysis. 
Bauer et al (2002) reviewed 103 negatively screened ethical mutual funds 
internationally. They found little evidence of significant differences in risk-adjusted 
returns between ethical and conventional funds between 1990 and 2001, although 
differences in relation to region and fund maturity were identified. Similarly, 
Kreander et at (2000) compared 40 negatively screened ethical funds and 40 `non- 
ethical' funds. While no significant differences in the financial performance indicators 
portfolio construction can be found in the seminal work by Graham and Dodd (1940). 
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were found, the paper did find evidence in support of lower levels of risk being 
generally associated with ethical funds. Elsewhere, Edwards (1998) analysed 
companies in the Jupiter Environmental Research Unit International Green Investment 
Trust acceptable list, and found that more than two-thirds of `green' companies 
performed better than their counterparts. But the extent of the performance difference 
was limited, leading to the overall conclusion that there was only limited support for 
the hypothesis that good environmental performance leads to above average financial 
performance. 
Therefore, as can be seen, portfolio analyses of negatively screened funds have not 
consistently demonstrated that such funds out- or under-perform conventional 
approaches. This may indicate that the mainstream CM also integrates an analysis of 
SEE issues in some way. However, there are two main problems with the claim that it 
is possible to use ethically screened fund portfolio studies in this way. First, the 
ethical criteria can be controversial: some funds screen out companies that are 
involved in animal testing for medical purposes and others do not invest in `poor 
countries'. In both cases, it is not clear that a more `ethical' outcome would arise from 
a restriction of capital to these areas. Second, the ethical screening process biases 
funds towards specific sectors that may be experiencing abnormal returns. "The 
Domini Social Index and the Citizens index42 are tilted towards large capitalisation 
growth stocks, and in particular overweight the technology stocks that have 
dominated the performance of the market up until last year" (Chen, 2001, p13). 
Consequently, any difference in performance may be for reasons other than the 
`ethical' nature of the criteria. 
2. Firm level regression analyses: these studies apply statistical analysis to the 
data on SEE and economic performance to look for correlations in the data. Salama 
(2003) looked at UK firms and conducted a median regression analysis on the 
relationship between environmental reputation and corporate financial performance. 
The study concluded that there was no statistical significant relationship between 
corporate environmental reputation and economic performance indicators. 
Conversely, Hart and Ahuja (1996) tested five hypotheses relating to emissions 
42 SRI screened indices. 
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reduction and return on assets, return on sales, and return on equity. The analysis 
suggested that it did `pay to be green' and that the high polluters in particular realised 
the biggest financial benefits due to significant low-cost improvements opportunities. 
Waddock and Graves (1997) also correlated companies'l previous year CSR ratings 
with financial performance'on measures such as return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), and return on sales (ROS). They found quantitative support for the 
assertion that there was a correlation between CSR and financial performance. 
Similarly, King and Lenox (2000) reviewed 640 manufacturing firms and found good 
environmental performance to be associated with strong financial performance. 
Salama also presents a summary of 45 empirical studies in the same area: "twentyf ve 
studies (55%) have provided support for a positive relationship.. . twelve studies 
(27%) 
did not find any linkages, three studies (7%) documented negative linkages, while five 
studies (11%) found mixed results" (2003, p6). As can be seen, while the balance of 
evidence is in favour of a positive correlation, regression studies do not consistently 
point to a strong relationship between SEE issues and financial indicators. This may 
be because there is "limited environmental performance data" available on companies 
(Wagner and Wehrmeyer, 2002, p150). Therefore, as Schaltegger and Synnestvedt 
(2001) point out, these correlations typically use small data sets that, with narrow 
definitions of environmental performance, may explain the lack of consistency. 
Furthermore, as Hart and Ahuja (1996) recognised, while regression studies are good 
at ascertaining correlations in the data, they are not good at identifying causality. 
Whereas there is a conceptual relationship between making environmentally related 
efficiency improvements and improved economic performance, it is also possible that 
the causality is the other way around. As Chen argues: "Social responsibility could be 
the by-product of financial success. A prosperous company has more incentive to 
protect its reputation and can afford to treat its stakeholders well, and invest in the 
environment and in the communities in which it operates" (Chen, 2001, p11). 
Therefore, even if correlation analyses of measures of SEE performance and stock 
market indicators consistently identified a strong link, this would not necessarily 
indicate that the CM integrates SEE issues into its analysis. 
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3. Event analysis of SEE issues: the events analysed range from disclosure of 
pollution inventory data through to catastrophes such as a major chemical spill and 
explosions. 
An influential study by Hamilton (1995) reviewed the impact on the share price of the 
US Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) release of companies' site-specific 
pollution data via the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) in 1989. This is one of the few 
event analysis studies to look at how specific `on the ground' corporate environmental 
performance correlates with share price movements across an industry. The intention 
of the EPA was that by subjecting the pollution data to public scrutiny, companies 
would be given an additional incentive to reduce emissions. The TRI placed data on 
some companies' toxic emissions to air, water and land in the public domain for the 
first time. This information was felt to be of potential relevance to investors as it 
could be a forward indicator of civil actions and pollution convictions, and a general 
indicator of the quality of a company's management systems. Hamilton's (op Fit, 
p 112) analysis indicated that shareholders in firms reporting TRI pollution figures 
experienced negative, statistically significant abnormal returns upon the first release 
of the information: "the average abnormal return on the day [the TRI] information 
made public was negative and statistically significant... firms lost on average $4.1 
million... the greater the number of different chemical submissions reported by the 
firms, the larger the drop in stock for the company". 
Separately, Blacconiere and Patten (1994) examined whether the catastrophe of Union 
Carbide's 1984 chemical leak in Bhopal, India, caused a market reaction in relation to 
other chemical firms. Their study found evidence of a significant intra-industry 
reaction. However, firms with more limited environmental disclosures in their 
financial reports prior to the chemical leak experienced a more significant negative 
reaction than firms with more extensive environmental disclosures. As with 
Hamilton's findings, Blacconiere and Patten concluded that their results suggested 
that investors include an analysis of the firm's environmental disclosures and regard 
them as a positive sign that the firm is managing its exposure to future regulatory cost. 
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More 'generally, Knight and Pretty (2001) analysed the shareholder `ValueReaction'a3 
to a number of corporate catastrophes. They identified `value reactions' arising from a 
number of corporate reputation crises that related to SEE issues. For example, 
following a Bridgestone Corporation product recall due to health and safety concerns 
related to their tyres being used on Ford Explorers, "the stock market reaction was 
severe: 50% of value [was] wiped off Bridgestone shares" (op cit, p. 20). They. also 
evaluated Bank of Scotland's (BoS) volte-face in relation to its joint venture with the 
American television evangelist Pat Robertson, who had "loud and hostile views on 
homosexuals, liberals, Hindus, Muslims, abortion, and the, role of women" (op cit, 
p30). BoS' initial response was to defend its joint venture because "most new 
initiatives upset some special interest groups. It would be almost impossible to run a 
business if you tried to please everyone" (op cit). BoS was to maintain this position 
for some months - but in the end, it cancelled the joint venture and apologised to 
shareholders at its AGM: "Our judgement was wrong and for that the board 
apologises" (op cit)., Knight and Pretty identify a shareholder value reaction to BoS in 
excess of 45 per cent arising from the Pat Robertson joint venture. 
Gunthorpe (1997) examined whether the financial markets penalised public 
corporations for unethical business practices. It looked at 69 US corporations that 
were the subject of public announcements concerning a range of ethical 
misdemeanours such as fraud, price fixing, bribery and patent infringement. It found a 
statistically significant negative abnormal (excess) return upon the announcement that 
a firm was under investigation or had in some way engaged in unethical behaviour. 
Gunthorpe concluded that this suggested that firms were penalised by the CM for their 
unethical actions. 
Therefore, as to whether the empirical evidence in relation to share price movements 
confirms investor claims regarding the integration of SEE issues into research, while 
there are problems using the portfolio and regression analyses, the above research 
strongly indicates that the CM includes an analysis of SEE issues where they can 
cause significant brand damage, costly litigation or serious regulatory ramifications. 
43 This is not a measure of absolute share price movements but "the extent to which the firm's share 
price outperformed or underperformed market expectations" (ibid, p14). 
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Therefore, in relation to the question at hand, there are circumstances in which SEE 
issues have been integrated into their CM analysis. 
While the above analysis addresses the first question as to whether the market 
incorporates SEE issues at all, it does not elucidate how NGOs shape the economic 
influence that the CM has over corporate practice. The second question remains - 
how do NGOs attempt to harness the CM's economic influence? 
One answer is that when NGOs act as a `Civil Regulator' (see Section 1.1), they can 
impact upon company earnings and share price. This claim was confirmed by the 
Knight and Pretty (2001) analysis of the BoS case (above). Similarly, Dowell et al 
(2000) conducted an empirical study into whether global environmental standards 
created or destroyed value. This concluded that "nongovernmental organisations 
expose unsound corporate environmental practices, raise consumer awareness, and 
put pressure on governments to discipline polluters even if the pollution is in overseas 
locations. Through these means poor environmental performance is translated into 
bad public image, lower consumer goodwill, and ultimately, lower firm value. Aware 
of this disciplinary effect, far-sighted managers conscious of firm value opt to 
maintain a high level of environmental practice, even where regulations do not 
require it" (op cit, p1070). 
This demonstrates that NGOs can influence the CM's economic influence, but it does 
not clarify how they attempt to harness it. From the specific perspective of the NGO 
CM intervention model (Section 3.1), when adopting an Economic Influence strategy 
an NGO has an `Argument' option which it can use to motivate behaviour on the part 
of third parties. This Nature of Argument refers to whether the foundations of the 
overall intervention are rooted in business case or moral case arguments. 
NGOs make moral arguments for divestment - and some individual investors may 
respond to this. However, in general, FIs are legally prevented from responding to 
purely moral arguments (see Section 3.4 for a detailed discussion surrounding the 
legal origins of this constraint). So when considering how NGOs deploy an Economic 
Influence strategy, the strength of the business case argument and/or their ability to 
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generate such a business case is a significant determinant of success and is therefore 
the focus of the discussion here. In general, there are two distinct scenarios arising: 
1. CM inefficiency: the NGO issue is currently material to company earnings but 
the market is not considering the issue. 
2. `Immateriality': the NGO issue is not currently material to company earnings 
and therefore not factored into company analysis. 
In respect of the `CM inefficiency' scenario, if sustainability issues are to matter to 
companies, then one option for NGOs is to bring such issues to the fore - within 
companies - by accentuating to investors the positive economic implications of social 
agendas (where they exist) so that investment analysis of performance in this area 
becomes integral to company valuation and, therefore, the company's cost of capital. 
NGOs have made a number of attempts to tailor their campaign to the CM by using 
business case and shareholder value arguments to support their moral standpoint. 
The Corner House, the NGO which has implemented a number of different CM 
interventions (see Appendix 2), has advocated to its peers the use of the business case: 
"The arguments that count in financial markets are not those based directly on ethics 
or environmental self-interest ('investing in this company means that your children 
are more likely to get cancer'), but on financial risk ('lawsuits arising from cancer 
cases will cost this company a lot of money and reputation, so your investment won't 
earn as much as you thought')" (Corner House, 2002, p3). (Section 6.1 below 
analyses the limitations that arise with such a strategy) 44 . 
A practical example of an NGO using business case arguments as part of a CM 
intervention is Greenpeace, which commissioned an assessment of the share price 
impact of government responses to the threat of climate change on an oil and gas 
company's share price. Greenpeace commissioned Innovest, a specialist investment 
consultancy, to quantify the risks that BP faced from climate change. 
44 It should be noted that while a compelling new business case may change investment decisions, it is 
clear that investors would care if their 'children are more likely to get cancer'. As demonstrated in 
Section 5, moral arguments have been used effectively by NGOs to promote change via investors. 
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This analysis found that "under plausible scenarios, the discounted present value of 
potential future carbon liabilities within a single energy-intensive manufacturing firm 
could represent a substantial percentage of its entire market capitalisation"(p3). It 
concluded: "A drop in demand for gasoline over the next 20 years owing to greater 
market penetration of low emissions vehicles could erode earnings by up to 5% ... 
BP's plans to expand upstream oil and gas production may serve to heighten the 
firm's exposure to climate change-related risks to the extent that carbon constraints 
disrupt demand for fossil fuels. As such, shareholders would be justified in seeking 
clarification of the company's risk mitigation strategy" (Whittaker and Brammer, 
2001, p14). This research was presented to institutional investors up to and at the 
2001 AGM. 
The key question here is whether this research encouraged shareholders to `seek 
clarification of the company's risk mitigation strategy'. It can be shown that by 
alerting the market to the potential `materiality' of climate change with this financial 
research, Greenpeace appears to have increased both investor interest in BP's climate 
change strategy and its communication to investors about the issue. The evidence in 
support of this claim includes: 
1. Investment Analysis: 
The investment consultancy Global Risk Management Services (2001, p6) referred to 
"BP going to unprecedented lengths [prior to the AGM]... The company held 
meetings with significant shareholders and SRI fund managers to stress its case, 
which indicates how seriously they took the challenges laid down. " 
2. Greenpeace claims: 
"It gave us a serious side - we had a reason to go and talk to investors and talk to 
them seriously about climate change and what BP were doing. It certainly put the 
wind up BP. They really didn't like us talking to their shareholders at all... if you put 
in a resolution you are entitled to circulate your argument, so we got in touch with 
one million people - at BP's expense - with our arguments about oil, pristine areas 
and climate change" (Tunmore, 2001: interview). 
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3. Investor activity 
Following the AGM, a number of BP's largest institutional shareholders, including 
Barclays Global Investors, Schroders, Henderson, Jupiter, USS, Friends Ivory & Sime 
and Morley Fund Management, met BP to review the detail of its strategy in relation 
to climate change. BP subsequently, ran its first high-profile climate change, 
technology presentation to mainstream oil and, gas analysts, which reviewed the 
company's renewable energy capacity and carbon sequestration technology. More 
than 18 months after the report, following a further BP presentation to investors, 
HSBC proffered the view that "BP leads the sector on its climate change strategy" 
(HSBC, 2002b, p3). v 
Clearly, this Greenpeace-commissioned business case analysis was not the only 
source of climate change-related influence on BP or its investors at the time. Such 
pressure would have also originated from the public policy debate, for example. 
However, there is prima facie evidence that investors were motivated to seek 
clarification of the company's risk mitigation strategy as a result of Greenpeace's 
business case arguments". 
In respect of the above `immateriality' scenario, where there is no initial business case 
for the NGOs' preferred course of action, NGOs have successfully influenced 
corporate practice by targeting their campaign activity on the key business drivers 
underlying a company's cost of capital. These share price value drivers include, inter 
alia, earnings, access to raw materials, productivity and brand value. The result is that 
the NGO effectively `materialises' the business case for corporate change. Some 
related examples are detailed below: 
1. Creating a business case via a focus on the earnings value driver. 
Where NGOs implement consumer boycott campaigns that change consumption 
patterns on a sufficient scale to be reflected in company earnings, the market picks up 
as Section 2 highlighted the fact that event analysis of the impact of specific NGO CM intervention on 
share price would be an interesting area of future research. As stated in Section 6, this Greenpeace 
intervention is one example that would benefit from such analysis. However, for the purposes of this 
example, it is sufficient to show that investors were motivated to take some action by an NGO using Business Case arguments. 
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the earnings effect within the quantitative analysis and may then reflect this in the 
valuation. To the extent that this changed valuation affects investment decisions, it 
will also have an effect on the company's cost of capital for as long as the campaign is 
effective. One example is the impact on consumer purchasing behaviour from the 
NGO campaign against genetically modified foods, and the subsequent impact on the 
share price of Monsanto, the main company supplying the new agricultural 
technology: "Monsanto's share price has fallen from a high of $51 earlier this year to 
just over $42 yesterday as the consumer backlash against genetically modified foods 
in Europe has spread to the US" (The Guardian, 1999, p16). 
2. Creating a business case via a focus on the raw material value driver. 
Where NGOs have limited the availability of raw materials to a company by, for 
example, preventing access to a particular source, investors have included the 
financial impact of this activity in their analysis. NGOs are more likely to choose this 
route of action when the company in question does not have a `high street' brand that 
is susceptible to consumer boycott. One example is the integration of access to 
environmentally sensitive sites into an assessment of BP's exposure to political risks 
that was conducted by SG Global Research brokers (Ennis 2002, p11). SG 
constructed a quantified model of political risk. This defined overall risk to the oil and 
gas sector as comprising three main components: 
" overall political risk; 
9 fiscal terms of the host country, and 
" risks associated with exploration and production. 
Overall political risk (component 1) comprises a number of subsidiary elements 
including the likelihood of imminent war, the stability of a country's regime and - of 
particular relevance here - `environmental sensitivity'. This is defined as "how much 
opposition there is within a country to the current development of petroleum 
operations. " Ennis cites the opposition to drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge as an example. The inclusion in mainstream financial analysis of the effect of 
the NGO campaign against drilling in the Arctic Refuge is noteworthy. It is also 
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interesting to note its relative importance: the model assigns a weighting of 1 per cent 
of the `Total Overall Risk' from `environmental sensitivity', whereas the risks arising 
from `war' (defined as outright war and cross-border disputes) is 0.9 per cent and the 
risks. from `repatriation' and the `fiscal terms' risk (changes in a country's fiscal 
policy) is 1.2 per centa6. 
3. Creating a business case via a focus on the employee productivity value driver. 
Where NGOs have affected employee morale in such a way as to be detrimental to 
productivity, investors have integrated this into their analysis via the productivity 
measures in the quantitative analysis.: Greenpeace's campaign against the proposed 
disposal of the Brent Spar oil storage platform in the North Sea seems to have 
contributed to corporate change at Shell. A combination of value drivers appear to 
have been involved here: Svendsen et al (2001) say that "Shell estimated that the 
direct costs to change the disposal decision was $200m US. Boycotts and threats at 
the pump also cost the firm sales and market share. 50 Shell service stations were 
vandalised, 2 firebombed and one raked with gunfire. Employee morale plummeted... 
the Brent Spar North Sea oil platform incident cost Royal Dutch/Shell fully 30% of its 
market share in Germany within one month. " 
However, according to Mark Wade, a senior executive in Shell's Sustainable 
Development Group, employee morale was the single biggest factor responsible for 
the turn-around in Shell's decision (pers com, 2000). 
Knight and Pretty (2001, pp 24-25) identify a ValueReaction in Shell's share price of 
almost -10 per cent from this Greenpeace campaign against Shell. In this context, this 
research is particularly important because it clearly demonstrates that an NGO can 
have a significant impact on a company's share price (and, therefore, its cost of 
capital). 
46 These weightings are not based on an empirical analysis but are relatively arbitrarily derived in that 
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4. ` Creating a business case via the brand valuation driver. 
Finally, and most pervasively, NGOs have also targeted the share price value driver of 
a company's reputation. `Brand' has become a highly important asset for many listed 
companies. In some circumstances, a corporate brand can account for more than two- 
thirds of a company's market value (Knight and Pretty, 2001, p9). In general, 
`intangibles', including brand value, represent about 27 per cent of the market value 
of the FTSE 100 (Financial Times, 2003b, p6). Unsurprisingly, companies spend 
considerable time and money on protecting and enhancing the value of their brand. 
And -as highlighted by Zadek (2000), "The relevance of intangible assets has 
increased'. Zadek also claims that the ability of NGOs to affect the value of these 
intangible assets has similarly increased. 
Zadek (1998, p16) further declares: "The traditional thinking behind `civil regulation' 
is that the reputation of companies can be damaged by civil action to a degree that 
will affect their business performance". However, he questions whether this happens: 
"Even the very high profile campaigns against Shell, Nestle, Monsanto and Nike did 
not have any demonstrable impact on shareprice or dividends... the empirical 
evidence just does not back this up" (ibid, p 17). However, as can be seen from the 
above analysis in points 1 and 3 above, Zadek was wrong to challenge the `traditional 
thinking' as it can be empirically demonstrated that NGO campaigns - including some 
of those that he cites - have had significant share price impacts. 
Similarly, as mentioned in Section 1, there are other examples of an NGO campaign 
potentially impacting on the intangible value of a company's brand through 
reputation. For example, Deutsche Bank sell-side broker analysis on ExxonMobil 
(2002, p4) refers to the campaign and concludes that: "While the company insists that 
it has suffered no fiscal impact from the boycott, being handed a reputation as 
environmental enemy number one for such a big customer facing business has to be 
considered a brand risk". Similarly, one investor - Robert Monks, Chairman of 
LENS Investment Management - filed a resolution at the ExxonMobil AGM calling 
they are based on an individual expert view. 
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for the separation of the Chairman and CEO positions because he believed "the 
current holder of the posts - Lee Raymond - and his denial of the global warming 
problem [was] - destroying the reputation, of, the energy giant". Monks claimed 
"Raymond's - extreme position and : negative public image is the reason that 
ExxonMobil's stock is undervalued compared to its peer group when it should be at a 
premium. " (O'Dwyer's, 2001). --_- 
The above analysis shows. how NGOs have in some instances influenced the key 
value drivers of a business. It further demonstrates that by influencing these key value 
drivers through their corporate campaigning, NGOs have `materialised' SEE issues 
for companies. The above examples of NGOs 'creating a business case for corporate 
change also demonstrate that the NGO does not necessarily have to engage actively 
with the CM in order to integrate the campaign into its analysis: the market should 
incorporate the impact of an effective NGO campaign into the qualitative and or 
quantitative analysis. However, where the market fails to do so, the NGO may target 
the CM with business or moral case arguments. I 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that where NGOs have either 
successfully advocated the inclusion of certain SEE issues into the investment 
analysis process, or influenced key business value drivers, then NGOs have made 
their issue material to the company. This can subsequently encourage changes to 
corporate practice via the influence that cost of capital has over a company's ability to 
do business. 
3.3 The Source of CM `Investor Advocacy Influence' 
As considered above, the second of the two principal routes through which the CM 
can influence the practices of listed companies is Investor Advocacy Influence. The 
discussion below reviews the origins, nature and scope of this influence. 
It has been demonstrated that Economic Influence arises from the trading activity on the 
CM. Conversely, Investor Advocacy Influence arises out of the law that has established 
the market. As mentioned in Section 3.1 above, this is distinct from an Economic 
Influence strategy as the latter is realised through buying and selling shares, whereas 
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Investor Advocacy Influence is realised via the ownership rights of shares which, when 
sold, are lost. 
In the UK; the opportunity for shareholder influence is a legal attribute of the corporate 
form as established in UK Company Law. Consequently, when seeking to understand 
the theoretical foundations of Investor Advocacy Influence, it is necessary to have a 
basic understanding of the legal context of Investor Advocacy. In particular, those 
sections dealing with the ownership, control and accountability of a company are 
important. The following discussion focuses on these aspects. 
As identified above, the Companies Act regulates PLCs. The main legal principles of 
the modern form of a publicly listed company are as follows (adapted from 
Mackenzie, 1993, p29): 
The Company: once incorporated, the company becomes a `legal person' on its own 
account. The directors are appointed by the shareholders to manage the company. 
The Directors: the law variously considers the directors to be the agents of the 
shareholders, the controllers of the company and the company's servants. The articles 
of association confer on the board overall control of the company's activities. The 
board typically appoints executives to exert day-to-day management control. As a 
counterpoint to this power, the Companies Act gives the board formal responsibilities 
to its shareholders, employees and the company as a whole. 
The Shareholders: individual and organisational shareholders become `members' of 
the company when they buy the shares. At the Annual General Meeting, they are 
expected to oversee the activities of directors and may vote on their (re-)election. 
Shareholders may alter the Articles of Association -a founding legal document of the 
company - and, in some companies and in certain circumstances, may direct the board 
to follow specific policies. 
Despite the common impression to the contrary, in strict legal terms, shareholders do 
not own companies as a whole. In a 1948 landmark test case, Lord Justice Evershed 
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concluded that . 
"Shareholders are not, in the eye of the, law, part, owners of the 
undertaking [the company]. The undertaking is something different from the totality of 
the shareholdings. " (Gower, 1969, p522). The intellectual basis of this judgement 
was, in part, the fact that in law a company is regarded as a `person', and is therefore 
beyond ownership. 
Nevertheless, a large part of Company Law exists in order to prevent shareholders' 
interests being abused by company directors and confers onto shareholders certain 
legal rights. As mentioned above, in Company Law, shareholders are expected to 
oversee the activities of directors. Directors are therefore accountable for their 
performance to the shareholders who elect them to act on their. behalf. Furthermore, 
the law conveys a collective responsibility on shareholders to ensure that `negligence 
and profusion' does not prevail in the management of the company. 
The principle for these legal provisions can. be traced back to Adam Smith, who 
argued that optimal market efficiency required the owners of capital to be directly 
involved in its management because they tended to be more vigilant with their own 
money (Smith, 1776). Where a company lacked oversight by the owners of the 
money, Smith argued that company directors, "being the managers rather of other 
people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own... Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less in the management of the affairs of such a 
company. " (Smith, op cit, p700). 
So while it is true that a company is more than a mere item of property, a legal 
relationship exists between company shareholders and company directors that 
provides shareholders with considerable Investor Advocacy Influence over corporate 
practices. 
The specific legal rights conferred upon shareholders by Company Law include 
certain rights of access to the company directors: entrance to annual general meetings, 
the ability to vote on resolutions, the appointment of the directors, approval of the 
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annual report, approval of the remuneration report and, in specific circumstances, the 
ability to table a shareholder resolution directing the company to take a particular 
course of action or call for an Extraordinary General Meeting (Mackenzie, 1996, p46). 
Company Law also sets the parameters for legitimate shareholder advocacy (see 
Section 1.8). For example, in the UK, formally submitting a shareholder resolution 
requires compliance with the procedures intended to ensure that the issues discussed 
at an AGM are appropriate. Specifically, Section 376 of the Companies Act states that 
when a company receives a resolution from shareholders who collectively represent a 
minimum of either 1/20th of the total voting rights, or 100 members holding shares 
collectively owning an average nominal47 holding of £100 per member, then the 
company must circulate the resolution to its shareholders with the notice of its AGM. 
In addition to the Investor Advocacy Influence derived from the legal rights 
associated with the ownership of ordinary voting shares, a norm has been established 
whereby a company director's prime responsibility is to increase `shareholder value' 
(SHV): "Shareholder value is the reigning orthodoxy" (Freeman, 2003, p7). This 
provides a secondary source of Investor Advocacy Influence. 
The SHV doctrine is embedded in the legal principle that shareholders entrust the 
directors with running the company's business on their behalf. It has now become 
common practice among UK PLCs to refer to the importance that directors place on 
the generation of SHV. Consequently, it is possible for investors to raise concerns 
with the directors of investee companies on the grounds that their control over the 
company's activities is affecting SHV. 
Investor Advocacy Influence is promoted by government-backed recommendations 
contained in the corporate governance48 best practice codes of conduct that encourage 
investors to play an active share ownership role. The main reasons why corporate 
governance guidelines are important to NGO CM Investor Advocacy Influence are 
47 'Nominal' refers to the value that is assigned to the share certificate itself for legal purposes, rather 
than the than the price at which the share is trading which is generally significantly higher. 48 Corporate Governance focuses on the problems resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control between directors and shareholders, and has been defined as "the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled" (Hampel, 1998, p1). 
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first, that they highlight the responsibilities of share ownership, and second, that they 
recognise that engagement on issues of, corporate social responsibility is, an 
appropriate activity for investors. 
In respect of the responsibilities of share ownership, the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Committee on Corporate Governance, May _ 2000)49 recommends that 
FIs should take a more active role in ' Corporate Governance, and states that 
"institutional investors have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes" 
(2000, p4). It recommends that they. "should be ready, where practicable, to enter into 
a dialogue with companies" (ibid). It also levies a commensurate stipulation upon 
companies to converse with their investors: "Companies should be ready, where 
practicable, to enter into a dialogue with institutional shareholders based on the 
mutual understanding of objectives" (ibid). 
The Combined Code is particularly important to NGO CM intervention because it is 
integrated into the UK Listing Authority stock exchange listing rules50. By way of 
sanction, a company risks losing its listing if it is found to be in breach of the listing 
rules and is not able to explain why this breach has occurred. A listing is important for 
any large company wishing to raise capital from investors, so such a potential 
sanction is a significant threat. (However, the question has understandably been raised 
as to whether the stock exchange would in practice withdraw a listing, since this 
would be deeply problematic for a company's shareholders who would find their 
share prices plummeting due to the significant decrease in the liquidity of their 
shares. ) 
In respect of the recognition within these corporate governance guidelines that 
engagement on issues of corporate social responsibility issues is an appropriate 
activity for investors, the Institutional Shareholders' Committee 51 has published The 
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents - Statement of Principles 
(2002). In addition to recommending the establishment of policies and systems for 
49 Updated in May 2003. 
so The Financial Services Authority, in its official role as the 'Competent Authority' for the UK Listing 
Authority, sets out the rules for companies wishing to be listed (UKLA, 2002). 51 In 2002, the members were the Association of British Insurers, the Association of Investment Trust 
Companies, the Investment Management Association and the National Association of Pension Funds. 
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conducting,. monitoring, measuring and reporting on activism52, this statement 
recognises that engagement on issues of corporate social responsibility is an 
appropriate activity for investors: "Many issues could give rise to concerns about 
shareholder value... Instances where institutional shareholders and/or agents may 
want to intervene include when they have concerns about... the company's approach 
to corporate social responsibility" (op cit, pp3-4). 
Similarly, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN, 2003, p3)53 
Statement on Institutional Shareholder Responsibilities declares that "it is clear that 
institutions risk failing to meet their responsibilities as fiduciaries if they disregard 
serious Corporate Governance concerns that may affect the long-term value of their 
investment. They should follow up on these concerns and assume their responsibility 
to deal with them properly. Such concerns may, for instance, relate to... the 
management of environmental, ethical and social risks". 
One further reason why Corporate Governance codes are relevant to NGO Investor 
Advocacy Influence is that these codes recommend certain mechanisms for investor 
intervention through which influence can be brought to bear. For example, ICGN 
(2003, pp3-4) details the following list of intervention options: 
"The general objective is to stimulate the preservation and growth of the companies' 
long-term value... Appropriate actions to give effect to these ownership 
responsibilities may include: 
" Voting; 
" Supporting the company in respect of good governance; 
" Maintaining constructive communication with the board on governance policies 
and practices in general; 
52 An alternative term for institutional investors' engagement with companies on issues of corporate 
3 
fovernance and corporate responsibility. 
The ICGN is a network of investors that works to promote better Corporate Governance worldwide. 
In August 2001, ICGN members were estimated to hold assets exceeding $10 trillion. These members 
include the founding pension funds such as the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS), the College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), and institutional investors such as 
the Council of Institutional Investors in the USA, the Association Francaise de la Gestion Financiere, 
Barclays Global Investors, Capital Group, CDC Investment Management, Deutsche Boerse, European 
Association of Securities Dealers, European Federation of Investment Funds and Companies, Fidelity, 
Paris Bourse, Trust Company of the West, Unicredito Italiano and others. 
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0 Incorporating Corporate Governance analysis in the investment process; 
" Stimulating independent buy-side research; 
" Expressing specific concerns to the board, either directly or in a shareholders 
meeting; 
0 Making a public statement; 
Submitting proposals for the agenda of a shareholders meeting; 
" Submitting one or more nominees for election to the board as appropriate; 
" Convening a shareholders meeting; 
" Teaming up with other investors and local investment associations either in 
general or in specific cases; 
" Taking legal actions, such as legal investigations and class actions; 
" Outsourcing any or all of these powers to specialized agents, for instance in the 
event the institutional shareholder concludes that it does not have the ability to 
muster necessary skills in-house; 
" Lobbying governmental bodies and other authoritative organisations; 
" Making appropriate statements concerning public policies affecting shareholder 
rights and Corporate Governance. " 
One Corporate Governance code of particular relevance to the NGOs in focus here is 
the Association of British Insurers' (ABI) SRI Guidelines (October 2001). These take 
"the form of disclosures, which institutions would expect to see included in the annual 
report of listed companies. Specifically they refer to disclosures relating to Board 
responsibilities and to policies, procedures and verification" (ABI, 2001, p2). They 
are a non-statutory document aimed at companies, and intend to encourage disclosure 
on corporate management of significant SEE risks within a framework of good 
Corporate Governance. 
What makes these ABI SRI Guidelines particularly important in the context of 
Investor Advocacy Influence by NGOs is their relationship with the interface between 
NGOs and FIs. At launch, the Financial Times (2001c, p21)considered that the 
initiative "stands between companies and the wilder ideas of non-governmental 
organisations". Similarly, when explaining the rationale for the development of the 
ABI Guidelines, Peter Montagnon, Head of Investment Affairs at the ABI, stated that 
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"institutions have... to be careful to avoid being obliged to take on the agendas of 
people with whom they have no contractual relationship.. . In other words, they have 
to avoid being hijacked by particularly vociferous single-issue lobbies" (Montagnon, 
2002, p3)54. 
In addition to the formal Investor Advocacy Influence originating from Company Law 
and the various codes of best practice on Corporate Governance, investor activism has 
informal effects on the practices of companies. For example, should a significant 
investor be sufficiently concerned about the directors' management of a specific 
corporate responsibility issue to `make a public statement' (ICGN, op cit), this may 
shame the directors into taking action. While it is important to recognise that softer 
Investor Advocacy routes exist, it is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis to focus 
on the legal sources of Investor Advocacy Influence. 
Therefore, in summary, Investor Advocacy Influence originates from three principal 
sources: - 
9 the mechanisms of the legal rights associated with share ownership; 
" the duties of directors to serve the interests of shareholders; and 
" the guidance contained in Corporate Governance codes of best practice. 
3.3.1 How NGOs Shape CM Investor Advocacy Influence 
This section reviews the practice of NGOs in adopting a direct and/or indirect Investor 
Advocacy Influence strategy. 
From a Direct perspective, as mentioned in Section 3.1, some NGOs routinely invest a 
portion of their financial reserves on the stock market. Some have used their own 
Investor Advocacy Influence to persuade their fund managers to raise concerns with 
companies on their behalf55. More typically, however, an Investor Advocacy strategy 
involves securing access to share ownership rights by investing in a particular 
company's shares specifically to gain the rights associated with shares. As 
54 In an interesting development, Friends of the Earth subsequently argued that these guidelines should 
be formally included alongside the Combined Code in the UKLA listing rules - see intervention 71 in 
the table detailing NGO CM intervention chronology in Section 4.1 below. 
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demonstrated in the chronology (Appendix 2), NGOs have used the right to attend a 
company's AGM and raise questions to the board. From a Direct perspective, , 
the 
question of how an NGO shapes Investor Advocacy Influence is a straightforward 
matter: with a Direct strategy, it has no need to influence other investors; instead, it 
can simply use the influence it has acquired from its own investments in a manner of 
its own choosing. 
But from an Indirect perspective, 'the situation is not so straightforwark the NGO 
must first persuade other investors of the importance of the issue before they will take 
it up. This section focuses on addressing the question of how NGOs shape Investor 
Advocacy Influence from an Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence perspective. When 
reviewing the practice of NGO CM intervention from this perspective, four main 
questions arise: 
1. Do FIs use the Investor Advocacy Influence open to them at all?. 
2. If they do, is such influence effective? 
3. Does FI Investor Advocacy Influence include the SEE issues that the NGOs in 
focus here work on? 
4. If so, how do NGOs working on SEE issues shape FI Investor Advocacy 
Influence? 
In respect of the first question, investors have been criticised for not discharging their 
responsibilities of ownership (Myners, 2001). Similarly, as highlighted in Section 3.4, 
in practice, institutional investors in the UK have historically tended not to perform an 
effective long-term ownership role. However, there is some evidence that an 
increasing number of UK institutional investors take matters of Corporate Governance 
seriously and are exerting their Investor Advocacy Influence on these issues. For 
example, in 2001, the Annual PIRC survey of proxy voting trends in the UK found 
that "institutional shareholders are failing to exercise responsible share ownership 
through voting their shares in companies they own. For the third year in a row, proxy 
voting levels at UK companies have failed to show any significant increase, with 
median turnout a disappointing 48.9% in the FTSE350". Furthermore, in 2002 the 
33 For example, WWF's fund manager has asked questions at company AGMs on its behalf. 
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findings had significantly improved: "There has been a significant improvement in 
UK voting turnout during the year. Our research this year has shown that the average 
voting 'level for FTSE 350 companies is up... The median turnout for FTSE350 
companies was 57% up from 49%". While this data is not sufficient to indicate a 
general trend, it does demonstrate that Investor Advocacy Influence is practised by a 
number of institutional investors. 
But to what degree is that influence effective (question 2)? In an influential review of 
the activism conducted by the Californian Public Employees' Retirement System 
(Ca1PERS) - one of the largest US Pension Schemes - Smith (1996, p251) concluded: 
"Overall, the evidence indicates that shareholder activism is largely successful in 
changing governance structure and, when successful, results in a statistically 
significant increase in shareholder wealth". Similarly, Karpoff (1998, p27) reviews 
20 empirical studies that attempted to measure the effects of shareholder activism on 
target firms' values, operations and governance structures. The review concludes: 
"Activists have been successful at prompting some firms to adopt limited changes in 
their governance structures. The rate of activists' success in prompting some change 
in target companies has increased over time". 
In respect of the question as to whether investors engage in dialogue with companies 
on SEE issues (question 3), as highlighted in Section 1.7, an increasing number of 
fund managers also use one-to-one company meetings to begin `engagement' with 
them on SEE performance issues. Some of these socially responsible investors 
explicitly recognise both the financial case for good corporate responsibility and the 
moral responsibility they share with the companies when they operate in the pursuit of 
shareholder value. Insight Investment56, for example, states: "Shareholders have both 
substantial powers over companies and considerable responsibility for what 
companies do in their name. We believe that investors have both a moral 
responsibility and compelling long-term interest in providing support and 
encouragement to companies in their efforts to comply with global business 
principles, as well as an important part to play in holding companies accountable for 
their compliance" (Mackenzie, 2002, p23). Schroder Investment Management (2003, 
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p7) also identifies a moral dimension to investment: "Equity investment is a moral 
activity if properly, and : responsibly undertaken. It offers the best medium for 
influencing responsible corporate behaviour and drives employment, and value 
creation. Economic growth has been am 'important mechanism for increasing 
standards of living, and equity investment (and the ownership rights it confers) offers 
the best vehicle for sharing in, and influencing this growth". These statement are 
noteworthy in this context as they delineate two complementary rationales for investor 
engagement: first, a moral obligation on the part of shareholders arising from their 
powers to oversee the activities of directors; and second, a long-term financial interest 
in ensuring business probity through, for example, the elimination of corruption: More 
generally, it also mirrors the parallel set of arguments relating to a business and moral 
case deployed by NGOs (this section later reviews how NGOs have used these 
alternative `Nature of Argument' options). 
Unlike Investor Advocacy influence on Corporate Governance, there is not yet a body 
of academic literature analysing whether Investor Advocacy Influence on the 
corporate responsibility agenda can be effective. Nevertheless, while Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility issues are different in nature, they do 
use the same Investor Advocacy Influence legal mechanisms - so reference to the 
evidence supporting the ability of investors to change Corporate Governance practice 
suggests a potential for Corporate Social Responsibility engagement to be effective. 
Some SRI teams publish reports on their engagement57. In general, these reports 
attempt to demonstrate that their engagement has been influential. While such claims 
may be biased for commercial reasons, the European Commission notes that "Many 
factors are driving moves towards corporate social responsibility: new concerns and 
expectations from citizens, consumers, public authorities and investors... social 
criteria are increasingly influencing the investment decisions of individuals and 
institutions" (EU, 2001, p7). Similarly, the influence of SRI engagement is recognised 
more generally: "The pressure on companies to improve their sustainability 
performance is mounting from... sources such as the growth of `socially responsible' 
56 The fund manager for HBOS plc with £67 billion under management at 31 July 2003 (and the 
author's employer). 57 Including, inter alia, CIS, Henderson, Insight, ISIS, Jupiter and Morley. 
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investment funds, supply chain initiatives and the growing number of guidelines 
designed to foster corporate social responsibility" (Financial Times, 2002d, p18). 
While no independent analysis of the effectiveness of such engagement has been 
published elsewhere to date, the WWF-BP-ANWR resolution and the Oxfam GSK 
NGO CM intervention case studies below (Sections 5.1.2 and 5.5) demonstrate that in 
the context of associated NGO CM interventions, there are circumstances in which 
SRI engagement has been highly influential. 
There is also some evidence from research into the implementation of Corporate 
Governance codes that Investor Advocacy Influence on SEE issues can work. In the 
UK; the ABI SRI Guidelines is the main Corporate Governance Code to focus on SEE 
issues. In a review of the impact of these guidelines the ABI concluded that "there 
had been a strong response to guidelines it issued' (Financial Times, 2003a, p2) and 
that more than two-thirds of FTSE 100 companies made `full' or `adequate' 
disclosure of the significant risks they faced from social, environmental and ethical 
issues. 
As can be seen, therefore, some investors do use Investor Advocacy Influence and 
there are circumstances in which this has been effective. Furthermore, it can also be 
demonstrated that some investors do raise SEE issues when conducting Investor 
Advocacy Influence. Nevertheless, the fourth and final question from the above 
introductory list (and the main question for this Section) remains unanswered: how do 
NGOs working on such issues shape their Investor Advocacy Influence through an 
indirect approach? 
NGOs have utilised an Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence strategy by exerting 
pressure on investors to `engage' with a company or sector on specific issues, as 
opposed to calling for outright divestment. Three contemporary examples include: 
1. WWF-UK 
"WWF's call to action to you is 'engage with companies in your portfolio on issues of 
social responsibility. We do believe it is better to engage rather than to screen. It is no 
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good simply walking away from companies. It is much more important to seek to 
engage with them. If in the end, engagement fails, then walk away rather publicly. "58 
'. ;_ 2. Greenpeace 
Greenpeace founded 'BP Shareholders Against New Exploration', which argues: 
"Shareholders are the primary regulators of the companies in which they invest. They 
have a right and a responsibility to challenge decisions made by the directors"- (BP 
SANE, 2000). 
3. Friends of the Earth (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) 
"Institutional investors have a moral responsibility not to fund the destruction of the 
environment and the exploitation of people. Now it is time for [institutional investors] 
to face up - systematically and proactively, not just when occasionally goaded by 
protest groups - to the morality, of investing in ' companies that collaborate with 
authoritarian regimes' mass-murder of native peoples; or who poison people's water; 
or who contribute to climate change that contributes to the deaths of thousands in 
hurricanes and floods. This report provides systematic evidence that major insurers 
are investing in and profiting from companies that do just those things. And they have 
the leverage and moral responsibility to change those companies' behaviour". 
(Friends of the Earth, 2000, p4) 
The main point here is that NGOs have argued that the existence of Investor 
Advocacy Influence places a moral responsibility on investors to change what they 
regard as immoral corporate behaviour (which is consistent with the analysis in the 
preceding section). More specifically, NGO campaigns to influence investors can be 
based on formal and informal shareholder rights-based initiatives. 
In respect of NGO CM interventions attempting to use the formal system of `legal 
rights' mechanism, interventions here have typically involved NGOs submitting 
shareholder resolutions. This encourages institutional investors to take the issue into 
account as they consider whether and how to vote. 
58 Robert Napier, CEO, WWF-UK. Speech to the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum Annual 
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As is demonstrated in Appendix 2, despite having to comply with the requirements of 
Company Law (see Section 3.3 above), UK NGOs have successfully filed resolutions 
at AGMs59. However, no NGO SEE resolution in the UK has yet succeeded in 
generating the support of more than a fifth of voters60. Therefore, what evidence is 
there that they can be influential? 
Despite no shareholder resolution having been carried at an AGM, there is 
considerable evidence from voting levels that resolutions have been successful in 
changing the Investor Advocacy Influence of large FIs. Among those resolutions that 
have been filed in the UK, it is not uncommon for in excess of 10 per cent of votes to 
either support the shareholder resolution or abstain. For example, in 2001 Balfour 
Beatty received a resolution submitted by the Ilisu Dam campaign. While the majority 
of shareholders who voted expressed support for the company management, with only 
1.9 per cent voting in favour of the campaigners, an unprecedented 40.9 per cent 
abstained. As to the ultimate impact on the company from this resolution, Balfour 
Beatty subsequently announced: "After thorough evaluation of the commercial, 
environmental and social issues it is not in the best interests of our stakeholders to 
pursue the project further"61. 
While this resolution was one part of a broader campaign, it can be seen that a 
sufficient number of investors appear to have had some sympathy6` with the NGO 
aims. Furthermore, it also suggests that it is misleading to judge the ultimate success 
or failure of resolutions by reference to the AGM vote alone. 
In respect of NGO CM interventions that attempt to take more informal approaches to 
the shareholder rights-based initiatives system, an increasing number of NGO CM 
interventions using an Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence Strategy are conducted 
outside a company's AGM. One example of an NGO successfully adopting this 
Conference. 30 November 2000. 
39 Based on discussions with Greenpeace, WWF-UK and Friends of the Earth, submitting a resolution 
has typically required a concerted effort involving an investment on the part of the NGO of between 
three and six person months. 60 At Rio Tinto's AGM in 2000, the ICFTU won 17.3 per cent of votes with a resolution encouraging 
the company to adopt a code of conduct guaranteeing internationally recognised labour rights. 61 Company press release - 14 November 2001 
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approach is Oxfam's `Cut the Cost' campaign against GSK. As can be seen from Case 
Study 5.5, it was ultimately successful, which indicates that such Investor Advocacy 
Influence can be influential. 
In conclusion, NGOs may attempt to influence corporate practice via a Direct or an 
Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence strategy. Direct involves securing access to 
share ownership rights by investing in a particular company's shares. With Indirect, to 
access the influence of other investors, the NGO must, first persuade them of the 
importance of their issue. As to the extent of Investor Advocacy Influence, some FIs 
exert their Investor Advocacy Influence and, when they have, such intervention has 
been shown to be influential. In the specific context of this thesis, there have been 
occasions where FI Investor Advocacy Influence has included the SEE, issues that 
NGOs work on. Furthermore, NGOs have attempted to shape this FI Investor 
Advocacy Influence by exerting pressure on investors to `engage' with a company or 
sector on specific issues. In particular, NGOs have argued, that the existence of 
Investor Advocacy Influence places a moral responsibility on investors to challenge 
what they regard as immoral corporate behaviour. - 
3.4 Practical limitations to NGO CM intervention 
Having detailed how NGOs may use the mechanisms of influence underlying the 
model, and provided an overview of the direct and indirect ways by which they 
harness these routes of influence, this section explores what the practical limitations to 
the alternative NGO CM strategies might be. The model provides the structure for this 
section, inasmuch as it considers the limitations of the four main components in the 
following order: 1. Direct; 2. Indirect; 3. Economic Influence; 4. Indirect Investor 
Advocacy. 
1. Direct 
Perhaps the most significant limitation of a Direct approach is the relatively 
minuscule investment reserves of most NGOs. For example, the total reserves of a 
relatively large NGO such as WWF-UK equate to less than one hundredth of one per 
62 Sparkes (2002, p39) describes the Balfour Beatty abstentions thus: "Abstentions should usually be 
read as shareholders who sympathise with the resolution but don't want to go the whole hog. " 
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cent of BP's -market value. As previously discussed, both Investor Advocacy 
Influence and Economic Influence will be most influential when the holders of large 
numbers of a company's shares either divest or use their investment to raise their 
concerns. As individual entities, NGOs do not have the financial reserves necessary to 
wield significant direct influence. 
Nevertheless, from the NGO perspective, there are reasons why an NGO may wish to 
deploy a Direct strategy. These include: 
1. Internal Consistency -'to practise what they preach': Where the NGO has 
investment reserves and advocates responsible ownership to large institutional 
investors, it is sensible to ensure that its own house is also in order if it is to 
avoid both embarrassment and a reduction in credibility. 
2. As a tactical measure to draw the attention of a company's board and/or the 
media to an ongoing NGO campaign: This could involve purchasing a token 
share in order to attend the AGM (see Section 3.3). 
3. To acquire campaign information: some companies have a policy of openness 
with their shareholders which does not extend to other stakeholders. 
NGOs have attempted to overcome this lack of significant Direct ownership influence 
by strategic use of the media and through attempts to co-opt the influence that other 
investors have. This latter approach entails an Indirect strategy. 
2. Indirect 
Since the inception of the CM, management and ownership of the capital have 
become increasingly concentrated among a few large institutions. As Holland (1998, 
p7) articulates, "the post-war concentration of share ownership in the hands of UK 
financial institutions has created a more concentrated form of institutional influence 
and control over UK companies". Similarly, Gaved (1997, p4) showed that 50 FIs 
owned half the equities in the UK stock market. These FIs therefore represent 
influential targets for NGOs. 
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However, factors, limiting the extent to which - NGOs can induce FIs to use this 
authority include: 
1. Skills mismatch: investment professionals' qualifications do not include SEE 
issues and, consequently, they tend not to have the expertise to judge the merits 
of the issue 
2. Lack of professional motivation: the investment professionals'- remuneration .- 
structure motivates a focus on financial performance rather than SEE issues per 
se, which themselves may be viewed as tangential to the core business of 
investment valuation. . 
3. Lack of client interest: quarterly performance meetings with institutional clients 
focus on financial performance. Institutional investment clients tend not to 
check on performance in relation to SEE issues. 
4. Lack of personal motivation: due to a lack of personal interest, some investment 
professionals can be uninterested in NGO SEE concerns (Waygood and 
Wehrmeyer, 2003, p. 377). 
These factors can result in significant NGO resources being required to convince FIs 
to use their authority. From the NGO perspective, this may not be an efficient 
allocation of its resources. 
3. Economic Influence 
As established in Section 3.2, it is potentially advantageous for an NGO to adopt an 
Economic Influence strategy: if it can divert capital away from a company that it has 
deemed to be detrimental to its goal, this can increase the target company's cost of 
capital which, in turn, will result in a marginal reduction of its ability to do business. 
Conceptually, at least, if an NGO can exert significant long-term influence over the 
distribution of capital, it will be able to incrementally redistribute some, resources 
away from some business activities and into others. 
The NGO CM intervention model highlights the fact that NGOs can make moral 
arguments for divestment - but FIs, generally speaking, are constrained in their ability 
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to respond. More specifically, this limitation occurs where an NGO call to sell the 
totality of a holding is made on purely moral grounds, and the company represents a 
profitable investment and/or-a significant part of a financial index. This is a major 
limitation for NGO CM intervention and requires further analysis. 
When an NGO calls for FIs to sell the totality of a company holding on purely moral 
grounds, this runs against three distinct but interdependent practical constraints: 
1. Fiduciary obligation: the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) sets out that a 
fund manager has a legal obligation to attempt to maximise the financial returns 
for its clients. Similarly, ICGN (2003, p2) states that "institutional shareholders 
have a general responsibility to ensure that investments are managed exclusively 
in the financial interests of their beneficiaries, as amplified - where relevant - by 
contract or law". In particular, where these beneficiaries are represented by 
pension fund trustees, the trustees must consider the financial return above any 
purely ethical concerns (see the Megarry Judgement below)63. Consequently, 
where a particular stock has good investment prospects, the fund manager is 
compelled to maintain its holding. 
2. Index-tracking funds (similar to point 3 below), where fund managers' clients 
have invested in passively managed index-tracking funds: in such circumstances, 
it is the job of a fund manager to mirror the index constituents within the portfolio 
so as to maintain the tracking error64 within specific boundaries. This does not 
mean that the fund manager must hold all the companies in an index, but it does 
mean that very large companies will need to be included in order not to breach the 
tracking error constraints. In other words, an institutional fund manager of passive 
index-tracking funds does not have the discretion to divest holdings, and simply 
tracks an index. 
63 The law as it relates to institutional investment by Charities or Trust Funds is different in that an 
investment may be excluded on ethical grounds if it conflicts with the objects of the charity and/or 
accepts a lower return on specific investments if in so doing, the objects of the charity are furthered. 64 A statistical measure of the difference between the configuration of the investment portfolio and the 
configuration of the index. 
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3. Load difference65: large active fund managers tend not to take absolute buy or sell 
`bets' on most of the biggest FTSE 100 listed companies. This is partly because 
institutional clients tend to stipulate an out-performance target based on an index 
as the benchmark (for example, exceeding the FTSE UK All Share by one per cent 
on a three-year rolling average). In practice, for reasons similar to the above case, 
this limits the extent to which the fund manager can. divest from the largest 
companies that reflect a significant proportion ' of the benchmark. Therefore, 
actively managed funds with such performance and risk objectives tend to make a 
relative bet, going over- or under-weight when compared to a company's presence 
in the benchmark index (this is sometimes referred to euphemistically as 'closet 
index tracking' - see point 2 above). 
The last two points allude to the difficulties of total divestment from large companies 
in an index when the index is set as the benchmark. To demonstrate how heavily 
biased indices are towards companies near the top of the index, the combined market 
capitalisation of the 699 companies in the FTSE UK All Share is collectively worth 
£1,102,692 million66 but the top 100 of these represent 85.58 per cent of this figure. 
This shows the relative importance of companies inside the FTSE 100 relative to the 
rest. Furthermore, within the top 100 is a significant emphasis on those in the top 10. 
To elucidate this point graphically, Figure 5 below depicts the Market Capitalisation 
of the companies in the largest 100 companies in the UK Financial Times Stock 
Exchange All Share (The FTSE 100): 
65 The load difference indicates the extent of the active `bet' in the fund against the index used as a 
erformance benchmark. `Excluding 
Unit Trusts, OIECs and Investment Trusts. Stock market figures at 31 Dec 2002 (HSBC, 
2003). 
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Figure 3.2: Comparative Market Capitalisation of FTSE 100 
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As can be seen from Figure 3.2, companies inside the top 25 positions represent a 
considerable part of the FTSE UK All Share, so totally divesting from such 
companies has significant risk and return implications for portfolio performance. 
The above three limiting factors of fiduciary obligation, load difference and index- 
tracking combine to prevent institutional investors from responding to calls from 
NGOs to sell the totality of a holding on purely moral grounds. Furthermore, the load 
difference and index-tracking constraints identified above also limit the extent to 
which divestment can take place on financial grounds. 
While these load difference and index-tracking constraints are relevant, the most 
important of the above limitations to NGO calls on investors to divest on purely moral 
grounds is the legal fiduciary obligation. The discussion below analyses this legal 
limitation in more depth. 
Fund managers cater for a range of different clients. While individual (or `retail') 
investors are free to choose which ethical concerns they wish to be considered and 
how they would like this to be done (eg divestment vs. engagement), this same 
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freedom does not apply to all the Fund Manager's clients. Occupational pension 
funds, for example, elect trustees who are charged with acting in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries as a whole. These trustees do not have the same scope as retail 
investors to incorporate ethical concerns (see below). Pension funds are among the 
fund management industry's most significant client groups: UK clients' pension fund 
assets totalled £625 billion at the end of 2002, representing 25 per cent of the £2,600 
billion of funds for which the UK fund management industry was responsible (IFSL, 
2003, p5). 
The most relevant Case Law regarding the scope of pension fund trustees to 
incorporate ethical y concerns 
is Cowan vs. Scargill - 1984. The question under 
consideration by the Judge, Sir Robert Megarry, was whether it was legitimate for 
trustees to restrict funds to investments in the UK and prohibit investments in 
industries competing with the coal industry. In what has come to be referred to as 
`The Megarry Judgement', Sir Robert made the following observations: 
"A trustee must take "such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he 
were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom 
he felt morally bound to provide". 
9 It was the main duty of trustees "to exercise their powers in the best interests 
of the present and future beneficiaries". 
" If the trust provided financial benefits, then "the best interests of the 
beneficiaries are normally their best financial interests". 
" "Although a trustee who takes advice on investments is not bound to accept 
and act upon that advice, he is not entitled to reject it merely because he 
sincerely disagrees with it, unless in addition to being sincere he is acting as 
an ordinary prudent man would act. " 
" "In considering what investment to make, the trustees must put on one side 
their own personal interests and views. " 
(Cowan vs. Scargill, 1984, [2 All E. R. 750]) 
This putting to one side of personal interests and views has been interpreted as 
constraining the extent to which trustees can prohibit certain companies from 
124 
investment on the basis of ethical concerns. However, since the Megarry Judgement, 
other rulings have taken a slightly more lenient view on the application of negative 
screening - or divestment criteria - on purely moral or ethical grounds. They indicate 
that it is not objectionable, provided it does not affect returns. In practice, this means 
that ethical criteria can be used by the Fund Managers selected by pension fund 
trustees to distinguish between two investments that are equivalent on purely financial 
grounds - unless it would be better to hold both to ensure sufficient diversification. 
When considering what reforms to the 1995 Pensions Act were required following the 
Robert Maxwell pension fund debacle, the Goode Committee stated that pension fund 
trustees must "treat the financial interests of Scheme members as paramount" and 
manage the fund "consistent with proper diversification and prudence" but, providing 
they do so, "trustees... are perfectly entitled to have a policy on ethical investment and 
pursue that policy" (E-USS, 1999, internet). The policy to which the Committee 
referred was an Integrated Assessment and/or Advocacy policy (see Section 1.7). 
While these cases were decided on their own merits, the implications for NGO CM 
strategy are that pension fund trustees are not legally able to respond to NGO calls to 
divest on purely ethical grounds and must instead operate in the best financial 
interests of the pension fund beneficiaries. 
Partially as a consequence of these limitations of moral arguments, NGOs have 
developed divestment arguments based on a business case analysis of their issue. 
When deploying a Business Case Route of Argument, the NGO attempts to 
demonstrate that integrating an analysis of its issue into the stock selection process is 
in the best financial interests of the beneficiaries of the investment fund. Furthermore, 
where business case arguments are successfully deployed, they may become 
integrated into the core functioning of the CM and, therefore, are more capable of 
providing the long-term influence referred to at the outset of this section. Therefore, 
as noted in Section 3.2.1 above, when considering how NGOs deploy an Economic 
Influence strategy, the strength of the business case argument and/or their ability to 
generate such a business case is an important determinant of success. 
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However, there are situations where, in the absence of an NGO campaign, a business 
case for an ethical issue does not exist-For example, as Pearce et al (2002, p28) 
identify, "an arms exporting company is unlikely to create value for its shareholders 
by, stopping sales of weapons to the third world [oppressive regimes]". Where the 
business case arises from the brand being put at risk through the NGO campaign, if 
NGOs allocate campaign resources to represent the business case - at the cost of 
representing the ethical case - they may paradoxically reduce the business case in 
support of the issue. 
Conversely, even `where a positive `business case' for the NGO issue, exists,, in 
practice convincing investment professionals of. its compelling nature is not without 
its own limitations: NGOs have been confronted by three main limitations (Waygood 
and Wehrmeyer, 2003, p376) associated with an Economic Advocacy Strategy: 
1. Information overload: supplying new information into an already 
information-saturated market. 
2. Perceived bias: investors habitually discounting information provided by " 
intermediaries with biases or potential conflicts of interest. 
3. Materiality: not only does the business case need to be compelling, but the 
issue also has to be sufficiently relevant to the financial valuation of the 
company ('material') to warrant the attention of busy fund managers. 
Despite these problems, when successfully presented, business case arguments can be 
influential (see inter alia Case Study 5.5 below). 
4. Investor Advocacy Influence 
As established in Section 1.6, it is potentially advantageous for an NGO to use 
Investor Advocacy Influence: if it can encourage holders of sufficiently large numbers 
of shares to engage with a company on their issue, then the NGO can change 
corporate practice. 
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In practice, however, when an NGO attempts to use either business or moral case 
arguments within an Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence strategy, it is confronted by 
one main limitation: institutional investors in the UK have historically tended not to 
perform an effective long-term ownership role. In a recent government commissioned 
review of the industry practices, Paul Myners concluded: `fund managers are 
reluctant to intervene in companies where they own substantial shareholdings, even 
where this would be in their clients' financial interests" (Myners, 2001, p3). As a 
result, company directors have effectively assumed de facto ultimate control. 
Part of -the problem 
is that while there is a collective interest in holding company 
directors to account, individually it is possible to `free-ride' on the activity of other 
shareholders, saving time and money involved in policing company directors' 
stewardship of investee companies. As Aristotle observed: "For that which is common 
to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it... For besides other 
considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects 
another to fulfil' (Aristotle, c. 350 BC). This has resulted in the public good 
dimensions of Corporate Governance activism by FIs being undersupplied. As Handy 
(2002, p57) describes, "there is, first, a clear and important need to meet the 
expectations of a company's theoretical owners: the shareholders. It would, however, 
be more accurate to call most of them investors, perhaps even gamblers. They have 
none of the pride or responsibility of ownership and are, if truth be told, only therefor 
the money. " 
However, there are some signs that this may be changing. In addition to the 
proclamation of responsibility set out by the Institutional Shareholder's Committee 
(ISC, 2003), the Annual PIRC survey of proxy voting trends in the UK, included in 
Section 3.3.1 above, found some evidence of change in ownership accountability by 
institutional investors and their agents - suggesting that this limitation may be 
diminishing in scale. In addition, there is currently a threat of further regulation in this 
area from the UK government. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has 
stated that "it's time to assert the principle that fund managers - as trustees, for us, the 
savers - have a responsibility, as well as a right, to be active owners... Beneficial 
investors need clear, concise and regular information on how fund managers are 
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acting and voting on their behalf. Whether through voluntary codes or regulation, we 
need to create a chain of transparency and accountability that stretches from the 
boardroom to the individual shareholder and saver, via the pension fund manager, 
trustee and institutional investor" (Hewitt, 2003, p10). 
In conclusion, this section has reviewed the practical limitations associated with the 
adoption of alternative NGO CM strategies. The main limitation of a Direct strategy is 
the relatively small financial reserves of most NGOs. One limitation of an Indirect 
approach is the scale of NGO resources required to co-opt FI influence. In respect of 
an Economic Influence approach, NGO moral arguments are mainly limited by the 
FI's fiduciary obligation. Divestment in general is also limited by the extent of the 
target company's presence , within a benchmark. Regarding an Investor Advocacy 
Influence approach, while there are a number of limitations, the main limitation is the 
lack of ownership responsibility on the part of many FIs. 
3.5 Hypotheses for NGO CM Strategy, 
The purpose of this section is to draw together, the preceding analysis of the various 
underlying NGO, CM intervention and establish hypotheses in relation to the relative 
probability, of success of various NGO strategies arising from the model. These 
hypotheses are tested in the subsequent empirical analysis (Sections 4.2.2 and 5.7.2). 
The analysis in the preceding sections argued that, regardless of the issue, NGOs have 
four specific strategic questions to address when developing CM engagement 
strategy: 
1. Mechanism of company influence: Economic cost of capital and/or Investor 
Advocacy influence? 
2. Route of influence: Direct or Indirect (and, if an Indirect approach is adopted, 
what `Stance' should be adopted)? 
3. Primary audience: corporate and investment `institutions' or government CM 
`policy-makers'? 
4. Nature of argument - moral case and/or the financial case? 
In general, the appropriate strategy will largely depend on the case in question; SEE 
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issues apply to the corporate context in different ways. The issue, its materiality, the 
force of moral compulsion, the company profile and NGO expertise will all have a 
bearing on NGO CM strategy. Even so, it is possible to make some generic 
comments. The following discussion sequentially reviews the relative merits of each 
of the above questions and proposes hypotheses in relation to which approach would 
be more successful. 
Question 1: Mechanism of company influence - economic cost of capital and/or 
Investor Advocacy influence? 
Conceptually, the probability of successfully changing corporate practice may be 
increased by adopting an Investor Advocacy Influence rather than an Economic 
Influence mechanism for the following reasons: 
9 Investor Advocacy Influence is arguably more precise in that a company can 
better heed explicit concerns raised by investors than attempt to interpret 
implicit signals from small variations in cost of capital; 
" NGOs can more readily use arguments based on morality which, when 
compared with business case arguments, is an observable NGO strength; and 
" the associated limitations can be more readily overcome - particularly those of 
fiduciary obligation and pension case law. 
This deduction results in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an Investor 
Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence strategy. 
Question 2: Route of influence - Direct or Indirect (and, if an Indirect approach is 
adopted, what `Stance' should be adopted)? 
In respect of the source of influence, theoretically, co-opting FIs influence should 
magnify the influence of the NGO - regardless of which primary audience is being 
addressed. Individually, NGOs' Direct influence is limited by their relatively 
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minuscule investment reserves. As Mackenzie (1997, p88) points out, "institutional 
investors own such large volumes of shares that companies listen to them as a matter 
of course. If shareholder activists can persuade institutional investors to support their 
cause, they gain considerable advantage. " Consequently, as Lake (1999, -, p2) 
articulates, "Prima facie... there are good reasons for NGOs seeking to influence 
corporate behaviour to explore the potential for working with institutional investors. 
These institutions have significant power, and are increasingly seeking to use it". 
This suggests that the probability of success may be increased by adopting an Indirect 
approach. But as indicated above, where an Indirect approach is adopted, the NGO 
also needs to decide upon what `Stance' should be adopted. 
The two main dimensions of the Elkington and Fennell taxonomy (Section 1.4), used 
to measure NGO Stance are integrators vs. polarisers, and discriminators vs. 
non-discriminators. Conceptually, whether the chances of success with an Indirect 
approach are increased by a confrontational (polariser) or cooperative (integrator) 
approach should depend on an analysis of the issue and the likely response of the CM 
institution. For example, if it is likely that the R will not respond to a cooperative 
approach, a confrontational campaign may be required. However, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that a targeted and more analytical approach is more likely to succeed than 
a non-discriminatory approach. This is because the relatively limited resources of the 
NGO will be more focused and better informed. Therefore, the dolphin and orca 
Stances should, in general, be more successful than shark and sea lion. 
This conjecture regarding the relative merits of a Direct vs. Indirect approach, 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an Indirect 
route of influence. 
Question 3: Primary audience - corporate and investment 'institutions' or 
government CM 'policy-makers'? 
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In respect of the choice of primary audience, in general, where the NGO concern 
relates to a specific company, investors should be the main focus. Conversely, if the 
NGO concern relates more to an issue exacerbated by the structure of the CM, 
government policy-makers should be the primary audience. The two audiences are 
relevant in different contexts and are not substitutes for each other. Even so, it is still 
possible to speculate about their relative chances of success. 
Arguably, changing public policy is more complicated and requires extended 
interventions. Conceptually, therefore, it may be that interventions where CM 
institutions are the primary audience are more likely to succeed. 
Once again, evidence in support of this supposition will be sought in the empirical 
analysis to test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Interventions that necessarily involve CM institutions as the primary 
audience have, in general, a higher likelihood of success than those that necessarily 
primarily focus on the public policy audience. 
Question 4: Nature of argument - moral case and/or the financial case? 
Conceptually, the probability of successfully changing corporate practice is increased 
by striking a balance between moral and financial arguments. This is for two reasons: 
1. Purely moral arguments run into conflict with the fiduciary legislative 
obligations that form part of the structure of the CM. 
2. Purely economic arguments can lack the force of compulsion, both for investors 
and their clients, that is inherent within clearly articulated moral arguments. 
The two arguments can therefore be regarded as complementary rather than 
contradictory. This suggests that the probability of success is increased by adopting 
both Moral and Business Case arguments. This deduction leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts a balance 
of both Moral and Business Case arguments rather than primarily focusing on one or 
the other. 
The above four hypotheses will be converted to null hypotheses during the testing in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.6 Chapter Conclusion 
In conclusion, the NGO CM Model uses the two main components of `Mechanism', 
and `Route', and combines them with three subsidiary elements of Argument, 
Audience and Stance. 
NGOs have attempted to influence corporate practice via two Routes: Direct or an 
Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence strategy. In the context of Investor Advocacy 
Influence, Direct involves securing access to share ownership rights by investing in a 
particular company's shares. With Indirect, to access the influence of other investors, 
the NGO must first persuade them of the importance of their issue. In the context of 
Economic Influence, Direct involves the NGO trading on its own account, whereas 
Indirect involves attempts to persuade FIs to trade. 
The principal source of the CM Economic Influence Mechanism is primarily the 
shareprice influence on a company's cost of capital, but it also originates from 
takeover prospects and directors' remuneration packages. NGOs have in some 
instances influenced the key value drivers of a business, and `materialised' SEE issues 
for companies. This has had cost of capital implications for the company in question 
and in some cases changed company practice. 
The source of the CM Investor Advocacy Influence Mechanism is primarily the legal 
rights associated with share ownership, but the duties of directors to serve the interests 
of shareholders and the guidance contained in Corporate Governance codes of best 
practice further support this Mechanism. There are instances where NGOs have 
shaped this FI Investor Advocacy Influence by arguing that the existence of Investor 
Advocacy Influence places a moral responsibility on investors to challenge what they 
regard as immoral corporate behaviour. 
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Regarding the limitations of NGO CM intervention, the main limitation of a Direct 
strategy is the relatively small financial reserves of most NGOs. Conversely, one 
limitation of an Indirect approach is the scale of NGO resources required to co-opt FI 
influence. The Economic Influence mechanism main limitation is that some Fl's will 
be unable to respond to an NGO's purely moral arguments because of the FI's 
fiduciary obligation. Whereas the most significant limitation with an Investor 
Advocacy Influence approach is the lack of ownership responsibility on the part of 
many UK FIs. 
In summary, this Chapter has -presented the model of NGO CM intervention, 
discussed the sources of this influence, analysed the limitations of each strategy and 
developed hypotheses for the relative success of each component of the NGO CM 
strategy. As identified in Section 2.2, these hypotheses will be tested alongside the 
main claims set out in Section 1 in relation to NGO CM intervention. 
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Chapter 4. How UK NGOs have used the Capital Market 
This Chapter analyses the chronology of UK NGO CM interventions arising during 
the 12-year period 1990-2002 (Appendix 2). There are five main reasons for 
developing this chronology: 
1. to provide the first record of UK NGO CM intervention during this time (as 
stated in Section 6, a central contribution of this thesis); 
2. to provide data for analysing the nature of NGO CM intervention; 
3. to test the NGO CM classification model against the empirical background of 
historical CM interventions by campaigning NGOs; 
4. to provide the empirical data necessary to assess claims regarding the changing 
nature of NGO CM intervention and the hypotheses regarding the probability of 
success of different strategies; and 
5. to place the subsequent NGO case studies (Section 5) into the broader context of 
overall NGO CM intervention. 
The discussion in this section focuses on points three and four above. 
4.1 Analysis of the Chronology 
The methodology (Section 2.2.2) set out how the classifications of NGO CM 
intervention in the above chronology was analysed. This analysis is presented here. 
As highlighted in the methodology, observational analysis of the chronology was 
augmented by statistical analysis of the model's components67 to identify underlying 
relationships in the data. 
The main purpose of the analysis is to assess the empirical data in the chronology 
against, first, the relevant main claims established at the outset of this thesis (Section 
1); second, the hypotheses regarding NGO CM intervention strategy set out following 
the deductive analysis of the model's limitations (Section 3.5); and, finally, to 
67 Mechanisms of Company Influence, Route of Influence, Primary Audience, Nature of Argument, and 
the relative Success of the intervention. 
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ascertain whether any trends in the nature of NGO CM intervention can be 
established. 
The overall structure of this section is consecutively to review the evidence from the 
table in order to develop the main claims (in Section 1.1) and to review the 
hypotheses (Section 3.5). The hypotheses regarding which strategies had the highest 
probability of success68 were: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence 
Mechanism. 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Indirect Route of Influence. 
Hypothesis 3: Interventions that necessarily involve CM institutions as the 
primary audience have, in general, a higher likelihood of success than those 
that necessarily primarily focus on the public policy audience. 
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts a 
balance of both Moral and Business Case arguments rather than primarily 
focusing on one or the other. 
Each of these hypotheses is developed into a null hypothesis for testing in the relevant 
section. 
68 As noted in the methodology, the chronology's classification for success - or otherwise - of the 
NGO interventions is based on a prima facie analysis of outcomes. Accurate outcome attribution 
requires detailed analysis against a set of performance criteria such as those developed in Section 2.2.3 
for the case studies. These conclusions regarding relative success should therefore be regarded as 
tentative. 
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4.1.1 Review of Main Claims 
1. Has the practice of NGO CM intervention changed in scale? 
Figure 6 below plots the overall number of UK NGO CM interventions that took 
place between 1990 and 2002. 
Figure 4.1: Frequency of NGO CM intervention 1990 to 2002 
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As can be seen, NGO CM intervention increased from average levels of 2.8 
interventions per annum during the first six years to 10.1 interventions per annum in 
the last six years. Based on the data in the chronology (Appendix 2), therefore, NGO 
CM intervention has significantly increased. 
However, it is noticeable that the trend is not positive throughout the time period. In 
particular, while the first half of the period contained a relatively low level of NGO 
CM intervention, there is a significant increase in NGO CM intervention after 1996. 
Does the chronology provide any clues as to what happened to catalyse the increase in 
NGO CM intervention at around this time? 
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Intervention 30 on the chronology involved the establishment of a requirement on 
occupational pension funds trustees to publish a statement regarding the extent to 
which SEE issues were taken into account in the investment process. As Case Study 
5.3 recognises, publication of statements of this sort would have increased the scope 
for NGO CM intervention on SEE issues. This is because such statements provided a 
SEE policy against which NGOs could hold the occupational pension funds to 
account. While it is probable that this reform did contribute towards the ultimate 
increase NGO CM intervention, the reform did not come into effect until half way 
through 2000. However, the increase in NGO CM intervention began some years 
before. Does the chronology include previous interventions that may have catalysed 
the original growth in NGO CM intervention? 
The chronology identifies two earlier successful NGO CM interventions with 
significant aims that may provide the answer: the international environment and 
development NGO coalition to stop construction of the Bakun hydroelectric dam in 
Sarawak, Malaysia; and the intervention by PIRC in conjunction with Greenpeace, 
Amnesty International and WWF-UK69 surrounding Shell's disposal of the Brent Spar 
storage buoy (see also Section 3.2.1) and its human rights record in Nigeria 
(Interventions 17 and 18). As a result of this success, it is probable that these NGOs 
would have been more likely to repeat a CM intervention strategy and, more 
significantly, other NGOs looking for effective campaign strategies would have been 
more likely to deploy a CM intervention themselves. However, to substantiate the 
claim that these interventions catalysed the identified increase in NGO CM 
intervention, the precise nature of these interventions, and the extent of apparent 
success, requires some analysis. 
The case of the Bakun dam NGO intervention was reviewed in Hildyard and Mansley 
(May 2001)70 
. The report highlighted the 
fact that the dam would have "entailed the 
involuntary relocation of some 10,000 indigenous people and the flooding of 70,000 
hectares of land' (p7). It argued that "the campaign succeeded in halting the project, 
although there is now talk of reviving the dam, albeit in a scaled-down form. Key to 
69 PIRC (1998, p8) identifies that the resolution had been drafted following conversations with 
Amnesty International, Greenpeace and WWF-UK. 70 Mansley and Hildyard were both personally involved in this CM intervention. 
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the campaign's success was the lobbying of potential investors in the dam - and of the 
financial analysts who advise these investors" (p7). Mansley (1996) reviewed the 
financial risks associated with the project. This analysis was used by FoE when it 
warned potential investors that "project delays had dogged other dam projects and 
were highly likely in the Bakun case; that the predicted power output was unlikely. to 
be materialise; and that the power purchasing agreement was overpriced and would 
probably end in renegotiation... Investment in Bakun is unlikely to offer the return 
you require. " The project failed to raise the necessary finance and was eventually 
indefinitely postponed. 
It is unclear precisely the degree of influence the NGO CM intervention and financial 
review had in the downfall of the Bakun dam. Nevertheless, the perception among 
NGOs was that the campaign had been a major success and that the CM intervention 
had been a significant contributory factor. This would therefore have been likely to 
contribute towards other NGOs exploring whether a CM intervention could benefit 
their campaigns. 
The second of the two successful contemporary interventions cited here is also singled 
out as catalytic by Sparkes (2002, p34): "The real beginnings of UK shareholder 
activism on SRI issues can be precisely dated to 14 May 1997. This was the date of 
the 1997 annual general meeting of the Shell Transport and Trading Company. Shell 
had already received negative publicity in 1995-96 over its planned disposal of the 
Brent Spar oil platform, and concern over human rights abuses in Nigeria 
culminating in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. In 1997 an NGO led-coalition was 
able to assemble enough support from local authority pension funds (coordinated by 
PIRC) and church investors led by ECCR to file a shareholder resolution". 
As can be seen from Figure 6 and from the ABB case above, Sparkes is wrong to 
suggest that no shareholder activism had taken place before this time. But he is right 
to single out this intervention as a turning point: not only were the Brent Spar and Ken 
Saro-Wiwa cases very high-profile, but this CM intervention was also highly 
successful in achieving its objectives. 
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The following discussion briefly assesses the extent of the resolution's success. The 
resolve clause stated that "in recognition of the importance of environmental and 
corporate responsibility policies, (including those policies relating to human rights), 
to the company's operations, corporate profile and performance, the directors are 
requested to: 
" Designate responsibility for the implementation of environmental and 
corporate responsibility policies to a named member of the Committee of 
Managing Directors 
" Establish effective internal procedures for the implementation and monitoring 
of such policies 
" Establish an independent external review and audit procedure for such 
policies 
" Report to shareholders regularly on the implementation of such policies 
" Publish a report to shareholders on the implementation of such policies in 
relation to the company's operations in Nigeria by the end of 1997'. 
Shell recommended voting against the resolution. Ultimately, 17 per cent of votes cast 
withheld support from the board71. While this represented a formal failure of the 
resolution, The Times' City Editor (1997, p23) summed up the significance of the 
lack of support thus: "The fact that 11 per cent of Shell's shareholders were 
persuaded to vote against the company's board was a huge blow to the company and 
carries a strong blow to industry generally... for the opposition to have reached that 
level means that some substantial funds voted for change. The grey men who run the 
institutional funds joined with small shareholders to deliver a drastic condemnation 
of the company". 
Perhaps as a consequence of this scale of apparent support for the resolution, over the 
course of the next 18 months Shell was to take actions that substantively met the five 
requests contained in the resolution. PIRC was later to state that "we consider that 
Shell has, in a relatively short period of time, moved as requested by the resolution `to 
the head of the movement for corporate responsibility"' (PIRC, 1998, p32). While 
71 A total of 39.9 million shares were voted in favour of the resolution, representing 10.5 per cent of 
votes cast, and 24.9 million shares were voted as an abstention, representing 6.5 per cent of votes cast. 
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probably biased, PIRC also states that it believed the resolution, and the work around 
it, were catalytic in Shell making these changes: "PIRC considers that the programme 
of research, meetings and discussion with the company, followed by the resolution, 
have had a constructive and significant impact upon the company. We welcome 
Shell's progress since the resolution and consider it a tribute to the ability of the 
directors, executives and other staff to respond positively to pressure for change both 
within the company and from shareholders and other groups in recent years" (PIRC, 
op cit). 
As can be seen, relative to previous interventions, both of the above were significant 
in scale and had substantive targets that appear to have been achieved. The apparent 
success of these CM interventions would have indicated to other NGOs looking for 
strategies to increase their influence that the CM could be a useful campaign device. 
Therefore, the apparent success of these two contemporary interventions probably 
explains the increase in NGO CM intervention since 1996. 
2. Have NGOs explored a broad range of strategies in CM intervention? 
The tables below highlight the relative frequencies with which NGOs sought to 
deploy each of the components of the model Mechanisms of Company Influence, 
Route of Influence, Primary Audience, Nature of Argument and the relative Success 
of the intervention: 
Table 4.1(a): Frequencies of Mechanism 
Mechanism 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Investor 47 60.3 60.3 60.3 
Economic 18 23.1 23.1 83.3 
Both 13 16.7 16.7 100.0 
Total 78 100.0 100.0 
This table demonstrates that an Investor Advocacy approach was the most commonly 
used Mechanism of Influence, and was more than twice as popular as the Economic 
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Mechanism of Influence. NGO CM interventions that attempted to use both were the 
least commonly deployed. Insofar as the analysis in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 suggested 
that, this would be a more successful strategy, this may indicate that NGOs are 
learning from mistakes in previous interventions. A move towards Investor Advocacy 
over time would indicate the consideration of lessons learned from previous 
interventions. Consequently, Section 4.1.3 analyses whether there was a change over 
time. 
Table 4.1(b): Frequencies of Route of Influence 
Route of Influence 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Direct 13 16.7 16.7 16.7 
Indirect (dolphin) 34 43.6 43.6 60.3 
Indirect (orca) 29 37.2 37.2 97.4 
Indirect (shark) 2 2.6 2.6 100.0 
Total 78 100.0 100.0 
Table 4.1(b) above demonstrates that an Indirect Route of Influence was over four 
times more commonly used (83.3 per cent) than a Direct strategy (16.7 per cent). It 
also highlights that within Indirect a dolphin and shark stance has been the most 
popular. A shark stance has been used in only 2.6 per cent of interventions and a sea 
lion stance has not been used at all. The potential reasons for this are discussed in the 
overall analysis of tables 2 (a) to (d) below. 
Table 4.1(c): Frequencies of Primary Audience 
Primary Audience 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid CM Institutions 67 85.9 85.9 85.9 
Public Policy 9 11.5 11.5 97.4 
Both 2 2.6 2.6 100.0 
Total 78 100.0 100.0 
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Table 4.1(c) above shows that CM, institutions were most commonly. the main 
audience for the CM interventions. This is not, perhaps, as obvious a result as it might 
seem in that it indicates that NGOs have made very few interventions on the public 
policy underlying the CM. Possible reasons for this result are discussed in the analysis 
following Question 5 below. 
Table 4.1(d): Frequencies of Nature of Argument 
Nature of Argument 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Business 29 37.2 37.2 37.2 
Moral 17 21.8 21.8 59.0 
Both 32 41.0 41.0 100.0 
Total 78 100.0 100.0 
Table 4.1(d) above demonstrates that the frequency distributions within Nature of 
Argument are more evenly distributed that the apparent choices made within any of 
the other components of the model. However, given the `moralising' nature of the 
NGOs in question, there has been a surprising lack of purely Moral Nature of 
Arguments - most interventions have incorporated business case arguments in some 
way. As before, the analysis in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 suggested that this would be a 
more successful strategy. In particular, it suggested that interventions that used Both 
Business Case and Moral Case arguments would be more successful (this hypothesis 
is tested in Section 4.1.2 below). Consequently, this result may indicate that, once 
again, NGOs are learning from mistakes in previous interventions. A move towards a 
`Both' classification over time would indicate the consideration of lessons learned 
from previous interventions. Subsequently, Section 4.1.3 analyses whether a move 
towards a `Both' classification can be discerned. 
Overall, these tables demonstrate that, with one exception, UK NGOs conducted 
interventions utilising the full range of alternative strategies within each component of 
the model during the time period in question. This suggests that NGOs have used a 
broad range of alternative strategies in their CM intervention. 
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However, there is one exception: that of a sea lion Stance within an Indirect strategy. 
There were no instances of an NGO adopting such an approach during the period in 
question. Why might this be so? 
As highlighted in Section 1.4, the sea lion's Stance "ignores relative performance of 
FI; willing to work closely with any Ff'. The popularity of the dolphin72 Stance (34 
per cent within Route) indicates that it was not a reluctance on the part of NGOs to 
work with FIs that led to the unpopularity of this strategy. Furthermore, the lack of 
popularity in the shark73 Stance (2.6 per cent within Route), indicates that NGOs were 
discerning in their selection of FI partner/target. This result indicates that NGOs have 
carefully selected which FI to target/work with. This makes some sense as it probably 
reflects a concern among NGOs of the dangers of being compromised - or being seen 
to have been compromised - by the FI in question. 
The frequency tables above also demonstrate that while NGOs have deployed a range 
of CM intervention strategies, there has been a predominance of certain strategies 
over others. In particular, there has been a high proportion of: 
" Investor Advocacy over Economic Influence (60 per cent within Mechanism); 
" Indirect over Direct as a Route of Influence (83.3 per cent of the interventions 
were Indirect) - and a preference for a dolphin Stance within Indirect; and 
0 CM Institutions as the Primary Audience (85.9 per cent). 
In addition, a marginal preference for `Both Business and Moral Case arguments' 
(rather than focusing on one or the other) within Nature of Argument (41 per cent) has 
been shown. 
Therefore, while NGOs have used a broad range of different strategies in their CM 
intervention, there has also been a focus on certain strategies over others. Section 
4.1.3 considers whether any patterns underlying. the evolution in these further 
strategies can be identified. 
72 Which is also willing to work closely with some companies. 
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3. Have NGOs changed the nature of their NGO CM interventions in any way? " 
A qualitative analysis of the. nature of first 10 NGO interventions indicates that four 
involved media-focused AGM disruption attempts of some kind. Examples include 
Surfers Against Sewage bringing a bag of sewage-related detritus to the 1990 AGM of 
South West Water, and PARTiZANS escorting Australian aborigines to RTZ's 1991 
AGM to question the board about mining in sacred burial sites. 
Conversely, the same analysis of the last 30 interventions74 indicates that only three 
represent new75 attempts to use an AGM to embarrass the company. This suggests a 
reduction from 40 per cent of the first few interventions to 10 per cent of 
approximately the last third of NGO interventions. Very broadly, representative 
examples of the latter period include the publication by Amnesty of a study linking 
human rights to corporate risk in 2002, and the collaboration between Oxfam, 
Christian Aid and VSO (also in 2002) to publish a set of company benchmarks 
enabling investors to compare pharmaceutical company performance concerning 
access to life-saving drugs in the developing world. This indicates that NGOs have 
evolved from mainly confrontational media-focused activities at AGMs to more 
substantive interventions targeting issues that are more relevant to corporate strategy 
and SEE performance. 
4. Has the relative success of the interventions changed over time? 
The table below is a chronological statistical analysis of the occurrence of prima facie 
success: 
73 Which also ignores the relative performance of companies. 74 The different numbers of interventions are chosen for comparison for two reasons: 1. the 
significantly higher number of interventions in the second period underlines the point that AGM- 
focused interventions have decreased; and 2. the higher number of interventions in the second period 
compensates for the fact that NGO CM intervention significantly increased in the latter years and, as 
AGMs are annual, a comparable number of years is required for fair comparison. 
75 There were other NGO attempts to use the AGM. However, they were continuations of previous 
interventions - for example, the ongoing resolutions by Greenpeace and WWF-UK at BP's AGM. 
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Table 4.2: Chronological Occurrence of Success 
YEAR " Success? Crosstabulation 
Success? 
N N? ? Y? Y Total 
YEAR 1990 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 5.3% 1.3% 
1991 Count 1 1 2 1 5 
% within YEAR 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 8.3% 5.3% 10.0% 4.3% 6.4% 
1992 Count 2 2 4 
% within YEAR 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 10.5% 10.0% 5.1% 
1993 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 4.3% 1.3% 
1994 Count 2 1 2 5 
% within YEAR 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 16.7% 5.3% 10.0% 6.4% 
1995 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 4.3% 1.3% 
1997 Count 1 1 1 3 
% within YEAR 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Success? 25.0% 5.0% 4.3% 3.8% 
1998 Count 1 1 1 2 5 
% within YEAR 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 25.0% 8.3% 5.3% 8.7% 6.4% 
1999 Count 2 2 2 2 8 
% within YEAR 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 16.7% 10.5% 10.0% 8.7% 10.3% 
2000 Count 3 5 3 11 
% within YEAR 27.3% 45.5% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Success? 15.8% 25.0% 13.0% 14.1% 
2001 Count 1 3 4 4 4 16 
% within YEAR 6.3% 18.8% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within Success? 25.0% 25.0% 21.1% 20.0% 17.4% 20.5% 
2002 Count 1 3 4 2 8 18 
%within YEAR 5.6% 16.7% 22.2% 11.1% 44.4% 100.0% 
% within Success? 25.0% 25.0% 21.1% 10.0% 34.8% 23.1% 
Total Count 4 12 19 20 23 78 
% within YEAR 5.1% 15.4% 24.4% 25.6% 29.5% 100.0% 
% within Success? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Success and Possible Success, combined, account for more than 55 per cent (29.5 per 
cent + 25.6 per cent) of interventions, whereas only 20.5 per cent (5.1 per cent + 15.4 
per cent) were either Unsuccessful or Possibly Unsuccessful. This indicates that 
overall, based on the prima facie success data, NGO CM intervention has a reasonable 
probability of some success. 
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The reason why there are only four failures overall relates more to the simplistic 
classification of success in the chronological data. It does not necessarily suggest that 
NGOs have achieved broad and substantive campaign goals via NGO' 'CM 
interventions. More specifically, success, in this context, does not necessarily indicate 
that the CM intervention was efficient and/or effective. Neither does it suggest that 
the outcomes were equitable. It merely denotes that the CM intervention appears to 
have contributed towards an outcome that furthered the overall aim of the intervention 
(see Section 2.2.3). Consequently, the criteria for success are significantly more 
lenient here than in the in depth analysis presented in the case studies in Section 576. 
Nevertheless, data of this sort is sufficient to address whether a change in success can 
be identified over time. 
Regarding whether an increase in success can be discerned, 34.8 per cent of successes 
occurred in the last year. Similarly, in absolute terms, there is a consistently positive 
increase in the number of successes occurring in each time period. 
However, there was also a strong growth in the absolute number of interventions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the relative intra-year success scores. 
Throughout the time period, the relative distribution of Success per Year remains 
relatively constant, suggesting that that the positive trend within Success is due to the 
growth in NGO CM intervention overall. Nevertheless, as argued above (Claim 3), the 
objectives of the NGO CM intervention changed over the time period, with 
interventions becoming less focused on media attention and more on corporate 
strategy and performance. Arguably, it is easier to generate media coverage than to 
generate substantive changes in corporate strategy and performance. Therefore, in 
view of the more substantive nature of NGO objectives over the time period and the 
trend in success, it is reasonable to conclude that there has been an increase in the 
success of the interventions. 
This conclusion may indicate that NGOs are learning from their previous 
interventions. It may also indicate that the Reform to the UK Pensions Act has 
provided greater scope for NGO CM intervention (Case Study 5.3). Whether there is 
76 Case study 5.2 includes an analysis of one of these failed interventions. 
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any empirical evidence to support this indication will be considered within the more 
detailed case study section below. 
5. Has there been a balance of NGO CM intervention between short-term 
instrumental use of CM influence, and attempts to change the structure of the 
CM over the longer term? 
Regarding the instrumental nature of NGO CM interventions, a qualitative analysis of 
the chronology demonstrates that only one NGO intervention was apparently 
motivated by an ongoing investment ownership concern. Specifically, Intervention 19 
by WWF-UK, which aimed to invest its own reserves so that "the principle of 
sustainable development is promoted' (WWF-UK, 1997, p1). With other Direct NGO 
CM interventions, the NGO purchased the shares in the company in order to raise 
their campaign concerns. Therefore, as prefaced in Section 1.8, the majority of Direct 
NGO CM intervention has been conducted outside any genuine investment ownership 
and involved instrumental use of the CM. 
As to how to make a distinction between short- and long-term NGO CM interventions 
overall, the government is responsible for setting the legislation that underpins the 
structure of the CM. This legislation is based on an analysis by the public policy- 
makers. Therefore, where the Primary Audience is the public policy-maker as 
opposed to the CM Institution, the intervention can generally be said to be long-term 
in nature. For that reason, the extent to which the Public Policy Audience has been the 
Primary Audience can be interpreted as an indicator as to whether the interventions 
represent an attempt to change the structure of the CM to influence companies over 
the longer term. 
The table below is a statistical analysis of the Primary Audience for the NGO CM 
interventions against year: 
6 
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Table 4.3: Chronological Analysis of Primary Audience 
Crosstab 
P nma Audience 
CM 
Institutions Public Policy Both Total 
YEAR 1990 Count 1 1 
within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
within Primary 1.5% 1.3% Audience 
1991 Count 5 5 
within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
within Primary 7.5% 6.4% Audience 
1992 Count 4 -4 
within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
within Primary 6.0% 5.1% Audience 
1993 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 1.5% 1.3% Audience 
1994 Count 5 5 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 7.5% 6.4% Audience 
1995 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
%within Primary 
1 5% 1.3%. Audience . 
1997 Count 3 3 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 4.5% 3.8% Audience 
1998 Count 4 1 5 
within YEAR 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
%within Primary 
6 0% 1% 11 6.4% Audience . . 
1999 Count 7 1 8 
% within YEAR 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
% within Primary 4% 10 11 1% 10.3% Audience . . 
2000 Count 8 2 1 11 
within YEAR 72.7% 18.2% 9.1% 100.0% 
within Primary 11.9% 22 2% 50.0% 14.1% Audience . 
2001 Count 15 1 16 
% within YEAR 93.8% 6.3% 100.0% 
% within Primary 22.4% 11 1% 20.5% Audience . 
2002 Count 13 4 1 18 
% within YEAR 72.2% 22.2% 5.6% 100.0% 
within Primary 4% 19 44 4% 0% 50 23.1% Audience . . . 
Total Count 67 9 2 78 
within YEAR 85.9% 11.5% 2.6% 100.0% 
within Primary 100.0% 100 0% 100 0% 100.0% Audience . . 
As can be seen from Table 4.3, over the time period in question, 85.9 per cent of NGO 
CM interventions primarily targeted CM institutions rather than the Public Policy. 
Furthermore, the few interventions that targeted Public Policy occurred towards the 
end of the period. Therefore, to the extent that this is a good indicator of short-term 
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instrumental use vs. longer-term systemic interventions, this result suggests that NGO 
CM intervention has been mainly short-term instrumental use of CM influence for 
corporate campaigning, rather than attempts to change the structure of the CM to 
influence companies over the longer term. This is a surprising finding as NGO 
campaigns generally make considerable use of public policy campaigning for changes 
to legislation. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the chronology demonstrates that only one NGO 
intervention (Intervention 51) specifically focused on the problems of short-termism 
in the CM. As set out in Section 1.6, to the extent that short-termism undermines 
corporate SEE performance, the incentives within the CM require structural change. 
This suggests that public policy changes are required. 
In the light of NGOs' extensive use of Public Policy interventions in their more 
general campaigning, and the strong rationale for CM Public Policy change, what 
might the reasons be for the relative dearth of Public Policy advocacy? 
As demonstrated by the above analysis, NGO CM intervention accelerates after 1996 
from a relatively low level. Unlike broader NGO campaigns - for example, on general 
environmental pollution issues - in comparison NGO CM intervention appears 
immature, so the legislation governing the CM, and the structure of the CM, is 
probably unfamiliar (see Section 1.5). This conclusion may indicate that, whereas 
NGOs may be learning from their previous interventions (see Question 4 above), the 
general level of understanding of the structure of the CM among NGOs remains poor 
overall. Whether there is any empirical evidence to support this indication will be 
considered in the case study section below. 
6. Have NGOs used the influence of investment intermediaries in CM 
campaigns? 
An analysis of the empirical data in the chronology reveals no examples of NGO CM 
interventions targeting investment consultants, and only four of the 78 interventions 
appear to have involved sell-side brokers. These latter interventions include: 
149 
" Intervention 7: Surfers Against Sewage (SAS). Presentation at James Capel, 
then a large City broker77, regarding the environmental performance of South 
West Water plc. April 1992; 
" Intervention 48: Friends of the Earth. The `Paper Tiger Hidden Dragon' report 
into illegal and unsustainable forestry, conducted by Asia Pulp and Paper, listed 
a large number of financial organisations, including some brokers, that were 
involved in the original deal. 2001; 
" Intervention 69: Friends of the Earth. Xstrata analysis of lack of disclosure of 
climate change risks recognised that JP Morgan plc acted as Sponsor. July 2002; 
and 
Intervention 70: Inclusion of HSBC sell-side research as one of 20 positive case, 
studies in the London Principles (see case study 5.6). August 2002. 
Arguably, even in each of these exceptions, the sell-side brokers have been tangential 
to the overall NGO CM intervention. Therefore, based on the available data78, NGOs 
appear to have largely ignored investment intermediaries such as sell-side brokers and 
investment consultants in CM campaigns. 
4.1.2 Review of Hypotheses 
The following section tests the hypotheses in relation to the relative success of various 
NGO CM intervention strategies. It makes extensive use of the Crosstab `Success? ' 
data tables in Appendix 3. 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence 
Mechanism (H1). 
77 Now part of HSBC Holdings plc. 
78 It should be noted that due to the nature of the data available on NGO CM intervention, it is possible 
that NGO CM interventions did target these audiences but were not identified. 
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Null hypothesis: the likelihood of success is not related to the Mechanism of 
Influence (Ho). 
The Crosstab `Success? * Mechanism' table in Appendix 3 (Table 4.4) depicts the 
relationship between the empirical data for prima facie success against Mechanism. 
Table 4.4.1 (below) provides the chi-squared values for Table 4.4: 
Table 4.4.1: Chi Squared Tests for `Success? * Mechanism' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.508a 8 . 702 
Likelihood Ratio 5.973 8 . 650 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association . 000 1 . 995 
N of Valid Cases 78 
a. 10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is . 67. 
This demonstrates that the x2 value is 5.508, which is not statistically significant at the 
5 per cent level. Therefore, the x2 is not sufficient to reject Ho. However, an analysis 
of the data in Table 4.4 reveals the following main points: 
" overall, an Investor Advocacy Influence Mechanism was used 60.3 per cent of the 
time, Economic Influence 23.1 per cent and Both 16.7 per cent; 
" 34 per cent of Investor Advocacy Influence interventions were Apparently 
Successful whereas only 16.7 per cent of Economic Influence interventions were 
Apparently Successful. This implies that the probability of Success is almost twice 
as high for interventions using an Investor Advocacy Influence mechanism; and 
" an Apparently Successful intervention has a 69.9 per cent chance of having 
involved an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy and a 13 per cent chance of 
having involved Economic influence. 
These points consistently indicate a higher Success rate associated with an Investor 
Advocacy Influence strategy over an Economic Influence strategy. This indicates that 
there is a relationship between Success and Mechanism. Therefore, based on this 
prima facie success data, Ho is rejected. This is an important finding with significant 
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implications for NGO CM intervention. However, due to the poor x2 value, the 
veracity of this result will be further analysed in the case study section where the data 
for success is based on a detailed analysis. 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Indirect Route of Influence (H1). 
Null hypothesis: the likelihood of success is not related to the Route of 
Influence (Ho)79. 
The Crosstab `Success? * Route of Influence' table in Appendix 3 (Table 4.5) depicts 
the relationship between the empirical data for prima facie success against Route of 
Influence. Table 4.5.1 (below) provides the chi-squared values for Table 4.5: 
Table 4.5.1: Chi Squared Tests for `Success? * Route of Influence' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.3655 12 . 671 
Likelihood Ratio 10.035 12 . 613 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.288 1 . 256 
N of Valid Cases 78 
a. 13 cells (65.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is . 10. 
This demonstrates that the x2 value is 9.365, which is not statistically significant at the 
5 per cent level. Therefore, the x2 is not sufficient to reject Ho. 
However, the data in Table 4.5 reveals the following main points: 
" overall, an Indirect Route was used in 83.3 per cent of interventions and Direct 
16.7 per cent; 
79 It should be noted that a hypothesis testing the relative success stance underlying Indirect can not be 
tested due to the highly limited use of shark and sea lion strategies. 
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" 25 per cent of Direct interventions were Apparently Unsuccessful, and only 8.7 
per cent Apparently Successful. This demonstrates that a Direct Route of 
Influence does not have a high relative probability of success; 
" an Indirect Dolphin strategy has a higher chance of being Apparently Successful 
at 35.5 per cent than any other success-related outcome; and 
87 per cent of Apparently Successful interventions adopted either an Indirect 
dolphin or Indirect orca route of influence. 
These points consistently highlight the higher success rate associated with an Indirect 
dolphin or orca Stance. This suggests that there is a relationship between Success and 
the Route of Influence. Therefore, based on this prima facie Success data, Ho is 
rejected. This finding also has significant implications for NGO CM intervention and, 
as with Hypothesis 1, will be further analysed in the case study section (with a 
particular focus on the Direct vs. Indirect component of the hypothesis). 
It should be noted, however, that there were only two instances of Indirect shark 
intervention, and no instances of a sea lion Stance within an Indirect strategy. Possible 
reasons are discussed above (Section 3.5), but as the empirical experience does not 
include attempts at such a strategy, this conclusion is limited. 
Hypothesis 3: Interventions that involve CM institutions as the primary 
audience have, in general, a higher likelihood of success than those that 
primarily focus on the public policy audience (HI). 
Null hypothesis: the likelihood of success is not related to the Audience (Ho). 
The Crosstab `Success? * Primary Audience' table in Appendix 3 (Table 4.6) depicts 
the relationship between the empirical data for prima facie success against Primary 
Audience. Table 4.6.1 (below) provides the chi-squared values for Table 4.6: 
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Table 4.6.1: Chi Squared Tests for `Success? * Primary Audience' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.063a 8 . 058 
Likelihood Ratio 15.262 8 . 054 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.002 1 . 317 
N of Valid Cases 78 
a. 11 cells (73.3%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is . 10. 
This demonstrates that the x2 value is 15.063, which is not (quite) statistically, 
significant at the 5 per cent level. Therefore, once again, the x2 is not sufficient by 
itself to reject Ho. 
Nevertheless, a review of the underlying data in Table 4.6 reveals the following main 
points: 
" overall, CM Institutions have been the Primary Audience in 85.9 per cent of cases; 
and 
" 31.3 per cent of interventions with CM Institutions as the Primary Audience were 
Apparently Successful, whereas only 11.1 per cent of interventions with Public 
Policy-makers as the Primary Audience were Apparently Successful. This 
indicates that those focusing on CM institutions are more likely to succeed. 
Therefore, based on the underlying data, it is possible to conclude that it is harder to 
achieve changes to Public Policy than CM Institutions. This indicates that Success is 
related to Audience, and therefore, Ho is rejected. However, regarding the practical 
implications for NGO strategy from this finding, as noted in Section 3.1, these two 
audiences are not alternatives but are appropriate to different contexts. 
This conclusion's main statistical limitation is the relatively small sample size of 
interventions that adopted either a Public Policy audience (nine interventions) or Both 
(two interventions). However, as this hypothesis is not used to derive 
recommendations, this statistical limitation does not represent a problem. 
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Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts a 
balance of both Moral and Business Case arguments rather than primarily 
focusing on one or the other (H1). 
Null hypothesis: the likelihood of success is not related to the Nature of 
Argument (H0). 
The Crosstab `Success? * Nature of Argument' table in Appendix 3 (Table 4.7) 
depicts the relationship between the empirical data for prima facie success against 
Nature of Argument. Table 4.7.1 (below) provides the chi-squared values for Table 
4.7: 
Table 4.7.1: Chi Squared Tests for `Success? * Nature of Argument' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.868a 8 . 032 
Likelihood Ratio 17.846 8 . 022 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 8.930 1 . 003 
N of Valid Cases 78 
a. 8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is . 87. 
This demonstrates that the x2 value is 16.868, which is statistically significant at the 5 
per cent level. Therefore, the x2 is sufficient by itself to reject Ho. Furthermore, a 
closer analysis of the data within the underlying table (Table 4.7) reveals the 
following main points: 
" Overall, a predominantly `Moral' Nature of Argument has been used least (21.8 
per cent of the time) with predominantly `Business Case' (37.2 per cent) and 
`Both' (41 per cent) being used most often; 
" within all `Apparently Successful' interventions, there is a 69.6 per cent 
probability that the intervention used a balance of `Both Moral and Business Case' 
arguments. This is significantly higher than purely `Moral Case' arguments at 
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only an 8.7 per cent probability or `Business Case' at 21.7 per cent probability; 
and 
"` similarly, there is a 50 per cent chance that interventions adopting `Both Moral 
and Business Case' arguments will be `Apparently Successful'. However, there is 
only a 17.2 per cent chance that a predominantly `Business Case' argument would 
be `Apparently Successful' and an 11.8 per cent chance that a predominantly 
`Moral' argument would be `Apparently Successful'. 
These points consistently underline the higher Success rates associated with 
interventions that adopt both Moral and Business Case arguments rather than one or 
the other. Furthermore, the least likely to succeed would appear to be a Predominantly 
Moral Case argument. Therefore, based on this prima facie success data an d the x2 
value, Ho is rejected. The veracity of this conclusion is also tested further in the case 
study Analysis (Section 5.7.2). 
4.1.3 Further Trends in NGO CM Intervention 
It was noted above that NGO CM intervention increased during the time period. This 
section reviews whether, in addition to those changes over time that were identified in 
Section 4.1.1, any further changes within the use of the various components of the 
NGO CM intervention model can also be identified. 
The structure of this section is to consider what changes over time exist within'the 
components in the following order: Mechanism of Company Influence; Route of 
Influence; Primary Audience; and Nature of Argument. This section makes extensive 
use of the `Year' Crosstab data tables in Appendix 3. 
1. Mechanism of Company Influence 
The Crosstab `Year * Mechanism' (Table 4.8) demonstrates that towards the end of 
the time period in question, NGO CM use became predominantly focused on an 
Investor Advocacy Influence mechanism. Section 4.1.2 demonstrated that, based on 
the available data, the likelihood of success appears to be increased when an NGO 
adopts an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence, 
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Mechanism. This could be an indication that NGOs have learned from previous 
failures. 
2. Route of Influence 
The Crosstab `Year * Route of Influence' (Table 4.9) demonstrates that while NGOs 
initially started with Direct CM intervention, there was a significant shift towards 
Indirect. It has been shown that the likelihood of success is increased when an NGO 
adopts an Indirect Route of Influence. Therefore, as before, this could also be an 
indication that NGOs have learned from previous mistakes. 
3. Primary Audience 
The Crosstab `Year * Primary Audience' (Table 4.10) demonstrates that CM 
Institutions were the main audience for NGO CM intervention until 1998. It also 
demonstrates that while still uncommon, Public Policy interventions had increased 
over this time. However, as there are so few examples of this intervention (despite 
some growth in Public Policy intervention), it is too early to conclude whether this 
could be indicative of a broader trend towards NGO CM Public Policy intervention. 
4. Nature of Argument 
The Crosstab `Year * Nature of Argument' (Table 4.11) demonstrates that CM 
Institutions initially used predominantly Moral Case arguments. Towards the end of 
the time period, predominantly Business Case arguments and a balance of Both 
became more popular. It has been shown that the likelihood of success is increased 
when an NGO adopts a balance of both Moral and Business Case arguments rather 
than primarily focusing on one or the other. Therefore, as before, this trend could also 
be an indication that NGOs have learned from previous mistakes. 
The case study analysis in Section 5.7 will therefore look for evidence that NGOs 
have learned from previous failures. 
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4.1.4. Restrictions on Further Statistical Analysis 
Consideration was given to conducting more sophisticated statistical analysis on the 
data set using methodologies such as factor analysis, regression analysis and power 
analysis. However, the bivariate correlation table (below) showed that there 
was 
significant mülticolinearity in the data set: 
Table 4.12: Bivariate Correlation Table 
Correlations 
Route of Primary Nature of 
YEAR Mechanism Influence Audience Argument TYPE Success? 
YEAR Pearson Correlation 1 -054 -. 
011 . 222 -. 
084 . 
004 . 
054 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 636 . 924 . 050 . 
463 . 969 . 
638 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Mechanism Pearson Correlation . 054 1 -. 028 . 026 -. 
128 -"282- . 001 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 636 . 805 . 823 . 
266 . 013 . 
995 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Route of Influence Pearson Correlation -. 011 -. 028 1 -. 052 . 043 . 
045 . 129 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 924 . 805 . 653 . 
711 . 694 . 
259 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Primary Audience Pearson Correlation . 222 . 026 -. 052 1 -. 
050 "109 -"114 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 050 . 823 . 653 - . 
664 . 340 . 
320 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 - 78 
Nature of Argument Pearson Correlation -. 084 -. 128 . 043 -. 050 
1 -215 " "341- 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 463 . 266 . 711 . 664 . 
059 . 002 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
TYPE Pearson Correlation . 004 ". 282' . 045 . 109 . 
215 1 . 055 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 969 . 013 . 694 . 340 . 
059 . 633 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Success? Pearson Correlation . 054 . 001 . 129 -. 114 . 
341 -055 
1 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 638 . 995 . 259 . 320 . 
002 . 633 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
ý" Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
"" Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Multicolinearity is "the undesirable situation where an independent variable is a 
linear function of other independent variables" (SPSS, 2002). This means that the 
correlations between different independent variables renders any further more 
sophisticated data analysis problematic because the independent variables are not 
genuinely independent. Consequently, the factor analysis, regression analysis and 
power analysis is not presented. 
4.2 Chapter Conclusion 
The Chapter has tested the hypotheses (developed in Section 3.5) against the 
empirical data of NGO CM intervention between 1990 and 2002, and analysed the 
changing nature of this intervention. Based on the initial success data, it has found 
158' 
evidence in support of both the main claims made at the outset of the thesis and the 
hypotheses. 
In general, the analysis highlighted that NGO CM intervention has increased and 
involved a broad range of strategies. In addition, it has been shown that NGO CM 
intervention has been mainly short-term instrumental use of CM influence for 
corporate campaigning, and that, surprisingly, NGOs have tended not to target 
investment intermediaries or CM public policy makers. 
In relation to the hypotheses, it has shown that, so some extent, the quantitative data 
supports the Hypotheses set out in Section. Specifically, the likelihood of success 
appears to increase when the NGO adopts: 
" an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence 
Mechanism; 
" an Indirect Route of Influence rather than Direct; 
"a balance of both Moral and Business Case arguments. 
It has also been shown that an increase in the success of the interventions, coupled 
with evidence of a change towards strategies that are more likely to succeed, indicates 
that NGOs have learned from errors in previous interventions. 
However, due to statistical problems relating to the size of some of the data samples, 
and the initial nature of the data regarding the success of the intervention, and 
multicolinearity in the data, in order to assess their veracity these initial conclusions 
will be analysed in more depth in the case study section below. 
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Chapter 5. Case Studies of NGO CM Intervention 
The previous Chapter analysed UK NGO CM intervention (1990-2002) overall. This 
Chapter, takes a detailed look at eight case studies selected from the chronology. The 
three main reasons for including case studies are: 
" to add depth to the analysis of the main claims and hypotheses in relation to 
NGO CM intervention established in this thesis; 
". to augment the analysis of the normative implications for NGO CM 
intervention strategy and policy; and 
" to check the classification of sample NGO CM interventions in the 
chronology. 
In particular, the case study analysis includes a review of the degree to which the 
campaign objectives were achieved; the degree to which the achievement can be 
attributed to the CM intervention; and an analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness 
with which the outcomes were generated. In addition to providing a record of the- 
interventions, and insights into the specific cases, the main intention is to further 
explore the initial conclusions drawn during the preceding analysis of the NGO CM 
chronology above (Section 4.1). In chronological order, the interventions chosen for 
case study review were: 
Table 5.1: NGO CM Intervention Case Studies 
1 Intervention Classification 
19 WWF-UK Engagement with companies . Economic and Investor 
held in own financial Advocacy 
investment portfolios . Direct 
" CM Institutions 
" Both Moral and 
Business Case 
20 People and Planet Ethics for USS campaign Economic 
" Indirect (orca) 
" CM Institutions 
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" Moral 
30 UKSIF, in Reform of the Pensions Act " Economic and Investor 
conjunction with Advocacy 
Traidcraft, War on " Indirect (dolphin) 
Want, Friends of " Public Policy 
the Earth and " Business and moral case 
W WF-UK 
33 WWF-UK BP and the Arctic Refuge 2002 " Economic Influence and 
resolution Investor Advocacy 
Influence 
" Indirect (orca) 
" CM Institutions 
" Business case and moral 
case 
34 Friends of the Capital Punishment and " Investor Advocacy 
Earth Norwich Union Campaign Influence 
" Indirect (orca) 
" CM Institutions 
" Business case and moral 
case 
43 WWF in The International Interfaith " Economic and Investor 
collaboration with Investment Group (3iG) Advocacy Influence 
the Alliance of " Indirect (dolphin) 
Religions and " CM Institutions 
Conservation " Business case and moral 
case 
63 Oxfam GSK Cut the Cost campaign " Investor Advocacy 
Influence 
" Indirect (orca) 
" CM Institutions 
" Business and moral case 
70 Forum for the The London Principles " Investor Advocacy and 
Future Economic Influence 
" Indirect (dolphin) 
" Both Public Policy and 
CM Institutions 
" Business case 
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The structure of this Chapter is to review the case studies in the order in which they 
occurred. The exception is the WWF interventions: these are reviewed collectively to 
avoid unnecessary repetition of the introduction to the NGO. The structure of the case 
study analysis and methodological approach to analysis has been established in the 
methodology (Section 2.2.3). 
i .. 
R 
5.1 WWF-UK Case Studies 
The following three case studies review three separate interventions by WWF: 
" WWF-UK's own Investor Advocacy Influence within its Ethical Investment 
Policy; 
" WWF-UK filing shareholder resolutions on the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge at BP's AGMs; and 
" WWF-UK partnership with the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC) 
and their establishment of the International Interfaith Investment Group (3iG). 
The structure of the studies are similar to the other case studies but do not repeat the 
introduction to the NGO section. The three CM interventions are different from the 
other case studies presented here: the Ethical Investment Policy is the only example of 
a purely Direct Investor Advocacy Influence approach in the case studies; the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge resolution is the only detailed case study of an NGO 
resolution; and the 3iG collaboration with ARC is the only example of an education 
initiative of investors conducted passively and is the only case study that focuses on 
religious investors. 
Introduction to the NGO 
WWF was founded under Swiss Law at Zurich on 11 September 1961. It sets out its 
mission thus: "WWF takes action to: conserve endangered species; protect 
endangered spaces; [and] address global threats to the planet by seeking sustainable 
solutions for the benefit of people and nature" (WWF, 2003). 
162 
The NGO has a global network of 52 offices working in more than 90 countries. In 
the 2001/2002 financial year, the UK office generated £31 million income and the 
WWF international network more than £200 million. WWF has 320,000 members in 
the UK and more than five million worldwide. It employs 270 staff in the UK and in 
excess of 3,000 worldwide (WWF, ibid). 
WWF-UK has established a programme of work with business. It has defined both a 
policy and strategy for this work, and sets out its rationale as follows: "In working to 
achieve this mission, WWF appreciates the key role that business and industry can 
and must play in moving towards sustainable development... businesses are at the 
very core of global environmental concerns and affect everyone. " (WWF, 1999b). 
The strategy is articulated as having four aims: to establish strong partnerships, to 
fundraise for nature and the environment, to innovate and to challenge (WWF, 2000e: 
10). 
In terms of the `Stance' that WWF takes towards business, the policy states that the 
NGO's approach is one of "pragmatism, cooperation and partnership" (WWF, 
1999b). This demonstrates that WWF generally adopts a dolphin Stance. However, 
the policy also states: "Growing numbers of businesses are seeking to move beyond 
traditional relationships to forge productive affiliations with NGOs. While WWF is at 
the forefront of this transition from a problem focused to a solution focused 
approach, we will continue our selective lobbying work whenever necessary. The 
approach taken depends on a detailed assessment of the issue, audience and business. 
Use of the media is carefully considered, as are shareholder resolutions at annual 
general meetings and/or recourse to the legal system" (WWF, op cit)80. 
In terms of WWF's legitimacy (see Section 1.1,1.8 and 2.2.3) it has had ECOSOC 
General Consultative Status since 1996 and therefore complies with the customary 
international law in this area. With respect to transparency, WWF produces an audited 
Report and Accounts (in line with Charity Law), an Annual Review of its activities, 
80 This reference to `selective lobbying' and the adoption of different approaches where an assessment 
deems it appropriate - including shareholder resolutions - demonstrates why, as argued in Section 1.4, it is necessary to classify each CM intervention individually rather than at the level of the NGO. 
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and an externally verified Environmental Report detailing its own resource 
consumption. It also produces a quarterly news magazine for its members. 
Regarding its internal consistency with its CM intervention, it banks with the Co- 
operative Bank due to the bank's ethical stance and offers its staff the option of 
investing their pension in the Standard Life ethical fund. The NGO also has an ethical 
investment policy that is the subject of the first case study. 
Introduction to the NGO's overall CM intervention 
The data listed in the overall CM intervention chronology in Appendix 2 includes 18 
separate CM interventions for WWF, rendering it one of the most active NGOs in this 
area. 
The NGO's strategy refers to CM intervention as a "mechanism to achieve long-term 
change in business sustainability" (WWF-UK 2000-2005 Strategic Plan, 2000h, p. 17) 
and establishes a "Critical Indicator: Ethical Investment a key-influence on 
development pattern of key sectors". It argues that its CM intervention is required due 
to the "lack of government willingness to regulate multinationals" (ibid) and describes 
its aims as being "to use the financial markets as a tool for change; to demonstrate 
that environmental sense makes good financial sense and to practice what we preach" 
(WWF-UK, 2000g, p. 4). In 2001, WWF-UK became the first UK NGO to employ a 
full-time CM campaigner (a "Sustainable Investment Policy Officer"), indicating its 
resource commitment to this area. 
Having introduced WWF's CM intervention generally, an introduction to each 
specific CM intervention is presented at the outset of each study below. 
5.1.1 Case Study: WWF-UK's Ethical Investment Policy 
Engagement 
This study focuses on the engagement carried out by WWF-UK on its own reserves. 
To reduce the potential for the investments to undermine its mission, WWF-UK 
established an ethical investment policy that "endeavours to steer.., investments away 
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from companies that conflict with (WWF's) environmental concerns and into those 
that are more in line with them"(WWF-UK, 2000a, p5). Its policy refers to investing 
in such a way that "the principle of sustainable development is promoted'(WWF-UK, 
1997, p181). This involves excluding some companies; adopting a `best of sector' 
approach to some sectors; and constructing a dialogue with certain investee 
companies using their "shareholding as a lever to influence (companies') 
environmental management" (op cit, p2). This dialogue component of the policy is the 
specific focus of this case study, as it represents an innovative CM intervention: no 
other contemporary UK NGO was undertaking engagement of this sort. 
As WWF has not published a review of the effectiveness of this engagement, the main 
purpose of this case study is to evaluate the degree to which this dialogue has been 
effective and efficient. The specific focus here is the engagement carried out by 
WWF-UK on its own reserves during the 1999/2000 financial year, as sufficient time 
has elapsed to judge whether companies have responded to the requests for change. 
1. Case Specific Legitimacy 
The company shares were purchased to provide an investment return. As argued in 
Section 1.8, WWF-UK's CM intervention is legitimised through its investment 
ownership. 
2. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
WWF's dialogue commences with a fact-finding questionnaire that "probes the 
standards of environmental management being achieved"(WWF-UK, 1998a, pp 2-4). 
WWF chose to focus on environmental management during its engagement as "there 
has to be a link between what [NGOs] are trying to do, how they make their 
investments and on what issues they engage with companies through their 
investments" (Jones, 2001: interview). Depending on the company's response to the 
questionnaire, "recommendations for improvement to its environmental management 
81 WWF-UK's investment policy has since been updated. The 1997 policy is used here for two reasons: 
1. it is the policy which applied during the period being analysed; and 2. the new policy is not 
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system may be made" (WWF-UK, op cit). The NGO externally disclosed a target to 
send the questionnaire to "at least 10 companies on the portfolio per annum" - 
approximately 10 per cent of the directly held companies. 
During the period under review, the questionnaire was sent to 31 Group, Barratt, 
Beazer, Cadbury Schweppes, EMI, Geest, Halifax, Hanson, Next, Reed, Vodafone, 
Williams and Wolsey (WWF-UK, 2000b). In response, WWF requested improvement 
in five cases (see Table 6 below): Beazer, Cadbury Schweppes, EMI, Geest and 
Halifax (ibid). 
All requests for change involved incremental improvements in the target company's 
Environmental Management System (EMS) or environmental reporting. As agreeing 
to these requests did not involve the companies making fundamental changes to their 
business models, the targets were feasible. Similarly, as each target involved 
incremental improvements and were scaled in accordance with the contemporary 
practice of the company in question, the targets were viable. 
In respect of the scale of the engagement process, sending a questionnaire to "at least 
10 companies on the portfolio per annum" (WWF-UK, 2000a: p5), followed by 
analysis of the responses and follow-up correspondence, represents minimal activity 
levels. While this was therefore not a significant resource burden on the NGO, it 
limited the chances of success in two ways: first, because it was entirely 
correspondence-based, influence from face-to-face meetings was not brought to bear. 
Second, as engagement took place in private, the potential for increased influence 
through the publication of targets was not realised. 
More significantly, WWF's potential direct influence was restricted by the limited 
nature of its reserves and its consequential `minor shareholder' status (see Section 
3.4). 
Notwithstanding the above, one of WWF's aims was `to practise what we preach'. As 
the NGO advocates "engagement with companies in your portfolio on issues of social 
substantially different in respect of WWF's commitment to engage with the companies in which it 
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responsibility" (see Section 3.3.1), it is necessary for consistency with its 
campaigning for it to engage with companies in its portfolio on issues of social 
responsibility. This engagement therefore enables WWF to demonstrate internal 
consistency. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness: 
The table below is an analysis of the outcomes generated by the requests following 
the correspondence in 2000. The table details the explicit and implicit intervention 
targets and assesses what related actions the target company took. It uses the key 
presented in Section 2.2.4. 
Table 5.2: An Analysis of WWF-UK Direct Engagement During 1999/2000 
Target Company Position Subsequent WWF Status at January Evaluation 
Company Request 2003sl 
Beazer Established an Consider a more Acquired by N 
Group environmental formalised EMS Persimmon. No 
policy and an based on ISO substantial 
environmental 14001 and produce environmental policy, 
committee. an externally report or emissions data 
(Company Response verified published by merged 
to Questionnaire) environmental entity on website. No 
report. (WWF-UK, evidence of EMS. 
2000b) 
Cadbury Published an Have the next Produced a second Tj 
Schweppes environmental environmental environmental report 
report (Company report externally which included more 
Response to verified. (WWF- detailed emissions data 
Questionnaire) UK, 2000b) but no external 
verification statement. 
EMI Group Produced an Encourage Published a 2002 
environmental sustainable Environment and 
report which was development Community report. 
also published on reporting. (WWF- While not a 
website. UK, 2000b) 'sustainability report', it 
owns shares. 
82 Analysis based on review of relevant company websites conducted on 4 January 2003. 
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Target 
Company 
Company Position 
Considering 
sustainable 
development 
reporting. (Company 
Response to 
Questionnaire) 
Subsequent WWF 
Request 
Status at January 
does include discussion 
of sustainability. No 
evidence that WWF 
intervention decisive. 
Evaluation 
Halifax Environmental Have the next Merged with Bank of y? 
policy linked to the environmental Scotland to form HBOS. 
company's report externally Prior to merger Halifax 
corporate objectives. verified and make produced an unverified 
Environmental the report available Environmental Report. 
report being on the internet. No HBOS Group 
published. (WWF-UK, 2000b) environmental report at 
(Company Response date of review. Some 
to Questionnaire) emissions data 
published via Business 
in the Community 
website but not 
externally verified and 
no targets. 
Geest EMS based on ISO Produce an Website included very N 
14001 (Company externally verified basic environmental 
Response to environmental emissions data. No 
Questionnaire) report and include a stand-alone report 
review of produced, no targets and 
environmental no verification. No 
performance in the mention of 
operating and environmental issues in 
financial review Annual Report and 
within the Annual Accounts. 
Report and 
Accounts. (WWF- 
UK, 2000b) 
The above analysis of the WWF target companies' EMS disclosure demonstrates 
there has been no substantial delivery of the improvements requested by WWF. 
Where there has been limited change, there is no evidence that this was as a result of 
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the NGO CM intervention. This suggests that from an ex post perspective, this CM 
intervention was ineffective. 
However, in view of the inclusion of the investment, policy work in WWF's 
environmental management system - and the NGO's intention to practise what it 
preached - the philosophical motivations for this engagement may have had more to 
do with internal consistency. This would appear to have been confirmed by the 
NGO's deputy chief executive, who has highlighted the importance of maintaining 
WWF's reputation: "Charities live by their reputation and our major risk is that 
people would simply stop giving us money if they found out we were investing in 
companies that were destroying the environment" (Guardian Society, 2003, p12 ). 
For the duration that the engagement investment policy has been in effect, WWF - 
unlike some other NGOs - has not encountered any negative publicity surrounding 
the ethical nature of its investment portfolio. Indeed, it has been cited as an example 
of best practice in relation to charity ethical investment (Green, 2003). In this more 
limited sense, WWF's direct engagement programme may be regarded as having been 
successful and, therefore, from a purely internal consistency perspective, it has been 
effective in this sense. 
However, in conclusion, as the main focus here is corporate change, overall this 
intervention has not been ex post effective. 
4. Efficiency 
In terms of the resources allocated to this activity, the process of dialogue is one 
component of the overall Environmental Management System. This fell under the 
auspices of a full-time Environmental Management Officer. The engagement was 
limited to sending 10 questionnaires per annum, analysing the responses, and sending 
a letter containing recommendations for improvement. It is estimated that this activity 
did not constitute a significant use of resources: it involved less than 5 per cent of the 
Environmental Management Officer's time, and there were some additional costs in 
terms of travel. Total cost of this activity is therefore estimated to be less than £1,000 
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per annum. The engagement conducted applied to approximately £7 million of assets, 
which suggest a cost/influence multiplier of 7,000. 
The ex ante analysis demonstrated that the engagement was ultimately ineffective in 
changing corporate practices. Therefore, from this perspective, resources were 
inefficiently allocated. However, regarding the NGO's internal consistency aim, one 
may conceive of this engagement as a cost of business that arises from its broader CM 
campaign work. From this perspective, efficiency should be measured by the cost of 
alternative forms of engagement that would enable internal consistency. These 
alternatives include commissioning an external organisation to conduct the 
engagement on its behalf, which is likely to have been significantly more expensive. 
Again from this narrower perspective, the CM intervention was efficient to the extent 
that it enabled the NGO to demonstrate internal consistency with its broader (and' 
more significant) campaign goals. However, it should be noted that this specific 
efficiency conclusion is a much more limited conclusion than a finding of general 
efficiency at achieving the aims of the corporate engagement. From a corporate 
change perspective, this was an inefficient resource allocation. 
5. Equity 
As demonstrated, WWF's 1999/2000 investment policy engagement programme had 
little impact on corporate environmental performance. As a result, no equity issues 
arise. 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
Section 3.1 sets out the NGO CM intervention model's four main components: 
L Mechanism of company influence: The overall investment policy refers to 
excluding certain sectors, and the investment questionnaire (op cit) implies that 
divestment may take place if WWF is not satisfied with the initial answers. 
Therefore there are elements of an Economic Influence strategy. However, the 
engagement component under review here uses the rights associated with share 
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ownership to raise concerns with the company. This intervention is therefore 
predominantly `Investor Advocacy Influence'. 
2. Route of influence: the NGO used the influence associated with buying, selling 
and owning shares in listed companies as investors in their own right and is 
therefore classified as `Direct'. 
3. Primary audience: as the engagement targeted specific companies and not public 
policy-makers, the audience classification is `Capital Market Institutions'. 
4. Nature of argument: the questionnaire introduced WWF's purpose as "to strive 
for a future in which people can live in harmony with nature" (op cit, p 1). 
However, in setting out the specific purpose of the questionnaire, it references a 
government report on sustainable development as follows: "The growing 
evidence of the implications of environmental performance on profitability, and 
the increasing costs of poor performance, should encourage investors to seek 
consistent and reliable information from companies on their environmental 
impacts, targets and progress towards them" (op cit, p 1). This is a clear 
business case argument. Consequently, this is classified as Both Business and 
Moral Case. 
In the light of the above detailed analysis, the overall tabular classification in the 
chronology in Appendix 2 (which refers to the policy overall) can be confirmed. As 
mentioned in Section 2.2.3, a scaled polar diagram is used here to depict a more 
nuanced classification that incorporates the relative emphasis of the other tactics 
deployed: 
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Figure 5 1: Polar Diagram of WWF-UK Direct Investor Advocacy 
Direct 
T6 
Moral Case Economic Influence 
INS 
Institutions Audience ý-"  Ot + Public Policy Audience 
Investor Influence Business Case 
Indirect 
Figure 5.1 indicates that, to some extent, this CM intervention also used Economic 
Influence. As identified above, the reason for this is that the information gathered by 
the questionnaire was, in part, used by the NGO to make investment decisions. It also 
highlights the fact that while the Business Case was used primarily, the Moral Case 
behind why the NGO was asking these questions was also presented. 
7. Inductive analysis 
As has been demonstrated, in respect of the `Route of Influence' the NGO deployed 
an entirely `Direct' strategy. Section 3.5 above deduced that the most significant 
limitation with a Direct approach was the relatively minuscule investment reserves of 
individual NGOs. It suggested that `Direct' success without additional sources of 
influence such as media interest was unlikely. The ex ante analysis of this case 
demonstrates that this NGO CM intervention was ultimately ineffective at generating 
corporate change. In this case, therefore, the empirical observation concurs with the 
hypothesis that `the likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Indirect strategy' (from Hypothesis 2, Section 3.5). 
Perhaps as a consequence of its Direct engagement experience, WWF-UK has 
suggested that NGOs are collectively missing an opportunity in not pooling their 
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resources: "NGOs have billions and billions of pounds under investment and could 
individually and collectively influence the companies in which they invest far more 
than they do at the moment" (Jones, 2001: interview). 
In addition to a lack of direct financial strength, NGO corporate lobbying typically 
entails a concerted public engagement effort, whereas WWF chose to engage 
privately and via a relatively limited level of correspondence. If it is to be an effective 
mode of corporate engagement, NGOs conducting such a CM intervention strategy 
may therefore need to allocate greater resources and consider using the media to 
increase their leverage. The pooling of the `Direct' engagement influence of other 
NGOs via a formal coalition could also be considered (See Section 6). 
8. Issues in Assessing Performance 
This case has benefited from considerable access to detailed records held by the NGO. 
Consequently, there are no substantive issues in assessing performance. 
9. Case Specific Conclusion 
From the perspective of the internal consistency aim, one can conclude that this CM 
intervention has been successful, ex post effective and efficient. However, it has not 
been ex post effective at achieving external corporate change via its engagement. 
Therefore, regarding the efficiency of this activity, this engagement should perhaps be 
seen as a cost of business arising from the NGO's broader CM campaign work. 
This case study has also demonstrated that the initial classification of the intervention 
for the chronology was accurate and, more important, that the deductive implications 
in respect of Direct CM intervention (see Section 3.4) are borne out by the empirical 
evidence from this case. It has also shown that NGOs do not have sufficient influence 
individually to mobilise corporate change effectively via their own reserves (see 
Section 5.7). 
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5.1.2 Case Study: WWF-UK shareholder resolution at BP's AGM 
This case reviews WWF's CM intervention in BP's involvement in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). In particular, this case study focuses on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the shareholder resolution presented at BP's AGM in 
2002. The main aim of WWF's CM intervention was "to persuade BP Amoco to 
publicly withdraw its interest in developing the Arctic Refuge and publicly support 
permanent protection of the Refuge for its wilderness values" (WWF-UK, 2000c). 
WWF has not published a review of the effectiveness of this CM intervention. 
Consequently, an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of this intervention is 
the purpose of this case study. 
The CM intervention was one part of a broader campaign to protect the coastal plain 
of the ANWR, a wilderness covering 7.6 million hectares in north-east Alaska. The 
area being considered for drilling opportunities was the "1002 area"83. This was the 
only protected part of Alaska's Arctic coastal plain, the remaining 95 per cent being 
open for oil and gas drilling. Since the 1002 area was established, a polemic debate 
has taken place regarding whether the refuge should be opened up to drilling. In 
relatively recent times, President Bush has argued that the refuge should be exploited 
to reduce US dependency on foreign oil. Environmental organisations, including 
WWF, have argued that the refuge is an important sanctuary for polar bears, musk 
oxen, caribou and migratory birds. Proponents of drilling say only 0.8 per cent of 
ANWR would be needed for equipment and operations, leaving plenty of room for the 
wildlife. In particular, Arctic Power, the lobby group focused on opening up the 
refuge, claims that "only the 1.5 million acre or 8% on the northern coast of ANWR is 
being considered for development. The remaining 17.5 million acres or 92% of 
ANWR will remain permanently closed to any kind of development. If oil is 
discovered, less than 2,000 acres of the over 1.5 million acres of the Coastal Plain 
would be affected. " (Arctic Power, 2003a). Arctic Power also contends that caribou in 
other Alaskan drilling areas have not been harmed (op cit). 
The indigenous people who have settled near the reserve are divided between those 
who see extra oil and gas investment as an opportunity for development, and those 
83 Defined by section 1002 of the Alaska National Interest Land Conservations Act of 1980. 
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who regard it as a threat to their way of life. Inupiat (Eskimo) people on the coast 
have traditionally depended on sea mammals rather than the 1002 area's wildlife. 
They support drilling for the direct economic benefit it would bring. But the economy 
of the Gwich'in (Native American) people on the southern boundary is linked to the 
vast porcupine caribou herd in the Refuge. They oppose drilling because of its 
potential impact on the caribou. 
WWF's broad ANWR campaign included: "Continued direct negotiation with BP 
Amoco; concerted media activity to raise the profile of the Arctic Refuge in the UK; 
use of WWF activist network [including]... letters to politicians [and] petitions to the 
US government; partnerships with other NGOs...; and use [of] WWF-UK's 
shareholdings in BP Amoco to act as additional leverage" (WWF, op cit). This 
demonstrates that the CM element under review here was established by the NGO as 
part of a broader ANWR campaign84. 
WWF's first CM intervention in this area took place in 2000, when the NGO 
collaborated with Greenpeace. Greenpeace had filed a resolution that referred to the 
Arctic Refuge but focused mainly on the climate change impacts of oil and gas 
exploration and production. While WWF did not co-file this resolution, it did 
participate in its advocacy - for example, by placing an advertisement in the Financial 
Times which articulated its own rationale for BP not entering the refuge. It also 
published "Challenging the Economic Myth: Oil & Gas in the Arctic Refuge, Alaska" 
(WWF-UK, 2000d), distributed the paper to large institutional shareholders, and voted 
in favour of the resolution using its own shares in BP. 
During 2001 and 2002, along with other interested NGOs and some concerned 
investors (mainly from the US), WWF participated in the drafting and co-filing of a 
resolution at BP's AGMs. It also approached institutional investors with large share 
holdings in BP on a number of occasions in order to generate interest in and support 
for the resolution. WWF led the drafting of the 2002 resolution: 
84 WWF's investment policy was not the catalyst for this CM intervention. Consequently, this case 
study is considered to be distinct from the previous study of WWF's investment policy engagement. 
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"RESOLVED, shareholders instruct the company to prepare a report 
disclosing, as appropriate, how the company analyses and takes steps, to 
control significant risks to shareholder value from operating in 
environmentally or culturally sensitive areas, and lobbying for access to areas 
with a protected environmental status. These risks include operating, financial 
and reputation risks to the business in general, the ability to attract and retain 
high quality staff, and the impact on BP's effort in building its reputation as a 
good corporate citizen. The report should include a description of how the 
information therein affects BP's decision-making processes". (Requisition by 
shareholders under Section 376 of the Companies Act 1985 for giving notice 
of an intended Special Resolution for the circulation of a statement on the 
matter referred to in the proposed Special Resolution at the BP plc 2002 
Annual General Meeting, BP 2002). 
In addition to submitting the resolution, the NGO also commissioned Innovest 
Strategic Value Advisors to prepare a financial analysis of the business case, entitled 
"Brand Risk and Sustainability: is shareholder value at risk in the new BP? 
Environmental Performance, Brand Equity and Shareholder Value" (Innovest, 2002). 
This concluded that "performance around sensitive sites is a financial risk issue that 
warrants serious attention" (ibid: 2). This report was used during dialogue with 
investors to back up the resolution's use of the influential Association of British 
Insurers disclosure guidelines (see Section 3.3). 
In addition to specific business case and reputational risk arguments aimed at 
investors, in the media WWF consistently argued a moral case for its preferred course 
of action by BP. For example: "BP Amoco... refuses to acknowledge publicly the 
damage that even exploratory drilling would do to the Refuge, let alone the impact of 
large-scale oil extraction. WWF believes that, as multinational oil companies already 
have access to 95 per cent of Alaska's Arctic coastal plain, this last five per cent 
should be left undisturbed. It is not only wildlife that could suffer as a result of oil 
drilling. The Gwich'in Athabascan people rely upon the caribou for their survival, 
and are therefore extremely vulnerable to the changes in migratory patterns that 
would be the result of oil extraction. " (WWF-UK, 2000e) This statement uses moral 
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arguments as it is based on the potential for oil extraction to cause suffering to people 
and the environment rather than the economic costs of this outcome. 
Assessment of the CM intervention 
1. Case Specific Legitimacy 
At the time of the intervention, WWF Investment Policy (see case study) approved 
85 ownership of shares in BP as a `best of sector' company, so shares were purchased 
to provide an investment return. Therefore, as argued in Section 1.8, this specific 
intervention is legitimised through its investment ownership. 
More generally, the intervention is legitimised by reference to the protection of 
endangered spaces, which is one of the mission objectives for which WWF receives 
funding from its members. 
2. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
The overall intention to prevent drilling in the 1002 area represented a highly 
ambitious campaign goal for WWF, as there were significant financial interests in 
support of opening up the refuge for drilling. For example, a US geological survey 
estimated that with a market price of around $24 per barrel, there was a 50 per cent 
likelihood of recovering 5.3 billion barrels of oil from the ANWR, with up to 16 
billion barrels being possible if prices were high enough (Reuters, 2002a) - i. e. a 50 
per cent likelihood of $127.2 billion dollars of oil at a $24 market price. Revenues 
would have flowed to the government, state, local people, the companies involved, 
and their investors. 
While the refuge would be open to drilling by any oil and gas company approved by 
the US government, the NGO appears to have chosen to confront BP for the following 
reasons: 
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1. BP was one of two oil companies that drilled exploratory wells in the area ,.. 
(Chevron being the other). 
2. WWF believed that a commitment from BP not to enter the refuge would send 
a signal to the rest of the industry that area 1002 was off limits, regardless of 
the US government's position on the area (pers corn, Clive Wicks, WWF-UK). 
WWF cites as evidence for this claim the view that BP was the most 
significant operator in the area and "the first mover on climate change - others 
follow their lead' (WWF-UK, 2002b). 
3. BP was `furthest ahead on (biodiversity) thinking.. . and we have been working 
with them for some time and feel it's time to challenge them to break the 
logjam on this issue" (WWF, op cit). 
4. BP was "lobbying to go into the Arctic Refuge" (WWF, op cit) through its 
membership of Arctic Power, an organisation which describes itself as "a - 
grassroots, non-profit citizen's organization with 10,000 members founded in 
April of 1992 to expedite congressional and presidential approval of oil 
exploration and production within the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge" (Arctic Power, 2003b). BP had also played host to 
delegations of Washington politicians and journalists visiting Alaska to see the 
coastal plain (New York Times, 2002, p4). 
BP was providing a considerable source of funds for Arctic Power, which was 
essentially the opposition to the NGO in this debate. Removing that funding would 
have weakened Arctic Power politically and financially (BP's fee was "at the top of 
the scale" for Arctic Power - New York Times, op cit). 
However, targeting BP generated a number of problems, not least of which was the 
general perception that the company led its sector on CSR - leadership which was 
recognised by the NGO in the resolution itself (BP, op cit). In addition to the 
challenge presented by BP's expertise on environmental issues in the oil and gas 
sector, and the considerable financial resources allocated to its CSR work, this 
perception of sector leadership was widely held and could have ultimately reduced 
support for the resolution. As one SRI analyst put it: "When NGOs focus on the 
83 WWF subsequently divested in autumn 2002 citing, inter alia, ongoing concerns with BP regarding 
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leaders like BP... that is not very helpful for us because BP is already doing more 
than any other oil company" (Johnston, 2001: interview). 
In addition to the perceived CSR strength of BP, there is an inherent flaw in the logic 
supporting the overall aim of the CM intervention (Wicks, op cit). The flaw stems 
from the NGO's rationale that a commitment from BP not to enter the Arctic Refuge 
would send a signal to the rest of the industry that area 1002 was completely off 
limits, regardless of its legal status. While such a statement from BP may have been 
feasible, it is highly unlikely that it would have secured the protection of the refuge 
should the government open the area for exploration. An oil and gas industry-wide 
voluntary commitment not to go into a legally accessible area would have been 
unprecedented. Furthermore, ExxonMobil operated in Alaska and was considered a 
strong contender for potential exploration leases in the area. Exxon was already 
regarded by environmentalists as a pariah not only because of the Exxon Valdez 
disaster in 1989 but also because it did not follow BP's commitments on climate 
change. This demonstrates Exxon's reluctance to respond to signals from the industry 
and highlights the flaw in the logic. 
This flaw represents a significant weakness in the stated aims of the CM intervention. 
It also hints at further possible internal reasons for challenging BP: confrontation by 
an NGO of a large multinational generally creates considerable media coverage. This 
would have been useful for the campaign to preserve the status of the refuge. 
Regarding the ex ante strengths of the CM intervention, as can be seen above, the 
NGO used both moral and financial arguments to further its aims. As argued in 
Section 3.5, this should have increased the effectiveness of the campaign. From the 
perspective of maximising potential votes in favour of the resolution, an additional 
strength of the resolution itself was that it asked for a report into how the company 
managed risk to shareholder value from operating in environmentally or culturally 
sensitive areas, and lobbying for access to areas with a protected environmental status, 
rather than asking directly for a commitment not to enter the refuge - WWF's overall 
campaign goal. The reason why this represents a strength relates to the controversial 
the Arctic Refuge and health and safety problems in Alaska. 
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nature of the business case for not drilling in the refuge. If investors' financial 
analysis of the costs in terms of reputational risk to the brand (etc) was lower than the 
potential benefit to- BP from extracting `up to 16 billion barrels' of oil, then a 
resolution focus on a commitment not to drill would have generated less support than 
a request for a report into how the company analyses the risk to shareholder value. 
In respect of this focus on a business rationale, a City Editor was to comment: "It is 
rather smart of the environmental lobbyists to focus their arguments on shareholder 
value. After all, BP has gone out of its way to trumpet its green credentials and its 
desire to be regarded as a good corporate citizen" (Daily Express, 2002: 57). , 
An insight into the resolution drafters' analysis of this point can be discerned from the 
following memo from Walden Asset Management, which was involved in the 
drafting: "The reason the resolution is framed as a request for a report is twofold. 
One, we know that a resolution of this sort gets more votes from concerned investors 
cautious about the financial impact of an outright ban on drilling in the Refuge. 
Second, however a resolution is framed, it engages the company in a serious debate 
about its plans -a public debate in which a whole range of arguments can be raised. 
We believe this resolution still sends a strong message of concern to BP. " (Walden, 
2001, p2) 
In summary, therefore, both the resolutions focus on shareholder value and its request 
for a report rather than not drilling. This increased the feasibility of generating 
significant interest from mainstream investors in this issue. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness 
Table 5.3 below details the explicit and implicit intervention targets and assesses what 
related actions the target company took. It analyses whether the campaign may have 
been responsible for generating this success and uses the key developed in Section 
2.2.4. 
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Table 5.3: An Analysis of the 2002 WWF-UK BP plc CM Intervention 
:'i Analysis Evalitation 
"To persuade BP BP response to Resolution 14 While BP does state that any N 
Amoco to publicly included the following statement: decision to enter into ANWR 
withdraw its "The company's position on the would consider 
interest in Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 'environmental and social 
developing the (ANWR) has been principled and risks' it did not make a 
Arctic Refuge and remains unchanged. It is that the statement to the effect that 
publicly support American people and their duly WWF intended. 
permanent elected representatives at the 
protection of the federal and state levels must However, BP did make a 
Refuge for its debate and decide... whether or number of statements on the 
wilderness values" not they wish to open the Refuge issue - some of which 
(WWF-UK, for exploration... We have sought conflicted - that enabled 
2000c). to play a positive role in that WWF to demonstrate that BP 
debate and will continue to advise was being duplicitous. For 
on technical aspects related to example, "They say 'We have 
whether, if oil were found, it could sought to play a positive role 
be developed in an in that debate'(13March 2002) 
environmentally acceptable way. and yet in the same week in a 
speech at Stanford, Lord 
BP will make a decision on Browne stated BP 'should take 
whether to seek entry only if no part in the debate' 
legislation is first passed in (11 March 2002). These 
America allowing access to statements cannot both be true 
ANWR. Our decision would then and yet come within days of 
be made in light of the economic, each other'. 
environmental and social risks (WWF-UK, 2002c). 
and in light of ANWR's 
attractiveness within a global Nevertheless, in respect of this 
portfolio of opportunities. " target, the CM intervention 
failed. 
To persuade BP to On 13 March 2002 BP published BP's formal response to the Y% 
"prepare a report its formal response to the resolution, when taken in 
86 IUCN - the World Conservation Union, defines a protected area as "an area of land and/or sea 
especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and 
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disclosing, as resolution and placed new conjunction with supporting 
appropriate, how material on its website dealing text published elsewhere, 
the company with the issues raised by the represented significant new 
analyses and takes resolution. BP's response to disclosure on "how the 
steps to control resolution 14 states that "the company analyses and takes 
significant risks to board opposes Resolution 14 for steps to control significant 
shareholder value the reasons given below and for risks to shareholder value 
from operating in those set out following the text of from operating in 
environmentally or the resolution: Our business environmentally or culturally 
culturally sensitive systems and processes throughout sensitive areas". 
areas, and the company are designed to 
lobbying for access address and manage Furthermore, the company 
to areas with a appropriately technical, made two new commitments 
protected competitive, commercial and that strengthened its approach 
environmental political risks as well as to biodiversity: first, that it 
status" environmental and social risks... supported the work of IUCN 
(Shareholder BP supports the work 1UCN 6 in developing more common 
Resolution 14, (The World Conservation Union) environmental definitions of 
published by BP, is doing to develop more common sensitive sites and, second, 
2002). environmental definitions... that if it decided to explore or 
In particular, if we decide to develop in IUCN category I- 
explore or develop in IUCN IV designated sites it would 
category 1-IV designated sites include in the annual 
where development is permitted, Environmental and Social 
we will, where we have Review descriptions of risk 
operational control and are assessments carried out. 
legally and commercially able to 
do so, include in the annual However, the response lacks 
Environmental and Social Review some of the detail that WWF 
descriptions of risk assessments appears to have wanted, 
carried out. These will include stating "issues regarding 
discussion of. access to new areas are often 
a.. issues and risks identified, complex and must be handled 
both technical and values based on a case-by-case basis". 
b.. consequent environmental, 
associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means. " IUCN categorises 
protected areas by management objective and has identified six distinct categories of protected areas. 
IUCN has members from some 140 countries including more than 70 States, 100 government agencies, 
and over 750 NGOs. 
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economic and social impacts and 
benefits 
c.. stakeholder dialogue 
undertaken to inform and be 
informed 
d.. actions taken to mitigate 
risk". 
The new material published by 
BP included a position statement 
on Sensitive Sites which stated 
that "exploring for and developing 
new oil and gas reserves can have 
environmental and social impacts 
on a variety of scales... Our 
approach to assessing new areas 
takes into account the following: 
... An integrated approach to the 
consideration of environmental, 
social and economic issues... 
we respect government decisions 
on protected areas and fully 
accept that some areas will not be 
open for development... The 
issues regarding access to new 
areas are often complex and must 
be handled on a case-by-case 
basis... When operations are 
established in new areas, we 
implement Getting HSE Right, our 
company-wide approach to 
managing HSE Issues and for 
major facilities we implement ISO 
14001, the international certified 
environmental management 
system. These systems aim to 
provide assurance regarding 
continual improvement of our 
environmental performance and 
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BP Action Analysis Evaluation 
of working towards our policy 
goal of no damage to the 
environment". 
To generate a Shareholders owning 59% of BP's This was the third year that 
N 
significant vote in stock voted, with 7% of these NGOs had filed resolutions 
favour of the backing the resolution. that mentioned ANWR - the 
resolution. first two focused on climate 
change. The year 2000 
resolution received a 13.5% 
vote in favour and the year 
2001 received 13%. While 7% 
represented shareholders with 
£8 billion of BP stock (and a 
reasonably high percentage 
when compared with similar 
resolutions filed at other 
companies in the US), 
compared with previous years, 
this low vote in favour 
represents a failure. 
As stated above, BP's 
response to the resolution - 
which recommended a vote 
against - went much of the 
way to meeting the terms of 
the resolve clause. 
To promote BP held several meetings with The resolution stimulated Y 
investor dialogue investors regarding the resolution considerable dialogue between 
on biodiversity in advance of the AGM. The CM institutions (both 
issues. Association of British Insurers companies and investors). 
also hosted a debate which was This dialogue was largely 
attended by a significant number absent before the resolution. It 
of large institutional investors. is reasonable to conclude, 
therefore, that it would not 
have taken place otherwise. 
To persuade BP to As mentioned above, BP In advance of the resolution, Y 
disclose a policy in published a new position BP did not have a policy 
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relation to 
biodiversity. 
j/ 
statement on Sensitive Sites which 
included analysis of its impact on 
biodiversity. 
Atialysis 
statement on biodiversity. 
That it published one 
concurrent with its response to 
the resolution demonstrates 
that it did so, at least in part, 
as a consequence of the 
resolution itself. 
/// 
To persuade BP "to BP's 2002/2003 Corporate Social BP has studied the Y% 
study the Responsibility Report states that implications of halting 
implications of a "During 2002 we have: identified existing exploration and 
policy of refraining areas of biodiversity risk and production activity, which 
from drilling in opportunity within our operations partially meets the letter of the 
protected areas around the world... further WWF request. However, it 
listed as IUCN developed our biodiversity made no commitment 
Management performance measures and data regarding refraining from 
Categories 1-IV'- collection... BP's response to the future drilling in IUCN 1-IV 
explicit in the 2002 AGM Shareholder sites, which was the 
supporting text of Resolution 14 required us to implication of WWF's 
the resolution (BP, include in the annual request. 
2002) Environmental and Social Review, 
descriptions of our risk 
assessments carried out if we 
decide to explore or develop in 
IUCN category 1-IV designated 
sites where development is 
permitted, where we have 
operational control and are 
legally and commercially able to 
do so. During 2002 we have 
reviewed our portfolio of assets 
and potential future projects to 
determine those that sit within or 
may enter 1 UCN designated 
areas. As a result of this review 
we can confirm that no decisions 
were made during 2002 that 
required us to explore or develop 
within such areas. " It also 
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published a new list of sites that 
fall within IUCN categories I-VI 
areas that mentioned 11 IUCN 
sites. 
Analysis Evaluation 
To persuade BP to "BP, the world's third-largest oil BP pulled out of Arctic Power. y 
pull out of Arctic company, has pulled out of a As to whether it did so as a 
Power ("BP states major lobbying group that is result of the NGO's resolution, 
that it does not spearheading the campaign to one institutional investor's 
advocate opening open the Arctic National Wildlife position statement on the 
the Refuge for Refuge in Alaska to oil drilling, a resolution referred to BP 
development. company spokesman said having given it "a commitment 
However, the yesterday. BP's move comes just to review their membership of 
company is a as the Republicans, who back Arctic Power" during 
financial drilling in the area, are about to conversations regarding the 
contributor to the regain control of the Senate, resolution (CMIM, 2002). 
advocacy group giving proponents their best This implies a direct cause and 
Arctic Power, chance in years to pass legislation effect relationship between the 
which is lobbying opening the area along Alaska's resolution and BP's 
the U. S. Congress Beaufort Sea coast to oil withdrawal. Furthermore, BP 
to open the region exploration... ". In the same claimed that it would play no 
for drilling", article, a BP spokesperson was further active role in the 
supporting text of quoted as saying "we are no ANWR debate. This 
the resolution (BP, longer going to be involved in represented a significant 
op cit)) ANWR debate... When and if the success for the NGO. 
American people decide ANWR 
should be opened, we will 
consider it based on its 
commercial and competitive 
attributes" (New York Times, op 
cit) 
To persuade BP acknowledged the shareholder The resolution promoted y 
investors that value case made by the resolution: debate on the shareholder 
biodiversity issues "managing risks is fundamentally value case related to 
are relevant to important both to good corporate biodiversity risks and impact. 
investment citizenship and to the preservation WWF's argument that 
decisions (implied and enhancement of shareholder management of biodiversity 
target). value... Our business systems and risks were relevant to 
processes throughout the shareholder value appears to 
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company are designed to address have been accepted by some 
and manage appropriately, investors. The SG mainstream 
technical, competitive, broker research is particularly 
commercial and political risks as noteworthy as it would appear 
well as environmental and social to be the first time that 
risks". Separately, in advance of sensitive sites were recognised 
the AGM, a spokesperson for to be a relevant risk by a 
Friends Ivory & Sime, one of broker. This indicates that the 
BP's largest investors, was quoted CM intervention has been 
as saying: "We consider these influential. 
issues to be very significant in 
terms of shareholder value and 
we believe the resolution has 
considerable merit" (Financial 
Times, 2002a, p22). Furthermore, 
as mentioned in Section 3.2, 
Societe Generale Global Research 
was later to conduct an 
assessment of BP's exposure to 
political risks (Ennis 2002, pl1). 
This included `environmental 
sensitivity', and cited the 
opposition to drilling in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge as an 
example. 
To generate media The resolution was covered by a This was broad coverage for 
coverage for the large number of mainstream the NGO and demonstrates the 
broader campaign newspapers including, inter alia, media interest in NGO- 
to secure protection The Independent, The Guardian, business confrontations. 
for the ANWR. Financial Times, Evening 
Standard, Daily Mail, New York 
Times and Wall Street Journal. 
The above analysis demonstrates that the resolution failed to generate a statement 
from BP `publicly withdrawing its interest in developing the Arctic Refuge and 
supporting permanent protection of the Refuge'. However, as argued above, a 
statement to this end does not appear to have been the main underlying aim of the CM 
intervention and a number of the subsidiary aims have been achieved. 
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The analysis also demonstrates that the resolution failed to generate a significant vote 
in favour at the AGM. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate that the resolution generated 
considerable change in BP's biodiversity policy, systems and disclosure. It also 
promoted a new discussion between CM institutions on the issue and appears to have 
persuaded investors that there was a shareholder value argument in support of 
establishing biodiversity risk management systems by extractive companies. 
Furthermore, while the resolution may not have reduced the likelihood of BP entering 
the refuge if doing so were to become legal, it may have reduced the possibility that 
the refuge would be opened at all. Despite two opportunities for the US Senate to 
open the refuge since the resolution, the area retains its protected status. In this 
context, it is noteworthy that Reuters linked the resolution to the Senate vote thus: 
"The resolution came just before US President George W. Bush suffered a major 
energy-policy defeat with a Senate vote on his administration's plan to give oil 
companies access to the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska. Bush, a former 
Texas oilman, made drilling in the refuge the centrepiece of his proposed US energy 
policy but failed to gain the 60 votes necessary to end the debate and allow drilling to 
go ahead. " (Reuters, 2002b). While direct evidence that the two are linked is not 
available, it is possible that the resolution did play a role. 
From the perspective of the NGO's broader campaign to protect the Arctic Refuge, 
there are two significant outcomes from the CM intervention: first, it generated 
directly attributable success in the form of BP's withdrawal from Arctic Power and a 
commitment from BP to play no further part in the debate which may have 
contributed to the protection of the reserve itself; and second, the resolution created a 
considerable quantity of media interest. Therefore, from this perspective, this CM 
intervention was ex post effective. 
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4. Efficiency 
WWF's main additional87 costs from the 2001 CM intervention were the Innovest 
research, and the staff time in coordinating the resolution and broader media work. 
WWF worked in a coalition on the campaign, so many costs in terms of time and 
resources in preparing the resolution were carried externally. The main combined 
costs to the NGO of this resolution would have been in the order of £25,000. The 
costs incurred by BP in defending itself from the resolution are estimated to have been 
some £5 million (Kirk, 2002: pers com). It is instructive to consider that the relative 
costs are different by many orders of magnitude (BP's costs were 200 times higher). 
Regarding the investment assets influenced by WWF, 7% voted against company 
management (representing shareholders with £8 billion of BP stock), which means 
that the cost/investor influence multiplier was 320,000. However, in practice, the 
actual multiplier is likely to be much higher as there were investors who intentionally 
abstained due to some sympathy88 with the filer's issue, and other investors who 
supported company management only after discussion of the issues it raised. 
The above ex post analysis demonstrates that the intervention appears to have 
generated considerable success. While it is difficult to assign economic values to the 
outcomes, based on the outcomes themselves and the relative distribution of costs, it 
is reasonable to conclude that this was an efficient CM intervention. 
5. Equity considerations 
The most significant equity benefits and burdens relate to the degree to which the 
resolution played a role in maintaining the protected status of the refuge itself. If the 
resolution did play a role, then the Gwich'in people, for example, benefited from the 
87 The total costs of the broader campaign to protect the ANWR are considered to have been costs that 
would have been incurred in the absence of the CM intervention and are therefore not incorporated 
here. 
88As noted above, Sparkes (2002, p39) states that: "Abstentions should usually be read as shareholders 
who sympathise with the resolution but don't want to go the whole hog. " 
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prevention of potential damage to the porcupine caribou herd, whereas the Inupiat did 
not derive the direct economic benefit from development for which they had hoped. 
Regarding the unintended consequences of the CM intervention, one of the main 
outcomes was BP's improved policy, procedures and reporting systems'-on 
biodiversity and socially and environmentally sensitive sites. While this was an 
intended outcome, it is possible that if area 1002 is opened to drilling, and BP secures 
a lease, this suite of new and improved biodiversity documents will better prepare it 
for a more robust defence of a decision to enter area 1002. 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
The NGO CM intervention model has four main components. The following classifies 
this intervention using these components: 
1. Mechanism of company influence: The intervention uses the rights associated 
with share ownership to raise concerns with the company and is therefore 
`Investor Advocacy Influence'. 
2. Route of influence: the NGO approached institutional investors via the AGM 
resolution and through a number of communications leading up to the event. It 
is therefore classified as `Indirect'. As the resolution involved challenges to 
institutional investors, the Stance is classified as orca. 
3. Primary audience: the broader context of this intervention was public policy on 
ANWR - so, therefore, public policy. However, the CM intervention itself 
targeted both a company and investors, therefore the `audience' is `Capital 
Market Institutions'. 
4. Nature of argument: as shown above, WWF used both Moral and Business Case 
arguments. 
In the light of the above detailed analysis, the overall tabular classification in the 
chronology in Appendix 2 is accurate. However, as mentioned in Section 2.2.3, a 
scaled polar diagram is used here to depict a more nuanced classification 
incorporating the relative emphasis of the other tactics deployed: 
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Figure 5.2: Polar Diagram of WWF-UK BP plc 2002 Resolution 
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Figure 5.2 shows that in addition to the tabular classification in the chronology, this 
CM Intervention involved a degree of Direct influence (the NGO used, in part, its 
own reserves to file the resolution). It also shows that the Public Policy audience was 
a target of the campaign - while the main audience for the CM intervention itself was 
CM institutions, underlying this was the intention to influence the broader public 
policy debate on the legal status of ANWR. 
7. Inductive analysis 
The relevant hypotheses posited that the probability of success would be increased by 
adopting an `investor advocacy influence' rather than a `capital redistribution' 
mechanism (Hypothesis 1); co-opting FIs influence through an `Indirect' approach 
(Hypothesis 2); and striking a balance between moral and financial arguments 
(Hypothesis 4). In this case, the NGO adopted an Indirect Investor Advocacy strategy 
using both financial and moral arguments that theoretically should have increased its 
probability of success. While this NGO CM intervention did not achieve all its stated 
targets, it has been effective in generating change efficiently. Consequently, the 
empirical experience with this case supports the above hypotheses. 
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Section 3.3.1 argued that it is misleading to judge the ultimate success or failure of 
resolutions just by reference to the AGM vote on the day. Judging the outcome of this 
effective case study in this way would have entirely obscured the main outcomes from 
the resolution. This case confirms the fallacy of judging resolution outcome based on 
the vote. 
This case shows that WWF's costs were in the order of £15,000, whereas BP's were 
£5 million -a ratio of 333: 1. This highlights the extent to which the target company 
can have significantly more financial resources with which to defend itself than the 
NGO has for its campaign. 
The resolution's focus on shareholder value appears to have generated considerable 
dialogue among CM institutions on the issue. In the longer term, if analysis of oil and 
gas companies' performance in relation to how they manage their biodiversity impacts 
and risks becomes a standard part of institutional investors analysis, then (as argued in 
Section 3.2) the cost of capital pricing signals will promote better practices by those 
companies in relation to biodiversity management (see also Section 6). 
However, the votes in favour of the resolution were ultimately limited. This appears to 
have been for three main reasons: first, the oil field was potentially lucrative and 
could enhance BP's shareprice; second, the company's response to the resolution in 
advance of the AGM went a considerable way towards meeting the terms of the 
resolve clause (as opposed to the NGO's underlying political motivation); and third, 
there was no similar report by other companies which investors could use as a 
benchmark for judging BP's disclosure. Consequently, they would have been inclined 
to support the company on the basis that it was a strong CSR leader and already 
publishing more in this area than any other oil and gas company. From an NGO 
perspective, therefore, this case highlights one of the weaknesses of using a resolution 
to confront a company regarded as being a leader in CSR. 
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8. Issues in assessing performance 
There are two main issues in assessing the performance of this intervention. First, in 
the context of a significant overall campaign to protect ANWR, it is difficult to 
measure the extent to which any success in maintaining its status can be attributed to 
the CM intervention. Second, it is also difficult to assess the degree to which the 
campaign overall was responsible for the continued protected status of the refuge. 
9. Conclusion 
This case has highlighted the fact that NGOs can deploy effective and efficient 
Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence strategies and use a CM intervention as part of a 
broader campaign to generate significant media coverage on politically relevant 
issues. It has also shown that the empirical evidence from this case concurs with the 
deductive theory. 
The study has further demonstrated that the classification in the chronology is 
appropriate and, more important, that the deductive implications in respect of Direct 
CM intervention are borne out by the empirical evidence from this intervention. It has 
also confirmed the importance of judging the success of a resolution by measuring 
outcomes as well as votes. 
5.1.3 Case Study: WWF-UK, ARC and 3iG 
This case study reviews an attempt by WWF-UK and the Alliance of Religions and 
Conservation (ARC) to found the International Interfaith Investment Group (3iG). 
ARC was established as an independent group in 1995, with financial assistance from 
WWF, with the intention of promoting conservation activity by the world's religions. 
ARC proposed the 3iG initiative in 2000 following an 18-month research project with 
faith communities "exploring the range and degree of assets and land holdings that 
each community holds" (ARC/WWF, 2000, p9). ARC claimed: "The results were a 
surprise to many, not least within the faith communities themselves. It swiftly became 
clear that the financial holdings of the faiths were far in excess of anything that most 
people would have expected.. .a major economic 
force for change lies within the 
control of faith communities worldwide" (ARC/WWF, op cit). 
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No external review of the effectiveness of 3iG has been published to date. It is the 
purpose of this case study to review the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
intervention. 
The intention was that 3iG would empower faith groups to work on socially 
responsible investment in the belief that many religious groups did not realise the 
potential influence they had. Specifically, 3iG was intended to promote action on 
environmental protection by the faith community, and ultimately become an 
independent alliance between faith groups on social responsible investment. 3iG's 
mission was later articulated as "stewardship and care for all creation, and the 
possibility of the fullness of life for all people" (ARC, 2002, p 1). 
The main initial focus of the collaboration between WWF and ARC was to create a 
handbook "to initiate a wider dialogue". The handbook was intended to "show 
religious involvement in ethical investments around the world and include 
recommendations for implementation" (WWF-UK, 2000f, p1) and was to be launched 
at a conference in Kathmandu in November 2001. The NGOs' longer term aim 
appears to have been to establish a group of institutional investors that factored 
WWF's environmental issues into their investment analysis and engage with 
companies on issues of corporate environmental performance. 
Assessment of the CM intervention 
1. Case Specific Legitimacy 
The world's faith groups work with ARC/3iG voluntarily. 3iG specified that it did not 
want to take control of the assets: "... Each faith will of course retain ultimate control 
over their funds and all financial details will be treated as confidential. " (ARC, 
2000b). Consequently, its main purpose was to provide an education service for the 
faith groups concerning how to integrate their faith's beliefs - particularly on 
environmental issues - into their investment portfolio. As participation and 
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consequential action on the part of the faith groups owning the shares was optional, no 
additional legitimacy questions arise from this case. 
2. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
Bringing together the world's faith groups to discuss ethical investment presented 
coordination and philosophical challenges. Both were alleviated by the prior existence 
of ARC, which had significant experience in bringing together the many religious 
philosophies for conferences on conservation issues. 
Targeting the faith community in this way represented a potentially effective strategy 
for WWF, as the faiths have significant funds under management and an apparent 
predisposition towards environmental stewardship. Furthermore, SRI activity of the 
faiths as institutional investors is not limited (in the UK) by the Megarry judgement 
(see Section 3.4). The main limiting factor appears to be a perception among the faith 
community that SRI means increased cost or reduced profitability. Success may also 
have been limited by the sensitivity surrounding both the size of faith groups' 
investments and the ethical profile of companies in the portfolio. 
The underlying aim was ambitious in that it intended to mobilise a significant pool of 
capital to influence corporate environmental performance, yet realistic in that the 
target audience should have been well predisposed to such an approach. So because 
the intervention was both ambitious and realistic, from an ex ante perspective, it was 
effective. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness 
The table below details the explicit and implicit intervention targets and assesses what 
related actions the target company took. It analyses whether the campaign may have 
been responsible for generating this success and uses the key developed in Section 
2.2.4: 
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Table 5.4: An Ana lysis of the 3iG CM Interventio n 
NG Ahn Action Analysis Eval. 
To create a ARC published "A Capital The 56-page booklet included basic y 
handbook which Solution: Faith Finance and guidance to the faith groups in 
could be used as a Concernfor a Living Planet" chapters headed `What is Ethical 
model for religions (ARC, 2000a). Investment? ' and `Is there a Cost to 
to initiate a wider Ethical Investment? '. It also provided 
dialogue on ethical A meeting in June 2002 at the five case studies by"different faith 
investment. Council on Foreign Relations in groups on ethical investment along 
New York concluded that "the with outlines of principles on 
lack of information analysis which economics, development and the 
the faiths could trust and access environment written by nine faith 
was acknowledged to be a major groups. 
concern that 3iG should try to 
address. At the moment, a lot of The booklet was endorsed by the 
people, who theoretically have a President of the World Bank: "From 
lot of power to make decisions, do the perspective of the World Bank, I 
not feel empowered and capable not only welcome this ARC MVF 
of making these decisions. " (ARC, initiative, but also invite the 
2002). proposed International Interfaith 
Investment Group to engage with us 
in serious collaboration. " (ARC, 
2000a, p3) 
To generate WWF and ARC hosted a three- Many of the attending faiths, 
interest among day gathering in Kathmandu in including the Bahais, Buddhists, 
religious groups. November 2000 where faiths were Christians, Hindus, Jains, Jews, 
invited to make `Sacred Gifts for Muslims, Methodists, Shinto, Sikhs, 
a Living Planet'. The event Taoists and Zoroastrians attended the 
included discussion of an event. Of these, the Christians, Jews, 
ARC/WWF Partnership Paper, Shinto, Sikhs and Zoroastrians 
"Ethical Investment Of Faith undertook to participate in the further 
Funds". This stated that development of 3iG (Triolo, 2003). 
"delegates will be asked to 
consider committing themselves to 
a partnership proposal which will 
lead to the creation of the 
International Interfaith investment 
group (3iG): 
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"Our commitment is to check that 
our faith's reserves are invested 
with due regard to our beliefs. 
values, the environment and 
human rights - so that all life on 
Earth can benefit. " (underlining 
represents where original was 
italicised). (ARC, 2000b, p1) 
To establish the A number of meetings between 3iG appears to have considerable y% 
International parties interested in establishing support among the faith community 
Interfaith 3iG have been convened. The and has been established in principle. 
Investment Group most significant took place in However, in practice "It is 
(3iG) November 2002 and was reported anticipated that a further meeting in 
thus: "A group of 23 religious the Fall of 2003 or early Spring of 
organisations, with access to 2004 will be convened during which 
assets worth $7,000bn the formal legal and financial 
(. E4,400bn), are joining forces to structures will be adopted. After this 
launch an ethical investment second meeting, some six to nine 
strategy, putting their money months of follow-up will be 
where their consciences are. " necessaryfor the instruments and 
(The Independent, 2002, p12. ) organization to be fully realized, 
culminating in the formal launch of 
The meeting included a 31G in late 2004/early 2005" (State 
celebration of religion's of the World Forum. International 
contribution to environmental Interfaith Investment Group (3iG) 
conservation hosted by Queen Special Initiative Conference of 
Elizabeth and Prince Philip at the Religious Money Managers, New 
Banqueting House in London. York, 
18-20 June 2002) 
One issue which could arise with = 
formal membership, however, is the 
potential membership fee that the 
organisations may be charged. 
To promote SRI by At the time of writing, 3iG has not Additional $30 billion of assets by 7 
the faith groups. yet been formally established. the United Methodist Church is a 
Nevertheless, there is an example potentially significant development. 
of a faith group which has However, there is no reporting on 
NG Aint Action Analysis Eval. 
apparently committed additional what, in practice, it has done. 
assets to SRI following an 
approach by 3iG: at the Furthermore, it is not clear whether 
Kathmandu event, one of the any faith groups have yet determined 
`Sacred Gifts`came from the "whether an ethical investment 
United Methodist Church, which policy is in force for the faith 
committed itself to "a drive... group.. . to then develop a 
Statement 
worldwide to develop an ethical of Ethical Investment Principles, 
investment framework for up to regarding human rights, and 
US$30 billion of church assets, to environmental concerns appropriate 
support environmental and social to the faith. Key environmental target 
justice, through shareholder areas may include urgent and 
action". (Environmental News pressing issues such as forestry, 
Service, 16 November 2000) toxics and climate change. " (ARC, 
2000a). 
Nevertheless as the Financial Times 
describes it, "the potential shift is 
massive... if religions can 
successfully advocate this to their 
own faithful, the change could be 
truly huge"89 (Financial Times, 
2002c, p 10). 
Generate One 3iG meeting decided "the It appears that the faith community 
promotion of idea was that it would be has agreed to intervene on 
WWF pragmatic alliances between environmental issues. However, there 
environmental specific groups to achieve a is no evidence that specific action on 
agendas by faith particular goal of increasing environmental issues has yet been 
groups through influence and effectiveness within taken. 
I 
their investment a sphere of socially responsible 
reserves. investment. It was agreed that... 
the focus [would be] on the 
environment as an agreed value". 
(ARC, 2002) 
89 While any 3iG influence here would be less direct, various faith groups, including the Christian, 
Muslim and Jewish religions, have provided influential guidance on the 'right use of money' for many 
centuries. 
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The above ex post analysis demonstrates that, at the time of writing, 3iG had achieved 
some significant milestones towards the establishment of a group of institutional 
investors factoring WWF's environmental issues into their investment analysis and 
engagement. While the underlying data was not available, the estimate that the 
participating religious institutions had "access to assets worth $7,000bn" is 
particularly noteworthy, as the figure represents more than six times the value of the 
combined market capitalisation of the companies listed in the FTSE UK All Share. 
Consequently, 3iG could become a highly effective source of influence90. 
Furthermore, the publication of `Capital Solution', in conjunction with the various 
conferences, has apparently already successfully initiated the intended wider dialogue 
on ethical investment. The level of participation of the religious groups would imply 
that the groups in question have realised `their potential influence' and are interested 
in exploring it further. 
However, in respect of `action on environmental protection by the faith community', 
three years after the completion of the 18-month research project, 3iG is yet to 
demonstrate that it made any practical impact in relation to corporate environmental 
performance via increased action by the faith groups on corporate responsibility 
issues. While some faith groups appear to have committed themselves to ethical 
investment, it has not been possible to assess the extent of additional practical activity 
as no report was published. Furthermore, as the formal launch of 3iG was not 
anticipated for a further year and a half, action on environmental protection would not 
be in evidence for some time. Even then, as the criteria for faith-group membership of 
3iG does not currently include a reporting requirement, it is unclear whether this 
evidence will be forthcoming. 
Nevertheless, 3iG is a long-term initiative to generate change and it is therefore too 
early to come to a conclusion in relation to ex post effectiveness. Ultimately, the 
effectiveness of 3iG should be measured by the degree to which it has prompted 
effective action on corporate environmental issues by the faith communities. 
90 The phrase "assets" can be misleading indicates that this figure includes the value of the faiths' 
substantial land holdings. These are likely to be significant proportion of this sum, which reduces the 
relative impact on listed companies. However, equities will still be a significant proportion of this sum. 
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Based on the data available at the time of the review, it is reasonable to conclude that 
3iG had made promising progress towards its formal establishment. But while 3iG_ 
could potentially stimulate environmental protection by the faith community- in 
respect of their assets under management, it is not yet an effective force for change. 
In summary, the ex post analysis to date indicates that 3iG has the potential to be 
highly effective, but that it cannot yet be considered effective at generating change at 
either the faith investment level or, therefore, among listed corporations. 
4. Efficiency 
As stated in the ex post analysis above, it is too early to reach a conclusion as to, the 
ultimate effectiveness of 3iG. Efficiency must therefore be considered in relation to 
the cost effectiveness of progress achieved to date. 
In respect of identifying what resources WWF allocated to this activity, the initial 
funding was £20,000, including 30 days at £7,500 to research and pull together the 
book. WWF collaborated in writing the book and funded the Kathmandu event, of 
which the socially responsible investment section represented about 5 per cent of the 
activity. The main direct and indirect initial costs to WWF are therefore 
approximately £30,000. These costs provided the initial funding source for 3iG, which 
was to later secure funding from elsewhere. Longer term, it is intended that the 
initiative will become self-sustaining through membership fees. 
Regarding the assets influenced by WWF, assuming the equities represent half of the 
assets under management by the faith groups (i. e. $3,500bn), the potential 
cost/investor influence multiplier for WWF is over 66 million91. However, as this 
figure is based on the assets of the currently participating faith groups, some of which 
may ultimately pull out, the final figure is likely to be smaller. 
91 Using a sterling to dollar exchange rate of 1 GBP = 1.74229 USD (applied on 9/12/03). 
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As mentioned in the ex ante analysis, 3iG was particularly ambitious and was dealing 
with sensitive issues relating to the faiths' investments and the philosophical 
consistency of beliefs between the religions. These mitigating factors may help to 
explain the project's almost seven-year time frame from commencement of research 
to its anticipated formal launch. Without such factors, based on the resources 
available, this protracted timeframe might otherwise be reasonably regarded to have 
been inefficient. Taking into account the above mitigating factors, so long as 3iG is 
ultimately launched - and goes on to meet its potential for effectiveness - the WWF 
resource allocation can be regarded as efficient. But it is too early to reach a 
conclusion. 
S. Equity 
As the 3iG initiative is yet to launch, it has not generated any outcome changes at the 
level of listed companies. Consequently, there are no substantive equity issues. 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
Section 3.1 sets out that the NGO CM intervention model has four main components: 
1. Mechanism of company influence: the intervention ultimately proposes to (a) 
use the rights associated with share ownership to raise concerns within the 
company and (b) change investment analysis so that environmental issues 
receive greater attention in the investment decision. 
2. Route of influence: The NGOs approached the faith groups as institutional 
investors so this is therefore classified as `Indirect'. The nature of the indirect 
Stance is dolphin due to the partnership approach of 3iG. 
3. Primary audience: the faith groups as `CM institutions'. 
4. Nature of argument: WWF used both Business and Moral Case arguments. 
In the light of this detailed analysis, the overall tabular classification in the 
chronology in Appendix 2 is accurate. However, as mentioned in Section 2.2.3, a 
scaled polar diagram (Figure 5.3) is used here to depict a more nuanced classification 
incorporating the relative emphasis of the other tactics deployed: 
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Figure 5.3: Polar Diagram of WWF-UK/ARC `3iG' CM Intervention 
Direct 
6 
Moral Case 
4 
CM Institutions Audience 
Investor Influence 
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Indirect 
Economic Influence 
Public Policy Audience 
Business Case 
This polar diagram is intended to show that in addition to the above classification, 
there was some focus on the business case within the literature developed around the 
intervention. 
7. Inductive analysis 
As it is not yet possible to conduct a full ex post review of effectiveness, the 
implications from this case for the above NGO CM theory are relatively limited. If the 
in-principle expressions of interest from the faith groups can be taken as an indicator 
of future action, this will underline the recommendations regarding the Indirect Route 
of Influence, specifically that "co-opting FIs influence should magnify the influence 
of the NGO" (i. e. Hypothesis 2). It could also underline the theoretical need to strike a 
balance between the moral and business case arguments (i. e. Hypothesis 4). 
While expressions of interest are not a reliable indicator of future action, on the basis 
that most of the faith groups that have been approached have expressed interest, it 
would appear that a focus on large institutional investors having a strong affinity with 
ethical and environmental issues has the potential to be a highly effective strategy. 
Furthermore, achieving high-level endorsement from members of the British royal 
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family and the President of the World Bank appear to have motivated further action 
on the part of the faith groups (See Section 6). However, the slow progress may 
indicate that the above conjecture regarding the sensitivity of both the size of faith 
groups' investments and the ethical profile of companies in the portfolio was accurate. 
8. Issues in Assessing Performance 
The significantly limited access to data regarding practical engagement on the part of 
the faith groups, and in particular the long-term nature of this programme, makes it 
difficult to draw firm conclusions at this stage of the process. In addition, in the 
absence of a similar initiative to use as a benchmark for this kind of initiative, it is 
difficult to assess the degree to which a five-year set-up period represents an efficient 
and effective level of activity. 
9. Conclusion 
The study has demonstrated that, to some extent, the deductive implications in respect 
of Indirect CM intervention may ultimately be borne out by the empirical evidence 
from this intervention. It has also confirmed that the initial classification in the 
chronology was accurate. 
3iG has been shown to be effective from an ex ante perspective and potentially 
effective and efficient ex post. However, there are significant issues relating to both 
data shortages regarding outcome generation, and the timing of this review. 
Ultimately, this initiative should be judged by the effectiveness of the SRI practices 
that are implemented by the faith groups as a result of the 3iG initiative. As evidence 
in this area is currently limited, these conclusions in relation to 3iG's ex post 
efficiency and effectiveness should be regarded as both provisional and tentative. 
This case has also shown that there may be considerable potential for NGOs to 
motivate the faith groups to use the influence underlying their assets under 
management - but there is an absence of international civil society pressure on the 
faith groups to adopt SRI practices. Further, the protracted nature of the dialogue 
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between the participants suggests there are inherent difficulties with partnership 
negotiations of this sort. 
5.2 Case Study: Ethics for the Universities Superannuation 
Scheme 
Introduction 
This case reviews People and Planet's Ethics for USS (E-USS) campaign. No external 
review of this intervention has been published to date. Therefore, as with other case 
studies, the purpose of this is to review the effectiveness and efficiency of this CM 
intervention. The study adopts the structure set out in Section 2.2.3. 
This case is different from the others presented here in that an NGO was established 
specifically for this intervention. In particular, it is also the only case where the 
membership of the NGO was recruited from members of the target entity. 
Nevertheless, this case is related to the UKSIF study in that the reform of the Pensions 
Act reviewed in the UKSIF study is demonstrated to be a significant determinant of 
success here. _ 
People and Planet describes itself as "the largest student network in Britain 
campaigning to: end world poverty, defend human rights and protect, the 
environment" (People and Planet, 2003, internet). Its mission is "to educate and 
empower students to take effective action on the root causes of social and 
environmental injustice" (op cit). People and Planet was originally called Third World 
First and was set up in 1969 to raise money for overseas aid. It is a relatively small 
NGO with around 10,000 active supporters, an annual income of some £600,000 and 
a staff of 25 (People and Planet, ibid). In terms of the NGO's corporate campaigning 
Stance, it has adopted an orca Stance (see Section 1.4). 
Introduction to Specific CM intervention 
E-USS was set up by People and Planet in September 1997 as a separate entity. E- 
USS described itself as "the University staff campaign for ethical investment of our 
pension fund" (E-USS, 2003) and aimed to "convince USS to adopt an ethical 
investment policy that is accountable to its members" (Alexander, 2001: interview) 
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Reference to the NGO CM intervention chronology (Appendix 2) demonstrates that 
E-USS represents People and Planet's first and, for the time period in question'', only 
significant attempt to use the CM as a campaign tool. 
The Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) provides final salary occupational 
pensions for academic and senior university administrative employees throughout the 
'UK (USS, 2003). Around the time the campaign was established, USS represented the 
second biggest pension fund in the UK with assets of nearly £20 billion under 
management, some 250 employees and more than 150,000 members (E-USS, 1999). 
USS manages most pension scheme money in-house but also contracts out to external 
managers including Baillie Gifford, Capital, Henderson Global Investors and 
Schroders. 
People and Planet appears to have singled out USS from other large financial 
institutions for three main reasons: 
I. Scale: USS is one of the largest occupational pension schemes with 
significant assets under management. 
2. Stakeholder request: People and Planet was motivated by members of USS 
to adopt their position on SRI (Alexander, ibid. 
3. Influence of their membership: People and Planet is a student-based 
organisation. Consequently, the NGO had a greater ability to influence the 
members of this scheme than any other large pension scheme because they 
include University lecturers. 
92 It is, however, noteworthy that the NGO established `Fair Share' in conjunction with other NGOs in 
2003. This will attempt to take the lessons learned during the E-USS model and apply them to other 
pension schemes. 
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Assessment of the CM intervention(s) 
1. NGO Legitimacy 
E-USS did not have ECOSOC consultative status. However, assessing it against the 
main components of the protocol for eligibility generates the following analysis: 
Table 5.5: A Review of E-USS and People and Planet against ECOSOC 
1I . op Planet 
Must not be antithetical to the Complies 
participatory democratic state 
Should be non-profit making Complies 
Should be non-violent and non-criminal Complies 
Must not be directed against a particular Complies 
government 
As can be seen from the above table, from a high-level perspective of legitimacy, it 
appears that E-USS complies with the criteria for ECOSOC consultative status. 
Consequently, from the perspective of this thesis, the NGO is regarded as legitimate. 
Furthermore, as E-USS' membership is limited to members of the USS pension 
scheme, it is able to speak on behalf of a subset of USS members, which conveys a 
specific authority. USS recognises E-USS as a legitimate stakeholder. 
Finally, in respect of its internal consistency, E-USS chose the Co-operative Bank for 
its banking arrangements and the Friends Provident Stewardship fund for its pension 
arrangements because of these financial organisations' ethical Stance. 
Therefore, this NGO CM intervention meets the criteria for legitimacy as set out in 
Section 2.2.3. 
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2.. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
E-USS' aims were highly ambitious in the sense that, at the time, there were very few 
pension funds making any claims to being socially responsible. 
At the outset of the campaign, E-USS advocated an avoidance form of SRI to USS 
(see Section 1.7). This was due to significant concerns among some E-USS members 
that the investment portfolio was undermining their research efforts. For example: 
"Tobacco, for a lot of our members is a very serious issue -a lot of them do cancer 
research" (Alexander, 2001: interview). As highlighted in Section 3.4, such an 
approach ran counter to the Megarry judgement and was therefore illegal. It is this 
case law that underlies USS' original response to E-USS that "the trustee company is 
legally prevented from instructing the managers to invest wholly or primarily on 
ethical or environmental considerations alone and has not done so" (E-USS, 1999). 
Clearly, from an ex ante perspective, advocating an illegal position was not effective. 
However, in the light of this legal limitation, E-USS was subsequently to adapt its 
investment policy recommendation and advocate an engagement approach. The key 
document was "Meeting the Responsibilities of Ownership - Our Proposal to USS" 
(E-USS, 1999). This provided a detailed analysis of the legal and financial scope for 
USS defining and implementing an SRI policy. Financially, it argued: "As we are not 
proposing that USS change its share portfolio, such a policy cannot negatively affect 
financial returns... the growing practice of shareholder activism in the USA has, in 
recent years, had clearly beneficial results in terms of generating additional returns" 
(E-USS, 1999). 
Legally, E-USS also now argued that an SRI investment policy was consistent with 
USS' legal responsibilities as articulated by the government's Goode Committee on 
Pension Law Reform (see Section 3.4). More specifically, the NGO highlighted the 
fact that a reform of the 1995 Pensions Act (see Case Study 5.3) would come into 
force the following year. The reform would require occupational pension funds to 
state whether or not they took social, environmental or ethical considerations into 
account in their investment decisions (HMSO, 1999, section 35(3)(f)). The fact that 
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USS was to be legally compelled, to make some kind of statement - and that it 
highlighted the scope for both integrated assessment and advocacy SRI policies - 
would have significantly increased the likelihood of E-USS' campaign succeeding. 
Consequently, this reform was a highly significant factor for the success of the E-USS 
campaign as it changed the legal context within which it was operating. 
Other lower order factors that increased the ex ante effectiveness of the E-USS , 
campaign include: 
" Not calling for a boycott by potential members of the pension scheme: this was 
appropriate as USS has a degree of monopoly power - in general, academic and 
senior university administrative employees stand to lose financially if they elect 
to join an alternative to the USS pension scheme. 
A highly targeted approach: following the "Meeting the Responsibilities of 
Ownership" document, E-USS began a targeted campaign, promoting its 
analysis to specific members of USS board and the University Vice Chancellors 
who played an important role in the governance of USS. 
" Seeking expert advice: E-USS formed a steering committee from among its 
members. This included academics who, in addition to being members of USS, 
specialised in relevant fields. They also approached SRI practitioners for advice: 
"we are part of the UK Social Investment Forum, for example, and we've gotten 
some very, very useful advice from some well-connected people. " (Alexander, 
2001). 
0 Developing moral case arguments: E-USS used practical examples of on-the- 
ground impact of companies in USS' portfolio to illustrate the moral case 
underlying its cause. For example, it highlighted allegations of involvement in 
defence exports to oppressive regimes by British Aerospace and Rolls Royce. 
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"A realistic request: E-USS suggested that it should focus on SEE issues 
- surrounding management policy rather than practice, and that "USS should keep 
its engagement activities to a manageable scale" (E-USS, 1999). 
0 Securing political support: "Socially responsible business behaviour by 
companies can have an enormous impact on the lives of people in poorer 
countries... I welcome an opportunity to add the University Superannuation 
Scheme to the list of socially responsible investors" - Secretary of State for 
International Development (Short, 1998, pl). In addition, the Association of 
University Teachers, which is involved in the governance of the USS, agreed a 
motion endorsing E-USS campaign aims. 
Therefore, in the context of the contemporary circumstances, from an ex ante 
effectiveness perspective, the revised E-USS campaign aims can be summarised as 
ambitious, yet both measured and realistic. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness 
USS was subsequently to announce a strengthening of its policy on SRI (see below). 
At that point, E-USS changed its strategy from one of promoting this change of policy 
to one of involving ongoing monitoring and review of its implementation by USS. 
This involved monitoring and review meetings, analysing USS' external 
communications on the issue and promoting specific engagement activity in support 
of USS' commitment. 
The overall aims of the E-USS campaign therefore broadly fell into three categories: 
1. Policy: to encourage USS to produce a `positive' SRI policy. 
2. Transparency: to encourage USS to publish what activity it has carried out in 
support of this policy. 
3. Monitor and Evaluate: to maintain an ongoing review of the degree to which 
USS was delivering on its policy commitments. 
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The table below lists explicit and implicit E-USS campaign targets and assesses the 
related actions taken by USS. It also analyses whether the campaign may have been 
responsible for generating this success and uses the key in Section 2.2.4. 
Table 5.6: An Analysis of the E-USS CM Intervention 
"To convince USS USS issued a revised ethical USS published `frequently asked 
Y 
to adopt an ethical policy statement saying that it questions' on its website. In response to 
investment would "strengthen its Stance the question 'why have you developed 
policy... " on socially responsible an SRI policy? ', it states "It will 
(Alexander, 2001) investment policies" (USS, reassure our key stakeholders"(USS, 
1999) 2003c). While the accompanying text 
makes no reference to E-USS, it is 
reasonable to conclude that E-USS is 
among these key stakeholders and it 
therefore contributed to the generation 
of this outcome. However, the SRI 
disclosure regulation came into force 
during the campaign and is likely to 
have contributed towards E-USS' 
success. Nevertheless, when compared 
with other Pensions Act- generated 
SIPs, the one produced by USS 
represents best practice (see below) so 
it is possible to demonstrate that USS 
has gone further than any other 
occupational pension scheme on SRI. 
E-USS can therefore justifiably claim 
to have influenced the generation of a 
strong SIP by USS, but it cannot claim 
to have achieved this entirely unaided. 
E-USS promoted USS SIP committed itself to Before E-USS' campaign, USS' Y 
"a policy of `active "pursue a policy of more previous position on SRI stated that it 
investment'. This active engagement with could not get involved in the 
would involve USS companies" (USS, 1999). operational decisions made on a day-to- 
using its influence Also to raise 'ethical, day basis by the companies in which it 
as a major environmental and social invested. E-USS argued that "although 
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shareholder to issues' (ibid) with all the we have some sympathy for this 
encourage socially companies in which it position, an important distinction exists 
and -' invests; to identify those between day-to-day decision-taking 
environmentally companies that `do not meet and policy decision-making. Both for 
responsible best practice' on these issues reasons of principle and of practice, we 
corporate `and may have an adverse accept that the former must remain 
behaviour" (E- financial impact on the value almost exclusively the concern of 
USS, 1999). of the return on that company management. Nevertheless we 
investment'; to make `strong consider policy decisions, which can 
representations' in order to set the ethical and environmental 
`seek a corporate policy standards of some of the world's largest 
change' and to closely corporations, to be a legitimate area of 
monitor the results. (ibid) engagement for USS" (E-USS, 1999). 
That USS was to require "FTSE 100 
companies... to report and fully 
disclose their policies on and 
management of [Corporate Governance 
and SEE issues] at least once a year" 
(USS, 1999) demonstrates the 
effectiveness of E-USS' argument. 
"For the 'ethical USS is: 1. Committed to USS now meets a significant number of Y% 
investment policy "making more generally E-USS transparency and accountability 
to be accountable available some of the results requests. However, E-USS has not 
to its members"' of this policy, including an achieved its third goal of USS 
(Alexander, 2001). annual report" (USS, 1999) providing details of progress on 
"USS should 1. and also produce quarterly engagement with individual companies. 
post on the internet Voting Reports which, since When compared with its occupational 
a detailed annual Spring 2003 have contained pension fund peer group, it is highly 
report outlining considerable detail on its SRI unusual to produce a report or to 
specific actions activity. 2. Publishing the publish portfolio details on the internet. 
taken by USS to names of all of its investments Consequently, it is reasonable to 
implement their on its website. 3. Not conclude that E-USS has achieved 
policy... disclosing the detail of its partial success in these objectives. 
2. provide scheme engagement activity with 
members with a full individual companies due to a 
list of USS's 2,000 belief that this might affect its 
investments and 3. ability to enter into open 
provide Scheme debate with the company. 
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members with 
detailed 
information about 
the progress of 
USS's engagement 
with individual 
companies 
available on 
request". (E-USS, 
1999) 
"USS would also USS recruited two new USS recognised that SRI had Y 
need to employ specialist staff to "step up our previously not been `part of their day to 
experts in ethical policy of active engagement. day business': "To make socially 
investment This will involve researching responsible investment work for our 
analysis, and to areas of social and members and the companies in which 
provide existing environmental concern, and we invest, it needs to be part of our day 
staff with engaging with companies on to day business. This new appointment 
appropriate these issues. " (USS, 1999) helps us to get to that position, bringing 
training. " (E-USS, new insights and new networks to 
1999) complement our expertise in fund 
management" (USS, 1999). This 
confirms E-USS' initial analysis that 
"adopting an active investment policy 
would require the placing of ethical 
and environmental issues at the heart 
of investment decision-making within 
the current USS structure. " (E-USS, 
1999). When compared with peers, it is 
currently unusual for self-managed 
occupational pension schemes to 
appoint specialist staff on SRI. This is 
regarded as further evidence of E-USS 
success. 
Ongoing pressure: USS was to commission and As E-USS recognises, when compared 
Promote action by publish a discussion paper with other SEE issues at the time, a 
USS on climate into climate change considerable amount of analysis into 
change. E-USS investment risk (Mansley and the impact of climate change on share 
surveyed USS Dlugolecki, 2001) and then to price was available, and the subject was 
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E- USS Ahn USS Action Analysis Eval 
members "and then found the Institutional a prominent issue due to the climate 
presented the Investors Group on Climate change negotiations in Kyoto. While 
results to USS with Change -a collaborative USS chose to focus on the issue, there 
recommendations endeavour between is insufficient independent evidence to 
for action" institutional investors looking conclude that it chose to do so as a 
(E-USS, 1999). at, inter alia, climate change consequence of E-USS' campaign 
Following this issues in investment, public work. 
consultation, policy and the property asset 
E-USS strategy class. 
was to focus on 
climate change E-USS believed that USS 
"because that was work on climate change was 
the [issue] that "a convenient outcome but 
there was strongest not completely a 
interest in" coincidence... I think there is 
(Alexander, 2001). a strong link but climate 
change is obviously a good 
issue from [USS'] point of 
view. " (Alexander, 2001) 
Ongoing pressure: The voting record for the That USS appears to have withheld its 
To promote second quarter of 2002 support from Balfour Beatty on this 
engagement by discloses that of the 11 resolution indicates that USS did use its 
USS with Balfour resolutions at Balfour Investor Advocacy Influence over 
Beatty on the Beatty's AGM in 2002, USS Balfour Beatty in relation to the Ilisu 
controversial Ilisu voted in favour of 10 and Dam. However, as abstaining was 
Dam. abstained on one (USS, 2002: common among investors, there is no 
9). While it does not evidence that this was done because of 
explicitly say which USS. 
resolution USS abstained on, 
as 40.9% of Balfour Beatty's 
investors abstained on this 
Friends of the Earth 
resolution (see Section 3.3.1), 
this is the resolution on which 
USS probably abstained. 
Ongoing pressure: USS (2003) states that it had E-USS failed to motivate USS to N 
Promote USS "explained to Ethics for USS engage with BHP Billiton and Alcoa on 
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engagement on that the [USS] scheme this issue. 
BHP Billiton and recognised that the 
Alcoa, re: the construction of dams could 
World Commission have significant social and 
on Dams environmental impacts, but 
Guidelines: "USS that it had not been possible 
linked to massive to prioritise this project 
Amazon dam because this issue did not 
project: A group of affect the whole portfolio in 
aluminium the way that other issues and 
producers, sectors do". 
including two 
companies USS 
invests in, are 
involved in plans to 
build a series of 46 
dams on the 
Tocantins and 
Araguaia river 
systems in the 
Amazon Basin. "(E- 
USS, 2003) 
Ongoing pressure: In line with standard practice USS failed to meet this objective. N 
promoting among its peers, USS' March 
divestment from 2003 portfolio includes three 
the oil and gas oil and gas multinationals in 
sector. "! t is clear its top 10 holdings: 
from Ethics for BP: £598.6 million 
USS's research Shell: £309.5 million 
that many USS BG Group: £96.7 million 
members do not 
feel that it is in 
their interests for 
their pension fund 
to make a profit at 
the expense of the 
stability of the 
earth's climate" 
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(E-USS, 2000). 
Implied: USS to USS discloses the'results of While not an explicit aim of the N 
check that SRI its `Learning Review' (USS, campaign, E-USS was correct to 
principles are 2003). This found that `four assume that internal coherence would 
adopted by its of USS' seven fund managers lead USS to check what its external 
external fund have the basic foundations fund managers were doing on this 
managers. "We [for governance and SRI issue. While this is a significant 
assume that engagement] in place". positive outcome, USS is a large 
internal coherence In a follow-up letter from institutional client. Consequently, if its 
would suggest that Peter Moon (Chief external fund managers believe that it is 
anything that their Investment Officer), external taking SRI issues very seriously, they 
internal fund managers have been asked to will commit greater resources to this 
managers were outline their plans for further area. According to a representative of 
doing on this would development of SRI both in one external fund manager: 
also be affecting response to this learning "Representing many large institutional 
their external fund review and to the Institutional clients who have a strong interest in 
managers as well" Shareholder's Committee's SRI has definitely increased the 
(Alexander, 2001). Principles on Engagement. emphasis on SRI and its profile within 
"USS will assess each Schroders" (Stathers, 2003). As the E- 
manager's position again at USS campaign contributed towards 
the end of the scheme year, USS' original SIP, it can claim part of 
focusing on those managers the credit for generating this 
and those issues where there `multiplier' outcome. 
is greatest opportunityfor 
movement towards best 
practice... When managers 
are being considered for (re) 
appointment, performance in 
this area can be assessed 
(and compared) against the 
requirements of the SIP... A 
consistent finding was that 
this was the most thorough 
(in some cases, the f rst ever) 
evaluation that fund 
managers had experienced, 
either by clients or their 
agents (e. g. investment 
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As can be seen from the above table, an analysis of the degree to which the E-USS 
campaign was successful in its `policy' and `transparency' aims can conclude that it 
was highly effective, as there is evidence that E-USS either `achieved' or `partially 
achieved' the desired outcome in respect of all its initial objectives. 
Similarly, by engaging directly with its own external Fund Managers via the 
`Learning Review', USS is exerting its client influence on SRI over its own fund 
managers -a point confirmed by Schroders, one of its external fund managers 
(Stathers93,2003: perl com). 
However, once USS committed to a positive SIP, the above ex post effectiveness 
analysis of E-USS' ongoing `monitor and evaluate' campaign targets concludes that, 
in each case, there is either insufficient evidence that E-USS achieved its intended 
outcome, or evidence that it did not achieve its aim. It appears, therefore, that E-USS ` 
has been less effective when `watch-dogging' ('monitoring and evaluating') USS. 
As highlighted in the ex ante review above, the fact that USS was to be legally 
compelled to make some kind of statement would have significantly increased the 
likelihood of success. While this renders assessing E-USS effectiveness difficult, it is 
possible to use the response to the regulation of other similar occupational pension 
funds that were not confronted by a campaign, as a benchmark against which to 
measure the ex post effectiveness of E-USS. To that end, every study of UK 
occupational pension fund SRI policy and practice since the reform of the Pensions 
Act has singled out USS as a positive example: 
" Along with four other pension funds from the top 100, USS scored maximum 
marks in the FoE survey (Friends of the Earth, 2001); 
" an example of `The Best We Found' (Just Pensions, 2002); and 
93 SRI analyst, Schroders Fund Management. Schroders is one of USS' external fund managers. 
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" "USS is without question the UK's leading pension fund in terms of socially 
responsible investment". (TUC, 2003). 
E-USS' initial effectiveness in delivering the policy change can be further 
substantiated by the following statements: 
" "People and Plant successfully lobbied the USS. ['Meeting the 
Responsibilities of Ownership'] is still one of the best things written in this 
area" (Alam, 2001: interview); 
" "... without the Ethics for USS campaign, USS' SIP would not have been so 
strongly written" (Stathers, 2003: pers com); 
" "People and Planet succeeded in bringing pension fund managers to the table, 
and getting them to take members' social and environmental concerns 
seriously" (Mansley, 2001: interview); and 
" "People and Planet's Ethics for USS campaign has been an impressive 
campaign for socially responsible investment, particularly in its ability to 
mobilise pension fund members - the reverberations of this should spread 
across Europe and ultimately worldwide. More NGOs need to learn from 
People and Planet's experience" - Penny Shepherd, Director of UK Social 
Investment Forum (People and Planet, 2003). 
Therefore, by reference to the `business as usual' response to the Pensions Act from 
other occupational pension funds, it can be demonstrated that the E-USS campaign 
made a significant difference to the extent to which USS embraced SRI. 
It is also noteworthy that USS is now promoting SRI nationally and internationally. 
For example, in addition to the previously mentioned external fund manager review, it 
organised a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs reviewing the 
responsibility of investors. Furthermore, in a high-profile attempt to reduce short- 
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termism in the CM (see Section 1.6) USS organised a competition for fund managers 
and investment consultants to promote longer-term performance measurement. 
In contrast, the contemporary role of E-USS is limited simply to monitoring USS. 
Consequently, it appears that USS now has a broader, better resourced and better 
informed SRI advocacy programme than E-USS. While this reduction of E-USS' 
relative influence may be seen by E-USS as a negative outcome, the fact that USS 
appears to have become a stronger advocate of SRI than E-USS is ultimately a 
positive outcome for the E-USS campaign. 
In conclusion, from an ex post effectiveness perspective, after initially failing, E-USS 
was effective at generating a strong SRI engagement policy at USS. Consequently, 
People and Planet can justifiably claim to have "caused a £22 billion stock market 
fund to invest ethically" (People and Planet, 2002, p6) - although it was not the only 
`cause'. However, E-USS cannot claim to have been effective in relation to its 
ongoing `monitor and evaluate' objectives. 
4. Efficiency 
From the launch of the campaign, it took 27 months for USS to change its original 
SRI policy. This was partly due to the initial advocacy of an Avoidance policy that 
failed for important legal reasons. Campaign research should have considered this 
legal dimension so, to some extent, this duration was somewhat inefficient. However, 
the campaign did correct its initial error. 
In terms of costs, the most significant to the campaign was a half-time position which 
"has been devoted to the campaign since autumn of 1999" (Alexander, 2001). In 
addition, an operating budget of about £3,000 per annum was allocated to the 
campaign to cover member mailings. Therefore, the overall cost of the ongoing 
campaign to date is in the region of £60,000, which renders it among the more 
resource-intensive NGO CM interventions in the UK between 1990 and 2002. 
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In considering the benefit generated by the E-USS campaign (in addition to the 
positive SRI policy adopted by USS), based on the above ex ante and ex post analysis, 
the main direct benefit is the fact that USS has become a strong advocate of SRI. In 
particular, it has exerted client influence over its external fund managers, which 
collectively manage more than £220 billion. As this benefit figure is a measure of the 
volume of assets rather than the economic value of the benefit, the cost and benefit 
figures are not directly comparable. Even so, they are a useful measure and imply a 
multiplier for the campaign spend in excess of 3.5 million. Consequently, despite 
being initially ineffective and inefficient, it is reasonable to conclude that E-USS was 
efficient overall. 
5. Equity 
The USS SRI policy applies to all funds under management and therefore applies to 
all of USS' members. Consequently, the distribution of the costs and benefits among 
USS members has been equitable. However, the relatively limited membership of E- 
USS among the USS scheme beneficiaries indicates that some members care more 
than others about this change. To that extent, the benefit is experienced inequitably. 
From the E-USS perspective, one `negative' unintended consequence of the campaign 
can be discerned from the analysis of the degree to which E-USS has been successful 
in its watch-dogging ('monitoring and evaluating') role. This analysis found that, 
partly as a consequence of robust defence by USS, E-USS had largely failed to 
generate its intended outcome. 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
According to the NGO CM intervention model, E-USS deployed an `Indirect Investor 
Advocacy strategy', aimed at CM institutions, using both business case and moral 
case arguments and having adopted an orca Stance. In the light of this case study 
analysis, the overall tabular classification in the chronology in Appendix 2 can be 
confirmed as accurate. The scaled polar diagram is used here to depict a more 
nuanced classification: 
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Figure 5.4: Polar Diagram of Ethics for USS Campaign 
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The above polar diagram depicts the strategy undertaken by E-USS in its CM 
intervention. It demonstrates that in addition to the above classification, the NGO 
used some additional components: a limited Economic Influence dimension (it 
promoted divestment as a sanction once engagement failed) and limited degree of 
public policy audience. 
7. Inductive analysis 
The deductive analysis of the model argued that the probability of success would be 
increased by adopting an `Investor Advocacy Influence' strategy over an `Economic 
Influence' strategy (Hypothesis 1). It also suggested that an Indirect approach would 
be more likely to succeed than Direct (Hypothesis 2). This case strongly supports both 
hypotheses in that the initial investment policy recommendation of E-USS was an 
Economic Influence strategy and failed. When it reformed its recommendation to 
become that of Investor Advocacy, it succeeded. 
The deductive analysis also suggested that striking a balance `between moral and 
financial arguments' would be more likely to succeed (Hypothesis 4). In adopting an 
Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence using both Business and Moral Case arguments, 
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E-USS maximised the probability of success. As has been argued here, the E-USS 
campaign was highly effective (at changing USS' policy) and highly efficient, which 
would appear to support this hypothesis. 
While there are significant questions concerning the continuing effectiveness of the E- 
USS campaign post the USS policy change, it is important to review what further 
success factors can be cited from the initial campaign success: 
0 Advocating a legally possible position was of central importance; 
0 understanding the decision-making process and thoroughly analysing what 
influences the decision-makers increases the chances of success; 
" grass roots support is important for legitimacy, but targeted advocacy is 
necessary to influence the decision-makers; 
" political support for the CM intervention proved highly influential; and 
" it is important to assess who the audience is and manage the campaign message 
accordingly. The investor audience requires a strong financial case, but arguing 
that alone does not motivate NGO members or the broader public: "the 
argument that was really successful in the City was `financially this makes 
sense'. The argument that our members care about was 'this is your money - 
you should have a say in how its used and what happens to it and you should 
take responsibilityfor the companies that it has invested in'. " (Alexander, 2001) 
8. Issues in Assessing Performance 
Effect attribution in an interdependent system is an issue in this case. The reform of 
the Pensions Act significantly increased the likelihood of the campaign's success. 
However, as demonstrated above, the response of non-confronted pension schemes 
has provided a useful benchmark for measuring the E-USS efficacy. 
This case study has benefited as a consequence of the campaign being a main focus of 
an NGO, and because USS publishes an increasing amount of detail on its work. This 
has greatly facilitated the monitoring of the campaign aims and its success. 
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9. Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that, after initially failing, the E-USS campaign to encourage 
the USS to adopt an SRI policy was ultimately effective. The above ex ante 
effectiveness analysis demonstrates that E-USS ultimately established ambitious yet 
realistic objectives, and the ex post effectiveness analysis demonstrates. - that it 
achieved the majority of its original policy targets. Furthermore, the `equity' analysis 
demonstrates that the costs and benefits have been equitably distributed, and that no 
serious negative unintended consequences for societal welfare have been generated. - 
In summary, this case study has demonstrated that it is possible for NGO CM 
intervention to be both effective and efficient. The empirical experience here also 
appears to confirm that the deductive CM intervention theory appears to work in 
practice. 
5.3 Case Study: UKSIF and the Reform of the 1995 Pensions Act 
Introduction 
This case reviews the SRI advocacy surrounding the reform of the 1995 Pensions Act. 
This CM intervention was led by the UK Social Investment Forum (UKSIF) and 
included informal collaboration with other NGOs including Friends of the Earth, 
Traidcraft Exchange, War on Want and WWF-UK. No external review of this 
intervention has been published to date. It is therefore the purpose of this case study to 
review the effectiveness and efficiency of the UKSIF CM intervention. As before, this 
study adopts the structure set out in Section 2.2.3. 
This case is similar to the preceding E-USS case study in that it used the expertise as 
well as influence of its members. However, it is different from others in that it is 
focused on public policy advocacy regarding the framework of the CM. It is also 
different because it is based on an informal coalition of a number of NGOs, rather 
than being either a single NGO, or formal partnership. Furthermore, it is different 
insofar as UKSIF is a trade association rather than a campaigning NGO. 
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As to whether UKSIF is in scope here, McIntosh et al (Section 1.1) states that some 
business associations may be regarded as NGOs. This thesis includes NGOs that 
"promote environmental and/or societal goals" (Section 1.1). UKSIF's mission is "to 
promote and encourage the development and positive impact of SRI amongst UK- 
based investors. UKSIF believes that all material social, environmental and ethical 
issues 'should be integrated into standard investment practice and that individual 
investors should be able to reflect their values in their investments" (UKSIF, 2003, 
internet). Therefore, UKSIF promotes environmental and societal goals and is 
consequently within the scope of this thesis. 
UKSIF was set up in 1991 as "the UK's membership network for socially responsible 
investment" (ibid). At the time of writing UKSIF has more than 250 members, and 
affiliates include retail and institutional fund managers, financial advisors, SRI 
research providers, consultants, trade unions, banks, building societies, community 
development finance institutions, NGOs and individuals interested in SRI (ibid). Six 
staff members are employed by UKSIF, which has an annual operating budget of 
£300k (Harrison, 2003: pers com). 
UKSIF does not campaign on companies directly: while being positive towards SRI 
investment institutions, it has adopted a neutral approach to business 94. UKSIFqS 
corporate sector-relevant work includes hosting presentations by companies on SEE 
issues and coordinating some institutional investor engagement initiatives: "investors 
have set up a secretariat within the UK Social Investment Forum, the trade body for 
socially responsible investing. It will serve as the central hub for existing initiatives 
such as the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change and the Pharmaceutical 
Shareowners Group"95 (Financial Times, 2003c: 2). 
94 This highlights one of the limitations of the Elkington and Fennel model, in that it does not facilitate 
such a position. This is one of the reasons why this thesis uses an adapted version of this model (see 
Section 2.2.4. ) 
95 See Oxfam case study for more detail on the Pharmaceutical Shareholders Group. 
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Reference to the NGO CM Intervention Chronology (Appendix 2) demonstrates that 
UKSIF joined with campaigning NGOs for at least seven substantive - CM 
interventions between 1990 and 200296. 
In respect of the NGO's internal consistency with its external programmatic work, due 
to the companies' approach to ethical issues its staff group pension scheme is 
managed by ISIS and it banks with Unity Trust. 
Introduction to Specific CM intervention 
In 1999 UKSIF worked in an informal coalition with a number of NGOs to support a 
proposed reform of the 1995 Pension Act. The reform itself was first publicly 
proposed by John Denham MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social 
Security, during a speech to the UKSIF 1998 Annual Lecture on 9 July: "Ethical and 
socially responsible investment is an important issue, which needs to be addressed by 
those who manage pension funds... So I am minded to take action which will ensure 
that trustees set out the extent to which their investment strategy takes account of 
ethical and social considerations... so that scheme members are made aware of the 
existence and the nature of that policy" (Denham, 1998, p1). 
However, prior to the speech, a number of UKSIF-connected individuals had been 
privately involved in lobbying for this change. For example, Tessa Tennant, a former 
Chair of UKSIF, had proposed the reform to the MP who had been open to the 
suggestion. Subsequently, UKSIF liaised with officials in the then Department for 
Social Security (DSS) and was aware of the evolving policy position in advance of the 
speech (Noble, 2002: pers com). 
UKSIF submitted a formal response to the DSS' `Strengthening the Pensions 
Framework' consultation document. UKSIF's response was also disseminated to other 
NGOs, who were to support the proposal for SEE disclosure in the SIP and suggest 
stronger wording. They collectively argued that "trustees should incorporate certain 
96 As noted in Section 4.1 the NGO CM intervention chronology does not include all UKSIF's CM 
interventions, so that the integrity of the data on the trends in campaigning NGO use of the CM is 
maintained. See methodology for the rationale. 
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environmental considerations as part of their financial considerations" and that 
``... the statement must cover whether or not the trustees take into account 
considerations relating to moral, social and environmental issues" (WWF-UK, 
1999c, p2). 
Assessment of the CM intervention(s) 
-`1. NGO Legitimacy 
UKSIF does not have ECOSOC consultative status. However, assessing it against the 
protocol for eligibility generates the following analysis: 
Table 5.7: A Review of UKSIF against ECOSOC 
requirement 
Must not be antithetical to the Complies 
participatory democratic state 
Should be non-profit making Complies 
Should be non-violent and non-criminal Complies 
Must not be directed against a particular Complies 
government 
As can be seen from the above table, from a high-level perspective of legitimacy, it 
appears that if UKSIF were to apply for ECOSOC consultative status, the UN would 
be likely to approve it. Consequently, from the perspective of this thesis, the NGO can 
be regarded as legitimate. In respect of its specific CM intervention legitimacy, 
UKSIF derives legitimacy from its members (see above) because one of the explicit 
reasons for joining is to help it promote SRI in the CM. 
2. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
UKSIF's specific aim was to campaign for a disclosure clause in the reformed 
Pensions Act which would set out the degree to which pension funds must incorporate 
SEE issues. As the trade association for ethical and socially responsible investors, its 
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formal intention was to promote the commercial success of SRI. As can be discerned 
from its mission, underlying this commercial intention was a values-based belief that 
the CM could be used to promote more ethical business conduct and, consequently, an 
enhanced quality of life. 
Regarding its ex ante effectiveness, to some extent UKSIF's CM intervention was 
opportunistic: it used the broader Statement of Investment Principles review that was 
being developed in the wake of the Robert Maxwell pension scandal. However, this 
was also politically astute: as there was a suitable regulatory instrument already under 
review, this considerably increased the potential for success and it was therefore well 
timed. 
In preparing its advocacy position, UKSIF called on the significant expertise of SRI 
and the CM among its membership, which would have contributed to the weight and 
accuracy of its arguments. 
In terms of UKSIF's specific SRI disclosure request, while some of its members 
would have preferred to call for a negative screening form of ethical investment and a 
mandatory positive statement on SEE issues by pension schemes, calling for 'a 
disclosure requirement on whether or not SRI issues were considered, and including 
`engagement' (see Section 1.7) as an option, was considered legally viable and 
politically astute. It was also anticipated that, due to the nature of the issues, in 
question, most pension funds would prefer to make a positive statement to their 
members. UKSIF's original suggestion, therefore, was well considered, politically 
astute and more likely to succeed. 
However, previous public policy approaches to the government on SRI had not been 
well received ("I always had a lot of trouble getting support from Conservatives for 
any of [UKSIF's] parliamentary work" (Noble, 2002: pers com)). Consequently, even 
a disclosure regulation based on the principle of free access to information by 
consumers was an ambitious endeavour for UKSIF. But there were two important 
contemporary political factors that further enhanced the likelihood of success. First, 
the new Labour government had recently been elected and had positioned itself as 
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having a commitment to ethical and socially responsible policies on the part of 
companies (Denham, 1998). Second, the new Pensions Minister had previously 
worked for War on Want - one of the NGOs that supported the proposed reform. The 
Minister was therefore predisposed to SEE issues. 
In conclusion, despite the previous experience of public policy CM intervention, this 
intervention was well-timed, well-informed, politically astute and well-targeted. From 
an ex ante perspective, this intervention was therefore highly effective. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness 
Despite significant opposition - for example, from the influential National 
Association of Pension Funds - UKSIF's campaign was successful: the Pensions Act 
was amended to place a requirement on trustees to declare via a Statement of 
Investment Principles (SIP) "the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or 
ethical (SEE) considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and 
realisation of investments; and the policy (if any) directing the exercise of the rights 
(including voting rights) attaching to investments" (HMSO, 1999, Section 35(3)(f))97. 
UKSIF now proclaims "taking the lead in facilitating the introduction of the new 
regulation requiring pension funds to disclose their policies on social, environmental 
and ethical issues" at the top of its list of achievements (UKSIF, 2003, internet). 
It should be noted that - as suggested by UKSIF - the UK regulation did not require a 
`positive' position in respect of SEE issues; merely that the extent to which these 
concerns are incorporated should be disclosed. UKSIF's prior deduction that most 
pension funds would prefer to make a positive statement was confirmed by a 
subsequent study which found that "59% of funds, representing 78% of assets, 
incorporate[d] socially responsible investment (SRI) into their investment strategies 
97 Previous case studies have included a table assessing the achievements of the NGO in respect of each 
of the intervention aims. As noted in section 2.2.4, as this intervention had one central aim it is not 
necessary to use the tabular format to review success. However, in respect of the tabular classification 
of the 'success', this Pensions Act requirement would result in the tabular classification: `Y: evidence 
that NGO achieved desired outcome'. 
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either by engagement or by specific request to the fund manager" (Mathieu, 2000, 
P2)" 
UKSIF was also right to focus on what could be achieved within the scope of the 
existing legislation. As the Minster stated when first proposing the reform: "Trustees 
must remember that their own personal social, moral or political preferences are not 
matters which should interfere with their impartial and independent consideration of 
what is in the best financial interests of the beneficiaries. As the law stands, nothing 
can detract from the primary responsibility of pension fund trustees, to place the 
financial interests of the beneficiaries first. In a pensions trust, the object of the trust 
will be to secure financial benefits. It is therefore clearly inappropriate and indeed 
unlawful for trustees to pursue ethical goals in such a way as to prejudice the 
financial interests of the members" (Denham, 1998, p2). This clearly indicates the 
importance that the government placed on pension funds promoting SRI within the 
scope of the existing case law. The nature of the SRI policy it was seeking to generate 
was both Integrated Assessment and Advocacy (see Section 1.7). 
The reform was broadly welcomed by UKSIF, campaigning NGOs, investment 
institutions, companies and the main opposition political party. The reform was also 
cited by a number of interviewees98 when asked what the most significant 
development in SRI in the UK had been in recent years. For example, a former 
Secretary of State for the Environment stated: "It seems very small but is has made a 
huge difference - and that difference has been in two directions: [FIs] who have never 
thought about it before have got to think about it. And... it is very different in 
government because it is a statement by government that this is a proper thing for 
governments to do. We've never had that before. It was a very, very big change, and I 
think one has to give real credit to both governments... nobody made party political 
points. " (Gummer, 2000: interview). The Labour government's Minister for CSR was 
also later to comment: "The Occupational Pension Schemes Investment Regulations 
1996 which require pension scheme trustees to state their policy regarding the extent 
to which social, environmental or ethical considerations affect their investment 
decisions has made a valuable contribution to [CSR]. " (Alexander, 2001, p1). 
98 Including Niaz Alam, Duncan Green, John Gummer, Leslie Jones and Raj Thamotheram. 
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Several countries, including Australia, France, Germany and Sweden, have 
subsequently implemented similar reforms - some of them extending further to insist 
on an annual report of activity in this area, or that pension funds integrate SEE issues 
without affecting financial return. 
Regarding UKSIF's commercial objectives, Denham (op cit) stated: "I hope that 
people will see this change for what I believe it to be: an opportunity... for the 
development of products and services that will meet not just the domestic demand for 
such investment, but also the increasing interest from abroad". Subsequently, Friends 
Ivory & Sime, Insight Investment, Morley Asset Management and Henderson Global 
Investors, inter alia, were to announce SRI products that were tailored to pension fund 
investors (see Sections 1.8 and 3.3). However, while no detailed study of the 
commercial ramifications of the reform has been published, the increase in FIs 
claiming to engage on SRI issues provides prima facie evidence of a commercial 
demand. 
However, regarding the aspiration that the UK regulation would ultimately promote 
more ethical business conduct, serious questions remain as to what the ultimate effect 
of the regulation on companies has been. Mathieu (2000, p3) questioned whether 
there would be a "discernable impact on the environmental, social and ethical 
behaviour of the companies themselves". At the time of writing, no government 
review of the reform's success has been published. However, a subsequent NGO 
survey of the implementation of SIPS by pension funds found some examples of good 
practice but concluded that "poor practice in relation to socially responsible 
investment i. the norm" (Coles and Green, 2002, p2). Following this survey, calls 
have increased for the Pensions Act to be further strengthened by incorporating an 
annual reporting requirement in respect of what action has been taken in support of 
the SIP (for example: Wildsmith, 2003, Cowe and Porritt, 2002, p37, and Friends of 
the Earth, 2003a, p1). 
As regards the role that broader campaigning NGOs played in securing this reform, 
the complex relationship between NGO advocacy and the political process makes it 
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difficult to assess accurately the degree to which the reform would. have been 
implemented without the NGO campaign. However, the then political affairs 
campaigner at UKSIF has stated: "I think if it had been only NGOs lobbying, it 
wouldn't have been as effective as it was... without the hinterland of other interests it 
wouldn't have been such a strong force. " (Noble, 2002: pers com). This implies that 
the NGOs were effective, but that they required the `Indirect' support of the broader 
constituency of UKSIF's members to maximise their overall effectiveness. - 
In summary, from an ex post effectiveness perspective, UKSIF's CM intervention was 
highly effective in changing public policy and creating a new statutory instrument that 
supported SRI. However, there are a number of outstanding questions regarding the 
practical implementation of SRI SIPS by the pension fund industry and significant 
questions as to whether current practice meets the original political aspirations of the 
reform. Nevertheless, Denham stated: "If the regulation is passed, my officials will 
monitor the effects of the change" (Denham, 1998, p4). Therefore, this initial reform 
may have established a minimum level: as further policy reviews are conducted, it 
will probably be politically difficult to remove SEE issues from the statute book. 
Therefore, it is too early to conclude the degree of resultant corporate change. 
4. Efficiency 
t 
This CM intervention was a significant undertaking for UKSIF and involved 
considerable research and advocacy work over an extended period. It is estimated that 
total costs are limited to approximately six months of staff time - in the region of 
£ 12,500. In addition to being significant in absolute terms, the CM intervention costs 
represented approximately a sixth of the NGOs' overall human resources". 
The costs of the campaigning NGOs were negligible as UKSIF conducted most of the 
research. 
Regarding the intervention's investment impact on the CM, Mathieu (2000, p3) 
identified that 78 per cent of respondents - by funds under management (FUM) - 
99 At the time of the campaign there were three full-time staff members. 
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claimed that they integrated SEE issues. This equated to £234 billion of respondents' 
FUM. As the sample size was statistically significant, this implied that a total of 
£643.5 billion of pension assets integrated SEE issues -a cost/investor influence 
multiplier in excess of 50 million on the campaign cost. 
It is recognised that there are limits surrounding the degree to which these financial 
costs and investment `benefits' can be compared, and significant questions arise in 
regard to the veracity of the pension fund claims (Coles and Green, op cit). Even so, 
these figures provide'useful indicators and suggest that the NGO CM intervention was 
highly efficient. 
5. Equity 
Regarding the degree to which any costs were equitably distributed, a number of 
pension funds would have incurred administrative costs following the reform of the 
Pensions Act. However, most of these were associated with the broader nature of the 
reform, so additional administrative costs to the scheme regarding the SRI component 
can be considered negligible. Further, as recognised above, the government framed 
the legislation within the scope of the existing fiduciary responsibility and the relevant 
case law (see Section 3.4). This prevented pension fund trustees screening out 
companies on purely ethical grounds - so any subsequent action taken by pension 
funds would not incur the financial performance cost that can be associated with 
screening out industry sectors. 
While Coles and Green (op cit) concluded that poor practice by pension funds in 
relation to SRI was the norm, the study did find "positive examples of SRI best 
practice among pension funds" (2002, p12). To the degree that these positive 
examples originate from the reform and successfully promote welfare-enhancing CSR 
measures, society in general has benefited from the welfare enhancements brought 
about by this activity. 
One specific benefit to NGOs has been the increased scope for CM intervention 
provided by the positive statements on SEE issues (see Section 1.7). Following the 
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reform, the Financial Times (21 June 2000, p16) reported "Britain's top companies 
risk becoming targets of environmental activists unless they act urgently to give their 
pension fund trustees advice on socially responsible investment". Indeed, this 'may 
have been the motivation for some campaigning NGOs to have originally advocated 
the change. To the extent that their subsequent CM intervention brings welfare 
benefits to society, then this reform has succeeded. 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
This NGO CM intervention is classified against the four main components of ; the 
model as follows: 
1. Mechanism of company influence: as has been shown, UKSIF's objective was 
the promotion of material SEE issues into investment decisions and to increase 
Investor Advocacy Influence on SEE issues. This is classified here as both : 
`Economic Influence' and `Investor Advocacy Influence'. 
2. Route of influence: this case highlights an interesting special situation for the 
model. As the NGO in question is itself a trade association and includes both 
investors and NGOs among its membership, all its advocacy is Indirect. 
Furthermore, as it routinely works `on behalf of' these FIs and NGOs, its 
specific intervention Stance is dolphin. 
3. Primary audience: while the subtext of UKSIF's overall campaign was to 
change FI policy and practice, the primary audience for this CM intervention 
was `Public Policy' makers. 
4. Nature of argument: the NGO used `both Business and Moral Case' arguments. ' 
In the light of this detailed analysis, the overall tabular classification in the 
chronology in Appendix 2 can be confirmed as accurate. The scaled polar diagram is 
used here to depict a more nuanced classification: 
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Figure 5.5: Polar Diagram of UKSIF Pensions Act Advocacy 
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Figure 5.5 indicates that the report was also intended to address, at least to some 
extent, a CM institutions audience. The reason is that while the CM intervention was 
clearly focused on a public policy initiative, the audience affected by the reform itself 
was CM institutions. 
7. Inductive analysis 
The relevant deductive theory for the four main components of the model posited that 
an Economic Influence strategy would be harder to achieve success (Hypothesis 1) 
and that such a strategy would need to be mindful of the legal constraints. From a 
purely Economic Influence perspective, Mathieu (op cit) found that "48% of funds 
have requested that their fund manager takes account of the financial implications of 
environmental, social and ethical concerns when investing". The veracity of these 
claims is difficult to assess, as is the extent of the resulting Economic Influence. 
Nevertheless, this finding does suggest that some degree of Economic Influence may 
have arisen as a consequence of this CM intervention. On the face of it, this may 
undermine Hypothesis 1. However, as highlighted above, this success arose following 
an NGO investing a significant amount of resources in advocating a legally acceptable 
position. This confirms the deductive conjecture underlying Hypothesis 1. Therefore, 
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this study demonstrates that an Economic Influence strategy can be successful so long 
as its limitations are considered. 
More generally, the deductive analysis also hypothesised that an `Indirect' route of 
influence and a balance between Moral and Business Case arguments would increase 
the chances of success (Hypotheses 2 and 3 respectively). This case successfully 
deployed an Indirect approach with balanced arguments. Its success suggests that the 
empirical evidence here supports the retention of these hypotheses. In particular, this 
case implies that Indirect links with FIs can increase the chances of success by 
providing a strong understanding of the structure of the CM and the legislation 
governing it. 
This case also demonstrates that opportunistic CM public policy interventions can be 
highly effective and highly efficient, but that they may need to be well-timed, 
politically astute, well-targeted and well-informed. 
8. Issues in Assessing Performance 
The most significant issue in assessing the performance of this NGO CM intervention 
is the lack of published government information regarding its view on the outcomes of 
this regulatory change. The current evidence would suggest that the reform has 
generated some limited change, but that further reforms may be required if the 
original political aspiration is to be met. So while this intervention was successful in 
generating legislation change, the consequential impact of the change itself is difficult 
to assess. 
A subsidiary issue in assessing the performance of the NGO CM intervention is the 
extent to which the Minister's predisposition towards SEE issues contributed towards 
its success, and whether it would have been successful without him. 
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9. Conclusion 
Despite the lack of widespread investor engagement on SEE issues, this case study 
has demonstrated that CM public policy intervention can be highly effective and 
efficient in changing policy. Particularly noteworthy outcomes are that it has (1) 
contributed to regulatory change; (2) promoted consideration of and engagement on 
SEE issues by some mainstream investment institutions; (3) provided statements by 
investment institutions against which NGOs can hold them to account; and (4) been 
duplicated overseas by a number of countries. 
This study has also demonstrated that the classification of this intervention in the 
chronology is accurate and that it supports the relevant hypotheses set out in Section 
3.5. 
5.4 Case Study: Friends of the Earth and Norwich Union 
Introduction 
This case reviews the Friends of the Earth (FoE) `Capital Punishment' campaign 
which targeted, in particular, the Norwich Union "to demand greener investment 
policies" (Friends of the Earth, 2000b, pl). Once again, to date, no external review 
has been published, therefore this case study will review its effectiveness and 
efficiency. As before, this case study adopts the structure set out in Section 2.2.3. 
This case is also similar to the Ethics for USS case study in that it involves targeting 
an individual investment institution in an attempt to encourage it to develop an SRI 
policy. It is different, however, in that the campaign represents a confrontation of the 
asset management practices of insurance companies, rather than fund managers or 
pension funds. In addition, the NGO membership was not recruited from the 
campaign target's members. 
FoE describes its vision as "a world where everyone's needs are met in a way which 
values our quality of life and safeguards the future of the environment" (FoE, 2002, 
p3). Its mission is to work `for a world where environmental protection, social justice 
and economic welfare for all people go hand in hand" (ibid). 
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Internationally, FoE has one million supporters and claims to be the "largest 
international network of environmental groups in the world, represented in 68 
countries". More than 90 per cent of its income derives from individual donations 
(FoE, 2002: 11-16). 
Compared with other NGOs, FoE is highly active in corporate campaigning and has 
established a strategy in this area. Its rationale for this work states that "economic 
power is shifting from the general public to the boardrooms" and that "multinationals 
trade off the policies of one nation against another - resulting in erosion of 
standards, damage to wildlife and loss of jobs" (Friends of the Earth, 2003b). 
Regarding the NGO's corporate campaigning Stance, it is mainly orca (see Section 
1.4 above), although it has also adopted `shark' and dolphin Stances from time to 
time10°. 
Reference to the NGO CM intervention chronology (Appendix 2) demonstrates that 
FoE appears to have participated in at least 16 CM interventions between 1990 and 
2002. According to the chronology, its first, in 1991, was an attempt to stop Fisons 
extracting peat from Sites of Special Scientific Interest (Intervention 6). FoE was also 
one of the first NGOs to question the extent to which ethical investment funds "car' 
shift the behaviour of the large corporate powerhouses" (UKSIF, 1998, p1) and 
advocate transparent engagement. 
Introduction to Specific CM intervention 
In January of 2000, Friends of the Earth published `Capital Punishment: UK 
Insurance Companies and the Environment', which intended to "stimulate debate 
around the environmental consequences of the investment strategies of institutional 
investors" (FoE, 2000a, p4). 
This report focused on the Top 15 insurance companies and reviewed their 
investments in companies that FoE alleged to be causing environmental damage, 
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including: Chevron, Elf Aquataine, Exxon, Glaxo Wellcome, ICI, Monsanto, Rio 
Tinto, UPM Kymmene and Zeneca. The report claimed that the insurance companies 
"have the leverage and moral responsibility to change those companies' behaviour". 
More generally, it suggested that the financial sector had "a vital role to play in 
promoting sustainable development: it could potentially bring massive leverage to 
bear on other economic players to encourage them to integrate environmental and 
social with economic aims. There are powerful moral and economic reasons why it 
must now do so" (FoE, 2000a, p4). 
Financially, it argued that from a climate change perspective, the insurance companies 
would suffer financially from an increase in weather-related claims caused, in part, by 
the very activities that its fund management arms were supporting through their 
investments. 
Morally, it argued that "institutional investors have a moral responsibility not to fund 
the destruction of the environment and the exploitation of people... Most insurance 
companies shun on moral grounds investment in perfectly legal businesses such as 
strip clubs, the production of hard-core pornography, or the export of torture 
equipment. Likewise it is not only illegality that would make heroin dealing or 
protection rackets unacceptable to them and their shareholders" (ibid, p4). However, 
the report did not provide evidence in support of its claim that most insurance 
companies made investment decisions on purely moral grounds -a point that is 
reviewed below. 
Following its `Capital Punishment' report, FoE distributed an information pack to its 
"campaign express" network for use between March and June 2000. It was "targeting 
pension companies and the Norwich Union, demanding greener investment policies". 
(FoE, 2000b: 1). 
10° As noted in Section 1.4, this demonstrated one of the limitations of Elkington's model in that it 
attempted to categorise an NGO into one taxa. 
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Assessment of the CM intervention(s) 
1. NGO Legitimacy 
FoE has had ECOSOC Roster Consultative Status since 1972, which demonstrates 
that it passes the `legitimacy test' defined in Section 2.2.3. . 
In respect of the NGO's internal consistency with its external programmatic work, 
FoE's staff group pension scheme is in the Friends Provident Stewardship fund due to 
the company's ethical approach, and it banks with the Co-operative Bank. 
Interestingly, its public liability insurance is with Norwich Union - the focal point of 
the CM intervention (McLaren, 2001: interview). FoE also has a corporate fundraising 
policy: a company donation would "only be accepted where it fits into a relatively 
small category of acceptable activities with acceptable companies" (ibid). 
Consequently, FoE meets the legitimacy criteria set out in Section 2.2.4. 
2. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
The `Capital Punishment' report concluded with the following recommendation: 
"Insurance companies should urgently conceive strategies to use their considerable 
influence to hasten the changes that are required to create truly sustainable 
businesses. This must be done through systematically rewarding environmentally 
successful companies while penalising those who persist with unsustainable practices. 
This can be achieved through: 
1. asset management to encourage leading-edge sustainable business practice, 
including through (a) direct dialogue to improve performance of better 
companies and (b) withdrawal of investment from the non-compliant and 
worst companies. 
2. direct advocacy for tougher public policy and legal measures (such as 
mandatory corporate environmental reporting and more realistic official 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets)" (op cit: 73). 
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The first recommendation is particularly important from an ex ante effectiveness 
perspective because it not only demonstrates an NGO calling for a potentially illegal 
action; but also a contradiction with other statements in the report. 
Regarding the legality of the proposed investment policy, the implication of FoE's 
asset management recommendation was that sustainable asset management meant 
investing in the most sustainable companies and promoting further improvement, 
while withholding investment capital from 'the `environmentally' worst companies. 
Prima facie, such a recommendation, if adopted industry-wide, would in principle 
lead to "rewarding environmentally successful companies and penalising 
unsustainable ones" (op cit: 73). But in practice, it would be unlawful under current 
investment legislation for such an approach to be adopted industry-wide (or even for 
the majority of assets). This is because of the legal fiduciary responsibility that fund 
managers have in relation to their clients101: if the most environmentally damaging 
companies also happened to be the best financial investments, then unless their client 
had specified such an approach (and was in a position to do so - see Section 3.4), fund 
managers would be prevented from divestment on purely ethical grounds. FoE was 
aiming these recommendations at the fund management sectors of Life and Pensions 
businesses, and not those clients that were in a position to specify such an approach 
(i. e. individual retail investors). As a consequence, FoE's recommendation would fail. 
It is ex ante ineffective and demonstrates a superficial understanding of the fund 
management system. 
Regarding the contradiction, FoE's proposed investment policy conclusion includes 
the "withdrawal of investment from the non-compliant and worst companies". Yet 
elsewhere the report is critical of such an approach: "By screening all such companies 
out of their portfolios, how do ethical funds exert influence for change? Although 
some ethical funds.. . are now using positive screens to 
include certain companies, 
some of the familiar corporate laggards could never qualify and influence over them 
remains marginal. In short, the investment community's approach needs to be more 
proactive and much larger-scale. It will take the active leverage of large institutional 
101 In addition to being an insurance provider, Norwich Union, for example, also managed a number of 
occupational pension funds. The Megarry judgement prevented the trustees of these pension funds from 
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investors to get the attention of major corporate players such as Ford, Exxon and 
ICI. " (ibid: 8). The implication of this statement is that fund managers should adopt 
an active `engagement' approach in order to `get the attention of major corporate 
players'. Yet "withdrawal of investment from the non-compliant and worst 
companies" would mean the loss of share-ownership rights required for engagement 
(see section 3.3). This represents a serious logical discontinuity in the report. 
Furthermore, the contradiction itself makes it difficult to assess precisely what the 
aims of the report were when evaluating ex ante effectiveness. 
However, based on interviews with FoE staff, it appears that initially, the main 
purpose 'of the report was to convince members of the FoE network that this was an 
important area of campaigning and not to change the investment policy of the 
insurance companies that it reviewed: "[`Capital Punishment'] was very much our 
base marker to establish the legitimacy for a campaign in this area. So our interest 
wasn't so much - surprisingly - to expect to move particular companies through that 
report itself but to say here is the evidence as to why FoE wants to engage with this 
sector... this is a legitimate target for campaigning. On the back of that we wanted to 
be able to produce a briefing sheet for our members... about ethical investment or the 
influence of the investment community" (McLaren, 2001: interview). 
As to whether the report was likely to be effective in achieving these lower order 
internal aims, it included a number of company case studies that graphically 
highlighted the environmental damage caused by the FoE pariah companies. It also 
detailed the holdings of the top 14 insurance organisations in those companies and 
contained some discussion of what their moral obligations were in relation to those 
companies. It is unlikely that its members would have been aware of the legal 
limitations and contradictions inherent within FoE's proposed investment policy. 
Therefore, from an ex ante perspective, it is probably the case that FoE members 
would have been persuaded by `Capital Punishment' that FoE should increase its CM 
campaigning work. 
divesting from (as FoE describes them) the "non-compliant and worst companies" on purely ethical 
grounds - see Section 3.4. 
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A second medium-term aim of the report's analysis of insurance companies' 
investment holdings was to assess which companies FoE should confront in a 
campaign: "The analysis also gave us a company amongst the insurance industry 
which had the largest investments amongst the listed companies we had selected, and 
this insurance company therefore became the focal company of the campaign" 
(McLaren, op cit). 
The target selected by FoE was Norwich Union. Whether this choice was ex ante 
effective, it appears to have been an illogical choice: an analysis of the shareholdings 
detailed in the report indicates that both Prudential Assurance and Standard Life 
would have been more influential contemporary campaign targets. Prudential 
Assurance and Standard Life are ranked in the report (by long-term business - p77) 
first and second ahead of CGU and Norwich Union Life and Pensions, which were 
third and fourth respectively. Similarly, both Prudential and Standard Life did not 
perform as well as Norwich Union in FoE's own evaluation of their "commitment to 
sustainable development" (ibid: 78). Moreover, in 85 per cent of cases either Standard 
Life or Prudential owned more shares in FoE target companies than did Norwich 
Union. Finally, for half the companies in question, the shares owned by Norwich 
Union were in passive index-tracking funds where, in addition to the above fiduciary 
limitations, Norwich Union did not have the discretion to adhere to the FoE 
recommendation to divest (see Section 3.4). 
This apparent anomaly strongly suggests that FoE took into consideration the merger 
between CGU and Norwich Union, which was first mooted shortly after the 
publication of `Capital Punishment'. Such a merger would have produced a new entity 
with £140 billion funds under management, some 15 per cent more than the 
Prudential, the previous front-runner in the FoE report. Furthermore, the new Group 
would have then engaged in establishing Group-wide policy, providing an opportunity 
for FoE to influence this policy. Finally, CGU had developed a reputation for being at 
the vanguard of the debate on environmental management for financial institutions. 
For example, it had founded and chaired the first Financial Organisations Reporting 
Guidelines on the Environment (FORGE). These three factors combined to make the 
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new entity a logical contemporary campaign target for FoE, so it is reasonable to 
conclude that this choice of target was ex ante effective. 
In terms of the scale of FoE's ambition to confront this new entity, at the time only 
Friends Ivory & Sime, Henderson/NPI and Jupiter had invested significantly in the 
engagement activities that FoE was apparently suggesting. Consequently, if one 
interprets the `Capital Punishment' conclusion as being pro-fund manager-wide 
engagement, FoE's ambition was significant but realistic in that there were 
precedents. 
In conclusion therefore, from an ex ante perspective, the report was effective in regard 
to its internal aims but highly ineffective in respect of its specific investment policy 
recommendations. Nevertheless, the decision to target Norwich Union was effective 
at that time. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness 
As highlighted above, FoE's internal targets for the `Capital Punishment' report were 
to establish legitimacy for campaigns on investment; produce a briefing sheet for 
members and activists about the influence of the investment community; and establish 
a specific target for an investment campaign. Following the report, FoE did achieve 
these aims. Consequently, from the achievement of their internal targets perspective, 
the `Capital Punishment' report was ex post effective. 
However, the report's explicit and more substantive aims related to changing 
investment practices. Therefore, to be able to draw comprehensive ex post 
effectiveness conclusions, it is important to examine whether there is any evidence 
that the report has brought about those changes. As mentioned, while 14 insurance 
companies were included in the report, FoE mainly targeted the investment practices 
of Norwich Union. Therefore, in order to assess the degree to which the report 
changed investment practices, the analysis will focus on the degree to which Norwich 
Union's investment practices changed as a consequence of the report. 
242 
Following the merger, CGNU1°2 announced that it would establish an ethical unit, and 
recruited seven people from the original NPI Global Care team1°3. In line with 
industry SRI best practice, Morley104 made a commitment to engage on social, ethical 
and environmental issues on all the funds it had under management. It was also to 
establish a range of sustainability funds within Morley's overall product range. 
As the asset management company would now be promoting sustainability 
improvements within investee companies, this change represented part of the outcome 
that FoE was seeking to achieve through its campaign. However, CGNU's investment 
policy did not involve a fund manager-wide commitment to invest in the most 
sustainable companies, nor did it withhold investment capital from the 
environmentally worst companies that was (inconsistently) advocated in FoE's 
conclusion. While the SRI team was later to establish investment products that 
adopted this kind of approach, this approach accounted for less than a few per cent of 
the assets under management. It therefore did not represent the fund manager-wide 
approach sought by FoE. 
FoE also misrepresented CGNU's action by describing it as a commitment to recruit 
"a leading socially responsible investment team... to manage its £200 billion-worth of 
funds. " (FoE, 2000c: 1). As mentioned, this was not the case as the team was 
responsible, in part, for engaging with the companies in the portfolios - not making 
portfolio investment decisions in relation to `£200 billion-worth of funds'. 
Nevertheless, CGNU's actual announcement did represent a change in its engagement 
practices. So the question is, to what degree was this change a consequence of the FoE 
report? 
FoE is clear that it believes that the change was as a response to its report: Tony 
Juniper, its Policy and Campaigns Director, stated: "Socially responsible investment 
has now gone mainstream. Financial companies who continue to ignore ethical or 
102 As mentioned in Section 1, during the campaign Norwich Union was bought by CGU. It became 
CGNU (and has subsequently re-branded as Aviva). 
103 Following the acquisition of NPI by AMP, this team had merged with a smaller team at Henderson 
Global Investors, which had also been previously acquired by AMP. 
104 Morley Asset Management was the fund manager for CGU group and was merged with the fund 
management function of Norwich Union. 
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environmental concerns will lose customers to those who don't. In responding to our 
campaign for greener investment policies, CGNU has gained a competitive 
advantage" (ibid). However, clearly it would have been in FoE's organisational 
interests to represent itself as being able to run highly effective campaigns. 
Furthermore, and perhaps unsurprisingly, CGNU rejects any suggestion that its 
change was entirely a response to FoE's campaign: "the capital punishment campaign 
certainly raised awareness... but the fact is that Morley was already... thinking about 
hiring us before the report was published. You can't ever argue with an NGO - that's 
one of the problems: the NGO is always going to be seen in the best light. But it is 
slightly annoying because we would never claim that a company had done something 
directly as a result of our engagement. Morley has a very good relationship with FoE 
but I think that they are slightly foolish to make claims [to have changed CGNU 
policy] in their annual report that can't be substantiated. " (Johnston, 2001: 
interview)t05 
It is difficult to prove whether Morley was already planning to hire the Global Care 
team before FoE's report. However, it is noteworthy that in advance of the FoE 
campaign, the director at NPI who had been responsible for overseeing this team had 
moved to Morley. This would at least suggest that it was likely that conversations of 
this nature were taking place. 
Regarding whether any CGNU change was as a result of the Capital Punishment 
campaign, interviewees have stated (unattributably) that: "I thought Friends of the 
Earth attack on the insurance industry was very poor, frankly -I thought it was ill 
presented, poorly argued and really off the mark. You cannot really complain about 
investment institutions owning shares in other companies and it does seem nave. 
Having said that, it does seem to have had an impact in certain insurance-based 
investors... but I thought their report did a disservice to NGO-investor relations. That 
said, they have got better since then". Similarly, "I don't think that [FoE] can claim 
that they achieved [the change at CGNU] alone. I am willing to agree that they 
105 Interestingly, in respect of FoE's claim to have increased its competitive advantage, somewhat 
ironically, on the basis that the individuals were interested in SRI, Morley kept the FoE 'campaign 
express' postcards to use in the subsequent marketing of its investment products. 
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contributed to the debate... Having said that, there were other insurers in the report 
that have not changed their views on SRI since" (anon). A consistent view was that 
the campaign was not well-constructed but that it did increase the pressure on CGNU 
to respond in the way that it did. 
When questioned about its internal evaluation of the success of the campaign, FoE 
states: "There isn't a written review, but we are convinced that it was very successful. 
The step that we then took was to use that information for our `campaign express' 
group of activists... and, as far as I am aware, we managed to land somewhere 
between 1 and 1½ thousand postcards on the desk of the Chief Executive of Norwich 
Union... Our understanding was that as a result of that merger, staff came in who had 
some idea how to deal with it and the answer was to take a step that I guess several 
companies have been considering. The idea of taking some form of responsible 
investment approach to mainstream investments... and Morley/CGNU were second to 
announce it... So, our analysis was that it was effective at that level... and we [also 
attracted] a good deal of attention in the professional media. " (McLaren, 2001: 
interview). 
FoE is correct to say it achieved considerable media coverage. In a more general 
sense, this is a positive campaign outcome because the NGO's broader campaign 
messages reached audiences that it would not usually have been able to address. More 
specifically, in the context of the campaign, this coverage may have exposed Norwich 
Union to questions from its clients and provided part of its motivation to change. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen, whether the FoE campaign against Norwich Union was 
responsible for CGNU recruiting the Global Care team and establishing an SRI policy 
is a matter for conjecture. Having said that, there is a consistent view among all 
interviewees that the Capital Punishment campaign raised awareness at the CGNU 
level regarding SRI issues. In respect of the degree to which CGNU's investment 
practices changed as a consequence of the FoE report, it is reasonable to conclude that 
while the campaign was not uniquely responsible for the development of the SRI 
policy and appointment of the Global Care team, it did play a role in increasing the 
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importance of the issue internally 106. But beyond speeding up conversations that were 
already taking place, this was of marginal importance. 
Therefore, on the basis of the available information, from an ex post perspective, this 
campaign was effective in relation to its internal targets, marginally effective in 
relation to its investment policy targets, but highly effective at raising the profile of 
SRI issues in the investment community. Overall, its ex post investment policy 
effectiveness was significantly limited by the poorly constructed nature, of the 
proposed policy itself. 
4. Efficiency 
The report's main initial focus was research and internal advocacy. It is estimated that 
the report would have cost in the region of £ 10,000. The additional cost of the 
Norwich Union campaign to FoE would have been about two weeks of staff time and 
the production and mailing costs associated with the `campaign express' leaflet. The 
additional costs of the Norwich Union component of the campaign are estimated to 
have been £5,000. 
Regarding the assets affected by the NU policy change, notwithstanding the ex ante 
caveat regarding cause and effect, the engagement commitment across the (then) £200 
billion of assets under management implies a cost/investor influence multiplier of 13 
million. 
The campaign generated considerable media coverage for FoE and its issues, which to 
an extent makes this an efficient allocation of money. However, the Norwich Union 
campaign appears to have been only marginally effective. Consequently, it appears 
likely that the allocation of campaign time and money was not optimally efficient and 
that the resources would have been better spent elsewhere. 
106 Previous case studies have included a table assessing the achievements of the NGO in respect of 
each of the intervention aims. As this intervention had two main targets that are contradictory, it has 
been necessary to use a longer discursive analysis than is possible with the tabular analysis format. 
However, in respect of the tabular classification of the 'success', this discursive analysis results in the 
classification: `Y%: Evidence that NGO partially achieved desired outcome'. 
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5. Equity 
There are no substantive equity issues, as it appears that the campaign did not 
materially change outcomes at the investment policy level. 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
This NGO CM intervention is classified against the four main components of the 
model as follows: 
1. Mechanism of company influence: While its conclusion is contradictory, the 
`Capital Punishment' report attempted to exert `Economic' and `Investor 
Advocacy' influence. 
2. Route of influence: the NGO sought to mobilise the shares of institutional 
investors and is therefore classified as `Indirect'. The NGO scrutinised the 
relative performance of different insurance companies and attacked selected 
targets. This is classified as orca. 
3. Primary audience: `CM Institutions'. 
4. Nature of argument: the NGO used `both Business and Moral Case' arguments 
(see above). 
In the light of this detailed analysis, the overall tabular classification in the 
chronology in Appendix 2 can be confirmed as accurate. The scaled polar diagram is 
used here to depict a more nuanced classification: 
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Figure 5.6: Polar Diagram of Friends of the Earth Capital Punishment Campaign 
Direct 
Moral Case 
4 
2 
CM Institutions Audience- U "- 
Economic Influence 
Public Policy Audience 
Investor influence"" Business Case 
1 
Indirect 
Figure 5.6 indicates that the report was also intended to address, to some degree, the 
public policy audience. As identified in the ex ante effectiveness analysis above, the 
reason for this is that the report called for investors to advocate "tougher public policy 
and legal measures (such as mandatory corporate environmental reporting and more 
realistic official greenhouse gas emission reduction targets". While this was not the 
subsequent focus of the campaign, it does represent an attempt to use investors to 
change public policy. 
7. Inductive analysis 
According to the deductive theory, in particular Hypothesis 1, there was a significant 
limitation associated with FoE's Economic Influence advocacy in that it was 
contradictory and potentially unlawful. The deductive analysis also suggests that the 
balance between moral and business case arguments (Hypothesis 3), and the Indirect 
approach (Hypothesis 2), would enhance the chances of the campaign's success. 
In practice, the fund manager-wide action taken by CGNU was Investor Advocacy 
Influence, not Economic. This appears to reinforce the hypothesis that `the likelihood 
of success is increased when an NGO adopts an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy 
rather than an Economic Influence strategy' (Hypothesis 1). However, in the absence 
of conclusive evidence that FoE ultimately created the change, it is not possible to 
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discern conclusively whether the empirical experience here reinforces any of the 
hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, there are three points that can be discerned from this case: 
1. The importance of carefully constructed and legally viable investment policy 
recommendations. 
2. The importance of consistency in report recommendations. 
3. The importance of a detailed success analysis. 
On the face of it, this was an apparently successful campaign. It is not until one 
explores deeper that the lack of substantiating evidence becomes clear. 
8. Issues in Assessing Performance 
The most significant issue with this case study is the problem of effect attribution in 
an interdependent system that was identified in Section 2.2.3. Specifically, while the 
above analysis suggests otherwise, it is possible that this case may be an example of 
incidental success - i. e. the aim of the NGO may have been coincidentally realised 
during the campaign, without it having had any effect on the outcome. 
9. Conclusion 
Regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of this intervention, this study has 
demonstrated that it is possible for an NGO effectively to generate some CM 
intervention success, despite having been highly ineffective in respect of its specific 
investment policy recommendations. 
Specifically, the campaign appears to have persuaded the FoE network to increase its 
resource allocation to this area, generated considerable coverage in the media for FoE 
issues, and marginally contributed to changing CGNU's investment policy. However, 
in. the light of changes that took place in CGU prior to the campaign, the extent of 
FoE's influence should be considered dubious and, as a consequence, this could 
represent an inefficient allocation of resources. Overall, its ex post investment policy 
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effectiveness was significantly, limited by the poorly constructed nature of the 
proposed policy. 
Finally, the case has indicated that the relative likelihood of success of economic 
influence over investor advocacy may be correct. It has also demonstrated that the 
classification of this intervention in the chronology is accurate. 
5.5 Case Study: Oxfam `Cut the Cost' Campaign 
Introduction 
This case reviews the `Cut the Cost' CM intervention by Oxfam which focused on the 
difficulties of access to medicines in developing countries. Following this CM 
intervention, Oxfam produced an internal review of the opportunities available to it in 
the area of SRI (Buckley, 2002). However, no critical review of this CM intervention 
by Oxfam has been published. It is therefore the purpose of this case study to review 
its effectiveness and efficiency. As before, this study adopts the structure set out in 
Section 2.2.3. 
This case is different from others in that unlike the WWF-BP-ANWR case study, for 
example, Oxfam's direct approach to investors was made outside the context of, a 
formal shareholder resolution at the target company's AGM. To some extent, 
therefore, in addition to reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of the NGO CM 
intervention, this case study also assesses whether sufficient investor interest can be 
generated by an NGO outside the formal context of an AGM. 
Oxfam was founded in 1942 as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief and was one 
of a number of groups dealing with social and development problems created by the 
Allies' naval blockade of Nazi-occupied Greece. Since then, the organisation has 
updated its mission thus: "Oxfam works with others to overcome poverty and 
suffering. " It has also set out its beliefs: "... ln a world rich in resources, poverty is an 
injustice which must be overcome. Poverty makes people more vulnerable to conflict 
and natural calamity; much of this suffering can be prevented, and must be relieved... 
To overcome poverty and suffering involves changing unjust policies and practices, 
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nationally and internationally, as well as working closely with people in poverty" 
(Oxfam, 2003c, internet). 
Oxfam has approximately 23,000 volunteers as well as 1,300 staff in the UK. Its 
fundraising income for the 2001/02 financial year was £124.3 million with a further 
£ II million from trading activities. There are 68 policy staff and an overall strategy 
for engaging with the private sector has been developed (Oxfam, 2002c, p26). 
The corporate sector-relevant work includes campaigns to support coffee farmers, 
strengthen the rules on arms exports and "make further progress in cutting the cost of 
medicines by changing global patent rules" (Oxfam, 2003a, p36). The NGO's 
corporate campaigning Stance, a priori, mainly applies a dolphin Stance in its 
dialogue with business, although as demonstrated by this case, it adopts an orca 
Stance when it believes the situation warrants such an approach (see Section 1.4). 
Reference to the NGO CM intervention chronology (Appendix 2) demonstrates that 
Oxfam appears to have participated in at least five CM interventions between 1990 
and 2002. Its first, in 1998, was a collaborative endeavour with a number of other 
NGOs - led by Traidcraft and War on Want - which was to become `Just Pensions'. 
Oxfam has not deployed a CM intervention strategy as often as some environmental 
NGOs (for example, Forum for the Future and WWF), but it has used such a strategy 
more than most development NGOs. 
Introduction to Specific CM intervention 
The Oxfam `Cut the Cost' campaign was intended to encourage the "the world's 
pharmaceutical companies to do more to improve access to medicines in poor 
countries" (Oxfam, 2001a: 1). Oxfam published a briefing paper which targeted 
investors and called on them to use their influence to encourage GSK (in particular) to 
develop a policy setting out how it would meet its commitment to "maximising 
affordable access... within the first three months of the company's existence" (ibid). 
This paper was launched at a briefing for City investors on 14 February 2001 with the 
intention of mobilising the support of large institutional investors for its campaign. 
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While Oxfam was more concerned with the humanitarian consequences of pricing 
drugs out of the reach of people in developing countries, at the City briefing it 
highlighted the risks to reputation arising from GSK's position and its involvement 
with the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in a case brought 
against the South African government which sought the right to import ' cheaper 
medicines. Oxfam also criticised GSK for appearing to defend patents on Aids drugs 
in Ghana and Uganda. 
It should be noted that the pharmaceutical companies were previously aware of the 
problems surrounding access in developing countries and had taken some steps to 
address the matter. For example, GSK claimed to have been offering antiretrovirals on 
a not for profit basis for mother to child transmission since 1997, and was working 
with UN-AIDS to distribute medication (GSK, 2001, p2). However, in Oxfam's view 
these steps were insufficient to fulfil its responsibility in relation to the issue. 
Assessment of the CM intervention(s) 
1. NGO Legitimacy 
Oxfam has had ECOSOC Special Consultative Status since 1973. Interestingly, its 
1998 Strategic Review recognised the need for it to be accountable to both supporters 
and the people with whom it worked. The Review stated that in order to be 
accountable to these people, the NGO needed to "know what their views are on 
Oxfam's work and impact, and to report back on them" (Oxfam, 2003b). Oxfam has a 
"Statement of Legitimacy and Accountability" (ibid) which claims a sound basis for 
the organisation's legitimacy in "speaking out on issues such as world poverty". Part 
of this basis included 50 years of practical humanitarian work, giving it "vast 
experience, respected by the international community, southern and northern 
governments, other charities and people on the ground" (ibid). Oxfam also conducted 
a stakeholder survey, which gathered views from different groups of stakeholders 
(internationally and in the UK) on its performance: "a key mechanism which supports 
Oxfam's accountability" (ibid). 
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In respect of the NGO's internal consistency with its external programmatic work, its 
staff group pension scheme is managed by ISIS, due to the fund manager's approach 
to ethical investment. As regards the internal consistency with its banking and 
investment arrangements, Oxfam "holds 100% of its reserves as cash deposits, but 
still manages to apply an ethical policy to the banks and building societies that it 
uses" (Green, 2003: 8). 
Therefore, Oxfam complies with the criteria for establishing NGO legitimacy set out 
in Section 2.2.4. 
2. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
GSK was a strategically astute choice of focus for the campaigners for five principal 
reasons: 
1. It was newly formed from a merger of Glaxo Wellcome (GW) and 
SmithKlineBeecham (SKB) and was consequently receiving a 
considerable degree of media and investor scrutiny. 
2. The newly combined entity was establishing Group-wide policy. This 
provided Oxfam with an opportunity to exert influence. 
3. The component parts of the Group had previously reported total sales of 
$27.2 billion, including pharmaceutical sales of $22.2 billion, giving it 
around a seven per cent share of the global market (Oxfam, 2001: 10). This 
market share rendered the company highly influential in its sector. 
4. The CEO had previously voiced his "commitment to maximising 
affordable access to medicines in the developing world" (op cit: p8). 
Oxfam may have discerned an opportunity to use GSK to establish a new 
norm for the industry in relation to this issue. 
5. It was the largest UK company in the sector with a market capitalisation of 
£107.3 billion 107. It was, as a consequence, likely to have been a 
107 Based on price per share of £17.32 at close of business on 8 January 2001. 
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significant shareholding for many UK institutional investors - Oxfam's 
target audience. 
In particular, Oxfam was able to use the considerable degree of media attention to its 
advantage by running a concerted media advocacy campaign. The previously, 
mentioned briefing for City investors was hosted by Friends Ivory & Sime - one of 
the largest `socially responsible' investment institutions. This was likely to enhance 
Oxfam's chances of success for two reasons: the SRI investment sector should have 
been well predisposed to the issue, and the apparent support of such an investment 
institution would have set a precedent for the other investors in attendance108. 
However, there were two underlying limiting factors - `parallel importing'. 
ý and 
`reference pricing' - both of which significantly reduced the likelihood of success 
for 
Oxfam's proposed solution of charging a cost price in developing countries. Parallel 
importing involved the country arbitrage opportunities that could lead to smuggling 
medication back into developed countries. Oxfam's approach to this problem involved 
more stringent policing, tougher penalties and specific labelling. It also cited evidence 
from existing restrictions on parallel importing of branded products that allowed 
prices of patent-protected products to vary substantially among developed countries 
(Oxfam, 2001b, p2). 
Reference pricing involves developed countries using the developing country cost 
price as a reference point in negotiating their own contracts. Oxfam's approach here 
required the political will of developed country governments to refuse to use such 
negotiation tactics. It cited the UK government as an example of a country that had 
made such a commitment. That Oxfam recognised the limiting factors in relation to its 
proposal, and provided counter-arguments (ibid), reduced the extent to which these 
factors represented a limitation. 
Furthermore, rather than concentrating on the limitations of its suggested alternative, 
Oxfam focused on the potential impacts on the company from the status quo. Using 
both the Business and Moral Case, Oxfam argued: "Pharmaceutical companies face a 
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major reputation risk if they do not do more to promote access to life-saving drugs in 
the developing world. This is particularly important at a time of unprecedented 
scrutiny of the industry's record in this field. The withdrawal of public support could 
lead the industry to suffer the same problems of staff recruitment and retention 
suffered by companies charged with complicity in human rights abuses or 
environmental damage. Perhaps more significantly it carries with it the threat of 
more stringent government regulation... [It] is both ethically correct and in the 
company's self interest to ensure that those who own and control medical knowledge 
use all means at their disposal to stop preventable diseases from killing millions of 
people every year, particularly if they are using their exclusive marketing position to 
prevent others from developing the same knowledge" (Oxfam, 2001a, p5). 
In respect of the above business case arguments, the most significant was the potential 
for more stringent government legislation. This referred, in particular, to the potential 
for change in intellectual property legislation. Pharmaceutical companies depend on 
protection from intellectual property rights to secure future revenue streams from 
research and development into medication. Such an argument, if plausible, would 
have been of significant interest to investors. 
In conclusion, from an ex ante perspective, this CM intervention may be characterised 
as highly effective: it was focused, clearly defined, used powerful Moral and Business 
Case arguments, and fostered relationships with institutional investors. These factors 
would have increased its chances of success. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness 
Following the campaign's launch, Jean-Pierre Garnier, Chief Executive of GSK, 
reportedly undertook to "make the issue a priority" (Financial Times, 2001 a: p 12) and 
subsequently published a policy on access to drugs (GSK, 2001) that was cautiously 
welcomed by Oxfam. Similarly, on 19 April 2001, the South African Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association abandoned its case against the South African government. 
108 Including Co-operative Insurance Society, Henderson, Hermes, Jupiter, Methodist Central Finance 
Board, Morley and Universities Superannuation Scheme (see also Case Study 5.2). 
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For GSK, this was a "significant event ... amount[ing] to a recognition that their 
legal 
battle in South Africa was a public relations disaster" (FT editorial: 2001b, p19). ` 
From an NGO CM intervention ex post effectiveness perspective, it is important to 
establish the degree to which this actually increased access to medication. GSK's 
subsequent CSR Report highlighted "increased shipments of Combivir 109 to -the 
developing world from 2.2 million tablets in 2001 to nearly 6 million tablets in 2002" 
(GSK, 2003, p3). This increase approximately equates to an additional 2 million daily 
doses, which means that a further c. 5,500 people per annum have access to 
`affordable' Combivir. This confirms that access to medication increased. While this 
increase is significant, in view of the fact that 29.4 million people are thought to be 
suffering from Aids in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (UNAIDS/WHO, 2002, p6), this 
increase in access is clearly only sufficient to make a small difference to the overall 
problem of AIDS. 
As to whether the NGO's CM intervention contributed to this increased access, 
Mackenzie (2001) confirms that investors had been persuaded by Oxfam's arguments 
and had raised concerns regarding the reputational risks: Friends Ivory & Sime had 
"emphasised how important it [was] for GSK to protect its intellectual property 
rights... Failure to be seen to respond adequately to global concerns about the 
negative effects of the new... intellectual property regime could undermine the public 
case for patent protection. " More significantly, the target company confirmed that it 
had been influenced by investor concerns: "Jean-Pierre Gamier, chief executive of 
GlaxoSmithKline, one of the pharmaceutical companies that led the industry's retreat 
from the case, which had become a public relations catastrophe, said he had been 
influenced by concerns from investors, shareholders and the public about access to 
medicines" (Financial Times, 2001, p9). This indicates that Oxfam had successfully 
mobilised investor interest, and that this investor interest contributed to the change of 
GS K's policy"" 
109 An antiretroviral drug used in the treatment of patients with Aids. 110 Previous case studies have included a table assessing the achievements of the NGO in respect of 
each of the intervention aims. As noted in Section 2.2.4, as this intervention had one central aim it is 
not necessary to use the tabular format to review success. However, in respect of the tabular 
classification of the `success', this broad confirmation that Oxfam played a significant role in achieving 
its desired outcome would result in the tabular classification: `Y: Evidence that NGO achieved desired 
outcome'. 
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Sophia Tickell, Oxfam's Senior Policy Advisor on the Public Sector, later 
commented: "We knew that if we could persuade investors of our arguments, this 
would have a powerful impact on the companies as [investors] are more influential 
[with companies] than non-governmental organisations" (EIRIS, 2002, p3). This 
highlights the fact that Oxfam had made a strategic decision to attempt to harness 
Investor Advocacy Influence in the belief that it would magnify its own influence. 
Interviewees have also highlighted this case as a good example of NGO CM 
intervention: "Oxfam was a really classy departure for a development NGO when it 
launched its campaign against GSK. To launch a campaign with a City seminar is a 
first... That launch was really interesting because it represented a real departure from 
a more activist-based campaign and gone straight for the jugular.. . I've never seen a 
development NGO campaign on the front page of [the Financial Times'] Companies 
and Markets before. And I think the other NGOs should be looking at it" (Green, 
2001: interview). This comment by a campaigner from another NGO demonstrates the 
degree to which this CM intervention was regarded by Oxfam's peers as containing 
dimensions that could be usefully replicated by other NGOs in'their own campaigns. 
Oxfam followed its `Cut the Cost' campaign with a broader initiative calling on the 
pharmaceutical sector in general to be more socially responsible when dealing with 
the developing world, and for investors to be active in changing their policies. Oxfam, 
Save the Children and VSO jointly developed a standard (Oxfam, 2002b) for 
assessing pharmaceutical companies in responding to health problems in the 
developing world. The document proposed a set of benchmarks to assist investors in 
assessing the social responsibility of pharmaceutical companies and surveyed GSK, 
Abbott, AstraZenica, Aventis, Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
(BMS), Hoffmann-La Roche, Merck, Novartis and Pfizer. The benchmarks relate to 
company policies and practices in pricing, patents, joint public private initiatives, 
research and development and appropriate use of medicines. In launching this report, 
Oxfam stated: "Twenty six people die every minute from infectious diseases. These 
deaths are avoidable. Drugs companies can and should do more. Investors too have a 
vital role to play as how they invest their money can have a positive influence on 
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people's lives. There is a direct link between the City investor and an HIV-positive 
baby in Zambia" (Manifest, 2002, internet). This follow-up campaign is highly 
relevant, as it represents a significant outcome for the `Cut the Cost' campaign. This 
is because two institutional investors - FIS (ISIS) and USS - later developed it into a 
broad collaborative investor initiative on access to drugs. This initiative was, to 
become formalised as the Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group (PSG) "with more than 
£454bn of assets" and comprising "six investment houses: Co-operative Insurance, 
Henderson Global Investors, Insight Investment Management, ISIS Asset 
Management, Jupiter Asset Management, Morley Fund Management and Schroders... 
[and] one pension fund: Universities Superannuation Scheme" (Financial Times, 
2003c: 2). The purpose of this collaborative endeavour was to benchmark all 
companies in the sector in order to assist management, investors and analysts evaluate 
how pharmaceutical companies were responding to the risks related to the public 
health crisis in emerging markets (USS, 2003: 1). The PSG has the effect of 
institutionalising the analysis and review of Oxfam's original issue within the CM 
itself -a significant campaign outcome that further demonstrates the considerable ex 
post effectiveness of the original CM intervention. 
In conclusion, from an ex post effectiveness perspective, this CM intervention can be 
shown to have been highly effective: it achieved its original campaign targets in a few 
months and was able to mobilise considerable Investor Advocacy Influence outside 
the context of an AGM. It is particularly noteworthy that the target company's CEO 
confirmed that it had changed its policy in response to the campaign and concerns 
from investors, and that the shipment of antiretroviral drugs significantly increased 
(albeit not in line with the scale of the issue). Finally, the subsequent establishment of 
the Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group demonstrates that investors have formalised 
the ongoing monitoring and measurement of the issue, which represents a significant 
campaign influence multiplier outcome for the initial Oxfam campaign. 
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4. Efficiency 
Regarding the NGO's resource allocation to this initiative, it is estimated that the 
costs were about five months of Oxfam staff time, plus literature production and 
dissemination costs. The total cost to the NGO is an estimated £13,000. 
As mentioned, the CM intervention appears to have contributed to 5,500 more people 
in developing countries having greater access to antiretroviral medication in 2002 - 
with further increases expected in subsequent years. The previous annual cost of a 
course of Combivir in Africa was around £ 10,000. Consequently, the ex ante value of 
the increase in access can be calculated to be in the order of £55 million. As cost price 
is about 10 per cent of the original cost, this means that the campaign benefit was 
some £50 million which, when compared with Oxfam's campaign spend, represents a 
campaign cost/benefit multiplier in excess of 3,800. 
As to the cost/investor influence multiplier, the campaign has resulted in the managers 
of more than £450 billion of capital' 11 expressing formal concern about the issue and 
institutionalising its ongoing monitoring and measurement. Assuming half of the 
assets under management by these fund managers are in equities, this suggests that the 
cost/investor influence multiplier is in excess of 17 million. Consequently, as well as 
being highly effective, this NGO CM intervention was also highly efficient. 
5. Equity 
Most of the costs associated with the campaign relate to GSK's loss of profit from 
developing countries (estimated to have been less than 1 per cent of overall 
profitability). However, cost can be offset against the significant benefits to the 
industry from having reduced any previous threat to the global intellectual property 
rights system. 
Conversely, in respect of unintended consequences, questions remain regarding 
Oxfam's broader campaign against the World Trade Organisation rules on patents 
This represents total funds under management. However, equity investments will be a significant 
percentage. 
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(Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights or Trips). Trips enables 
companies to set prices over a 20-year period at the level necessary to make profitable 
returns on investment by ensuring that others cannot copy the product and sell it at a 
much lower price. There are some provisions for developing generic drugs for those 
in patent for countries to use in times of `national crisis'. However, Oxfam believes 
that the current structure of the Trips system creates further problems surrounding 
access to drugs in developing countries. Ironically, Oxfam's success with GSK may 
have made its long-term objective harder to attain: while the GSK campaign 
generated widespread publicity, it may have reduced Oxfam's longer-term ability to 
generate public outrage on a scale sufficient to reform Trips. 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
This NGO CM intervention is classified against the four main components of the 
model as follows: 
1. Mechanism of company influence: Oxfam targeted investors' influence which is 
classified here as `Investor Advocacy Influence'. 
2. Route of influence: the NGO did not purchase shares in GSK, seeking instead to 
mobilise the shares of institutional investors. This is therefore classified as 
`Indirect'. That it lobbied selected investors denotes the Stance as orca. 
3. Primary audience: while the subtext of Oxfam's overall campaign was changing 
public policy on intellectual property rights, the primary audience for this CM 
intervention was `CM Institutions'. 
4. Nature of argument: the NGO used `both Business and Moral Case' arguments. 
In the light of this detailed analysis, the overall tabular classification in the 
chronology in Appendix 2 can be confirmed as accurate. The scaled polar diagram is 
used here to depict a more nuanced classification: 
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Figure 5.7: Polar Diagram of Oxfam's `Cut the Cost' Campaign 
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Figure 5.7 is intended to show that in addition to the above classification, the Public 
Policy audience was, to a lesser extent, a CM intervention audience. This reflects the 
fact that underlying the intervention was the intention to reform the Trips system. 
7. Inductive analysis 
The relevant hypotheses for the four main components of the model posit that, in 
general, the probability of success of any NGO CM intervention would be increased 
by adopting an `investor advocacy influence' rather than a `capital redistribution' 
mechanism (Hypothesis 1), co-opting FIs' influence `indirectly' (Hypothesis 2), and 
striking a balance between moral and financial arguments (Hypothesis 4). In this case, 
the NGO CM intervention strategy has involved just such an approach. 
The NGO allocated significant resources to the campaign, provided well-researched 
business case arguments based on clear ethical principles, and focused public 
attention through a concerted media campaign. It disseminated its case to carefully 
targeted socially responsible investors and successfully shaped their views. 
Furthermore, Oxfam advocated a solution that was not totally antithetical to GSK's 
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business - that is to say, had Oxfam called for intellectual property rights to be 
overturned, it is likely that investor interest would have been less forthcoming. 
This case also demonstrates that an Indirect Investor Advocacy Influence strategy can 
succeed outside the formal procedures surrounding an AGM. Significantly, the 
establishment of the Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group demonstrates that there are 
circumstances in which the ongoing monitoring and measurement of an NGO issue 
can be formalised by investors. 
As can be demonstrated, in practice the CM intervention was both highly effective 
and highly efficient, which concurs with the deductive theory. Based on the evidence 
regarding the extent of its success, it is reasonable to conclude that the empirical 
evidence from this case study supports the retention of hypotheses 1,2 and 4. 
However, while recommending increased use of the CM for other campaigns, 
Oxfam's subsequent internal review of the opportunities available from the area of 
Socially Responsible Investment (Buckley, 2002) exposed the limitations of investors 
as regulatory surrogates: "SRI has not demonstrated that it can or should replace 
legislation... While it remains tempting to see SRI and market-based approaches as a 
powerful way to limit the effects of corporate ethics/harm issues, NGOs and civil 
society should also look at ways that this can enter onto legislative agendas" (p42). 
This suggests that Oxfam does not regard the ongoing monitoring and measurement 
of an NGO issue by investors as a sufficient replacement for regulation on corporate 
responsibility issues. 
8. Issues in Assessing Performance 
The most significant issues in assessing performance of this NGO CM intervention 
relate to the degree to which GSK's own CSR programme on access to medication in 
developing countries would have increased access in the absence of the campaign. 
However, in view of the GSK CEO's confirmation that investors had influenced the 
new policy, it is reasonable to conclude that the campaign was effective in generating 
this increase. While it is possible there may have been commercial reasons for the 
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CEO to misrepresent this influence, the expressions of concern from investors 
underline this conclusion. 
9. Conclusion 
This case study has demonstrated that it is possible for NGO CM interventions to be 
both a highly effective and a highly efficient form of NGO campaigning. Oxfam's 
intervention has been shown to have contributed to a significant increase in access to 
medication worth in the order of £50 million, which has commensurately enhanced 
societal welfare. The intervention also subsequently influenced the CM to integrate 
the ongoing monitoring and analysis of the issue in the form of the Pharmaceutical 
Shareowners Group. To the extent that the PSG is effective, Oxfam's intervention can 
be said to have institutionalised the concern into the CM. 
Significantly, this study supports the deductive hypotheses in section 3.5 and 
demonstrates that the classification of this intervention in the chronology is accurate. 
Furthermore, it has also highlighted the importance for NGO CM interventions of 
advocating a solution that is not antithetical to the target company's business. In 
certain circumstances, from an NGO perspective, this could represent a significant 
limitation of the CM approach (see Section 6.1.2). 
5.6 Case Study: Forum for the Future and The London Principles 
Introduction 
This section reviews the establishment of the London Principles (Pearce and Mills, 
2002) by Forum for the Future in conjunction with the Department for Environment 
Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Corporation of London. This case study will 
review the effectiveness and efficiency of the London Principles as no other external 
review has been published to date. As before, this study adopts the structure set out in 
Section 2.2.3. 
This case study differs from others in that it is a formal partnership between the 
government, a local authority and an NGO. It is also different in that it promotes FI 
best practice examples via case studies and offers a mechanism for interested FIs to 
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endorse the principles set out in the project. A further difference is that unlike some of 
the other campaigning NGOs in question here, the Forum uses business partnerships 
rather than adversarial lobbying to promote sustainability (see Stance below). It also 
represents one of the few attempts by campaigning NGOs to shape CM public policy. 
The mission of Forum for the Future (FftF) is "to accelerate... the building of a 
sustainable way of life, taking a positive, solutions oriented approach" (FftF, 2003b). 
It was founded in 1996 by Jonathan Porritt, Sara Parkin and Paul Ekins. It attempts to 
work at a strategic level through partnerships, particularly with businesses, to 
maximise its impact. It provides advice and develops partnership work on "climate 
change, procurement strategies, environmental accounting and the digital 
divide" 
(FftF, 2001a, p2). It has a staff of 65 and business represents its largest single source 
of funding (ibid). 
FftF has established an overall strategy for engaging with the private sector and has an 
internal policy that establishes where it will and will not work with specific 
businesses. Regarding its Stance, it consistently applies a dolphin strategy (see 
Section 1.4 above) through its business partnerships for sustainability. 
Reference to the chronology of NGO CM intervention (Appendix 2) demonstrates that 
this NGO has been highly active, with nine significant CM interventions. Its CM 
work commenced in 1998 with the Capital Futures Project. This aimed to build 
dialogue with the City; articulate a coherent case for the relevance of environmental 
considerations to investment analysis and decision-making; to build capacity for 
change through developing adequate analytical tools; and to strengthen leverage 
points to influence regulatory, self-regulatory, corporate and other channels to 
generate demand for environmental analysis and enhance disclosure of environment- 
related information (FftF, 1999). This evolved into the `Centre for Sustainable 
Investment' (CSI) which aimed to build on the Capital Futures Project pilot study, and 
sought to work with leading funding partners and project partners to "help financial 
institutions become leading participants in the move to a sustainable, wealth-creating 
economy" (FftF, 2001b, pl). 
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FftF itself describes how its CM work fits into the broader context of its mission as 
follows: "FftF's mission is to accelerate the move to [building of] a more sustainable 
way of life. Because of the importance of the capital market in getting a sustainable 
economy... FftF sees [its CM intervention] it as one of its five main programmes" 
(Pearce, 2001: interview). Interviewees welcomed the fact that the FftF is working in 
this area. For example: "It is very good that there is a sustainability-based think tank 
that is putting serious effort into what sustainability means for the investment 
community. " (Bell, 2001: interview). 
Introduction to the Specific CM intervention 
Together with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, CSI was initially 
commissioned by DEFRA to compile recommendations for the government's position 
on sustainable finance for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg in August 2002. This work was to evolve into the London Principles - 
the focus of this case study. 
The aim of the London Principles was to "examine the role of the UK financial 
services sector in promoting sustainable development, compile a compendium of best 
practice... lessons for future innovation and... [provide] mechanisms to ensure 
continual progress" (Corporation of London, 2002, p1). 
The document argued: "The biggest impact of banks, investors and insurers on 
sustainable development is not their own environmental footprint but their pivotal 
role in allocating financial capital between different economic activities, both at home 
and abroad... [financial institutions'] role as an intermediary implies that the 
financial sector is a critical channel through which price signals, regulation and civil 
society pressure can direct financial capital to more or less sustainable economic 
activity... Asset prices need to reflect sustainability performance; ownership needs to 
be exercised to promote sustainable asset use; access to commercial finance is 
required for technology developers and entrepreneurs in developing countries; due 
diligence should account for sustainability risks, and risk management products are 
in demand to insure against these emerging risks" (Pearce and Mills, 2002, p3-4). 
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As a consequence of this analysis, the London Principles were developed to "provide 
a framework for private financial institutions and policy-makers to focus on where 
innovations are required to further improve the role of the financial system Jn 
financing sustainable development" (op cit, p7), and to establish a set of principles 
(see below) which signatories to the document were asked to agree: 
"where relevant to the product and geographical scope of their business...: 
Economic Prosperity 
Principle 1 Provide access to f nance and risk management products for 
investment, innovation and the most efficient use of existing assets 
Principle 2 Promote transparency and high standards of corporate 
governance in themselves and in the activities being financed 
Environmental protection 
Principle 3 Reflect the cost of environmental and social risks in the pricing of 
financial and risk management products 
Principle 4 Exercise equity ownership to promote efficient and sustainable 
asset use and risk management 
Principle 5 Provide access to finance for the development of environmentally 
beneficial technologies 
Social development 
Principle 6 Exercise equity ownership to promote high standards of corporate 
social responsibility by the activities being financed 
Principle 7 Provide access to market finance and risk management products 
to businesses in disadvantaged communities and developing economies. " 
(op cit: 48) 
The Prime Minister launched the London Principles at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, during his post-plenary address on 2 September 2002. 
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Assessment of the CM intervention(s) 
1. NGO Legitimacy 
FftF does not have consultative status to ECOSOC. However, assessing it against the 
protocol for eligibility produces the following analysis: 
Table 5.8: A Review of FftF against ECOSOC 
UN requirement Forum for the Future 
Must not be antithetical to the Complies 
participatory democratic state 
Should be non-profit making Complies 
Should be non-violent and non-criminal Complies 
Must not be directed against a particular Complies 
government 
As can be seen from the above table, while FftF has not applied for ECOSOC 
consultative status, it appears that if it were to try, the UN would be likely to approve 
the application. Consequently, from the perspective of this thesis, the NGO can be 
regarded as legitimate. 
From the perspective of this specific CM intervention, however, as the project was 
commissioned by a government department, and launched by the Prime Minister, the 
intervention can be regarded as having derived societal legitimacy from the 
democratic process. 
In respect of the NGO's internal consistency with its external programmatic work, it 
chose the Co-operative Bank for its banking services and Morley Fund Management 
for its pension scheme, due to their compatible Stances on issues of corporate 
responsibility. The FftF has also been certified to ISO 14001 - the international 
environmental management system standard. 
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Therefore, this NGO CM intervention meets the criteria for legitimacy established in 
Section 2.2.4. 
2. Ex ante effectiveness - viability and feasibility 
As mentioned above, the document aimed to "compile a compendium of best 
practice... [include] lessons for future innovation and... [provide] mechanisms to 
ensure continual progress" (op cit). Of these aims, the most ambitious dimension was 
the promotion of future innovation by FIs and governments, and the establishment Of' 
mechanisms to ensure continual progress. In respect of the lessons for future 
innovation, the government's involvement in the production and dissemination of the 
initiative may contribute to further public policy innovation, not only in the UK but 
also overseas. However, it is difficult to assess the extent of the ambition because no 
targets for innovation were established. Nevertheless, prima facie, it appears to have 
been an ambitious target. 
The government's explicit support was a major potential for success. However, this 
support took the form of endorsement of a voluntary mechanism, not legislative 
change. This reduced the likelihood that the London Principles would serve as a 
`mechanism to ensure continual progress'. 
3. Ex post effectiveness - implementation effectiveness 
The table below lists explicit and implicit London Principles campaign targets and 
assesses what related actions have been taken. It also analyses whether the campaign 
may have been responsible for generating this success and uses the key in Section 
2.2.4. 
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Table 5.9: Analysis of the FftF London Principles CM Intervention 
Aint 
To identify 
financial product, 
process and market 
innovations 
that address 
sustainable 
development 
risks and 
opportunities. 
Action 
50 financial institutions were 
interviewed, and a workshop held 
for a further 80 participants. The 
final report included 20 case 
studies that, to some extent, 
addressed sustainable 
development risks and/or 
opportunities. 
Analysis 112 
The claims made by the companies 
in the case studies were not 
verified and may have been 
overstated. However, the case 
studies do cover a number of 
relevant innovations. 
Eval 
y 
To draw out of this All the case studies included a In general, the 'key success factors y 
experience lessons review of the `key success factors and challenges' section focuses 
for future and challenges' (FftF, op cit). The more on challenges than distilling 
innovation report also sets out 25 suggestions lessons. However, the report does 
covering legislative and fiscal include some high-level lessons 
measures for proposed that could aid future innovation. 
government action and initiatives 
for financial institutions. 
To promote The Principles were promoted at While too early to conclude, there ? 
innovation by investment conferences in Tokyo, has been little public disclosure of 
financial Johannesburg, Monaco, Zurich, any practical action taken by UK 
institutions Geneva, Paris and London FIs along the lines suggested in the 
(Pearce, B: pers com). The report"4. However, it fails to 
principles were also been clarify what should motivate action 
endorsed by a number of financial by the FIs - benevolence, 
institutions 113 at the launch. commercial self-interest, or 
However, "endorsement does not government regulation. 
imply commitment to the products While the report claims that all the 
or ideas advanced in the report, case studies are commercial, it 
which are intended to raise does not include a cost benefit 
awareness and discussion on the analysis, only a conceptual 
112 Conducted in January 2003. 
113 Signatories include ABF Capital Management, Allianz Dresdner Asset Management, Association of 
British Insurers, Apax Partners, Co-operative Bank, Co-operative Insurance Society, Friends Ivory & 
Sime, Friends Provident, Henderson Global Investors, Jupiter Asset Management, Morley Fund 
Management, Quadris Environmental Investments Ltd, SG Asset Management, Storebrand, UK Social 
Investment Forum and the Universities Superannuation Scheme. 114 Subsequent to the report, ISIS - one of the signatories - published its first public report detailing its 
engagement with investee companies during the third quarter of 2002. This is in accordance with Idea 2 
in the London Principles report, but there little evidence that ISIS took this step because of the report. 
A int Action 
rich selection of options facing 
financial institutions". 
12 Analysis' 
rationale which is less compelling. 
Eval 
To promote The report was discussed at the To date, no innovations have been 
innovation by 2002 World Summit on announced. While the report 
government Sustainable Development and includes a number of innovative 
a G8 ministers' meeting. A ideas for regulation and has 
memorandum of understanding undoubtedly stimulated high-level 
with the UN Environmental discussion, the public policy 
Programme Financial Institutions process takes time. 
Initiatives has been signed. 
To put in place The main mechanism involved a Signatories are expected to report y% 
mechanisms to series of principles which on progress annually but no 
ensure continuing financial institutions were mention is made of a sanction if 
progress in encouraged to endorse. Endorsing they fail to do so. The `Principles' 
financing institutions are expected to mechanism may make some 
sustainable produce an annual progress contribution to progress but will 
development by report. Other mechanisms include not `ensure continuing progress' by 
UK-based financial regulatory proposals yet to be itself. Furthermore, it is unclear 
institutions implemented. which institution will be 
responsible for `policing' 
implementation of the London 
Principles. However, some of the 
proposed regulatory changes 
would contribute. 
The report was -widely welcomed. For example: "... the principles represent a 
significant step for the UK finance sector. They complement a growing body of 
initiatives working towards sustainability through finance mechanisms" (Walker, 
2002, p1). Yet it was also controversial. Questions were raised regarding whether the 
London Principles were "anything more than a convenient wrapper to market 
`socially responsible' products... Meanwhile the organisations can carry on as 
before" (The Independent, 18 August 2002). Furthermore, Friends of the Earth 
claimed the Principles "had little chance of success unless backed up by robust 
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corporate accountability legislation... [and they] suffer from a lack of credible 
independent verification or enforcement' '(FOE, 2002b, p 1). 
The London Principles are too recent to be subjected to a detailed and full empirical 
evaluation at this stage. However, it is possible to draw some initial conclusions based 
on the above analysis: in terms of achieving their stated aims, the London Principles 
do "identify financial product, process and market innovations that address 
sustainable development", and draw out at least some "lessons for future innovation". 
In terms of "promoting innovation", to date, the Principles have been promoted at 
international investment conferences and have been endorsed by a number of FIs. 
However, as stated, there has been no public disclosure of any action taken by UK FIs 
along the lines suggested. Similarly, regarding "innovation by government", no 
innovations have yet been announced. The final objective of the Principles was "to 
put in place mechanisms to ensure continuing progress in the financing of sustainable 
development by UK-based financial institutions". Signatories are expected to report 
on progress annually, but no mention is made of a sanction should they fail to do so. 
While this disclosure mechanism may make some contribution to progress, it is 
unlikely to "ensure continuing progress" without regulatory changes. Furthermore, at 
the time of writing it is unclear which of the organisations - if any - will be 
responsible for policing the commitments made in the report. 
From an ex ante effectiveness perspective, therefore, the London Principles have 
achieved some success, but the final outcome remains unknown. The most ambitious 
aspect is the promotion of innovation by FIs and governments, and the success of this 
intervention should ultimately be judged against the achievement of this aim. 
Nevertheless, a significant success of the initiative was the signature of the influential 
Association of British Insurers (whose members manage c. £1.1 trillion'15) to the 
principles. 
1 15 At March 2002. 
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4. Efficiency 
The NGO benefited in terms of exposure to policy-makers and civil servants and was 
able to generate political support for the promotion of innovative sustainability-related 
financial products. It has also helped generate significant interest in sustainable 
finance, with more than 10,000 copies of the report being downloaded from the 
websitel 16. 
As to the cost/investor influence multiplier, taking the Corporation of London's costs 
117 
, and half of the combined value of the assets under management of the 
initial 
signatory bodies (as a proxy for the equity value of the assets - i. e. £650 billion), then 
this intervention has a potential cost/investor influence multiplier of just over 4 
million. 
However, as the project was entirely funded by the Corporation of London, the benefit 
was achieved at no direct financial cost to the NGO. The costs to FftF are therefore 
limited to the opportunity cost associated with the alternative allocation of employees. 
From the perspective of the NGO, therefore, this intervention was highly efficient. 
5. Equity 
There are currently no significant equity issues associated with the project although, 
depending on what consequential action is taken by FIs, these issues may materialise 
in due course. However, one unintended consequence may be that by providing space 
for voluntary sustainable investment on the part of FIs, this initiative may have 
delayed legislative measures by the government (this point is speculative as there is 
no evidence to support this conjecture). 
6. CM Intervention Model Categorisation 
Section 3.1 shows that the NGO CM intervention model has four main components: 
116 At December 2002. 
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1. -- Mechanism of company influence: The intervention encourages action on the 
part of FIs that included both `Economic Influence' and `Investor Advocacy 
Influence'. 
2. Route of influence: the NGO secured an initial list of FI signatories before 
launching and is therefore classified as `Indirect'. That it worked in partnership 
with (and was funded by) selected institutions denotes the Stance to be dolphin. 
3. Primary audience: the aim of this initiative was to promote innovation by both 
Fls and the government. Therefore `audience' is both 'CM Institutions' and 
`Public Policy'. 
4. Nature of argument: while the NGO itself does use Moral Case argument 
surrounding sustainability, the London Principles themselves set out a `business 
case'. 
In the light of this detailed analysis, the overall tabular classification in the 
chronology in Appendix 2 remains accurate. The scaled polar diagram is used here to 
depict a more nuanced classification: 
Figure 5.8: Polar Diagram of the London Principles 
Direct 
T6 
Moral Case Economic Influence 
4 
CM Institutions Audience "^ .j -1 Public Policy Audience 
Yt 
Investor Influence Business Case 
1 
Indirect 
117 The Corporation of London's costs were c. £160,000 (Mills, 2003: pers com). 
Figure 5.8 shows that the textual classification of the intervention accurately reflects 
the relative emphasis placed on the above components. 
7. Inductive analysis of the case against Deductive theory 
It is too early to reach a conclusion about the outcomes generated by the London 
Principles. However, they have demonstrated initial signs of ex post effectiveness. 
Judging by progress at the time of writing, this case supports the theoretical deduction 
that a business case is important for motivating action by FIs. Ultimately, however, it 
will be interesting to use the final outcomes to assess whether the intervention was 
limited by not using a balanced combination of Both Business and Moral Case 
arguments (Hypothesis 4). 
Nevertheless, the outcomes so far already demonstrate that the NGO has benefited 
from the Indirect approach it adopted (Hypothesis 2). Its partnership with the 
government and a local authority increased the NGO's influence and generated 
significant campaign funds. Based on the evidence from this case, therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is retained (see Section 5.7.2). 
8. Issues in Assessing Performance 
The main limitation in respect of a final assessment of this strategy's performance is 
the relatively short duration that had elapsed at the time of writing since the London 
Principles were published. This case study has been further limited by the lack of a 
report from the relevant institutions reviewing the project's success. 
9. Conclusion 
The study has demonstrated that the classification in the chronology is accurate. It 
also supports the deductive hypothesis that an Indirect approach has a higher 
probability of success than a Direct approach (Hypothesis 2). 
The London Principles have been shown to be effective from an ex ante perspective 
and, while it is too early to reach a conclusion, they have demonstrated initial ex post 
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effectiveness. It would appear, however, that they have not established an effective 
mechanism for ensuring continual progress in the development of sustainable 
investment products and processes by FIs. 
5.7 Overall Case Study Analysis 
Section 2.2.3 set out how an overall analysis of the degree to which the above case 
studies support the main claims (Section 1) and hypotheses (Section 3.5) would be 
necessary. The purpose of this section is to present this analysis. This section also 
considers whether there are broader implications from this research for the future of 
NGO CM intervention. 
The structure of this section is to compare and contrast the relative success of each of 
the case studies; to then review the evidence from the case studies in respect of the 
main relevant claims and the hypotheses; and, finally, to then assess the implications 
for future NGO CM intervention. 
The relevant main claims relate to `the changing nature of NGO CM intervention', 
`the societal contribution of NGO CM Intervention' and `blind spots', i. e.: 
1. `An increase in the incidence of successes of the interventions suggests that 
NGOs may have learned from previous interventions' (Section 1). 
2. `It is possible for NGOs to generate welfare-enhancing outcomes through CM 
intervention and to do so in an effective and efficient manner' (Section 1). 
3. 'NGOs in general have an under-developed understanding of the machinery of 
the CM and a tendency to make strategic mistakes' (Section 1). 
In respect of the hypotheses, these were predominantly evaluated within the statistical 
analysis presented in Section 4.1. However, this evaluation recognised two reasons for 
revisiting the analysis here. First, there were sample-size problems relating to some of 
the data. For example, in certain cases, strategies hypothetically thought to be 
ineffective were not tested in practice by NGOs (perhaps because the NGOs had 
reached a similar conclusion). Therefore, there was a commensurate lack of data on 
the specific strategy in question. Second, the statistical assessment highlighted the fact 
that the overall analysis was based on prima facie data regarding the success of the 
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intervention. Consequently, Section 4.1 identified the need to re-visit the hypotheses 
below following the case studies, as the data regarding the success of the intervention 
in the studies is based on a much more detailed assessment process (Section 2.2.3): 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence 
strategy. 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Indirect route of influence. 
The analysis from this Section and that in Section 4.1 is combined in Section 6 and 
developed into normative recommendations for NGO CM intervention. 
5.7.1 Comparative Analysis 
This section compares and contrasts the relative success, effectiveness and efficiency 
of each of the above case studies. The following table presents the overall main ex 
post effectiveness and efficiency findings from each of the case studies: 
Table 5.10: Overall Comparison of Case Studies 
Intervention Ex post effectiveness C/Al 
19 WWF-UK Engagement with The engagement was ultimately 7,000 
companies held in its ineffective in changing corporate 
own financial practices. The CM intervention was 
investment portfolios only efficient to the extent that it 
enabled the NGO to demonstrate 
internal consistency with its broader 
campaign goals. 
33 WWF-UK BP and the Arctic Effective: it generated directly 320,000 
Refuge 2002 attributable success in the form of 
resolution BP's withdrawal from Arctic Power 
and a commitment from BP to play 
no further part in the debate which 
may have contributed to the 
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protection of the reserve itself; and 
second, the resolution created a 
considerable quantity of media 
interest. 
43, WWF and the The International 3iG has the potential to be highly Potential 
Alliance of Interfaith Investment effective, but that it cannot yet be multiplier is 
Religions and Group (3iG) considered effective at generating over 66 
Conservation change at either the faith investment million. 
level or, therefore, among listed 
corporations 
20 People and Ethics for USS After initially failing, E-USS was c. 3.5 million 
Planet/ Ethics campaign effective at generating a strong SRI 
for USS engagement policy at USS. However, 
E-USS cannot claim to have been 
effective in relation to its ongoing 
`monitor and evaluate' objectives. 
30 UKSIF, in Reform of the UKSIF's CM intervention was c. 50 million 
conjunction Pensions Act highly effective in changing public 
with policy and creating a new statutory 
Traidcraft, instrument that supported SRI. 
War on Want, However, there are a number of 
Friends of the outstanding questions regarding the 
Earth and practical implementation of SRI SIPs 
WWF by the pension fund industry and 
significant questions as to whether 
current practice meets the original 
political aspirations of the reform. 
34 Friends of the Capital Punishment This campaign was effective in c. 13 million 
Earth and Norwich Union relation to its internal targets, 
Campaign marginally effective in relation to its 
investment policy targets, but highly 
effective at raising the profile of SRI 
issues in the investment community. 
Overall, its ex post investment policy 
effectiveness was significantly 
limited by the poorly constructed 
nature of the proposed policy itself. 
63 Oxfam GSK Cut the Cost This CM intervention was shown to c. 17 million 
have been highly effective: it 
achieved its original campaign 
targets in a few months and was able 
to mobilise considerable Investor 
Advocacy Influence outside the 
context of an AGM. 
70 Forum for the The London The London Principles have Potential 
Future Principles achieved some success, but the final multiplier is 
outcome remains unknown. c. 4 million 
GAI* = Cost/Assets Influenced multiplier. 
The Cost/Assets Influenced multiplier is used as one measure of efficiency and is 
calculated. Table 5.11 presents the detailed figures and calculates the averages: 
Table 5.11: Case Study Cost/Assets Influenced Analysis 
Case Cost 
1 WWF - own reserves 1000 
Assets Influenced (1) 
7,000,000.00 
Cost-A. I. Multiplier 
7000 
2 WWF - ANWR 25000 8,000,000,000.00 
320000 
3 WWF/ARC - 3iG (*) 30000 2,008,854,040,459.00 
66961801 
4 E-USS 60000 220,000,000,000.00 3666667 
5 UKSIF 12500 643,500,000,000.00 51480000 
6 FoE 15000 200,000,000,000.00 13333333 
7 Oxfam 13000 225,000,000,000.00 17307692 
8 FftF (*) 160000 650,000,000,000.00 4062500 
Totals: 316500 3,955,361,040,459.00 157138994 
Totals (excluding *): 126500 1,296,507,000,000.00 86114692 
Averages (including *): 39562.5 494,420,130,057.38 19642374 
Averages (excluding *): 15812.5 162,063,375,000.00 10764336 
(*) = Potential figures. 
This shows that, in total, the cases reviewed cost £316,500 and influenced £ 1.3 trillion 
(with the potential to influence a total of almost £4 trillion). On average, they have 
cost £40 thousand and influenced £162 billion (and, potentially, £494 billion), which 
demonstrates the potential influence of NGO CM intervention. However, in respect of 
the total Assets Influenced figures, this should be regarded as a proxy as there is likely 
to be a considerable amount of double counting. 
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It is interesting to note that there was only one case where it proved possible to 
measure the societal welfare benefit of the intervention in economic terms - the 
Oxfam/GSK Cut the Cost campaign (Case Study 5.5). The financial benefit from this 
campaign was calculated to be in the order of £50 million `which, when compared 
with Oxfam's campaign spend, represents a campaign cost/benefit multiplier in excess 
of 3,800'. This underlines Drucker's earlier point (noted in Section 2.2.4) regarding 
difficulty of measuring performance of `not-for profit' organisational activities. 
The following diagram shows how the Cost/Assets Influenced multipliers compare 
between the cases (the vertical axis is logarithmic): 
Figure 5.9: Graph to Compare Case Study Cost/Assets Influenced multipliers 
100000(m 
In conclusion, comparing the combination of ex post effectiveness and the 
Cost/Assets Influenced multiplier measure of efficiency, the NGO CM interventions 
that have been the most effective and efficient are the UKSIF reform to the Pensions 
Act case (Case Study 5.3) and the Oxfam GSK intervention (Case Study 5.5). The 
WWF/ARC 3iG intervention (Case Study 5.1.3) also has considerable potential, 
although, as noted in the ex post effectiveness analysis, it is too early to make a final 
conclusion in relation to this intervention. Conversely, the WWF Reserves 
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intervention was the least effective and efficient of all the cases reviewed. (Reasons 
for this are reviewed in the case study). 
5.7.2 Analysis of Main Claims 
1. Has the incidence of NGO CM interventions success changed, and if so, what 
does it suggest? 
Section 4.1 analysed the changing incidence of NGO CM intervention success and 
concluded that while the success ratio had stayed constant, the more substantive 
nature of the successes indicated that NGOs were integrating lessons from previous 
interventions into strategy. It also speculated that the Reform to the Pensions Act may 
have created greater scope for NGO CM intervention and highlighted the need to 
consider whether the case study evidence supported this initial conclusion. 
The above case studies confirm that NGOs have generated a number of successes 
through CM intervention. As to whether there was any indication that NGOs were 
internalising lessons learned, a number of interviewees commented on NGOs' 
increased understanding of CM intervention. Such comments originated from the 
following NGOs: 
1. WWF-UK: "NGOs are getting better at understanding capital markets and 
shareholder meetings and how the whole system works" (Jones, 2001: 
interview). 
2. Friends of the Earth: "NGOs are really only just beginning to focus on this area 
and employ staff whose full-time focus is SRI... It has probably been a usable 
lever for longer than we have realised" (McLaren, 2001: interview). 
3. Greenpeace: "It has only been relatively recently that [NGO CM intervention] 
has been seen to be so successful in the US. They've got their heads around how 
it works and what you need to do. We've gone through the protesting and 
disrupting AGMs and begun to realise that the power is passing from the hands 
of governments into companies and, therefore, if companies aren't going to be 
regulated by governments they have to be regulated by their investors. So now 
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we need not to alienate investors but to approach them and talk to them and get 
1s them to regulate the company" (Tunmore, 2001: interview)'. 
Interviewees working for CM institutions confirmed the NGO claim above regarding 
their increasing knowledge of the CM: 
" An important contemporary development in the area of SRI: "The much greater 
professionalism of the NGOs in... targeting fund managers and investors... there 
is a spectrum - obviously - but there is a very savvy part of that spectrum" 
(Thamotheram, 2001: interview). 
" "I think that within Greenpeace, FoE and WWF it is now understood as 
something you do alongside your government lobbying and consumer 
campaigns as a campaign tactic" (Bell, 2001: interview). 
As to whether the Reform to the Pensions Act increased the scope for NGO CM 
intervention, case study 5.3 recognised that the Reform was welcomed by NGOs; that 
they had used it to police investor action on SEE issues; and that, by requiring policy 
statements, it provided a mechanism against which NGOs could hold investors to 
account and, as a result, increased the scope for NGO CM intervention. 
Therefore, in the light of this additional evidence developed through the case studies, 
it can be shown that NGOs have internalised lessons from previous CM interventions, 
that they have increased the scope for their interventions, and that the initial analysis 
of the chronology was accurate. 
2. Is it possible for NGOs to effectively and efficiently generate welfare- 
enhancing outcomes through CM intervention? 
A number of the above case studies exemplify situations where NGOs have generated 
welfare-enhancing outcomes through CM intervention effectively and efficiently. 
118 In addition to acknowledging in increased understanding of the CM, Tunmore's point confirms the 
analysis in section 4.2.1 regarding the claim that 'NGOs have changed from mainly confrontational 
media-focused activities at AGMs to focus more on substantive interventions that target corporate 
strategy'. 
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However, as highlighted in Section 1.1, the measurement of welfare is difficult and 
controversial. For example, as demonstrated by the WWF ANWR study, it is possible 
that the Gwich'in tribe benefited from the prevention of damage to the caribou herd, 
whereas the Inupiat may have suffered as a consequence of the economic 
development benefits forgone. 
While welfare is difficult to measure, the case study most clearly demonstrating that it 
is possible for an NGO to generate welfare-enhancing outcomes through CM 
intervention effectively and efficiently is the Oxfam `Cut the Cost' campaign (Case 
Study 5.5). This case study showed that the CM intervention contributed to 5,500 
more people in developing countries having greater access to antiretroviral medication 
during 2002. The economic value of this increase was in the order of £55 million 
which, when compared with Oxfam's estimated campaign spend, represented a 
campaign multiplier of more than 3,800. Consequently, the case study concluded that 
in addition to being highly effective, this NGO CM intervention was highly efficient. 
In conclusion, that it is possible for NGOs to generate welfare-enhancing outcomes 
through CM intervention effectively and efficiently has been substantiated. 
3. Do NGOs have a sufficiently developed understanding of the machinery of the 
CM? 
Section 4.1.1 concluded that the legislation governing the CM is unfamiliar to many 
NGOs. It also found that the system of advice, both at the level of investment analysis 
and the institutional investor's process for selecting a fund manager, were not well 
understood (see Section 1.6). Despite the improvement in understanding of the CM 
among some NGOs (referred to above), it was concluded that there remained a 
generally poor level of understanding of the structure of the CM among NGOs 
overall. However, Section 4.1.1 also highlighted the need to consider whether the case 
study evidence supported this conclusion. 
As to whether there was any evidence from the case studies that NGOs have an under- 
developed understanding of the machinery of the CM, while interviewees noted an 
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improving level of understanding (see above), many also commented that this was not 
well developed: 
" "There is a general lack of sophisticated understanding of how the capital 
markets work... At least we have got to the stage where NGOs are developing a 
vocabulary that investors understand' (Bell, 2001: interview). 
" "1 don't see the quality of strategic analysis from NGOs in relation to 
influencing Financial Institutions that NGOs often show when they are 
analysing their real targets... The problem is they do not understand what 
pressure it is that they should be putting and where to put it" (Thamotheram, 
2001: interview). 
" "Some NGOs... don't really understand how the capital markets work" (Green, 
2001: interview). 
0 "A lot of older people in the NGO world don't know the financial world and 
don't know how to deal with analysts" (Elkington, 2000: interview). 
" "There is still a lot of learning in terms of understanding how financial markets 
operate and targeting your campaign accurately" (Mansley, 2001: interview). 
On the basis of the above evidence, the claim that NGOs in general do not have an 
advanced understanding of the machinery of the CM can be upheld. As to whether 
there was any evidence from the case studies that NGOs have a (consequential) 
tendency to make strategic mistakes, significant strategic errors arose in two 
instances: 
1. People and Planet's `Ethics for the Universities Superannuation Scheme' 
campaign (Section 5.2): at the outset of the campaign, E-USS advocated an 
avoidance form of SRI to USS that ran counter. to the Megarry judgement (see 
Section 3.4) and was therefore illegal. 
2. Friends of the Earth - `Capital Punishment' and Norwich Union (Section 5.4): 
the `Capital Punishment' report (FoE, 2000a) suggested withholding investment 
capital from the `environmentally' worst companies and implied that this should 
be done even where these companies were profitable investments. Similar to the 
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E-USS study above, this recommendation also contravenes the legal fiduciary 
responsibility of fund managers and therefore represents a strategic error. 
Therefore, strategic mistakes were made in two of the eight case studies. However, 
rather than implying that NGOs have a general tendency to make such mistakes, it 
indicates more that they tend to overlook legislation surrounding the parameters 
within which FIs operate when developing policy recommendations. In some cases, 
this has resulted in the development of strategies that failed - and, in the absence of 
changed legislation, will always fail. Therefore, the earlier finding that NGOs tend to 
make strategic mistakes can be confirmed, but it is possible to be more specific: 
NGOs tend to ignore fiduciary law when confronting fund managers. 
However, NGO CM learning networks are beginning to emerge. For example, 
following a number of interventions, The Corner House produced "The Campaigners' 
Guide to the Financial Markets: effective lobbying of companies and financial 
institutions. " (Hildyard, N. and Mansley, 2001). Similarly, following its successful 
Ethics for USS intervention, People and Planet (see Case Study 5.2) has established 
`Fair Share' - an NGO network which attempts to take the lessons learned during the 
E-USS model and apply them to other pension schemes. 
The case study analysis also demonstrated the benefits of seeking expert advice. In 
addition to the emerging inter-NGO learning networks above, there is considerable 
evidence that NGOs have established learning networks within the CM itself. For 
example, both E-USS and UKSIF benefited from networks with SRI investors. 
Similarly, when interviewed, Amnesty International cited this network as important to 
its CM interventions: "... if not for having people on our business group from the SRI 
field, we would not have been in a position to even contemplate this. So this first 
lesson was that it was only by working with other organisations, and most of whom 
actually knew more about the issue than we did, that we were able to work in this 
area at all... the intellectual input to our Human Rights guidelines for Pension Fund 
trustees came from within the SRI industry" (Frankental, 2001: interview). 
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5.7.3 Analysis of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence 
Mechanism (H1). 
Null hypothesis: the likelihood of success is not related to the Mechanism of 
Influence (H0). 
The Section 4.1.1 analysis consistently pointed towards a higher success rate being 
associated with an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy over an Economic Influence 
strategy. It tentatively concluded that Ho was rejected and showed this to be an 
important finding with significant implications for NGO CM intervention. 
Consequently, it recommended that the veracity of this result be further analysed. This 
analysis is presented below. 
The analysis of the Friends of the Earth `Capital Punishment' report (Case Study 5.4) 
and People and Planet's `Ethics for the Universities Superannuation Scheme' 
campaign (Case Study Section 5.2) strategic failings (Section 5.7.1 - Claim 3) - both 
of which implemented an Economic Influence strategy - confirms that an Economic 
Influence strategy can be ineffective if misapplied. Furthermore, the fact that the E- 
USS campaign subsequently changed its strategy and successfully called for an 
Investor Advocacy Influence approach to SRI supports the Section 4.1.1 analysis of 
Hypothesis 1. 
Conversely, the WWF-UK BP ANWR case study (Section 5.1.2) and the Oxfam `Cut 
the Cost' case study (Section 5.5) both adopted Investor Advocacy Influence 
strategies and achieved success. This further reinforces the Section 4.1.1 analysis and 
undermines Ho. 
However, it is recognised that the WWF-UK Ethical Investment Policy Engagement 
case study (Section 5.1.1) used an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy and, in terms 
of bringing about change, was not effective. Nevertheless, as recognised in the 
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analysis of the case in question, the engagement involved limited resources and was 
conducted in the absence of a broader campaign. Therefore, as the execution of the 
Investor Advocacy Influence strategy in this case was restricted, its relative lack of 
success does not support Ho. 
In conclusion, Ho is rejected. More specifically, the likelihood of success is increased 
when an NGO adopts an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an 
Economic Influence strategy. 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Indirect Route of Influence (H1). 
Null hypothesis: the likelihood of success is not related to the Route of 
Influence (Ho) 
The analysis in Section 4.1.1 also consistently highlighted the higher success rate 
associated with an Indirect dolphin or orca Stance and concluded that Ho was rejected. 
This finding was also noted to have significant implications for NGO CM intervention 
and was correspondingly marked for further analysis in this section. 
The main case study analysis of a Direct intervention is that of WWF-UK's Ethical 
Investment Policy Engagement (Section 5.1.1). As previously mentioned, in terms of 
bringing about change, this intervention was not effective - which appears to confirm 
the limited nature of the Direct strategy119 . 
While individual NGO Direct influence appears to be highly limited, charitable NGOs 
(for example) have a considerable amount of assets under management: "In 2001, 
registered charities held £68bn in assets, of which some £47bn was invested, largely 
in equities and bonds" (Green, 2003, p3). They also have a substantial interest in 
promoting enhanced societal welfare outcomes through the CM. As highlighted in 
Case Study 5.1.1, it has been suggested that NGOs are collectively missing an 
opportunity in not pooling the influence underlying their resources: "NGOs have 
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billions and billions of pounds under investment and could individually and 
collectively influence the companies in which they invest far more than they do at the 
moment" (Jones, 2001: interview). 
More generally, the analysis of the following case studies identified the Indirect 
component as being a major contributory factor to the outcome of the intervention: 
" WWF-UK filing shareholder resolutions on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
at BP's AGMs (Section 5.1.2); 
" UKSIF advocacy of SRI within the reform of the 1995 Pensions Act (Section 
5.3); 
" Oxfam `Cut the Cost' Campaign (Section 5.5); and 
0 Forum for the Future and the London Principles (Section 5.6). 
This also supports the comparative strength of an Indirect over Direct strategy. In 
conclusion, therefore, on the basis of the available evidence, that Ho is rejected: the 
likelihood of success is increased when an individual NGO adopts an Indirect rather 
than a Direct strategy. 
5.8 Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter has taken a detailed look at eight case studies selected from the 
chronology in Appendix 2. Each case study has evaluated the degree to which the 
campaign objectives were achieved, the degree to which the achievement can be 
attributed to the CM intervention, and has conducted an analysis of the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which the outcomes were generated. 
In all cases, the analysis confirmed the classification of the relevant NGO CM 
intervention in the chronology (Appendix 2). The individual analysis was 
subsequently used to test the analysis of the main claims and hypotheses in relation to 
NGO CM intervention established in this thesis (Section 5.7). This analysis 
demonstrated that, in general, the claims could be substantiated and that the 
119 However, it does not suggest that a Direct strategy will always fail: additional resources and a 
strategic use of the media may well have changed the outcome. 
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hypotheses could be retained. This analysis will be used in Section 6 below to 
augment the normative implications for NGO CM intervention strategy 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
This thesis has established that the CM has influence over companies via two 
principal mechanisms: Economic Influence via a company's cost of capital, and 
Investor Advocacy Influence via the rights associated with share ownership. It has 
demonstrated that the CM is relevant to NGOs because of this influence, and that this 
influence is relevant in two related ways: as an instrumental mechanism for changing 
corporate practices, and as a target for systemic change in itself. 
It has been shown that some NGOs have exerted CM Economic Influence by 
influencing the key value drivers of a business. This has had cost of capital 
implications for the company in question, and in some cases has changed company 
practice. It has also been shown that there are instances where NGOs have shaped FI 
Investor Advocacy Influence by arguing that the existence of Investor Advocacy 
Influence places a moral responsibility on investors to challenge what they regard as 
immoral corporate behaviour. In some cases, this has also changed company practice. 
NGOs derive legitimacy for this CM intervention mainly from their welfare-oriented 
role in society. Furthermore, in the long term, NGO CM intervention as Civil 
Regulator of unethical corporate practices maintains trust in the market and therefore 
helps to maintain the market itself. Consequently, NGO CM intervention which aims 
to enhance welfare (and which operates within the boundaries of Company Law) is 
both legitimate and in the long-term collective interests of companies and their 
shareholders. 
In order to better understand the complex interface between NGOs, the CM and PLCs, 
a grounded theory approach to research and analysis was conducted. This combined 
desk-based research and exploratory interviews for data gathering and a mixed 
methodology quantitative and qualitative approach for data analysis. A model for 
NGO CM intervention that provided clarity on the area of NGO CM intervention was 
developed. This model enabled the classification of NGO CM interventions in the 
chronology and the development of hypotheses in relation to the relative probability 
of success of different CM intervention strategies. 
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The classified chronology enabled the quantitative evaluation of how NGO CM 
strategy evolved over this time and how success relates to strategy. The quantitative 
analysis demonstrated that NGO CM intervention has increased and involved a broad 
range of strategies. It also enabled an initial analysis of the hypotheses (see below). In 
addition, it showed that NGO CM intervention has been mainly short-term 
instrumental use of CM influence for corporate campaigning, and that, surprisingly, 
NGOs have tended not to target investment intermediaries or CM public policy- 
makers. It suggested that that an increase in the success of the interventions, coupled 
with evidence of a change towards strategies that are more likely to succeed, might 
indicate that NGOs have learned from errors in previous interventions. 
The qualitative empirical review of its effectiveness and efficiency was conducted by 
researching specific case studies of NGO CM influence. This enables a much more 
detailed analysis of the hypotheses in relation to NGO CM intervention. This analysis 
demonstrated that the hypotheses in relation to NGO CM intervention success could 
be retained. This in turn showed that the likelihood of success increased when the 
NGO adopted an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic 
Influence Mechanism; an Indirect Route of Influence; and a balance of both Moral 
and Business Case arguments. 
The section immediately below considers the implications of this research, first for 
NGOs and then for companies, investors and public policy-makers. The remainder of 
this concluding Chapter then considers both the main avenues of future research and 
what has been achieved with this research. 
6.1 Implications of the research 
Section 1 stated that the main aims of this research were the conclusions relating to 
the normative implications for NGO CM intervention strategy. The purpose of this 
part of the concluding section is to present these normative recommendations. 
As introduced at the outset of this thesis, the central argument was that while some 
NGOs have become effective at generating corporate change via the CM, effective 
NGO CM intervention is not yet widespread and, therefore, the combined efforts of 
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NGOs do not maximise positive welfare impacts. The recommendations presented in 
this concluding section are therefore one of the central contributions of this thesis. 
By way of structure, this section commences with a review of the NGO CM strategy 
recommendations arising from a combination of the analysis in Sections 4.2.1,4.2.2, 
5.7.1 and 5.7.2. It then considers what the implications are from this research for other 
CM actors. 
6.1.1 Implications for NGO CM intervention 
The following discussion reviews the normative implications for NGO strategy from 
the retained hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Investor Advocacy Influence strategy rather than an Economic Influence 
strategy. 
The relevant analysis in Section 5.7 concluded that on the basis of the available 
evidence, the above hypothesis (derived in section 3.5) was retained. Does this mean 
that an NGO should always adopt an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy over an 
Economic Influence strategy? 
Where an NGO is attempting to mobilise against a specific company that is listed on 
the CM, this conclusion indicates that the most efficient and effective way of doing so 
is to adopt an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy. However, as identified in 
Sections 1.6 and 3.2, if the CM is to promote long-term sustainability, the market 
itself must systematically integrate SEE issues into its investment analysis in such a 
way that corporate performance in this area becomes a capital constraint. Therefore, 
from the NGO perspective, there is a conundrum: in the short term, NGOs are more 
able to deploy an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy than an Economic one, but in 
the long term, there is a need for an Economic Influence strategy in order to ensure 
that the market supports rather than undermines sustainability. 
Consequently, where seeking specific corporate changes, NGOs should make 
instrumental use of the CM by deploying an Investor Advocacy Influence strategy. 
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But when seeking to integrate a SEE issue into the CM over the long term, an 
Economic Strategy should be deployed. 
However, Section 5.7.1 concluded that some NGOs have made strategic mistakes. 
The specific problem was NGO deployment of an Economic Influence strategy 
without considering the fiduciary responsibilities of investors. It concluded that NGOs 
tend to overlook legislation surrounding the parameters within which fund mangers 
are allowed to operate and, consequently, may make policy recommendations that are 
unlawful. In such circumstances, the fund manager is unable to respond without a 
business case rationale. Therefore, when engaging with fund managers, NGOs should 
make policy recommendations regarding the responsibilities of ownership (for which 
there is a considerable legal and normative basis - see Section 3.3), and deploy 
business case arguments for the integration of their issue into the stock selection 
process. This highlights the need for the business case Nature of Argument (see 
Hypothesis 4 below). 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts an 
Indirect route of influence. 
The analysis in Section 5.7.3 concluded that based on the available evidence, 
Hypothesis 2 was retained: the likelihood of success is increased when an NGO 
adopts an Indirect rather than a Direct Route of Influence. Does this result therefore 
suggest that an NGO should always adopt an Indirect strategy over a Direct strategy? 
The deductive analysis in Section 3.5 set out instances where an NGO may wish to 
deploy a CM intervention strategy involving a Direct Route of Influence. However, in 
general, where an NGO is seeking to use the CM to change corporate behaviour, this 
analysis demonstrates that an Indirect Route of Influence is the most efficient and 
effective way of doing so. Furthermore, the case studies demonstrate the importance 
of an analytical approach to selecting which FI to target. 
From an NGO perspective, therefore, if an NGO decides to use a Direct Route of 
Influence to change corporate behaviour effectively, the Section 5.7.2 analysis 
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suggests that it should consider adopting a broader campaign and using the media to 
compensate for the lack of its financial leverage. 
More broadly, Case Study 5.1.1 identified that the NGOs' internal consistency with 
their external programmatic work was an important motivator for Direct intervention. 
All NGOs in the case study sample had taken steps to ensure that their internal 
financial arrangements did not conflict with their programmatic campaign work. 
However, as highlighted in Section 1.6, outside the case study sample there is 
evidence that a significant number of NGOs have not established a SRI policy for 
their own financial arrangements. While establishing such a policy is particularly 
important for the NGOs in focus here - i. e. those actively deploying CM intervention 
strategies - it is also important to the internal consistency of other NGOs working on 
SEE issues in general to consider what the implications from their investment 
portfolios are for their programmatic work. 
One reason for the broader lack of NGO SRI policies that can be identified from this 
research is that very few instances of NGOs confronting other NGOs such as large 
charitable trusts have been identified. Such trusts often have significant assets, which 
would suggest that they were relevant to NGO CM intervention. However, they are 
also often significant funding sources for NGO campaign activities, which may be the 
reason for this lack of confrontation: perhaps NGOs are reluctant to `bite the hand that 
feeds them'. This lack of reputational risk or adverse publicity threat may mean that, 
ironically, the civil regulation incentives for NGOs to produce an SRI policy are 
absent. 
It has also been identified (Section 5.7.3) that UK NGOs collectively have 
considerable assets under management on the CM - equal to a few per cent of the 
issued share capital of listed UK companies. Therefore, in addition to those NGOs 
with investment reserves establishing an investment policy that considers the mission- 
related issues arising from their investments, they should also consider the costs and 
benefits associated with pooling the influence of their combined investment reserves. 
If cost-effective mechanisms can be established, the collective pool of NGO capital is 
potentially influential. 
293 
Hypothesis 3: Interventions that necessarily involve CM institutions as the 
primary audience have, in general, a higher likelihood of success than those 
that necessarily primarily focus on the public policy audience. 
The analysis in section 4.2.2 retained the above hypothesis (derived in section 3.5). 
However, it also demonstrated that the Public Policy and CM Institutions audiences 
should not be regarded as alternatives, as they are appropriate in different contexts. To 
elucidate this point: Section 1.6 showed that the influence of the CM is relevant to 
NGOs in two distinct but related ways: 
" as an instrumental mechanism for changing corporate strategy: NGOs can seek 
to harness this in different ways; and 
" as a target for systemic change in itself: because the influence of the CM can 
undermine long-term sustainable development goals. 
Two significant findings from this study have been the relative dearth of NGO CM 
Public Policy advocacy (Section 4.1.1), and that during the time period, only one 
NGO intervention (Intervention 51) specifically focused on the problems of short- 
termism. 
Section 1.6 reviewed the reasons for short-termism in the CM and highlighted the 
problems in relation to corporate performance on SEE issues in the absence of long- 
term incentives from the CM. It argued that SEE issues are inherently long-term, and 
that short-termism is therefore a significant issue for NGOs working on such issues. 
However, it has been shown that the majority of NGO CM intervention has been 
mainly short-term instrumental use of CM influence for corporate campaigning rather 
than an attempt to change the structure of the CM to influence companies over the 
longer term. More specifically, there has been a dearth of NGO CM public policy 
intervention. Even where an NGO has believed that the CM is systematically 
undermining the achievement of its long-term objectives, it tends not to have a 
detailed alternative public policy agenda that would reform or replace the functions of 
the CM (exceptions include the New Economics Foundation and Centre for 
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Tomorrow's Company). In view of the vociferous nature of some NGO criticism of 
`capitalism', this is an interesting omission and indicates that NGOs have a lack of 
long-term solutions. 
Nevertheless, the UKSIF case study (5.3) demonstrates that NGOs can change CM 
public policy. Consequently, while it is harder for an NGO to generate change through 
the public policy audience, it appears to be important from their perspective that they 
should attempt to do so. Therefore, NGOs should analyse the public policy structure 
of the CM and develop long-term measures to reduce and remove short-termism in the 
CM. 
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of success is increased when an NGO adopts a 
balance of both Moral and Business Case arguments rather than primarily 
focusing on one or the other. 
Similarly, the analysis in section 4.2.2 concluded that based on the available evidence, 
the above hypothesis from section 3.5 was retained. Does this imply that a balance of 
both Moral and Business Case arguments should always be used rather than primarily 
focusing on one or the other? Once again, in order properly to answer this question, 
further analysis is required. 
The USS case study (5.2) above highlighted the benefits of assessing the relative 
motivations of the audience and managing the campaign messages accordingly. In 
particular, it showed that arguing the financial case alone does not motivate NGO 
members, or the broader public, to taking action. Conversely, as highlighted in the 
analysis of the normative implications from Hypothesis 1 above, in almost all cases, 
advocating that institutional investors divest from a particular stock for purely moral 
reasons would fail. 
On the other hand, some might argue that successful CM intervention requires NGOs 
to go beyond a balance of arguments, and focus instead on developing `shareholder 
value' or `business case' arguments in their interventions. But if a shareholder value 
strategy were exclusively adopted by NGOs then, in the absence of NGO moral 
295 
arguments to the contrary, the force of moral compulsion would be absent. In some 
cases it is this moral compulsion that causes the business case for change via. a 
companies reputation and brand (see Section 3.2.1). There is a paradox here: for 
issues that depend on reputation risk for a business case, to the extent that the NGO 
diverts resources from arguing the moral case to arguing the business case, the NGO 
undermines the business case by arguing for it. However, the NGO often requires a 
business case to create change via the CM. 
Therefore, a purely shareholder value strategy potentially creates long-term problems 
for NGO CM intervention. Consequently, carefully constructed moral as well as 
financial arguments are both important components of successful NGO CM 
intervention - so, from the NGO perspective, a balance of both Moral and Business 
Case arguments should normally be used. 
Furthermore, case study 5.5 highlighted the importance to NGO CM interventions of 
advocating a solution that is not fundamentally antithetical to the target company's 
long-term business positions. Where shareholder support is required for the NGO's 
chosen strategy to be effective, the NGO is unlikely to achieve this support by 
advocating anti-business solutions. In certain circumstances, from an NGO 
perspective, this could represent a significant conceptual limitation of NGO CM 
intervention. However, in practice, this may not be such a significant limitation to 
NGOs because a long-term business case argument can be made in favour of many 
SEE corporate performance issues via the mechanism of reputation risk (the limitation 
applies predominantly to CM interventions of the type conducted by the 
`revolutionary' NGOs referred to in Section 1.4). 
In addition to the analysis of the above findings, NGOs in general were found to have 
an under-developed understanding of the machinery of the CM. In particular, Section 
4.1.1 assessed the evidence in support of these claims and concluded that NGOs are 
unfamiliar with the legislation governing the CM. It also found that the system of 
advice at the level of investment analysis, and the institutional investor's process for 
selecting a fund manager, were not well understood (Section 1.5 demonstrates the 
importance of these institutions). Despite evidence of an improvement in NGO 
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understanding of the CM, Section 5.7.1 concluded that there was a generally poor 
level of understanding of the structure of the CM among NGOs overall. To maximise 
the effectiveness of their CM interventions, NGOs should better understand the 
functioning of the CM. 
One significant impediment to a greater NGO understanding of the CM is the 
consistent finding from the case studies that few NGOs publish strategic reviews on 
their CM intervention performance success. Where such reviews were conducted, 
they tended to be for funding bodies and not a `warts and all' analysis. Furthermore, 
even where significant successes were publicly claimed, there were few efforts to 
provide specific evidence of performance improvements and causality120. As Forum 
for the Future (2003a, p22) states (albeit in the context of NGO-business 
partnerships): "This is the worst kind of reporting and ironically it is precisely the sort 
of information which NGOs deride as whitewash or greenwash when it emerges from 
corporations. " 
Nevertheless, when compared with the volume of interventions that took place during 
the period in question, the above reviews represent a minimal level of information 
sharing and learning. Unless this is corrected, NGO neglect of learning reviews in this 
area will act as an impediment to the more rapid development of understanding in 
NGO CM intervention and - more important - the achievement of more pervasive 
improvements in welfare. Therefore, NGOs should routinely publish evaluations of 
the successes - and failures - of their CM interventions. 
6.1.2 Broader Implications of the Research 
Section 1 highlighted the fact that the paucity of independent and verified data 
researching the impact, effectiveness and legitimacy of NGO CM intervention was a 
problem because companies, investors and public policy-makers had no research with 
which to inform their decisions in this area. This thesis goes some way towards 
correcting this situation. The following analysis therefore considers the initial 
implications of this research for these non-NGO CM participants. 
120 One notable exception to this criticism is the Oxfam GSK intervention (see Case Study 5.5) which 
conducted a review that aimed "to provide an introduction to SRI for anyone who wishes to enter the 
debates and/or develop policies or campaigns that incorporate SRI' (Buckley, 2002). 
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1. Companies: 
NGOs are becoming demonstrably more adept at confronting companies via the CM. 
While their general understanding of the CM is not good, it is sufficient to have had 
considerable impact on some investors and companies. Due to the cost of capital 
ramifications of investors' decisions and their ownership influence, they are an 
extremely important audience for companies. Consequently it is in a company's best 
interests to ensure that investors look favourably upon its prospects and its 
management. Therefore, some listed companies exposed to NGO campaigning should 
familiarise themselves with NGOs, their campaigns, and the issues at hand. 
One way in which the company can familiarise itself with NGO issues is to consult its 
key NGO stakeholders in order to ascertain the issues of significance to them. Being 
aware of which issues are important to NGOs - and could therefore result in CM 
interventions - enables companies to prepare a defence of a controversial position at 
the AGM or in public, and/or proactively change corporate practice. This suggests 
that the relevance of stakeholder consultation processes such as AA 1000 
(Intervention 28) will become increasingly relevant to business practices. 
More generally, companies will be better able to defend themselves if they can 
demonstrate that they have considered the issue and developed an understanding of 
how it relates to their business. This suggests that policies in relation to the most 
significant SEE issues should be published. Furthermore, where relevant, 
management systems certified to the appropriate standard can be implemented to 
provide a level of external assurance to NGOs and investors that SEE issues are 
understood and being managed within the business. Finally, listed companies are 
increasingly publishing corporate social responsibility reports and/or including 
information on their SEE issues in their Annual Reports and Accounts. Preparing and 
publishing such information enables listed companies to demonstrate to investors that 
they are managing the risks arising to the business from NGO activism. 
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2. Financial Institutions: 
It has been shown that NGOs are increasingly targeting FIs and their clients during 
Indirect CM interventions. NGOs challenging investors around the responsibilities of 
share ownership presents a particular problem to inactive investors (see Section 3.3). 
Similarly, the Ethics for USS case study (Section 5.1) demonstrates that FIs can be 
confronted by NGOs effectively. Furthermore, as identified in Section 3.2.1, NGO 
CM intervention has occasionally had considerable impact on a company's share 
price. Similar to the implications for companies, investors may therefore wish to 
prepare for the possible impact of NGO CM intervention. In the case of FIs, this may 
involve the explicit integration of responsibility for SEE issues into any existing 
corporate governance function, so as to contend with challenges of irresponsible 
ownership. Furthermore, in order to minimise exposure to the financial impact of 
NGO campaigning, establishing mechanisms to consider material SEE issues in the 
investment analysis process may also be relevant. 
As with the above implications for companies, a proactive mechanism for consulting 
NGOs and preparing for debate on SEE issues could be beneficial. This would 
involve establishing policies in respect of the investment ramifications arising from 
SEE issues and responsible ownership, and disclosing relevant information in respect 
of how these policy statements are being applied. Such disclosure may also act to 
reduce the threat of government regulation (see Section 3.4). 
3. Public policy-makers: 
Many public policy issues are relevant to the CM and vice versa. However, in relation 
to the specific public policy issues arising from NGO CM intervention, it has been 
demonstrated that when NGOs act as Civil Capital Market Regulators, they are 
effective and can enhance welfare. This intervention is in the long-term collective 
interests of companies, shareholders, the capital market and, therefore, the economy. 
However, where the NGO does not have welfare enhancing aims, such intervention, 
while illegitimate, can still be effective. While it appears that the majority of UK CM 
intervention so far has been welfare-enhancing, illegitimate NGO CM intervention is 
against the interests of companies, shareholders and the capital market. The 
Huntingdon Life Sciences case (Section 1.8) is particular cause for concern. 
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NGOs with welfare-oriented objectives should be encouraged to play a full CM 
intervention role. Conversely, NGOs with more nefarious objectives should be 
prevented from doing so - although in practice, how the government does this 
is 
predominantly a matter for the policy-makers. Nevertheless, Case Study 5.2 
demonstrates that increases in FI transparency and greater public access to 
information on SEE policies lead to greater scope for Civil Capital Market 
Regulation. Lessons in relation to restricting access of some NGOs to the CM may be 
learned from the US experience with the Securities Exchange Commission, which 
plays the role of ombudsman in relation to NGO/company shareholder resolutions. It 
is possible that using a combination of reforms to Company Law, and extending the 
scope of both the Financial Services Authority and the Charity Commission, could 
encourage more active Civil Capital Market Regulation and discourage illegitimate 
NGO CM intervention. 
6.2 Future Research 
There are further avenues of research that can be identified. Section 2.2.3 showed that 
where an NGO CM intervention has targeted a specific company, one potentially 
interesting measure of the impact of NGO CM intervention was the degree to which 
that intervention influenced the company's share price. Section 2 established why a 
quantitative event analysis of the impact of NGO CM intervention would not be 
conducted in this thesis, but identified such analysis as an interesting avenue of future 
research. In particular, while the Greenpeace/Shell/Brent Spar intervention 
(Intervention 18) has been assessed by Knight and Pretty (2001, pp 24-25 - see 
Section 3.2.1 above), the successful interventions by the Bakun Dam campaign vs. 
ABB (Intervention 17), WWF and Greenpeace vs. BP (Interventions 32 and 33), 
Friends of the Earth vs. Norwich Union (Intervention 36), Friends of the Earth vs. 
Balfour Beatty (Intervention 44) and Oxfam vs. GSK (Intervention 63) could provide 
interesting cases for financial analysis. 
Separately, this thesis focused on local, national and international NGOs operating in 
the UK and their interaction with UK-listed companies (Section 2 sets out the 
rationale for this UK focus). However, it also recognised that the situation in other 
countries is different. For example, US NGOs in particular have made more extensive 
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use -of the CM in their campaigning and have made greater use of adversarial 
shareholder resolutions than UK NGOs. Different countries have different models of 
corporate law, different Corporate Governance norms and different legislation 
underpinning their capital markets. Therefore, analysis of NGO CM intervention 
conducted in other geographical regions may produce alternative models and different 
normative recommendations for NGO CM intervention. Consequently, NGO CM 
intervention in other parts of the world - particularly where the CM is structured 
significantly differently - is another potential avenue for future research. 
This thesis also focused on the NGO intervention with the CM that takes place via 
equities. There is increasing NGO use of the banking sector's project finance function 
and governments' international Export Credit Guarantee institutions. As highlighted 
here, such financial markets are quite different from the market for equities. 
Therefore, further research could be conducted into modelling this intervention and 
ascertaining its effectiveness and efficiency in these areas. 
Furthermore, it is noted in Section 2 that the success evaluation in the chronology is 
based on a prima facie analysis and that the chronology itself may be incomplete. If 
further information comes to light on either the relative success of specific 
interventions, or that specific interventions have been omitted, then as the chronology 
is presented here as a document to be built upon, extending and updating it may offer 
potential for future research. 
While evidence of the welfare-enhancing aspects of CM intervention has been 
identified here, further research into this area could be conducted as NGO CM 
intervention matures. In particular, the scope of this research focused on NGOs that 
promote welfare enhancing environmental and/or societal goals, specifically 
excluding those NGOs that are antithetical to social welfare. Beyond the controversial 
campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences, there are few such UK examples of 
subversive use of the CM. However, a global analysis of the strategies, tactics, 
legitimacy and welfare impact of such NGO CM intervention is an important area for 
future research. 
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Section 4.1.1 demonstrated a significant growth in NGO CM intervention since 1996. 
It is not yet clear whether this trend will plateau before the strategy becomes standard 
practice for NGO corporate campaigning. However, it is clear that a sub-set of NGOs 
is increasingly active in this area and that once an NGO has attempted such a strategy, 
only rarely does it stop. In view of this ratchet effect, and the fact that NGO CM 
intervention can be a highly effective form of corporate engagement, such 
intervention is expected to increase further. As this happens, further avenues for 
research are likely to open. For example, it is noticeable that NGO CM intervention in 
the UK has not used the law courts. If such intervention were to take this course, it 
may have implications for the currency of the model. Similarly, the small amount of 
NGO public policy intervention conducted to date has been mostly tactical and 
opportunistic, and has reduced the sample pool from which to discern 
recommendations for public policy intervention. If such interventions increase, then 
further case study analysis could be conducted into the specific normative 
recommendations for such intervention. 
More generally, research into other actors in the Civil Capital Market Regulation 
arena could be of use. Is it possible to apply a game theory pay-off matrix to the 
relationship between companies and NGOs in order to discern what the best response 
of each actor is? Have companies become more responsive to NGO CM intervention 
and, if so, why? How could FIs optimise their relationships with NGOs in order to 
maximise the financial benefit to them from this engagement? What is the optimum 
level of shareholder activism and Civil Capital Market Regulation that the 
government should promote? 
While this thesis has resolved a number of important questions in relation to the 
practice of `Civil Capital Market Regulation', further research is required to ensure 
that NGO CM intervention is optimally effective in order that society derives the 
maximum welfare benefit associated with such intervention. 
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6.3 The Contribution of This Thesis 
There are two main categories of contribution arising from this thesis: theoretical and 
practical. 
In terms of the theoretical contribution, this thesis identified NGO campaign use of 
the CM as a new area requiring theoretical research. The paucity of independent and 
verified analysis of NGO CM intervention highlighted at the outset was redressed 
through a grounded theory methodology in order to systematically analyse the data 
and generate theory. The central contribution of this thesis is that it has generated a 
theoretical model for NGO CM intervention that has been shown to provide a useful 
conceptual structure to an otherwise complex area. It has also developed a theoretical 
analysis framework for the outcome attribution and measurement of NGO CM 
interventions (Sections 2 and 3). 
The NGO CM intervention model defined new theoretical dimensions that influence 
agent behaviour, including the Economic Influence and Investor Advocacy Influence 
mechanisms of influence; and the Indirect and Direct routes of influence. The model 
was successfully applied to categorise the data within the chronology of NGO CM 
intervention. The model also facilitated the development of hypotheses based on 
plausible relationships between the sets of concepts underlying the model. These 
hypotheses were tested through the systematic analysis of the chronology and case 
study data. 
Regarding the practical contribution, this thesis has critically reviewed NGO CM 
intervention in order to establish where and why such intervention has been effective. 
It has shown that while some NGOs have become effective at generating corporate 
change via the CM, effective NGO CM intervention is not widespread and, therefore, 
the combined efforts of NGOs in this area do not currently maximise the potential 
positive welfare impacts of NGO CM intervention. 
More specifically, this thesis has established why the CM is important to NGOs, how 
it influences corporate practices, and where this influence originates. It has established 
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that NGO CM intervention with welfare-enhancing objectives is legitimate and in the 
long-term collective interests of listed companies and their shareholders. It has also 
highlighted what relevance, if any, the various SRI strategies have to NGOs working 
on SEE issues (Section 1). 
In addition, it has provided the first chronology of UK NGO CM intervention and a 
detailed historical record on eight NGO CM interventions. The thesis has also 
established the extent to which CM intervention has increased in the UK, analysed the 
evolution of the different strategies adopted and assessed the underlying trends. 
Furthermore, it has demonstrated that it is possible for NGOs to generate welfare- 
enhancing outcomes through CM intervention and that, from the perspective of the 
NGO, there are cases where welfare-enhancing outcomes have been achieved 
effectively and efficiently (Sections 4 and 5). 
Further, while capitalism and the capital markets have been heavily criticised by many 
NGOs, this thesis has shown that the CM is, in general, not well understood by them. 
Specifically, this thesis has demonstrated that many NGOs have an under-developed 
understanding of the structure of the CM and some have a tendency to make strategic 
mistakes by advocating unlawful fund management policies. In addition, it has shown 
that NGO CM intervention has been mainly short-term instrumental use of CM 
influence for corporate campaigning rather than an attempt to change the structure of 
the CM to influence companies over the longer term and has argued that, from the 
NGO perspective, this is a mistake. 
The main intended outcome of normative recommendations for NGO CM 
intervention reviewed above has also been achieved (Section 6.1). The retained NGO 
CM intervention strategy hypotheses demonstrate that, when attempting to change 
corporate practices via the CM, the NGO's probability of success is increased by: the 
development of Investor Advocacy Influence objectives; the targeting of FIs; and a 
balance of moral and financial arguments (see above). The thesis has also shown why, 
in almost all cases, advocating institutional investors' divestment from a particular 
stock for purely moral reasons will fail. Furthermore, it has made proposals for 
correcting NGO strategic blind spots, in particular a better understanding of the role 
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of Investment Brokers and Investment Consultants and more substantive public policy 
interventions. 
Fundamentally, these findings matter because, as demonstrated, corporate practices 
can have significant positive and negative impacts on society and the environment 
(Section 1.3) and the CM can help improve the net corporate impact on society and 
the environment (Section 1.6). Given that NGO resources are limited, CM 
intervention strategies must be carefully thought through in order to maximise 
welfare-related benefits through least cost. Consequently, to the extent that this thesis 
enhances the understanding of whether, how and why NGO CM intervention is 
effective, the research may contribute towards welfare benefits. 
Finally, it has been shown that NGOs have significantly increased the number and 
scope of their NGO CM interventions and have, in certain circumstances, successfully 
changed corporate practices using such a strategy. While Newsweek International may 
have overstated its case when it christened the emergence of this practice a `cultural 
revolution' (see Section 1.1), it is clear that the practice of NGO CM intervention 
does have far-reaching implications for NGOs, investors and companies alike. 
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Appendix 1: Interviewees 
NGOs 
Greenpeace/BP SANE Stephanie Tunmore, Senior Climate Campaigner 
WWF-UK Leslie Jones, Deputy Chief Executive and Director of 
Finance. 
Traidcraft Exchange Duncan Green, Senior Policy Advisor (part time) 
CAFOD. Project manager (part time) Traidcraft 
Exchange/War on Want "Just Pensions". 
Friends of the Earth Duncan McLaren, Acting Director of Campaigns. 
War on Want Rob Cartridge, Campaigns Director. 
Amnesty International Peter Frankental, Director of the Amnesty International 
Business Group. 
Forum for the Future Brian Pearce, Director of the Centre for Sustainable 
Investment. 
Ethics for USS Meredith Alexander, Senior Campaigner, People and 
Planet/Ethics for USS. 
Opinion Formers 
John Elkington Chairman, SustainAbility. 
Niaz Allam Legal Advisor, Ethical Investment Research Service 
(EIRIS). 
Dr Raj Thamotheram Senior Advisor, SRI, University Superannuation 
Scheme. 
Jo Johnston SRI Analyst, Morley Asset Management. 
Stuart Bell Director of Research, PIRC. 
Mark Mansley Executive Director, Claros Consulting. 
Rt Hon John Gummer MP Director, SRI, Storebrand Skudder. 
Mark Campanale Associate Director, Henderson Global Investors. 
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Appendix 3: Statistical Analysis of the NGO CM Chronology 
Table 4.4: "Success? * Mechanism" 
Crosstab 
Mechanism 
Investor Economic Both Total 
Success? N Count 2 2 4 
% within Success? 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 4.3% 11.1% 5.1% 
N? Count 7 4 1 12 
% within Success? 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 14.9% 22.2% 7.7% 15.4% 
? Count 11 5 3 19 
% within Success? 57.9% 26.3% 15.8% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 23.4% 27.8% 23.1% 24.4% 
Y? Count 11 4 5 20 
% within Success? 55.0% 20.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 23.4% 22.2% 38.5% 25.6% 
Y Count 16 3 4 23 
% within Success? 69.6% 13.0% 17.4% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 34.0% 16.7% 30.8% 29.5% 
Total Count 47 18 13 78 
% within Success? 60.3% 23.1% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 4.5: Success? * Route of Influence 
Crosstab 
Route o f Influence 
Indirect Indirect 
Direct (dolphin) Indirect orca (shark) Total 
Success? N Count 1 1 2 4 
% within Success? 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Route of 
Influence 7.7% 2.9% 6.9% 5.1% 
N? Count 2 5 5 12 
% within Success? 16.7% 41.7% 41.7% 100.0% 
% within Route of 
Influence 15.4% 14.7% 17.2% 15.4% 
? Count 6 9 4 19 
within Success? 31.6% 47.4% 21.1% 100.0% 
within Route of 
Influence 46.2% 26.5% 13.8% ° 24.4% 
Y? Count 2 7 10 1 20 
% within Success? 10.0% 35.0% 50.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
% within Route of 
Influence 15.4% 20.6% 34.5% 50.0% 25.6% 
Y Count 2 12 8 1 23 
% within Success? 8.7% 52.2% 34.8% 4.3% 100.0% 
% within Route of 
Influence 15.4% 35.3% 27.6% 50.0% 29.5% 
Total Count 13 34 29 2 78 
within Success? 16.7% 43.6% 37.2% 2.6% 100.0% 
within Route of 
Influence 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 4.6: Success? * Primary Audience 
Crosstab 
Primary Audience 
CM 
Institutions Public Policy Both Total 
Success? N Count 2 2 4 
% within Success? 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 3.0% 22.2% 5.1% Audience 
N? Count 11 1 12 
% within Success? 91.7% 8.3% 100.0% 
% within Primary 16.4% 11.1% 15.4% 
Audience 
? Count 14 5 19 
% within Success? 73.7% 26.3% 100.0% 
% within Primary 20.9% 55.6% 24.4% 
Audience 
Y? Count 19 1 20 
% within Success? 95.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 28.4% 50.0% 25.6% Audience 
Y Count 21 1 1 23 
% within Success? 91.3% 4.3% 4.3% 100.0% 
% within Primary 31.3% 11.1% 50.0% 29.5% Audience 
Total Count 67 9 2 78 
% within Success? 85.9% 11.5% 2.6% 100.0% 
% within Primary 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Audience 
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Table 4.7: Success? * Nature of Argument 
Crosstab 
Nature of Argument 
Business Moral Both Total 
Success? N Count 1 2 1 4 
% within Success? 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature of 
Argument 3.4% 11.8% 3.1% 5.1% 
N? Count 7 4 1 12 
within Success? 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 100.0% 
°/a within Nature of 
Argument 24.1% 23.5% 3.1% 15.4% 
? Count 9 5 5 19 
% within Success? 47.4% 26.3% 26.3% 100.0% 
% within Nature of 
Argument 31.0% 29.4% 15.6% 24.4% 
Y? Count 7 4 9 20 
% within Success? 35.0% 20.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature of 
Argument 24.1% 23.5% 28.1% 25.6% 
Y Count 5 2 16 23 
% within Success? 21.7% 8.7% 69.6% 100.0% 
% within Nature of 
Argument 17.2% 11.8% 50.0% 29.5% 
Total Count 29 17 32 78 
% within Success? 37.2% 21.8% 41.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature of 
Argument 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 4.8: YEAR * Mechanism 
Crosstab 
Mechanism 
Investor Economic Both Total 
YEAR 1990 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 2.1% 1.3% 
1991 Count 4 1 5 
% within YEAR 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 8.5% 5.6% 6.4% 
1992 Count 4 4 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 8.5% 5.1% 
1993 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 5.6% 1.3% 
1994 Count 5 5 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 27.8% 6.4% 
1995 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 2.1% 1.3% 
1997 Count 1 1 1 3 
% within YEAR 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 2.1% 5.6% 7.7% 3.8% 
1998 Count 1 3 1 5 
% within YEAR 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 2.1% 16.7% 7.7% 6.4% 
1999 Count 5 3 8 
% within YEAR 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 10.6% 23.1% 10.3% 
2000 Count 8 3 11 
% within YEAR 72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 17.0% 23.1% 14.1% 
2001 Count 8 6 2 16 
% within YEAR 50.0% 37.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 17.0% 33.3% 15.4% 20.5% 
2002 Count 14 1 3 18 
% within YEAR 77.8% 5.6% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 29.8% 5.6% 23.1% 23.1% 
Total Count 47 18 13 78 
% within YEAR 60.3% 23.1% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within Mechanism 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 4.9: ` YEAR * Route of Influence 
Crosstab 
Route of Influence 
Indirect Indirect 
Direct dol hin Indirect orca (shark) Total 
YEAR 1990 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Route 7.7% 1.3% 
of Influence 
1991 Count 2 2 1 5 
% within YEAR 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Route 15.4% 6.9% 50.0% 6.4% 
of Influence 
1992 Count 1 3 4 
within YEAR 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
within Route 7.7% 8.8% 5.1% 
of Influence 
1993 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Route 3.4% 1.3% 
of Influence 
1994 Count 1 4 5 
% within YEAR 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
% within Route 2.9% 13.8% ° 6.4% 
of Influence 
1995 Count 1 1 
within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
within Route 2.9% ° 1.3 /° 
of Influence 
1997 Count 1 2 3 
% within YEAR 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within Route 7.7% 6.9% 3.8% 
of Influence 
1998 Count 1 3 1 5 
within YEAR 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
within Route 7.7/° 7.7% 8.8% ° 3.4% 6.4% 
of Influence 
1999 Count 4 4 8 
% within YEAR 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Route 11.8% 13.8% ° 10.3% 
of Influence 
2000 Count 3 4 3 1 11 
within YEAR 27.3% 36.4% 27.3% 9.1% 100.0% 
within Route 
of Influence 
23.1% 11.8% 10.3% 50.0% 14.1% 
2001 Count 9 7 16 
% within YEAR 56.3% 43.8% 100.0% 
% within Route 26 5% 24.1% 20.5% 
of Influence . 
2002 Count 4 9 5 18 
within YEAR 22.2% 50.0% 27.8% 100.0% 
within Route 30 8% ° 26.5% ° 17.2% 23.1% 
of Influence . 
Total Count 13 34 29 2 78 
% within YEAR 16.7% 43.6% 37.2% 2.6% 100.0% 
% within Route 100 0% ° 100 0% 100 0% 100 0% 100.0% 
of Influence . . . . 
342 
Table 4.10: YEAR * Primary Audience 
Crosstab - 
Prima Audience 
CM 
Institutions Public Policy Both Total 
YEAR 1990 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 1.5% 1.3% 
1991 Count 5 5 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 7.5% 6.4% 
1992 Count 4 4 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 6.0% 5.1% 
1993 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 1.5% 1.3% 
1994 Count 5 5 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 7.5% 6.4% 
1995 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
%within Primary 
Audience 1.5% 1.3% 
1997 Count 3 3 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 4.5% 3.8% 
1998 Count 4 1 5 
% within YEAR 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 6.0% 11.1% 6.4% 
1999 Count 7 1 8 
%within YEAR 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 10.4% ° 11.1 /° ° 10.3 /° 
2000 Count 8 2 1 11 
%within YEAR 72.7% 18.2% 9.1% 100.0% 
% within Primary 
Audience 11.9% 22.2% 50.0% 14.1% 
2001 Count 15 1 16 
% within YEAR 93.8% 6.3% 100.0% 
% within Primary 4% 22 11.1% 20.5% Audience . 
2002 Count 13 4 1 18 
% within YEAR 72.2% 22.2% 5.6% 100.0% 
% within Primary 4% 19 44.4% 50.0% 23.1% Audience . 
Total Count 67 9 2 78 
% within YEAR 85.9% 11.5% 2.6% 100.0% 
% within Primary 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Audience . 
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Table 4.11: YEAR * Nature of Argument 
Crosstab 
Nature of Ar ument 
Business Moral Both Total 
YEAR 1990 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 5 9% 1.3% 
of Argument 
1991 Count 4 1 5 
% within YEAR 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 23.5% 3.1% 6.4% 
of Argument 
1992 Count 3 1 4 
% within YEAR 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 17.6% 3.1% 5.1% 
of Argument 
1993 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 3.1% 1.3% 
of Argument 
1994 Count 4 1 5 
% within YEAR 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 13 8% 3.1% 6.4% 
of Argument . 
1995 Count 1 1 
% within YEAR 100.0% 100.0% 
within Nature 3.1% 1.3% 
of Argument 
1997 Count 1 2 3 
% within YEAR 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within Nature 5"9% 6.3% 3.8% 
of Argument 
1998 Count 2 1 2 5 
% within YEAR 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 6 9% 5.9% 6.3% 6.4% of Argument . 
1999 Count 3 1 4 8 
% within YEAR 37.5% 12.5% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 10 3% 5.9% 12.5% 10.3% of Argument . 
2000 Count 3 8 11 
% within YEAR 27.3% 72.7% 100.0% 
% within Nature 10 3% 25.0% 14.1% 
of Argument . 
2001 Count 9 3 4 16 
within YEAR 56.3% 18.8% 25.0% 100.0% 
within Nature 31 0% 17 6% 12.5% 20.5% 
of Argument . . 
2002 Count 8 3 7 18 
within YEAR 44.4% 16.7% 38.9% 100.0% 
within Nature 27 6% 17.6% 21.9% 23.1% 
of Argument . 
Total Count 29 17 32 78 
% within YEAR 37.2% 21.8% 41.0% 100.0% 
% within Nature 100 0% 100.0% 100 0% 100.0% 
of Argument . . 
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